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Ecclesiastical Censorship of Books in the Twelfth Century

G. B. FLAHIFF, C.S.B.

THE writings of Ralph Niger in the last quarter of the twelfth century manifest an unusual preoccupation on the part of their author to obtain ecclesiastical approval for his books.[1] This preoccupation led him to take elaborate steps, even in quarters as lofty as the college of cardinals, in the hope of winning for his works the favour of the highest possible authority in the Church, namely, of the pope. The nervous excitement displayed by Niger prompts us to enquire whether his case was an isolated one, whether his attitude was exceptional among writers of the late twelfth century. To what extent was ecclesiastical approbation required? Not before the end of the fifteenth century do we find anything that can be termed a censorship policy or any attempt at a censorship system,—even the Mediaeval Inquisition seems to have provided no machinery for a systematic enquiry into books,—nevertheless, there is evidence of censorship of a kind being exercised much earlier than this period.[2] Indeed, instances can be cited of the condemnation of writers and the prohibition or even destruction of their books from the very early days of the Church. It is the purpose of the present article to give some account of censorship in the twelfth century, particularly in its latter half, and to set the case of Ralph Niger in its historical context.

Censorship of books, in its broadest sense, is a supervision over books exercised by a lawful authority to protect its subjects against the ravages of pernicious writings. Censorship is either ecclesiastical or civil, according as it is practised by the spiritual or the secular authority. In this article, the censorship dealt with is ecclesiastical and of the Catholic Church only. It may be exercised in two ways: before the publishing of a work by examining it (*censura praevia*), or after its publication by repressing or prohibiting it (*censura subsequens* or *repressiva*). The present Code of Canon Law reserves the term 'censorship' for the former only, calling it always *censura praevia*, and refers to the latter simply as *librorum prohibitio*.[3] General usage likewise applies the word more commonly to the previous examination only of works. The multiplication of books, especially of copies of a same book, resulting from the invention of printing has led to emphasis being placed on the *censura praevia*. There existed in the Middle Ages, as compared with our times, but few books; moreover, as they were multiplied by handwriting only, the number of copies to be met with was very small; finally, a limited number of persons could make use of them. All these reasons made preventive censorship less necessary. For the most part, it sufficed, if a dangerous book appeared and became known, to condemn it, forbid any copies to be made, and order its destruction. We may with some degree of truth classify censorship before the invention of printing as predominantly repressive and after, as predominantly preventive. Nevertheless, the case of Ralph Niger is one in point of a preventive censorship, even though the initiative in the matter was taken by himself and not by ecclesiastical authorities. Abelard's story of the condemnation at Sens in 1121 of his treatise on the Trinity refers likewise to a preventive censorship and carries even the suggestion that it could be officially required, since the grounds alleged for the condemnation are that the book from which he lectured had never been approved by the Roman Pontiff or the Church.[4] A previous examination of books was therefore not unknown in this period of the Middle Ages. In fact, there is reason to believe that the desire for approbation beforehand, resulting sometimes in an examination of the book in question, took a considerable *essor* in the twelfth century. It is this point particularly that we hope to establish. But we must begin by presenting first what is known of repressive censorship at that time. The two types of censorship are by no means unrelated, as we shall see.

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[1] Cf. G. B. Flahiff, 'Ralph Niger: an Introduction to his Life and Works,' *Mediaeval Studies*, II (1940), 111-112 and n. 43.

[2] Most modern works dealing with the history of ecclesiastical censorship devote no more than an introductory section to the period prior to the introduction of printing in the fifteenth century and the inception of a regularized censorship. Good representative works on the whole subject are: F. H. Reusch, *Der Index der Verbotenen Bücher*, 3 vols. (Bonn, 1883-1885); A. Arndt, *De Libris Prohibitis Commentarii* (Ratisbon, 1895); J. Hilgers, *Der Index der Verbotenen Bücher* (Freiburg, 1904); G. H. Putnam, *The Censorship of the Church of Rome* (New York, 1905).

[3] *Codex Juris Canonici*, tit. XXXIII: De Praevia Censura Librorum Eorumque Prohibitio (can. 1384 ff.).

I.

Literary censorship for the suppression of dangerous books was known to both Jewish and Roman authorities before the Christian era. The right of the Christian Church to do likewise flows from her claim to be custodian of the faith and guardian of morals. It is in virtue of her mission to assure the salvation of souls by teaching them revealed truth and forming them to the Christian virtues that it becomes her duty to guard her children against anything that might lead them into error or vice. Hence the measures taken from the very first to prevent the spread and reading of books and writings detrimental to the faithful. The burning of their superstitious books by St. Paul's newly converted Christians at Ephesus seems to have been undertaken by them of their own accord. Clear-cut instances of prohibition are lacking before the fourth century. But hardly had peace come to the Church when the Council of Nicaea (325) added to a personal condemnation of Arius that of his book entitled *Thalia*; the writings of Arius and his friends were to be delivered up to be burned. In the following centuries popes and councils, bishops and synods condemned not only false doctrines but likewise the books which contained them. Pope Innocent I drew up a list of certain apocryphal writings to be condemned, while Gelasius I added heretical and otherwise objectionable ones. Prohibitions of books with the accompanying order that they be burned continued in the early Middle Ages. We have not to deal with them here. Let it suffice, before coming to the twelfth century, to note the persistence of the usage and to recall such well known instances as those of Gottschalk in 849 and Berengar of Tours in 1050 and 1059.[5]

The case of Abelard, the first one in the twelfth century and the most resounding one throughout its length, is especially significant for it occupies historically a key-position in regard to the attitude adopted towards heretical teaching. Ever since Berengar, and yet more since Roscelin, condemned at the Council of Soissons in 1092, there had existed a profoundly troubled state of mind marked by serious doubts and much hesitation in the realm of theology.[6] Still, nothing like an anti-heretical movement was to be found, no stalking of errors. There was room for enquiry and discussion. Indeed, with Abelard himself, it is the person of the man that aroused opposition to him in the first place, not his doctrine: his intolerable vanity, his love of publicity and his unique position as a teacher could not but attract attention and excite both envy and enmity.[7] Once his doctrine, however, and the novelty of his method in applying dialectics to theology were challenged by his adversaries, a 'party of tradition' began to take shape and gradually to crystallize over the period of twenty years whose terms are marked by his two condemnations, at Soissons in 1121 and at Sens in 1140. It is doubtful if Gilbert de la Porrée would have drawn hostile notice to himself in 1147-1148, had this party not first 'tasted blood in the person of Abelard.'[8] Not that they had things all their own way.[9] Strong currents were running. The same free spirit of enquiry and speculation that characterized Abelard animated others as well, some more and some less. Application of the dialectical method to problems of theology came to be increasingly the vogue as the century wore on; the current of theological disputation was too strong to be checked for long. Nevertheless, the condemnations to which Abelard submitted himself did lead many to adopt an attitude of excessive mistrust towards philosophy.[10] The danger of heresy seemed to lurk in any application of it to theology; hence the alarm aroused and the reaction provoked in conservative circles. The teaching of Peter Lombard, who had been himself one of those who prosecuted Gilbert de la Porrée at Rheims, came next under fire. His christology was attacked, although posthumously, and condemned in several councils and papal letters between 1163 and 1177. To St. Bernard and Gerhoh of Reichersberg had succeeded Walter of St. Victor and Stephen of Tournai, and others far more extreme. The brilliant master Simon of Tournai was viewed with grave suspicion and accused of heresy.[11] John Scotus Erigena's teaching was newly censured at this time,[12] while the condemnations pronounced at the Council of Paris in 1210 against the works of Aristotle, against Amaury of Bène and others, were but the culmination of attacks dating from the late twelfth century.[13] Nevertheless, it is perhaps well to note with Professor Powicke that there was no clear-cut issue between heresy and orthodoxy as such during these years; it is much truer to speak of a ferment of thought, in which admittedly the danger of heresy lurked and which made any master of an original or advanced turn of mind an object of suspicion not only to 'heresy hunters' but even to more moderate theologians.[14]

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[4] See below, n. 16.

[5] See the works cited in n. 2 and also J. Hilgers, *Die Bücherverbote in Papstbriefen* (Freiburg, 1907).

[6] J. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique au XIIe siècle* (Paris, 1914), pp. 106-107.

It is not the heretics themselves that concern us here; nor is it their doctrines, but simply the treatment accorded their books. When Abelard was summoned to appear at Sens to answer charges made against him by his adversaries, he was ordered to bring with him his 'celebrated book' on the Trinity.[15] The book was offered to the papal legate who in turn committed it to others for examination. Lotulf and Alberic of Rheims, the two chief accusers, were among these. We know that the book was examined, because Alberic had it with him when on one occasion he came to Abelard to question him regarding a certain statement. According to Abelard's story,—and he is the unique source for all these details—nothing could be found against him in his words or writings so that the legate and the bishops were in a quandary as to what should be done with him and his book. Finally, after open debate had been declined by the accusers, the legate was persuaded to condemn the book and order it to be burned by the author's own hand, not because of proven error but solely, it is said, because he had taught this book publicly and allowed copies to be made without its being approved by the Pope or by the Church.[16] If Abelard means by this that a previous official approval of a book before lecturing from it was so necessary that failure to obtain the same might result in the book's condemnation, then it would seem that a preventive censorship of books, for teaching at least, was already in vogue at the begining of the twelfth century. Nevertheless, the complete absence of corroborating testimony by contemporaries to such a usage makes one hesitate to affirm it. Two other explanations are possible: Abelard, piqued at the condemnation which appeared to him so unjustifiable, may have put these words into the mouth of his adversaries, as the ground on which they condemned him, in order to represent an admission on their part that no doctrinal error could be found; *or* his adversaries may have spoken the actual words and advanced this reason as sufficient for condemnation in the particular case because of his extreme temerity, without this being necessarily evidence of a general usage of the kind. The latter hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that the accusers make no appeal to custom; on the contrary, they urge a condemnation in order that it may be a lesson to others for the future.[17] The instance is too isolated and the subjective quality of the testimony too supect to justify our concluding to the existence of an obligatory preventive censorship at this early date. Even half a century later evidence of any such thing is completely lacking; the most we find is an author voluntarily submitting a book for approval, apparently as a precaution in his own interest.[18]

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[7] R. L. Poole, *Illustrations of Medieval Thought and Learning* (2nd ed., London, 1920), p. 153.

[8] R. L. Poole, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

[9] A. Hayen, 'Le Concile de Reims et l'erreur théologique de Gilbert de la Porrée,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge*, X (1935), 29-31, 34-35; cf. Poole, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-174.

[10] M. de Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (3rd Engl. ed., London, 1935), p. 203.

[11] J. Warichez, *Les Disputationes de Simon de Tournai* (Louvain, 1932), Introduction, pp. xix-xxvi.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] How far the rampant Catharist heresies and their growing success in the twelfth century are responsible for the nervousness even in intellectual circles, is hard to estimate. They were spreading rapidly in the North of France as well as in the Midi and were a cause of grave concern to the hierarchy. They may certainly have helped to create a mental attitude of suspicion and alarm but they exercised no influence in the schools. Their appeal was primarily to the masses and they were disseminated by popular methods, by preaching rather than by teaching or writing. We are concerned here with the schools. For a general view of these heresies in Northern France see J. Guiraud, *Histoire de l'inquisition. I. Origines . . .* (Paris, 1935), pp. 10-20.

[14] F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 50-51; the author gives a clear summary (pp. 49-54) of the currents of thought at Paris in the latter part of this century. Other excellent accounts of the same are to be found in J. Warichez, *op. cit.*, Introduction, and in M. de Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (2nd Engl. ed., London, 1926), pp. 196-216 (the third edition of this work in 1935 was organized somewhat differently; see especially pp. 241-254). See also Paré, Brunet, Tremblay, *La Renaissance du XIIe siècle: les écoles et l'enseignement* (Ottawa, 1933) and J. de Ghellinck, *op. cit.*

Nearly twenty years later, Abelard's works were again the centre of a storm. William of Saint-Thierry first raised the alarm and appealed to Saint Bernard to take some action. A study of the works in question convinced Bernard of their heretical nature and by private conversations he sought to have Abelard make the necessary corrections. The latter was inclined at first to do so but then hardened in his refusal and even demanded the right to debate the challenged points before a council of the bishops. The result was the council of Sens in June 1140. St. Bernard had extracted a number of passages deemed to be heretical. With these Abelard was to be confronted at the first session, although, as Bernard put it, the fact that they were there in writing was enough to warrant the accusation against him. But Abelard, seeing himself thus placed on the defensive, refused to accept the challenge and appealed from the jurisdiction that he himself had chosen to the pope. The council proceeded to a detailed scrutiny of the passages in question and condemned fourteen as contrary to the faith and manifestly heretical. On his own behalf and on that of the archbishops of Sens and Rheims, St. Bernard acquainted the pope and the cardinals, in several letters, with what the council had done, and pleaded for a solemn condemnation of the errors. There was all the more need of it, he added, since copies of Abelard's books were circulating far and wide spreading broadcast the poison of their errors. The pope's answer came on July 16 of the same year. A first letter condemned the fourteen articles and imposed silence on their author as a heretic;[19] a second one ordered him to be confined and his books to be burned wherever they were to be found.[20] Because of Abelard's refusal to take any part in the discussions of the council at Sens, the whole procedure in this case turned out to be one exclusively of repressive censorship of books and followed the pattern that became standard. Certain writings, without being sought out by ecclesiastical authorities, are cited to them nevertheless as suspect of heresy; they are officially, sometimes even solemnly, examined and condemned for their false teaching; whereupon the pope confirms the sentence, once more on the evidence of the books themselves, and orders these to be burned in all their existing copies.

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[15] *De Unitate et Trinitate Divina*, published by R. Stölzle, *Abaelards 1121 zu Soissons verurtheilter Tractatus De Unitate et Trinitate Divina* (Freiburg, 1891).

[16] *Historia Calamitatum*, c. 9 (PL 178, 140-150). The sentence of the text which gives the grounds for condemnation should be read according to the corrected version of Denifle: 'Dicebant enim, ad dampnationem libelli satis hoc esse debere, quod nec romani pontificis nec ecclesie auctoritate eum (libellum) commendatum legere publice presumpseram atque ad transcribendum iam pluribus eum (libellum) ipse prestitissem, (*Die Entstehung der Universitäten des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1885, p. 765, n. 31). The faulty readings in the extant editions would make it appear that Abelard was condemned for having taught without approval, whereas the corrected text of Denifle makes it clear that it was, according to Abelard, for having taught from a book that had not received official approval. More recent scholars have followed Denifle: Paré, Brunet, Tremblay, *op. cit.*, p. 67; Poole, *Illustrations* . . . p. 132; J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge, 1932), p. 16, n. 2, although Sikes seems to repeat the old view in his text on the same page. It might be noted that the authors of the *Histoire littéraire de la France*, to whom Denifle does not refer, had read the text correctly (new ed., Paris, 1868, IX, 28-29).

[17] PL 178, 149: '[Dicebant] . . . et hoc perutile futurum fidei Christianae, si exemplo mei multorum similis praesumptio praeveniretur.'

[18] See below, pp. 12-17. I have met with no text in the twelfth century, other than the one of Abelard, to even suggest a compulsory preventive censorship.

William of Conches, pupil of Bernard of Chartres and later a teacher at Paris, had been attacked by the same William of Saint-Thierry for errors in his trinitarian doctrine. It seems to have been the condemnation of Abelard in 1140 that caused him to reconsider his former teaching. In 1145 he formally retracted not only statements contrary to the faith but likewise anything that might so much as savour dangerously of novelty. Although no official condemnation of his work had been pronounced, William himself suppressed it of his own free will and begged all who possessed copies of the book to join in condemning and destroying it.[21]

The conduct of the enquiry made shortly after into Gilbert de la Porrée's commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate* was similar to that in the foregoing cases. The author was denounced by several teachers, including Peter Lombard and Robert of Melun, who had found statements in the work that they deemed to be questionable. Discussions held at the council of Paris in 1147 with Pope

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[19] 'Nos itaque . . . communicato fratrum nostrorum episcoporum cardinalium consilio, destinata nobis a vestra discretione capitula et universa ipsius Petri dogmata sanctorum canonum auctoritate cum suo auctore damnavimus, eique tanquam haeretico perpetuum silentium imposuimus' (PL 179, 517).

[20] 'Per praesentia scripta fraternitati vestrae mandamus quatenus Petrum Abaelardum et Arnaldum de Brixia, perversi dogmatis fabricatores et Catholicae fidei impugnatores, in religiosis locis, ubi vobis melius visum fuerit, separatim faciatis includi, et libros erroris eorum ubicunque reperti fuerint igne comburi' (*ibid.*). The story of the council of Sens has been told many a time in books on Abelard and St. Bernard. Abundant references to the sources, which consist largely of the letters of St. Bernard, will be found in C. Rémusat, *Abélard* (2nd ed., Paris, 1855), pp. 183-245; Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des conciles*, V (Paris, 1912), 747-790; J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge, 1932), pp. 219-235.

[21] It is in the preface to his *Dragmaticon* or *Dialogus de Substantiis Physicis* (Strasburg, 1567), pp. 5 ff, that William takes back the errors found in his *Philosophia*, of which the *Dragmaticon* is practically a second edition. See H. Flatten, *Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches* (Coblenz, 1929), pp. 10-11, 183-184 and R. L. Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning* (2nd ed., London, 1920), pp. 106-111, 155; Poole gives the text on pp. 302-303.

Eugene III present ended in an impasse when it was found that no one had brought the disputed book.[22] As a result the debate was postponed until the following year. Meanwhile the pope was careful to have the treatise of Gilbert closely scrutinized before the question was reopened at the last session of the council of Rheims (1148).[23] The ensuing debate resolved itself into a duel between Gilbert and St. Bernard. What is of particular interest to us is the former's repeated demand that he be judged on what he had actually written. He refused to be judged on the memoir of another purporting to contain errors taught by him or on the writings of men who had been his disciples. Time and again he stated his willingness to retract any errors that might be found in his own writings, but he was unwilling to answer to what others had written.[24] Let the council indicate the reprehensible passages in his work and gladly would he correct them. Even when the pope asked for the book that he might make the necessary changes and deletions, Gilbert replied that it was rather he himself who should alter whatever was amiss.[25] From a doctrinal point of view the final result was indecisive; by way of compromise four propositions of a *Credo* drawn up by St. Bernard were read aloud and Gilbert was ordered to modify whatever in his commentary on the *De Trinitate* might be in opposition to them. As regards the book however, the decision was clear-cut: it was to be neither taught nor kept by anyone nor given to be copied until such time as these alterations should be made.[26]

There were no further notable condemnations of particular books in the second half of the twelfth century like these well known ones of the previous decades. For anything comparable, we have to await the council of Paris in 1210, excommunicating Amaury of Bène and forbidding the use of Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics* as dangerous to orthodox teaching,[27] and then the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) renewing the condemnation of Amaury and his teaching and condemning Joachim of Flora's book on the Trinity.[28] During the third and fourth quarters of the twelfth century it was mainly controversies over doctrines that held the stage. One of these controversies was well nigh as bitter and as drawn out as that which had centred around Abelard. It is the dispute over Peter Lombard's teaching to the effect *quod Christus, secundum quod homo, non est aliquid*. The Lombard's success as the leading teacher at Paris could not but invite the attention and envy of rivals. He had often to defend himself against attack in his lifetime, but the battle was yet more acute after his death. Hardly had he disappeared when a hot dispute over certain christological views took place before Alexander III at Tours in 1163.[29] At the council of Sens in the following year, the pope forbade the undisciplined discussion of theological questions at Paris and throughout France.[30] By 1170, he had formally condemned the error *quod Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid* and ordered the metropolitans of Northern France to see to its eradication.[31] His letter to the archbishop of Sens mentioned Peter Lombard specifically as author of the condemned proposition.[32] The moving force in the persistent attack pressed through these years seems to have been Walter of St. Victor. His campaign was waged as violently during the following decade in an effort, says De Ghellinck, to bring about a complete condemnation of the Master of the Sentences, whose work was used already as a sort of text-book.[33] Another letter of 18 February, 1177, written by Alexander III to the archbishop of Rheims, commanded that the masters from Paris, Rheims and elsewhere should meet to forbid the teaching of the aforementioned proposition.[34] The question was opened again at the general council of the Lateran in 1179 when it required the representations of numerous cardinals to prevent a formal condemnation of Peter Lombard.[35] The latter's name was not officially cleared of the suspicion of heresy until the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215.[36]

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[22] Hefele-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, V, 812-817.

[23] Hefele-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, V, 832-838. Poole gives a penetrating analysis of the events connected with the council and their significance in *Illustrations . . .*, pp. 156-170. The most recent treatment of the subject is that of A. Hayen, 'Le Concile de Reims et l'erreur théologique de Gilbert de la Porrée,' *Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du m-âge*, X (1935), 29-102; pp. 29-43 deal with the council, and the rest of the article with the doctrinal question at issue.

[24] John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis*, c. 10, ed. Poole (Oxford, 1927), pp. 22-25.

[25] 'Absit, domine, ut hunc laborem omni iure mihi debitum subeat alius . . . uos potius prescribite quid eradi oporteat, et ego mandatum uestrum sedulus adimplebo' (*Hist. Pont.*, c. 11, p. 24).

[26] '. . . precepit dominus papa ut hiis adversa, si in libro suo repperirentur, corrigeret, inhibiens ne retineretur ab aliquo iam exscriptus uel traderetur alicui exscribendus, antequam ad hanc formam corrigeretur' (*Hist. Pont.*, c. 11, pp. 25-26; cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, PL 185, 592).

[27] *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. Denifle-Chatelain, I (Paris, 1889), p. 70.

[28] Hefele-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, V, 1327-1329.

[29] Hefele-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, V, 976.

[30] *Ibid:* '. . . condemnavit et omnino interdixit omnes tropos et indisciplinatas quaestiones in theologia, Parisiensique episcopo sub oboedientia praecepit ut per totam Franciam eas conpesceret;' the text is from the *Annales Reicherspergenses* (MHG, SS XVII, 471).

None of the texts relating to the controversy over the Lombard's teaching and the condemnation of his christological proposition speak of a censorship of books in this connection. It is a question only of an erroneous doctrine which is assumed to have been taught by him being condemned and the true doctrine stated. Nevertheless, the long-sustained battle that was waged around it, so typical of the fervid atmosphere of thought and feeling that pervaded intellectual circles at Paris not only in the 1160's and 1170's but in the following years as well,[37] cannot but have made the danger of condemnation an ever present reality to writers of the time. Now it is precisely during these decades of the century that Ralph Niger was active at Paris, first as a student and later as a master.[38] Little wonder then that he and others with him should be considerably preoccupied about some sort of official approval for their works. The presence of a strong party constantly vigilant and keen for the condemnation of error might well inspire them to take thought as to their complete orthodoxy before publishing their writings. Hence the preventive censorship of a kind that grew up.

II

It has been rather generally assumed that the preventive censorship of books dates only from the time when the invention of the printing press and the subsequent large circulation of printed works increased the harm done by pernicious books in a manner hitherto unknown.[39] Such a view is correct as regards a regular machinery for preventive censorship. It is likewise correct in so far as it refers to an obligatory censorship imposed by ecclesiastical authorities.[40] But the earliest form of preventive censorship, if we are to take preventive in its root meaning of previous, was not imposed from above; it resulted from the initiative of authors who sought by means of a previous examination of their works to obviate the danger of a repressive censorship being exercised later.[41] Such an examination could be more or less official, made either by some lawful authority or by a private person deemed by the author to be competent. Of this kind of preventive censorship there is clear evidence in the twelfth century; instances are multiplied especially in its latter half.[42] Nor is it rash to see therein a consequence of the nervousness caused by the condemnations and controversies of the period.[43] The evidence comes largely from dedicatory letters addressed to the person to whom the work is sent for examination and correction. However, this type of voluntary censorship seems to have had a forerunner in those prologues and prefaces so common to the works of the twelfth century, wherein authors humbly declare their lack of literary or intellectual gifts, renounce in advance any error that may have crept into their work, publicly profess their faith, or submit themselves beforehand to the Church's judgment. Although many of these make no specific mention of seeking approval, it may well be that the writers felt they were protecting themselves to some extent by such declarations. Statements of this kind are not entirely new in the twelfth century, but their profusion and variety at that time are certainly unprecedented.[44] Because of their relation to the growing desire for a previous approbation of writings, it should not be without interest to include them too in attempting a classification of the expressions to be found in all these prologues, prefaces and dedicatory letters. We may distinguish four general types: (a) those characterized by sentiments of humility; (b) those containing an act of submission either implicit or explicit; (c) those asking another person to correct errors and to emend the work in every way possible; (d) those wherein the author seeks not only the correction but also the approbation of his work in order that greater authority may attach to it. In each of these categories exists a considerable variety of expression. Moreover, a same author may voice the sentiments of more than one of the categories.

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[31] PL 200, 684-685.

[32] *Chart. Univ. Par.*, I, 4.

[33] *Le Mouvement théologique au XIIe siècle* (Paris, 1914), pp. 152-160; De Ghellinck gives an even fuller account of this campaign in his article, 'Pierre Lombard,' *Dict. de théol. cath.*, XII, 2003-2009.

[34] *Chart. Univ. Par.*, I, 8-9.

[35] Hefele-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, V, 1110.

[36] Can. 2 (Hefele-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, V, 1327-1328).

[37] See above pp. 2-3.

[38] Flahiff, *art. cit.*, pp. 105-110.

[39] E. Jombart, article 'Censure des livres,' *Dict. de droit canonique, III* (Paris, 1938), 158: 'La censure préalable n'a été instituée dans l'Eglise qu'après l'invention de l'imprimerie.' J. B. Sägmüller, *Lehrbuch des katholischen Kirchenrechts* (3rd ed., Freiburg, 1914), II, 9: 'Die ersten solchen Präventivzensur finden sich Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts.'

[40] Hilgers refers to cases of preventive censorship 'established by law in the very centres of scientific life' in the Middle Ages (art. 'Censorship of Books,' *Catholic Encyclopaedia*, III, 520). The allusion is to papal and other statutes for universities (e.g. *Chart. Univ. Par.*, I, 533; II, 190-191, 531). But these are purely a booksellers' regulation, meant to guarantee genuine and correct copies of professors' lectures; they have nothing to do with a censorship of the author's original work.

(a) Comparatively few authors begin a work without prefacing it by some formula of humility. Of the degree to which it is sincere, we are not always in a position to judge. Certainly it smacks somewhat of a literary device when we find the greatest writers of the twelfth century protesting their inability to treat the matter at hand. Many declare that they are poor in genius, devoid of learning, unskilled and unlettered,[45] or that so much is already written that they must appear rash indeed to attempt to add anything.[46] Or again, the subject which they have to treat is so profound, so exalted, or just so difficult that it is quite beyond their capacity; such is the case when St. Bernard treats of the office of a bishop,[47] Abbot Philip of Harvengt comments on the *Canticle of Canticles*,[48] Peter Lombard compiles his *Sentences*,[49] Baldwin abbot of Ford and later archbishop of Canterbury writes of the Sacrament of the Altar,[50] or Peter of Riga publishes his *Aurora*.[51] Some, in apologizing for treating matter so difficult, are careful to explain that they here put forth an opinion rather than dogmatize, that they themselves are enquiring about doubtful things rather than defining certainties; it is with sentiments like these that Abelard begins his *Hexameron*.[52] Others wish it to be known that they are writing not so much for the scholarly reader as for the simple.[53] A few, men like John of Salisbury, Peter of Blois, Innocent III, who are somewhat surer of themselves, offer the excuse that lack of time, pressure of manifold occupations and the like have prevented them from bestowing on their work the care they should like to have given to it.[54] Perhaps the commonest formula of humility is that where the author, having been asked to write, protests that only obedience, or the desire to gratify, or the fear of offending could have led him to comply with the request.[55] It is a reversal of the proper rôles, he sometimes adds, that he the author should presume to write on such a subject to him who has made the request.[56] Finally, a great many writers wish to attribute whatever of good may be found in their works to the inspiration and grace of God, not to their own efforts or learning; to these latter are attributable only the faults and errors that the works may contain.[57]

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[41] F. W. Bussell, *Religious Thought and Heresy in the Middle Ages* (London, 1918), p. 657: 'But before this age of selfish individualism (time of the Renaissance), often concealing itself under a seemingly generous demand for liberty, there was a time when men were still willing to submit their theses for the *imprimatur* of the Church and were surprised when charged with heresy and sedition.'

[42] The authors of the *Histoire littéraire de la France* (new ed., Paris, 1868, IX, 28-29), after noting that the case of Abelard offers the first trace of the custom of a previous approbation of books, go on to state that they had found no cases in the course of the twelfth century where an approbation was sought or given for books published. Evidence to the contrary appears in the following sections of the present article.

[43] It is surely more than a mere coincidence that in those instances, with very few exceptions, that have been found for the twelfth century, the person seeking approval, or the person from whom it is sought, or both, have some connection with the schools of Northern France, usually with Paris itself, or are at least associated with persons who were notably active in the chief controversies of the time.

[44] Attention was drawn to the significance of these in *Hist. litt. de la France*, IX, 29: 'Peut-être regardoit-on comme une espèce d'approbation, la dédicace de ces écrits qui se faisoit à des personnes constituées en dignité et pour l'ordinaire d'un sçavoir reconnu. Il se pouvoit faire aussi qu'on regardât de même la communication, que les Ecrivains de connoissance se donnoient mutuellement de leurs ouvrages, ce qui s'est pratiqué en tous les siècles. Non seulement l'Auteur qui communiquoit à un autre Sçavant l'écrit qu'il venoit de finir, le prioit d'y faire ses corrections mais il lui envoïoit même quelquefois le petit instrument à manche d'yvoire, qu'on nommoit Quinniens, c'est-à-dire un stylet ou espèce de canif pour effacer ce qui ne seroit pas à son goût' (See below, n. 67, for the text which refers to the *Quinniens*).

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[45] Gerhoh of Reichersberg: 'Sed quid hec ad me hominem ingenio pauperem, miseria obsitum, ignorantia obvolutum, sermone incultum et nullius mihi ex me facultatis et gratiae eiusmodi conscium?' (MGH, *Libelli de Lite*, III, 306); George of Breteuil: '. . . rogo quatinus in labore pauperis et illiterati dignentur occupari . . . nec propter paupertatem illius, quae nullius momenti vel auctoritatis est, personae meae opusculum istud contemnendum ducatis' (Martène, *Thesaurus Anecdotorum*, Paris, 1717, I, 426-427); Hugh of Amiens: '. . . me licet sensu tenuem . . .' (PL 192, 1141); Philip of Harvengt: '. . . vultis ut aggrediar quod in mea tam scientia quam facundia non habetur' (PL 203, 182); Anselm of Havelberg: '. . . si imperitia scribendo peccat . . .' (PL 188, 1142); Anon. 'Imperitiam quidem, non autem studium reprehendant' (PL 213, 964); Anon. William: 'ingenioli mei parvitate' 'auctori ignorantiam suam profitenti' (PL 209, 872); Baldwin of Ford and Canterbury: 'Sed insufficientia mea, quaeso, adjuvetur oratione tua, et benevolentia tua, sicut confido, contenta sit mediocritate mea' (PL 204, 642).

[46] Hugh of Amiens: 'De multis interrogas et plura proponis, nec me minus idoneum qui respondere debeam importunus attendis. Praetendo tibi sacra doctorum volumina subtilibus admodum sententiis plena, verborum decore perspicua, sed inertem te video . . .' (PL 192, 1141); Philip of Harvengt: 'Denique tam moderni quam antiqui, tot inveniuntur hujus operis tractatores, ut nesciam si quid ultra potuerint addere tardiores' (PL 203, 181); Gunther of Pairis: 'Inter tam multa sanctorum Patrum volumina quibus Ecclesia Dei illustrata atque ornata est, novum aliquid cudere quod legatur, nil fere aliud est quam solis radios accensa juvare facula, vel arenis littoreis pugillum pulveris adjicere, vel maris plenitudinem pauculas aquae guttas effundere' (PL 212, 99-100); Adam Scot: '. . . super temeritate jure me redarguendum non diffiteor' (PL 198, 439).

[47] 'Qui enim nos sumus ut scribamus episcopis?' (PL 182, 809).

[48] 'Opus grave et arduum, et meis impar viribus postulastis, non satis attendentes quid, a quo, tam instanter, tam sollicite deposcatis' (PL 203, 181).

[49] 'Cupientes aliquid de penuria et tenuitate nostra cum paupercula in gazophylacium Domini mittere ardua scandere opus ultra vires nostras agere praesumpsimus' (PL 192, 521).

[50] 'Res enim magna est et longe supra me et quomodo potero ad eam? Profundum sacramentum sacro velamine rectum, ineffabile, incogitabile, incomprehensible! Quis ego sum, ut casto et puro sermone, sicut oportet, decet et expedit, eloqui sufficiam?' (PL 204, 641).

[51] 'Vires enim ingenii tanto operi minime sufficere considerabam' (PL 212, 19).

[52] He quotes the words of St. Augustine to this effect as expressing his own approach to so difficult a matter (PL 178, 732); cf. Gerhoh of Reichersberg: '. . . ita ut totus sermo meus magis inquirentis quam difinientis sit' (*Libelli de Lite*, III, 307).

[53] Philip of Harvengt: 'Si autem quod scripsero in manus vel aures cujuspiam venerit sapientis, ne, quaeso, festinet praesumptuosum judicare, quod responsiones meas scripto voluerim commendare, quia, etsi hoc videbitur non necessarium eruditis, non erit tamen inutile mihi et mei similibus imperitis' (PL 203, 593); Gunther of Pairis: 'Nobis autem hujus operis est intentio, non tam verbis lepidis pruritum auribus excitare, nec obscura subtilitate obumbrare sententias, quam rerum de quibus agitur perspicue rimari veritatem; et quid ille inspiraverit, sine quo nihil recte vel fieri vel dici potest, sermone plano atque palpabili, simplicibus ac nostri similibus intimare' (PL 212, 104); Gerhoh of Reichersberg: '. . . Quod proinde sermone agresti compegimus, ut simplicibus quoque lectoribus in promptu sit hic invenire thesaurum in agro styli agrestis absconditum' (PL 194, 1075).

[54] John of Salisbury: 'Unde me excusatiorem habendum puto in his que obtusius et incultius a me dicta lector inueniet. Ariditas enim lingue, torpor sensuum, partim premissis, partim curialibus nugis ascribenda sunt . . .' (*Metalogicon*, ed. Webb, Oxford, 1929, p. 117; cf. p. 3: 'Nam ingenium hebes est et memoria infidelior quam ut

(b) The charge most generally levelled at writers taxed with unorthodox views was that of departing from the traditional teaching of the Church, as represented especially by the Fathers. To the more conservative thinkers, the application of dialectics to theology was tantamount to abandoning authority for reason as a guide. Abelard, Gilbert de la Porrée and others after them were accused of rationalism in their theology. As a result, many an author of the period was at considerable pains to state and restate his desire to depart in no way whatsoever from the teaching of the Fathers; he wished to renounce in advance any error that might have crept involuntarily into his work, and to bow beforehand to the traditional teaching and authority of the Church. These acts of submission, either explicit or implicit,[58] form the preface to the works of

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antiquorum subtilitates percipere, aut que aliquando percepta sunt diutius ualeam retinere. Linguam vero impolitam esse stilus ipse conuincit'); Peter of Blois: 'Lectorem etiam rogo, ut hic elimati operis non requirat ornatum; jejunae siquidem et inurbanae orationis ruditatem, hinc angustia temporis, hinc angustiae curiales excusant. Pro negotiis etiam Cantuariensis Ecclesiae ad tempus milito in castris et curiam sequor; ubi nec habeo corporis quietem, nec pacem animae, nec librorum copiam, nec spatium scribendi, nec studendi opportunitatem . . .' (PL 207, 797; Innocent III: '. . . feci diligenter ut potui, non sufficienter ut volui, praesertim cum ex officio tot causarum sim impeditus incursibus, tot negotiorum nexibus irretitus ut infra breve temporis spatium nec ad meditandum otium nec ad dictandum quiverim nancisci quietem' (PL 217, 913-914; for similar sentiments of the same pope see cols. 921-922, 967).

[55] The examples are particularly numerous; the following are typical. St. Bernard: 'Scribere tantae altitudini supra me est; et eidem non obedire contra me est. Utrobique periculum; sed in ea parte majus imminere videtur, si non obediero' (PL 182, 809: cf. PL 184, 773); Anselm of Havelberg: 'Sane quicunque haec legerit, sciat me ea scripsisse non tam ut quemquam docerem, aut quid ego didicerim ut ostenderem, quam ut apostolicae beatitudinis sancto mandato obedirem' (PL 188, 1142; he was writing at the command of Pope Eugene III); Richard of St. Victor: 'Cum vero mea legeris, multaque reprehendenda inveneris, facile mihi apud te veniam impetrabis: nam si insipiens factus sum, tu me coegisti. Da veniam, lector; non ego docere praesumpsi, sed petenti amico satisfacere volui' (PL 196, 1118); Peter of Blois: 'Magistri Sigerii frequens instantia et vestrae praeceptionis auctoritas me compellunt, de transfiguratione Domini aliquid, quod publice auditores aedificet et luceat in commune, conscribere' (PL 207, 777; cf. 207, 1005); Peter of Riga: 'Frequens sodalium meorum petitio . . . ut librum Geneseos stylo metrico depingerem . . . instanter persuasit . . . Vires enim ingenii tanto operi minime sufficere considerabam. Sed alia de parte petitioni sodalium obviare formidabam . . . Assidua ergo sociorum prece vel potius fraterna charitate devictus, opus injunctum arripui' (PL 212, 17-19).

[56] Anonymous *Dialogus de Pontificatu Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae*: 'Haec autem inquisitio talis est, acsi molendinum aquam petat a furno' (*Lib. de Lite*, III, 528); Peter of Blois: 'Rogasti me ut tibi aliquid de virtute confessionis . . . exararem. Sic aquam postulat fons a rivo, magister a discipulo scientiam, contemplativus ab activo, ab archidiacono praesul, spiritualis a carnali, sanctus a peccatore, sapiens ab ignaro' (PL 207, 1077; cf. 207, 1097: 'Doctum indoctus docere praecipior, et aegrotus bene habenti remedium medicinale conficere').

[57] Hugh of Amiens: 'Lege, fili, legat qui voluerit ista, sed conditione data, ut omnia falsa falso mihi, omnia vera Spiritui veritatis habeant imputari' (PL 192, 1248-1249), 'Hoc tamen a te exigendum puto ut quaecumque in meis responsionibus inveneris vera, Deo attribuas; quae autem non vera videris, mihi penitus ascribas' (PL 192, 1142); Aelred of Rievaulx: 'Si quid igitur in hoc sudore nostro proposito congruens processit, gloriae largitori et vestrae orationi debetur; si quid vero aliter, mihi artem aut usum non habenti' (PL 195, 503-504), 'In hujus igitur lectione si quis profecerit Deo gratias agat et pro peccatis meis apud Christi misericordiam intercedat' (PL 195, 660); John of Salisbury: 'Si quid uero exierit aptius, ei gratia referatur, sine quo nichil potest humana infirmitas' (*Metalogicon*, ed. Webb, p. 3); Innocent III: 'Si quid dignum in hoc reperietur opusculo divinae gratiae penitus ascribatur . . . Si quid indignum insufficientiae deputetur humanae' (PL 217, 774; cf. 217, 701).

[58] Passages such as those cited in the preceding note, where the author ascribes to himself whatever may be faulty or wrong in his work, might be considered implicit acts of submission.

numerous twelfth-century writers, beginning with Abelard himself.[59] Anyone, after all, may fall into error; not error, however, but the obstinate and contumacious clinging to it makes the heretic.[60] More often than not the submission is stated unreservedly, but in some cases it is accompanied by an appeal for a fair hearing. There are persons who are aching to find heresy everywhere; such as these ought not to judge whether a thing has been stated falsely or not, but only men of open and unbiased minds.[61] It is intriguing to find Gerhoh of

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[59] Abelard, *Introductio ad Theologiam*: 'In quo quidem opere, si culpis meis exigentibus a Catholica (quod absit!) exorbitavero intelligentia vel locutione, ignoscat ille mihi, qui ex intentione opera pensat, parato semper ad satisfactionem de malis dictis vel corrigendis vel delendis, cum quis me fidelium vel virtute rationis vel auctoritate Scripturae correxerit . . . Tanti itaque viri (St. Aug.) instructus exemplo, si qua forte per errorem proferam nulla in his per contemptionem defendam, aut per elationem praesumam. Ut si nondum ignorantiae vitio caream, haeresis tamen crimen non incurram' (PL 178, 980-981); *Sic et Non*: 'Unde placuit nobis huic operi nostro, quod ex sanctorum dictis compilaverimus in unum volumen congregatis, decretum illud Gelasii papae de authenticis libris praescribere, quo videlicet sciatur nihil nos hic ex apocryphis induxisse' (PL 178, 1349; the opening sentences of the *Sic et Non* display a marked reverence for the Fathers, col. 1339); Hermann of St. Martin at Tournai: 'Sciatis tamen me in eo nihil de meo posuisse, sed quod in sanctis doctoribus legeram, et maxime in libro domini Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi' (PL 180, 11); Alger of Liège: '. . . si forte minus discrete sanctorum dicta distorsisse videor, ut errori meo, si quis est, nullam defendam auctoritatem . . .' (PL 180, 859); Hugh of Amiens: 'Magnis sane doctoribus ita sunt proponenda, non opinando, sed veris assertionibus enodenda, aut quod validius est, divinis auctoritatibus comprobanda' (PL 192, 1141-1142); Gerhoh of Reichersberg: 'Harum et similium anteactarum offensionum non immemores, et de futuris cavere volentes, quaedam decerpendo, quaedam addendo, dictamen nostrum castigatius facimus. Auctoritates vero Patrum, quibus nec addi nec decerpi quidquam licuit, partim textui sermonis nostri competenter inseruimus, partim in latere apposuimus. Quibus diligenter inspectis nos immunes fore credimus, et coram Deo excusabiles; etiamsi aliquos de his, quibus ipse Christus est *lapis offensionis et petra scandali*, continget in dictis nostris offendi et scandalizari' (PL 194, 1191-1192), 'Si autem lectores ebrii, scholastico vino ultra modum potati, offenduntur in scriptis meis, ignoscendum est illis nisi forte ita fuerint obstinati ut acquiescere nolint sanctorum Patrum testimoniis certis et apertis, quibus nostra scripta concordare in opusculo subjecto monstravimus' (PL 194, 1074-1075; Gerhoh voices these sentiments in nearly all his works); Adam Scot: 'Nam absit a nobis semel et iterum ac longe semper et ubique absit a nobis, ut elationis inflati tumore vel errorem nobis evidenter ostensum excusemus . . .' (PL 198, 611); Peter of Blois: 'Incipio ergo nihil de spiritu meo prophetans, sed ea quae praesens tractatus exposcit, sanctorum Patrum auctoritate confirmans; micas enim collegi quae ceciderunt de mensa dominorum meorum' (PL 207, 1077).

[60] Abelard: 'Non enim ignorantia haereticum facit, sed magis superbiae obstinatio, cum quis videlicet ex novitate aliqua nomen sibi comparare desiderans, aliquid inusitatum proferre gloriatur, quod adversus omnes defendere inopportune nititur, ut vel caeteris superior, vel nullis habeatur inferior' (PL 178, 981): John of Salisbury reports what Gilbert de la Porrée has said: 'Dicebat se nec esse hereticum nec futurum, qui paratus erat et semper fuerat acquiescere ueritati et apostolicam sequi doctrinam; hereticum namque facit non ignorantia ueri, sed mentis elatio contumatiam pariens, et in contentionis et scismatis presumptionem erumpens' (*Hist. Pont.*, c. 10, ed. Poole, p. 22); William of Conches: 'Verba enim non faciunt haereticum sed defensio' (*Dragmaticon*, Strasburg, 1567, p. 5).

[61] Gerhoh of Reichersberg: 'Magni ergo viri (St. Aug.) exemplo edoctus, nolo sic in verba mea jurari ut non patiar inde aliquid rectractari; quin potius ego illud retractabo, si quid in eis reperietur, quod sano sensui repugnans esse judicabitur, ab his duntaxat judicibus quorum simplex et bene purgatus est oculus . . .' (PL 193, 622), 'Et facile inveniendum non his qui semper errant corde, quibus est oculus nequam, sed humilibus et benevolis lectoribus, quibus est oculus columbinus et simplex . . .' (PL 194, 1075), '. . . Ut ergo tutus ac liber incedam in expositione Psalmorum neque timeam mihi a verbo aspero, quoniam usitatum est quibusdam importunis vocare schismaticum vel haereticum quemcunque suo sensui viderint minus consonum. Si quae forte modernis lectoribus inusitata interponentur, antiquorum Patrum orthodoxorum sententiis veris hinc inde cincta et scuto veritatis circumdata invenientur' (PL 194, 1162); William of Conches: 'Si inquirentem aliquem sciant illum esse haereticum clamant, plus de suo caputio praesumentes quam sapientiae suae confidentes' (quoted by Poole, *Illustrations . . .*, p. 109, n. 21); John of Salisbury: 'Non ergo quis sed quid quaue de causa scribam diligens lector attendat et, ubi male dicta invenerit, sincerus judex et nec inuidiae nec odii nec alterius affectionis motu concussus testimonium de malo perhibeat et, ubi bene dixero, non me caedat. Michi tamen pro minimo est si innocentiae meae gratis detrahitur a peruersis, quos emendari uellem, si me tamen benignitatis tuae fauor exceperit' (*Polycraticus*, prol, to Book VIII, ed. Webb, Oxford, 1909, II, 227); Baldwin of Ford and Canterbury: 'Unus autem sermo in re tam sancta incaute prolatus, vel non pure intellectus, citra errorem non nunquam ingerit suspicionem erroris' (PL 204, 642; these words are found, significantly enough, in the prologue to Baldwin's treatise on the Blessed Sacrament, concerning which doctrine Ber-

Reichersberg, who is usually considered to be one of the century's *grands veneurs d'hérésie*, begging most insistently for an unprejudiced hearing.[62] A milder form of the same appeal is that which urges that, while admittedly some parts may be objectionable, this should not cause the work as a whole to be rejected; other parts of it may be quite recommendable.[63]

(c) It is a still further step in the direction of preventive censorship when the author actually sends his completed work to another person, asking that it be examined, corrected and emended in every way possible. To be sure, such a request may at times be no more than an act of self-abasement, to be classified therefore among the formulae of humility. Such would be the case particularly for prologues which are addressed in general terms to anyone who may read the book, expressing the desire to be corrected.[64] Nevertheless, in the majority of cases, the appeal is to a particular individual and has a ring of sincerity. The fact too that the person to whom the work is sent is so frequently a scholar of rank and still more often an ecclesiastical superior, would lead to the conclusion that correction by competent authority is honestly sought.[65] It amounts to an informal and unofficial sort of preventive censorship.

Between the years 1130 and 1134, Hugh of Amiens, archbishop of Rouen, completes his *Dialogues* on various theological questions, first undertaken years before at the insistence of his relative Matthew, now cardinal-bishop of Albano, in whose company he had frequented the schools of Laon and with whom he had been particularly intimate when the latter was still prior of St. Martin-des-Champs at Paris. He thereupon sends the work off to the cardinal with a letter urging him in the name of charity to indicate to Hugh what things may need correcting.[66] It is not the only occasion on which this prelate is appealed to as censor. A certain Bernard, who has sometimes been confused with the great abbot of Clairvaux, sends him a sermon on the gospel of the unjust steward beseeching him to emend it. There can be no question of a mere formula this time: Bernard actually sends along with the sermon a small ivory-handled knife with which the cardinal-bishop may erase anything objectionable.[67] St. Bernard

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engar had been condemned as heretical in the eleventh century).

[62] See the two preceding notes; cf. another passage in *Lib. de Lite*, III, 137.

[63] Gerhoh of Reichersberg: '. . . Et tu ergo sacerdos legitime, si quid, ut putatur, novum in scriptis meis repereris, noli statim repudiare, sed igne Sancti Spiritus adhibito, prius inter me ac te aliosque fideles fiat inde familiaris collatio et, si opus fuerit, aliqua talis consequenter emendatio, quae viriditatem spicarum sic torreat ut grana in eis latentia non destruat' (PL 193, 622); Adam Scot: 'Et si quid boni vobis in eo appositum est, cum quo et aliquid mali interpositum est, sic vestra, quaesumus, cautela devitare studeat spinam, ut cura quoque vestra excolere non negligat rosam' (PL 198, 624); elsewhere Adam asks that attention be paid to what is said rather than how or by whom; so too John of Salisbury in the text quoted in n. 61.

[64] E.g. Peter Lombard's preface to his *Liber Sententiarum*, PL 192, 522: 'In hoc autem tractatu, non solum pium lectorem sed etiam liberum correctorem desidero, maxime ubi profunda versatur veritatis quaestio, quae utinam tot haberet inventores quot habet contradictores;' cf. the prologues of the following works: William of Tyr, *Historia Rerum in Partibus Transmarinis Gestarum*, PL 201, 214; Alan of Lille, *Anticlaudianus*, ed. Wright, *The Anglo-Latin Satirical Poets* . . . (Rolls Series, London, 1872), II, 268; the sentiment is similar when Adam Scot addresses himself to whole groups of his fellow Premonstratensians, PL 198, cols. 442, 611, 796; etc.

[65] From notes that have gone before and others to follow, it is evident that the author has often in mind the correction of style as well as content; sometimes it is his sole preoccupation. Again, correction is frequently sought for works of a non-doctrinal nature, although in regard to these latter it is not always sure that the mediaeval author would have viewed it as purely secular (see below, n. 96; cf. n. 92). However, we are concerned with works whose content is primarily religious and usually even doctrinal.

[66] PL 192, 1142: '. . . quae autem non vera videris, mihi penitus ascribas, nec recipias, sed mutua charitate, ut corrigi debeant, mihi benigne referas.'

[67] PL 184, 1021: '. . . Super hoc igitur quaeso vos in me pietatis et charitatis abundare visceribus quatenus et ignoscatis mihi quod distuli, et emendetis vobis incorrectum quod obtuli; auctoritati namque prudentiae vestrae reservavi id corrigendum et suppliciter offero. Et cultellum qui vulgo Quinniens nuncupatur, habens manubrium de ebore, cum chartula mitto quatenus imposturam, quam avulsione dignam adjudicaveritis, meo gladio succidatis.' How general such a usage was, I do not know; just possibly the references elsewhere to a *lima* are less figurative than might appear.

himself does have recourse to a critic, but it is his friend William of Saint-Thierry whose judgment he invites in order that his treatise on grace and free-will may be made as useful as possible.[68] Gerhoh of Reichersberg, whom we have already seen so careful to submit himself in advance to the Church's teaching, usually takes the added precaution of having outstanding men read through his works for purposes of correction. Shortly after 1135, he sends his *Liber de Simoniacis* to St. Bernard, with whom he was associated in various ways at this time,[69] desiring him to see that it is in strict conformity with the truth.[70] A quarter of a century later he is still concerned about the matter of correction; men like Godfrey, abbot of Admont in the diocese of Salzburg, and Eberhard, archbishop of this city, both leading reformers and scholars as well as friends of Gerhoh, are called upon to examine respectively his *Liber contra Duas Haereses*[71] (ca. 1155-1160) and his completed commentary on the Psalms[72] (1163). About the same time in England the saintly Aelred of Rievaulx addresses a collection of sermons to Gilbert Foliot, bishop of London, formerly prior at Cluny and a noted scholar, with the request that the bishop examine them, correct and add to them.[73] In 1159, John of Salisbury dedicates his *Polycraticus* to Chancellor Thomas Becket, who was then at Toulouse with his master Henry II of England, assuring Becket that everything therein contained is made subject to his examination: to the correcting of a work, he adds, should attach a glory both greater and more richly deserved than to the writing of it.[74] John's great reputation for scholarship could hardly fail to inspire others to submit their writings to his keen scrutiny. His friend and sometime host at Rheims, Abbot Peter de la Celle, sends him a little work called *Liber de Panis*, exhorting him not to let their friendship be any obstacle to the condemning of whatever is wrong, even should it involve the rejection of the whole work.[75] When Wolbero, abbot of St. Pantaleon at Cologne, turns to the abbot of Geroda for assistance, he specifically asks the latter to reply in writing as to whether his commentary on the *Canticle of Canticles* is at all worthy to be published or whether it were better it should never see the light. The glowing testimonial of the critic has been preserved to us, witnessing therefore to the reality of an examination.[76]

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[68] PL 182, 1001: 'Proinde illud legite primus et, si judicaveritis, solus ne si proferatur in medium magis forte scriptoris publicetur temeritas quam lectoris aedificetur charitas. Quod si palam fieri utile probaveritis, tunc si quid obscurius dictum adverteritis quod in re obscura servata congrua brevitate dici planius potuisset, non sit vobis pigrum aut emendare per vos aut mihi resignare emendandum . . .'

[69] Gerhoh's associations with St. Bernard would serve to keep him in touch with currents of thought in France. At a later date he displays a marked hostility towards Gilbert de la Porrée, linking his name with that of Abelard when he speaks of dangerous trends in certain schools in France (*Liber de Novitatibus Huius Temporis* in *Lib. de Lite*, III, 301, 303). He is likewise one of those to attack Peter Lombard (*Lib. de Lite*, III, 275) and denounce his suspicious christology to Alexander III (PL 193, 565-566). Gerhoh seems never to have had direct contact with the schools of France himself, but it may not be without significance that a brother of his had frequented them (A. Budinszky, *Die Universität Paris und die Fremden an derselben im Mittelalter*, Berlin, 1876, p. 128).

[70] *Lib. de Lite*, III, 241 (see below, n. 84).

[71] PL 194, 1162 (see text below in n. 84).

[72] PL 193, 622.

[73] PL 195, 361-362: 'Hinc est, Pater amantissime, quod studium meum, si quod est in litteris sacris, ad tuae discretionis examen credidi referendum, ut ubi sanum sapio tua me confirmet auctoritas, ubi haesito te docente mihi luceat veritas, ubi erro corrigat me tua sancta severitas;' 363-364: 'Licet igitur magnum sit sapienti vel modicum tempus otio dare, non pigeat, rogo, Dominum meum tantillum tempus perdere, quo ex his quae scripsimus vel resecare superflua vel supplere hiantia vel universa delere possitis.'

[74] Ed. Webb, I, 17: '. . . Omnia uero tuo reseruantur examini, ut tibi maior et iustior corrigendi quam michi scribendi gloria debeatur.'

[75] PL 202, 927-930: 'Testor Deum te aeque offensurum amicitiam nostram si indigna laudaveris ac si digna vituperaveris; tolerabiliori enim patientia sustinebo erroris redargutorem quam improbum adulatorem. Non itaque graveris propter eam quae ad invicem est dilectionem vel partem vel etiam totum sermonem, si justum fuerit, delere et ut aliter tractetur remandare.'

[76] See below, n. 87. Wolbero seems to have been present at the council of Rheims (1148) which investigated the case of Gilbert de la Porrée; a letter of his to Suger of St. Denis alludes to a favour he had asked of Suger on the occasion of the council (PL 186, 1401).

William of the White Hands, archbishop of Sens and later archbishop of Rheims, has no serious rival among ecclesiastics as the outstanding patron of letters in the latter half of the twelfth century. Several writers great and small dedicate their works to him;[77] usually they do not fail to add a petition that the archbishop examine and correct them as well.[78] Contemporary with him is the scholarly abbot of St. Genevieve at Paris, Stephen of Tournai, later bishop of the city whose name he bears. Little wonder that his distinction in the schools and in ecclesiastical office should make him the choice of certain authors as critic and censor. Godfrey of Breteuil, having become a canon at St. Victor, dedicates his *Fons Philosophiae* to Stephen with a flowery preface wherein he likens his work to a cup of wine proffered to the abbot, not that he needs it for his refreshment, but in order that he may better the taste of what is flat and sweeten what is bitter, or, should he deem it best, throw out the entire contents of the cup.[79]

An unknown George of Breteuil has left us one of the most interesting of these dedicatory letters. More enterprising than the majority of his contemporaries, he addresses his letter to the abbots and monks of no less than four religious houses, each of a different order: Cistercians, Benedictines, Canons-Regular of St. Augustine and Premonstratensians. His commentary on *Exodus* is just finished and he calmly requests that they have it read in all their various houses for the purpose of examining and correcting it. But, lest the monks and canons be inadequate as judges, he would have them invite those of their friends the masters of Paris, whose morals are in keeping with their scholarship, likewise to have a share in the work of correction.[80] The date of the letter is uncertain, but by its style and contents it fits perfectly into this same latter part of the twelfth century, where its editor Martène has placed it.[81]

The custom therefore of dedicating a book to some great figure, outstanding either for his scholarship or for his ecclesiastical office, of exchanging works with a learned friend, and of requesting the actual correction of the contents, is evidently quite widespread in the middle and latter half of the twelfth century. It amounts to a very real *censura praevia*, even though it be of an unofficial or, at best, a quasi-official character.

(d) It may be supposed that authors who send their works to others to be corrected expect as a result of the examination an implied, or perhaps even an explicit, approval of what is good about them and free from error.[82] In any case, the most complete type of the informal censorship that we have been reviewing is that where the writer himself not only states specifically his desire for approval but wishes it in order that his work may carry greater authority and may likewise be communicated to others. It is this precisely that the full-blown preventive censorship of more modern times is meant to provide: a guarantee of orthodoxy and the permission to publish. Most of the twelfth century writers were teachers to whom such an approbation would be of considerable service. Nor is it unreasonable to presume that a good number of them, especially when treating of disputed questions, sincerely believed their works to embody the true solution which ought therefore to be propagated with all possible zeal. Generally the approval is sought of such men as we have seen appealed to in the last section; but a few, like Gerhoh of Reichersberg, Godfrey of Viterbo, Herbert of Bosham and Ralph Niger, are content with nothing less than a recommendation from the pope himself.

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[77] J. R. Williams, 'William of the White Hands and Men of Letters,' *Anniversary-Essays . . . Charles Homer Haskins* (Boston, 1929), pp. 381-387.

[78] A certain William, in dedicating his *Microcosmographia*: 'Hujus autem operis ultimum excellentiae tuae relinquo examen' (PL 209, 872); cf. dedication of Peter Comestor's *Historia Scholastica* (PL 198, 1053-1054) and Peter of Poitier's Sentence Book (PL 211, 789-790).

[79] *Chart. Univ. Par.*, I, 48-49: 'Calicem plenum mixto vestre destinavi pater eruditionis examinandum judicio, quatinus utrumque sit in manibus vestris, ejus videlicet vel status vel eversio. Continet autem mixtum dupliciter . . . Ne queso desistat ob hec, sed bibat et ebibat, quicquid illuc est, vestra dignatio, non ut sue sitis indigentiam reficiat, sed ut ipsius calicis amaritudinem tollat, insipientiam condiat, sive per loca dulcioribus infusis amara quelibet et insipida tollendo, sive totum, si sic potius visum fuerit, evertendo. Quod si totum salvum fore magis elegeritis, unum michi tante dignationis hoc erit argumentum, si quod in eo vestre correctionis invenerit condimentum.'

[80] Martène, *Thesaurus Anecdotorum* (Paris, 1717), I, 426: '. . . Quoniam igitur claustrales viros in hoc agro (scripturae) non ignoro conversari, rogo quatinus in labore pauperis et illiterati dignentur occupari nec dedignentur Exodi flosculos in solitudine veteris testamenti collectos ruminare . . . Mediantibus igitur vobis, legantur haec in claustris quadripartitae vestrae professionis, nec propter paupertatem illius, quae nullius momenti vel auctoritatis est, personae meae opusculum istud contemnendum ducatis, sed tam per vos quam per amicos vestros magistros Parisienses, illorum scilicet quorum litteris conveniunt mores, illud diligenter examinari et corrigi faciatis.'

[81] Chevalier (*Répertoire . . .*, Bio-Biblio.) gives the twelfth century as George of Breteuil's date; so too do the authors of vol. XIV (p. 449) of the *Hist. litt. de la France* by reason of the letter's style. The authors of a later volume of the same work (XXI, 296-297) devote another article to the same George of Breteuil, assigning to him the date *vers 1286* but without giving any evidence whatsoever and without making any allusion to the earlier article in vol. XIV.

Orderic Vitalis is confident that his *Ecclesiastical History* will gain greatly in prestige if it receives first the approval of his abbot.[83] Gerhoh of Reichersberg clearly implies that he has other readers in mind when he asks Archbishop Eberhard of Salzburg to censor his *Liber contra Duas Haereses*, for he says: 'It is on account of others who walk in darkness that I send this work to you.'[84] The same is suggested by Peter de la Celle in a letter to John of Salisbury; he entreats his friend to correct the *Liber de Panis* which he is sending in order that as it goes to him privately it may come forth publicly.[85] A volume of sermons destined by Eckbert of Schönau to refute the errors of Catharist sects is sent to Reginald, the metropolitan of Cologne, with an accompanying preface that begs Reginald to circulate the work if he finds it of some utility in the cause of the Christian faith.[86] Wolbero of St. Pantaleon at Cologne very evidently has in mind the publication of his Commentary on the *Canticle of Canticles*, if it meets with the chosen censor's approval; he must have been greatly encouraged by the enthusiastic recommendation he received in reply.[87] Two of Paris's most prominent masters dedicate works of theirs to William of the White Hands while he is still archbishop of Sens (1168-1176), confident that his correction and his approval will assure their fame. It is the case for Peter Comestor who counts on this to guarantee perennial success to his *Historia Scholastica*,[88] and for Peter of Poitiers who sees in it a source of lustre and authority for his Sentence Book.[89] Alan of Lille betrays the preoccupation typical of the teacher when he wishes Hermengald, abbot of St. Gilles, to examine, judge and approve his *Liber in Distinctionibus Dictionum Theologicalium* 'before he delivers it publicly to the ears of others.'[90]

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[82] Some express their desire for such approval; e.g. Hermann of St. Martin at Tournai: '. . . orans ut, si quid in eo perperam dictum est, per vos corrigatur; quod vero bene, per vos approbetur (PL 180, 11).

[83] Ed. LePrevost (Publ. Soc. de l'Hist. de France, Paris, 1838), I, 3-4: 'Praecipium nempe in hoc fiduciam habeo, quod hoc opus incoepi venerandi senis Rogerii abbatis simplici praecepto, tibique, Pater Guarine, qui secundum ecclesiae ritum ei legitime succedis, exhibeo, ut superflua deleas, incomposita corrigas, et emendata vestrae sagacitatis auctoritate munias.'

[84] PL 194, 1162: 'Tu igitur, quem rectum corde non dubito quia non ambulas in obscuro, minime habes necessarium praemuniri hoc opusculo nostro; verumtamen propter alios in obscuro ambulantes hoc ipsum tibi destino, ubi placet approbandum atque ubi rationabiliter displicet emendandum vel mihi ut emendetur caute resignandum.' Cf. *Liber de Simoniacis* addressed to St. Bernard (*Lib. de Lite*, III, 241): 'Ut igitur ego potius cum paucis veritati consonem quam cum multis errem, per tuam paternam prudentiam instrui cupio, an in his, que continet subsequens libellus, veritatis et sobrietatis verba loquar . . . Opto autem hunc libellum . . . ad te pervenire, ut examinetur te primo et, si judicas, solo lectore. Si autem videbitur spiritui pietatis habitatori tui pectoris, ut ad plurimorum veniat noticiam, tunc rogo, si que in eo corrigenda, vel tu corrigas vel mihi corrigenda suggeras.'

[85] PL 202, 927-928: 'Ad te, mi charissime, unum hoc opusculum nostrum mitto ut tua licentia prout dignum fuerit ingrediatur ad secretum et egrediatur ad publicum. Rogo ut apponas manum approbando utilia, etc.'

[86] PL 195, 13-14: 'Rogo autem ut si rationabiliter forte judicaveritis hujus libri compositionem et in aliquo utilem Christianae religioni fore perspexeritis, in commune eum venire faciatis ut sit in scandalum generationi illi pessimae cunctis diebus.'

[87] It is this letter of reply that we possess, not the original request; however, it speaks of the request before going on to praise Wolbero's work and recommend its usefulness for others, especially for the nuns for whom it was written: 'Scribitis enim et familiari omnibus et sapientia spiritus utentibus humilitate, rogando monetis et monendo rogatis ut opus vestrum super *Canticum Canticorum*, remota penitus omni captatione benevolentiae vestrae, diligentius consideratum, quidquam tamen mihi videatur videlicet sive in lucem proferendum sentiam, vel abscondendum et deponendum intelligam, vos scripto certificem . . . Et opus istud non abolendum, imo ad gloriam Dei, gloria enim revelare sermonem (Tob. 12), et ad utilitatem Ecclesiae Dei illarumque institutionem quibus scribitur, manifestandum

Peter of Blois, the celebrated archdeacon of Bath, shows that a writer can take very seriously this matter of correction with a view to publishing a work. His *De Praestigiis Fortunae*, it would appear, has already acquired something of a reputation when a certain student asks if he may read it. But the archdeacon answers curtly that he may not have it yet: it must first be subjected to criticism before circulating publicly.[91] The correction already undertaken by his own brother Master William will not suffice, for he might be too indulgent. And so we find Peter sending the work to his less well known friend of the same name as himself, Peter of Blois canon at Chartres, asking him to go over it carefully and to correct it both as to form and content.[92]

Examples of writers who seek their approval from the pope himself are fewer. Gerhoh of Reichersberg is the first one. He sends a part of his long commentary on the Psalms, which the archbishop of Salzburg has already examined, to Bishop Otto of Freising for further emendation and then asks Otto to bring the number of 'witnesses' to three by begging Pope Eugene III to share in the work of correction.[93] Gerhoh had already received from the same pope a letter of praise which he must have treasured greatly, since he mentions it here and inserts it in several different parts of his subsequent works. The letter is couched in general terms, approving Gerhoh himself rather than any specific books of his;

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omnimodis censeo, revera et fide catholicum, et moribus instruendis, omnis Christianus bene in domo Dei vivere disponens judicabit aptissimum . . . Fratres nostri contra voluntatem quidem vestram, sed me volente et super hoc gaudente, certatim hunc (librum) rapuerunt et sedulo et diligenter legerunt, et studio lectionis commendabilem reddiderunt . . .' (PL 195, 1009-1010).

[88] PL 198, 1053-1054: '. . . Verumtamen quia stylo rudi opus est lima, vobis, Pater inclyte, limam reservavi ut huic operi, Deo volente, et correctio vestra splendorem et auctoritas praebeat perennitatem.'

[89] PL 211, 789-790: '. . . Tuae igitur bonitatis erit sicut tuus est mos humilibus favere opus humiliter elaboratum multisque vigiliis causa communis commodi elaboratum paterna manu suscipere, susceptum splendore correptionis illustrare, correptis auctoritatem praebere.'

[90] PL 210, 686: '. . . Non enim volo ut opus meum prius in aures publicas exeat divulgatum quam a statera tuae examinationis exierit trutinatum ut vel valeat tuae prudentiae judicio comprobatum vel vileat tuae auctoritatis sententia reprobatum.'

[91] Ep. 19, PL 207, 71: "Librum meum *De Praestigiis Fortunae* quem postulas adhuc habere non potes; prius enim quam exeat in publicum, sentiet castigatioris limae judicium.'

[92] Ep. 77, PL 207, 239: '. . . Libri mei siquidem prima pars a magistro Willelmo fratre meo correcta est; sed quia timeo ne sit indulgentior mihi si quid in eo vitiosum invenerit, precor ut ab initio totum diligentiore cura recurratis quatenus nihil ibi resideat quod lectorem offendat, quod inducat errorem, quod virtutem non exerceat, quod non aedificet fidem, quod vitam non instruat, quod non sapiat honestatem.'

[93] Ep. 3, PL 193, 491: 'Itaque fidelitati et prudentiae tuae mitto et committo legendum, quod in prima parte Tractatus in Psalmos prae manibus habeo, ut sicubi sanum sapio tuae auctoritatis fulciar testimonio; sin aliter quod non recognosco pie recognoscens tuo emendem consilio . . . Angelus Ecclesiae Juvavensis hanc ipsam partem necnon et alteram diligenter perlegit . . .' Col. 492: 'Nunc autem quia de camino exsilii te quasi aurum probatum, Deo donante, recepimus, tu, annunente gratia divina, mihi aliter angelus es in testimonium sanae doctrinae advocandus ut in ore duorum vel trium testium stet nostri operis verbum tertio angelo videlicet pontifici Romano, si vobis placet, praesentandum cujus ad quaedam nostra scripta prae manibus est epistola quam si cui legere placet, quid ille angelus de me sentiat, satis intelligere valet, quatenus per electos angelos in conspectu angelorum caeterorum, qui opus nostrum legere dignabuntur, fiat ipsius commendatio et ubi res exigit emendatio.'

it lauds his zeal and encourages him to continue his writing.[94] Some fifteen years later, the author turns to Alexander III with a request that he deign to correct certain christological works, which Gerhoh is sending to him, as likewise a treatise on the errors of the Greeks which he has already sent.[95] No further instance of a direct request to the pope himself for correction and approval seems to occur before that of Godfrey of Viterbo who addresses his *Pantheon* to Urban III in 1186. Even though the work deals primarily with history, it is but reasonable, he says, that it be judged by, and receive its authority from, him to whose care God has committed things earthly as well as heavenly.[96] In the two other cases that have been noted recourse is had by the author to intermediaries to obtain the Supreme Pontiff's favour for his works. Like so many others, Herbert of Bosham, at a date shortly after 1170, recommends his revision of Peter Lombard's gloss on the epistles of St. Paul to William of the White Hands with the request that the prelate vouchsafe not only to accept the book but also to obtain for him the approval of the Apostolic See in order that he may continue his work on the other books of Scripture.[97] The archbishop's close associations with Pope Alexander III even at this date would make him a powerful advocate. But he would be yet more so after his elevation to the cardinalate (1179), and it is during this period of his life that Ralph Niger begs his assistance to have his works approved by the pope. A similar request is addressed by Niger to another of the best known cardinals of the time, Conrad of Wittelsbach, cardinal-bishop of Sabina, while still elsewhere the same Niger dedicates certain of his scriptural commentaries to the college of cardinals as a body, beseeching them to correct them and win for them the favour of the Holy See.[98]

Thanks to a number of documents still extant considerable information is available about the case of Ralph Niger. Not only can we observe his very real preoccupation about this furthest degree of preventive censorship or previous approbation for his works; but we can follow in detail the steps he took in obtaining it. A careful examination of the incidents in Ralph's life centring around this point will be justified by the interest they present even for the individual case, but yet more so because they may well serve to illuminate the obscurities left by the formulae of the foregoing texts and to fill in the bare outline which they provide concerning the matter of censorship.

III

Ralph Niger,[99] a native of England, came to Paris about the year 1160. As a student, as an exile from the wrath of his monarch Henry II, and probably as a teacher, he remained in France until shortly before 1194 when he appears to have returned to England there to die a few years later. While but few details of his life can be ascertained, references in his own works and in those of one or two contemporaries show him to have been in contact, and even on intimate terms, with some of the chief ecclesiastical figures of the third and fourth quarters of the twelfth century. He moved intimately in the circle of Thomas Becket and his followers during their exile in France. John of Salisbury seems to have been his closest friend among the group. He knew Conrad of the noble, and in 1180 ducal, house of Wittelsbach, later archbishop of Mainz and cardinal, well enough to be instrumental in bringing him into touch with Becket as early as 1165. He had ready recourse at various times to prelates of the rank of Maurice de Sully, Guy de Noyers and William of the White Hands. What school or schools he frequented at Paris, we cannot say for sure: Gerard Pucelle is the only one of his masters whom he mentions by name. John of Salisbury congratulated him on his choice of a school where virtue rather than empty argumentation was cultivated; this might well be an allusion to St. Genevieve where the reform consequent upon the introduction of Canons Regular in the middle of the century had already born fruit, or to St. Victor which had just produced men like Hugh and Richard, as saintly as they were scholarly.

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[94] The letter is published in one of the treatises in *Lib. de Lite*, III, 396; see n. 3 on the same page for other references to it; cf. preceding note of this article.

[95] Ep. 20, PL 193, 574: '. . . Ut ergo sciatis qualiter illi me habuerunt legere dignemini scripta nostra in curiam per latorem praesentium missa. Quibus lectis et perspectis, ubi videbor adjuvandus adjuvate; ubi emendandus emendate;' cf. col. 575.

[96] MGH, SS XXII, 131: 'Quare, si quod ystoriarum opus nova per aliquem institutione conficitur, ratio suggerit, ut, antequam in publicum deveniat, apostolico examini presentetur; quatinus, si acceptione dignum esse perpenditur, eius mandato et iudicio approbetur et ab eo vires auctoritatemque recipiat, cui terrena et celestia divinitus sunt commissa. Eapropter, reverendissime pater, hoc opusculum . . . ante vestrum examen perferre disposui.'

[97] 'Verum tue erit prudentie, beatissime presul, prout justum noverit, operam elaboratam acceptare, meum vero apostolice ecclesie invocare suffragium, ut in reliquis sacre scripture libris valeam ad optatum ipsius adhuc elaborare profectum' (*Journal des Savants*, Paris, 1900, p. 738; the prologue is there published by L. Delisle in an appendix to an article which he wrote on M. R. James's *Catalogue of the Western MSS in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge*).

[98] See below, n. 100, 102, 103.

[99] The following general remarks concerning Niger and his works are condensed from my article, 'Ralph Niger . . . ,' *Mediaeval Studies*, II (1940), 104-126.

Niger's literary works, with the exception of his two chronicles and perhaps two others, were composed during his stay on the continent, roughly between the years 1175 and 1194. They consist chiefly of scriptural works: commentaries on the first five, perhaps on the first seven, books of the Bible and on *Kings, Paralipomenon* and *Esdras*; an allegorical treatise on warfare and pilgrimages (*De Re Militari*) based largely on Old Testament sources; and a treatise on the Hebrew names contained in the Scriptures. This last work, as well as the offices which he composed for the four major feasts of the Blessed Virgin Mary, dates probably from the early 1190's and may well have been written after his return to England.

As mentioned at the beginning of this article, Niger displays in several parts of his works a nervous preoccupation about ecclesiastical approval for his books. It is this, along with the measures adopted to secure the approval, that concerns us here. Ralph did not content himself with acts of humility and of general submission, or with a mere desire for correction; he took steps to have his works actually examined and at the hands of competent censors. He informs us that no less an authority than the bishop of Paris, Maurice de Sully (1163-1196), a scholar of note himself, had been accustomed to see to the correction of his earlier works. The allusion is undoubtedly to his first commentaries on the Scriptures. In the schools of Paris, one could scarcely receive a more influential recommendation than that of the bishop whose particular duty it was to supervise these schools directly. Even as late as 1190, Ralph's chief reason for not then sending further works to the bishop was the latter's advancing age. Hence he turned to Guy de Noyers, archbishop of Sens, who could not however at the moment accede to his request. When others were approached, they found excuses either because the work involved was too great or on some other grounds. Ralph suspected that his own impecunity had something to do with their refusal. It was then (ca. 1190) that he had recourse 'like a beggar' to the most prominent ecclesiastic in France, William of Champagne or of the White Hands, metropolitan of Rheims, cardinal, and for the moment regent of the kingdom. He petitioned the archbishop to have his *De Re Militari* and his commentaries on the Mosaic books carefully examined before Ralph or anyone else should publish them. He was well aware that error might easily have crept in when dealing with so difficult a subject-matter, which he likens in one phrase to the wastes of the desert, in another to the depths of the sea. The archbishop should be able to find men suitable for the work of emendation and, if need be, even impose it upon them as a public task (*munus publicum*). Ralph was willing in advance to correct anything they might find to be false or contrary to the faith, provided of course they were men learned enough to fit them for the office of censor. His last recommendation is an intriguing one: he invited the examiners to render more graceful anything that was awkwardly expressed but urged them to eliminate nothing that was true and in conformity with the faith merely on the grounds that it was inelegant.[100]

We do not know what immediate results Niger's request produced. We do know, however, that a year or two later the archbishop of Rheims and the archbishop of Sens (still Guy de Noyers) were both conducting an investigation into his writings at the command of the Supreme Pontiff.[101] Had William taken the initiative of recommending the works to the pope for examination and approval? It is possible. Or had Ralph, in some letter now lost to us, begged him to take this step? The latter hypothesis is more probable. But there is a third possibility, namely that yet others had intervened on Ralph's behalf to obtain action from the Holy See. Evidence is to hand to show that even before the appeal to the archbishop of Rheims Niger had petitioned others to intercede for him at Rome in the interest of his writings. Some eight years earlier he had written to Cardinal Conrad of Wittelsbach, asking in the name of their long-standing friendship and in virtue of services rendered to him that Conrad use his influence among the other cardinals to have his works corrected and then to have them approved by the pope himself.[102] About the same time he was dedicating certain of his commentaries to the cardinals as a whole, or to a group of them at least, with a similar request.[103] Hence it may have been as a result of these efforts too that the eventual examination of his writings was undertaken. Be that as it may, the pope himself did take action and, moved by someone, commanded a diligent enquiry into Niger's works with a view to according them his approbation.

On February 7, 1191, Clement III wrote from the Lateran Palace to Guy de Noyers.[104] He had learned that Ralph Niger was the author of several volumes on the Scriptures the use of which might be profitable to the Church, but which had so far received no authorization. Wherefore he now commissioned the archbishop of Sens to choose prudent and capable men from his province, learned in law as well as in Scripture, to read carefully, and after deliberation to correct, if need there should be of correction, the works of Master Ralph. The archbishop was further instructed to lose no time in reporting to the pope in order that the books in question might be approved by the Apostolic See and listed among the works of Catholic authors (*inter catholicorum virorum opuscula computari*).

Six weeks later Clement III was dead. His commission had therefore no further force. Probably representations were made anew to his successor

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[100] These facts are reported by Ralph himself in the prologue to his *De Re Militari*, where he makes his request to Archbishop William; the parts of the prologue relative to them have been published as an appendix to the article cited in the preceding note, pp. 125-126.

[101] See below, n. 106.

[102] 'Tibi vero, dilecto Conrado Sabinensi episcopo et sancte Maguntine sedis archiepiscopo et Januensis ecclesie custodi, veteris amicitie gratia propensius supplico quatinus merita magnificientie, quibus incomparabiliter pressuris ecclesie Romane communicasti, apud dominos et fratres vestros cardinales michi suffragantur ut operi ab eis emendato autoritatis apostolice suffragium implorent . . .' (published by M. Preiss, *Die Tätigkeit . . . der Cisterzienser im Schisma* 1159-1177, Berlin, 1934, p. 261; cf. Flahiff, *art. cit.*, p. 105).

[103] Prologue to the first part of the commentary on *Kings* (Lincoln Cathedral Library, *Ms* 25, fol. 2-2v); also prologues to the commentaries on *Paralipomenon* and *Esdras* (Lincoln *Ms* 27, fol. 1-1v, 113). The end of the prologue to *Paralipomenon* is typical: '. . . expurgatione presentis triture ecclesie Dei et mihi pro debito officii vestri satisfaciatis et apostolici culminis favorem operi emendato concilietis.'

[104] W. Holtzmann, *Papsturkunden in England.* 2 Band. *Die kirchlichen Archive und Bibliotheken* (Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft zu Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Phil.-Hist. Klasse, ser. 3, no. 14, 15), pp. 453-454, no. 258.

Celestine III. If not, then the case of Ralph Niger must have been considered as rather important, since among the earliest letters of the latter occurs a word-for-word renewal of the command given by his predecessor to the archbishop of Sens, dated April 24 of the same year 1191.[105]

Guy de Noyers was not the only censor of Ralph's works. The writings were divided between the archbishop of Sens and his neighbour the archbishop of Rheims to be examined. We may suppose therefore that William of the White Hands received a commission similar to Guy's, which however has not come down to us. A copy of the letter to Guy was preserved, thanks to its inclusion in a note made at Sens regarding the whole matter of the censorship of Niger's works. The note provides us with interesting details regarding what happened to those books which fell to the lot of the archbishop of Sens.

Guy took it upon himself to examine the second part of the commentary on *Kings* (Books III, IV), while the first part was committed to a canon of the cathedral, Petrus Anglicus, and a number of his brother canons to be studied in common. The commentary on *Paralipomenon* and that on *Esdras* were entrusted to the abbot and canons of the Premonstratensian house of Saint-Marien at Auxerre. The commentary on *Numbers* came into the hands of other Premonstratensians at Dilo not far from Joigny. The scrutiny must have been a careful one: the deputed censors kept the books from the feast of St. John the Baptist (June 24) until the following Easter (evidently of the year 1192: April 5). And it is significantly added that far from complaining of the task that had been enjoined upon them, they rendered much thanks.

On the strength of this detailed examination, the archbishop reported in favorable terms to Pope Celestine, probably in the Spring of 1192. He had carried out exactly, he says, the prescriptions given him by the Supreme Pontiff and was now in a position to state that the learned and prudent men who had read and reread Master Ralph Niger's volumes had found in them nothing whatsoever either contrary to the faith or dangerous to Christian doctrine.[106]

This is as far as we are able to trace the censorship of Niger's works. We know nothing of the part taken by the archbishop of Rheims, beyond the mention in the Sens note to the effect that the censorship of a number of the books was his charge. Presumably he proceeded to an examination and report along the same lines as his fellow archbishop. Nor do we know for sure if Ralph received at last the much desired approval of the Holy See. There is no reason to suppose that he did not. The tone of Celestine III's commission to Guy is such that one may well conclude that, once the favorable report of the censors was received, the pope would readily issue a letter of approbation confirming the orthodoxy, and even recommending the use, of Niger's scriptural works. What it availed the author, we likewise do not know. But the incident has for us a considerable interest in itself as illustrating more fully than is done anywhere else the steps of an actual censorship in the late twelfth century.

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[105] Holtzmann, p. 454, no. 259.

[106] Holtzmann, p. 454-455: '[D]iuisis uoluminibus inter dominum Guidonem Senonensem archiepiscopum et dominum Remensem archiepiscopum idem dominus Senonensis assumpsit sibi ipsi secundam partem moralium Regum ad inspiciendum et examinandum, priorem vero partem moralium Regum tradidit magistro Petro Anglico canonico et aliis canonicis in commune ad inspiciendum et examinandum. Epithome uero ueteris testamenti et remediarum Esdre commisit domino abbati sancti Mariani Altisiodorensis et canonicis eius ad inspiciendum et examinandum. Digestum uero Numeri inspiciendum et examinandum commisit abbati Dei loci et canonicis eius. A festo uero beati Iohannis baptiste usque ad sequens pascha fuerunt libri apud eos, quos tunc cum multa gratiarum actione et sine omni querela restituerunt. Unde et prefatus archiepiscopus rescripsit domino pape Celestino in hec verba:

> [S]anctissimo patri et domino reverendo Celestino Dei gratia summo pontifici G. Senonensis ecclesie minister humilis salutem et debitam in omnibus obedientiam . . . Nos itaque mandato uestro ea qua debuimus sollicitudine utentes iam dicta uolumina uiris prudentibus et in utroque testamento plenius eruditis tradidimus, qui longa deliberatione ea legentes et relegentes nichil in ipsis inuenerunt sacre fidei contrarium uel doctrine christiane periculosum.'

Were there other cases similar to this one? If so, the record of them seems not to have been preserved for us. One thing, nevertheless, it seems justifiable to conclude: the concrete evidence of actual censorship in the case of Niger will not permit us to classify indiscriminately all the requests for correction contained in letters and prefaces as no more than empty formulae. There is a striking resemblance between many of Ralph's expressions and those quoted above from other documents. It could very well be therefore that some at least of these others were preliminary steps to an actual examination, even if the sequel does remain unknown to us. Niger's reference to the fact that Maurice de Sully regularly (*consuevit*) corrected his works for him is further evidence that the practice could be quite normal and not exceptional. It seems not too rash to argue from analogy that others took similar steps and that only the documentary evidence of this is lacking. Nor, for that matter, is it completely lacking: in the case of Gerhoh of Reichersberg[107] and in that of Wolbero of St. Pantaleon,[108] we have some sparse information about the steps of an actual examination of certain works and the approval received.

For all that, Ralph Niger's preoccupation with the matter of approval for his writings does strike us as extraordinarily insistent. And it carries on into his later works where expressions similar to the foregoing are to be found, inviting criticism and correction from prudent and learned men. Such is the case for a part of his longer chronicle and for his *De IV Festivitatibus Beatae Mariae Virginis*.[109] Can it be accounted for? We can never be sure of having the complete explanation of Ralph's attitude, but certainly it does become much more comprehensible when placed in its historical setting. A number of interesting facts can be adduced.

There is, in the first place, the whole atmosphere at Paris during the years that Niger was a resident of the city. Echoes still lingered of the condemnation of Abelard and of the charges levelled against Gilbert de la Porrée. Both John of Salisbury and Thomas Becket, with whom Ralph was closely associated, had been present at the Council of Rheims (1148) when the case of Gilbert de la Porrée was investigated. Repeated efforts were being made in the years between 1163 and 1179 to bring about a formal condemnation of Peter Lombard. Even the reputation which he had earned as one of Paris's greatest and most influential teachers did not render him immune from the charge of heresy. Niger was later to seek approval for his works from the very prelate, William of the White Hands, who was charged by Pope Alexander III to condemn the erroneous christological statement attributed to the Lombard. The only one of his masters whom Ralph mentions by name, Gerard Pucelle, was for a certain time under ecclesiastical censure for his association with the schismatic archbishop of Cologne.[110] All this could not but serve to make Master Ralph cautious, to say the least. He was by nature a conservative, and probably by training, too. His marked interest in biblical studies, his method of commenting on the Scriptures and the allegorical character of his *De Re Militari* would lead us to place him in the Victorine tradition, whether or not he was ever directly associated with St. Victor or St. Genevieve. There is nothing of the dialectician about him; his appeal is always to the authority of the Fathers and the canons of the Church. Finally, as a teacher during these years of intellectual ferment wherein the danger of heresy seemed ever to lurk, Niger may well have desired, besides the personal approval of himself as a master, the added safeguard of the stamp of orthodoxy upon his books.

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[107] N. 93, 94.

[108] N. 87.

[109] Flahiff, *art. cit.*, p. 122, n. 101 and p. 115, n. 60.

[110] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

A number of general conclusions may be drawn from this review of censorship in the twelfth century. Like the previous centuries it too offers evidence of the continued exercise of a *censura repressiva* which, without searching out books deemed to be heretical, examines and condemns them once they have been cited to ecclesiastical authorities. Likewise it offers evidence of the reality of a *censura praevia* in one clear-cut case at least, that of Master Ralph Niger. It is not an obligatory censorship imposed by authority; on the contrary, it is sought voluntarily by the author and accorded only after he has begged for it. There would seem therefore to be no regular machinery easily to be set in motion for the task. Nevertheless, when Niger's petition is heard, the pope himself orders an investigation, the books are carefully read, and a favorable report is made to the Holy See. The detail with which we know the case of Niger is unparalleled in the twelfth century.

This instance of actual censorship may represent an isolated and exceptional case. On the other hand, the case may be exceptional only in the sense that for it alone are documents enough extant to provide a fairly complete picture of the various steps taken in having a book approved. For a great many other cases there is documentary evidence of considerable preoccupation about approval: authors' prefaces and letters ranging in tone from mere acts of humility and apologies for undertaking so difficult a task to general submission in advance to ecclesiastical authority and even to explicit requests for the correction of certain works. One might be tempted to lump all these and classify them as empty literary formulae. But the case of Ralph Niger is there to prove that in one instance at least formulae of this sort were actually the first step in a procedure that terminated in a careful censorship of books. It may well have happened in other cases too. However this may be, these repeated expressions must certainly witness to a desire on the part of many writers in the second half of the twelfth century to have their works corrected and approved before publication. For what reason? Undoubtedly for the same one as in the case of Niger; the background of several outstanding condemnations during the century and the hotly controversial atmosphere of the latter part of it made them chary of going ahead without some sort of previous approbation.

It would be interesting to know if any special significance is to be attached to Niger's persistence in seeking papal approval. Was it just a fixed idea of his? Possibly so; but there is the further possibility that it is not unconnected with the growing interest of the Church's highest authority in the *Studium* at Paris. D'Irsay has already noted that ever since the 1160's Paris was rapidly becoming a universal centre of ecclesiastical studies. The responsibility for it tended to pass out of the hands of the local bishop into those of the pope himself. The Supreme Pontiff had more than a growing interest in it; he was already exercising something of that supervision which was to be a regular thing after the turn of the century.[111] Conscious of this fact, Niger may have deemed that papal approbation alone would be an adequate guarantee. Hence his elaborate steps among the cardinals to have his books accepted and recommended by the Holy See.

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[111] S. d'Irsay, *Histoire des universités françaises et étrangères,* I (Paris, 1933), 64-65, 67-69.

Spontanéité et Indépendance

JACQUES MARITAIN

ON sait que la métaphysique thomiste est une métaphysique des degrés de l'être,—ce qui implique le double mouvement de procession ou de descente à partir de la Source de l'être, et de conversion ou de remontée vers cette Source, dont l'idée était centrale chez Plotin, et dont la *philosophia perennis* a élaboré la doctrine sous l'impulsion de la révélation judéo-chrétienne et en transfigurant Plotin. Cette métaphysique des degrés de l'être est en même temps une métaphysique des degrés de spontanéité et finalement d'indépendance. C'est de des degrés de spontanéité que je voudrais esquisser la description philosophique, en m'inspirant de la doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin.[1]

Etre libre, d'une façon générale, c'est ne pas souffrir d'empêchement, n'être pas lié. Cette même notion générale peut se réaliser selon deux types spécifiquement différents. Il y a une liberté qui consiste dans l'absence de *nécessité*, même interne, de tout déterminisme: c'est la liberté de choix, ou le libre arbitre. Et il y a une autre liberté que la liberté de choix, une liberté qui consiste dans l'absence de *contrainte*. C'est des degrés de cette seconde sorte de liberté, ou de la liberté de spontanéité, qu'il sera question ici.

Il y a, au plus bas de l'échelle ontologique, un tout premier degré de spontanéité qui concerne la nature en général: puisque la nature, au sens aristotélicien, est en chaque être le premier principe d'activité de celui-ci, toute nature comporte donc un certain minimum de spontanéité. Déjà, dans le langage courant, on dit qu'une pierre tombe "librement" quand rien ne l'empêche de suivre la loi de la gravitation qui est celle de sa nature. Pour prendre un meilleur exemple, disons que dans un atome les électrons tournent "librement" autour du noyau. Il y a une spontanéité qui convient aux substances corporelles non vivantes, celles-ci ne sont pas des machines naturelles; si c'étaient des machines naturelles, comme le voulait le cartésianisme, il n'y aurait pas du tout de spontanéité chez elles; mais ce ne sont pas des machines naturelles, (concept en lui-même contradictoire); ce ne sont pas des assemblages de parties géométriques comme le pensait Descartes, ce sont des natures; elles ont en soi, et *comme les constituant*, un principe radical interne d'activité; toutefois cette activité est exclusivement tournée vers le dehors, c'est une activité *transitive*, et dans l'interaction des corps les uns sur les autres, elle s'exerce suivant ce qu'on peut appeler avec saint Thomas des *formae inditae a natura*, des "formes reçues de la nature,"—formes reçues de la nature ou principes prochains d'activité qui traduisent dans l'ordre opératif la "forme substantielle" des corps en question. En langage moderne nous pourrions dire que cette activité s'exerce suivant les "conditions de construction" typiques de chaque substance corporelle; ou, si l'on veut, à raison de la structure constitutive de celle-ci.

En bref, nous avons ici deux notes: des formes *inditae a natura*, des conditions de construction suivant lesquelles s'accomplit tout ce que l'être en question accomplit; et une activité exclusivement réduite à l'action transitive mutuellement exercée et reçue. De telle sorte que tout en ayant le minimum de spontanéité impliqué dans la notion de nature, l'être corporel, à ce degré-là, n'agit que réglé à chaque instant par les actions du dehors qui s'exercent sur lui.

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[1] Cf. *Sum. Theol.* I, q.18, a.3; et surtout *Summa contra Gentes*, Lib. I, c. 97-99 et Lib. IV, c.14.

Un second degré de spontanéité est présenté par les organismes corporels vivant de la vie végétative. Cette fois nous avons affaire non plus à une activité transitive, mais à une activité *immanente*, nous avons affaire à l'activité auto-constructive et auto-perfectionnante propre à la vie; mais c'est le degré le plus bas de l'activité immanente; c'est une activité immanente par rapport au tout qui s'élève lui-même en qualité ontologique, si je puis ainsi parler, mais elle s'exerce au moyen de l'action d'une partie de l'organisme sur une autre partie; l'action transitive joue encore là un rôle essentiel, selon qu'une partie de l'organisme ou de la cellule vivante est extérieure à l'autre et agit à ce titre sur celle-ci: parce que nous sommes encore dans le domaine propre de la matière. Et cette activité immanente usant de l'activité transitive s'exerce encore suivant des *formae inditae a natura*, suivant les *conditions de construction* ou la structure constitutive des organismes. La plante vit, elle assimile, elle transforme les aliments tirés du sol en sa propre substance, mais c'est suivant le déterminisme lié à sa propre structure ontologique dans ses relations avec les autres corps que ces processus s'accomplissent. Il y a en elle une activité immanente, et à ce titre-là elle est moins soumise au monde extérieur que le minéral, elle commence à n'être plus une simple partie de l'univers matériel, elle commence à être l'ébauche d'un tout, elle commence à intérioriser les actions qu'elle reçoit du dehors, cependant elle est à peine un tout et elle reste, dans toute son activité, liée aux conditions du milieu. La plante est plus libre que l'atome, elle est encore cependant toute liée au monde des actions physiques. On peut dire qu'avec elle une poussée de spontanéité nouvelle, celle de la vie, tend à soulever la masse de la matière; elle n'y réussit qu'à peine.

En résumé nous avons ici, comme dans le cas des êtres non vivants, une activité s'accomplissant tout entière suivant des *formae inditae a natura*, suivant les conditions de construction de la chose, mais cette fois c'est une activité qui est, quoique d'une façon très imparfaite, déjà immanente et non plus exclusivement transitive.

La réussite de la vie est meilleure dans les fonctions qui sont le privilège de l'animal. Nous pouvons dire que nous sommes ici à un troisième degré de spontanéité, le degré propre à la vie sensitive. Considérez le vol de l'oiseau, il est réglé à chaque instant par les sensations que l'oiseau éprouve et par les objets qu'il voit. L'animal agit, il se déplace dans l'espace selon des formes ou des "patrons de mouvement"—qui sont maintenant des structures psychiques, des perceptions, des formes non plus innées ou données par la nature, mais reçues "intentionnellement" ou immatériellement par le sens, et relevant de cette activité immanente, immatérielle, et beaucoup plus typiquement immanente que l'activité végétative, qui caractérise déjà la connaissance du sens.

Nous voilà au seuil d'une spontanéité plus haute, qui n'est plus seulement naturelle ou physique, mais déjà, dans une certaine mesure, supra-matérielle ou supra-physique. L'animal, dans ses fonctions typiques de motricité, n'agit pas seulement en fonction des structures constitutives, ou des conditions de construction qu'il a reçues de la nature, mais aussi en fonctions *d'objets* qui viennent en lui par l'activité immanente de la perception. Cela n'empêche pas qu'il est encore réglé par le dehors, mais cette fois ce ne sont plus les actions transitives exercées sur lui par le milieu qui règlent son activité, ce sont des objets perçus; ce qui implique une charge d'immanence et de spontanéité beaucoup plus haute; c'est à condition d'être intériorisé par la perception des sens externes et d'éveiller les "notions" des sens internes et de ce que les anciens appelaient l'"estimative", la connaissance propre à l'instinct, que le milieu règle l'activité de l'animal. On pourrait dire que la notion de l'*au-dedans*, qui se réalise déjà, mais au minimum, chez l'atome, se transfigure quand on passe à l'animal. Il est vraiment déjà l'ébauche d'un tout. Encore réglé par "le dehors", le "dedans" chez lui prend une telle valeur qu'il est, surtout dans les plus hautes formes de vie animale, comme sur le point d'échapper à ce réglage.

Disons, avec saint Thomas, de l'animal comme tel ou considéré dans sa vie sensitive: *Animal est se movens quantum ad formam ipsam quae est principium motus*; il se meut lui-même quant à la "forme" même qui est le principe de son acte; et cette "forme" ou ce patron de mouvement, il se la donne par l'activité immanente du sens, il ne l'a pas reçue de la nature, ce n'est pas une des conditions de structure de son être entitatif, de son être de nature, c'est sa propre activité immanente qui lui donne cette "forme" selon laquelle s'accomplira son mouvement.

Toutefois, c'est encore là le plus bas degré, non pas de la vie—le plus bas degré de vie c'est la vie végétative—mais le plus bas degré de connaissance, et c'est un degré encore assez bas de la liberté de spontanéité. C'est une victoire sur la matière inanimée que le vol d'un oiseau, et son aisance à se mouvoir qui éclate en cris. Mais les fins de son activité et de son mouvement, il ne se les donne pas ainsi à lui-même; elles sont toutes préétablies par sa nature, et ce vol que nous disons libre, et qui dépend des perceptions de l'oiseau, s'accomplit selon des structures psychiques et des instincts qui font partie des conditions de construction reçues de la nature par l'oiseau. Le supra-physique est ici, si nous pouvons ainsi parler, immédiatement saisi et employé par le physique.

Le quatrième degré de liberté de spontanéité est celui de la vie intellective. Non seulement l'être humain agit selon des formes ou des patrons d'activité qui ne sont pas pré-établies par sa nature, mais reçues de sa propre activité de connaissance, mais encore *les fins de ses actes* ne lui sont pas, comme celles de l'instinct animal, imposées par la nature; étant capable de dépasser le moment du sens, et de connaître l'être, et les natures intelligibles, il connaît ce qu'il fait, et la fin de ses actes comme telle; il se détermine à lui-même, par sa propre activité intellectuelle, les fins de son agir. L'homme, si imparfaitement que ce soit, est vraiment et proprement un tout (une personne).

On pourrait noter qu'à ce degré de l'échelle ontologique le mot *nature*, en passant le seuil du spirituel, prend un sens différent. Aux degrés inférieurs on avait affaire à la nature sensible, ou, si on peut ainsi parler—cela a l'air d'une tautologie—à *la nature physique*, le mot physique ayant pris ce sens restreint, parce que la *phusis* aristotélicienne désigne l'analogué primitif du concept de nature, la nature telle qu'elle se présente d'abord à notre regard d'hommes, qui se porte primitivement aux choses visibles et tangibles; c'était là l'univers du temps et du mouvement, de la nature sensible, de la "physique" au sens aristotélicien du mot.

A partir du quatrième degré de spontanéité, on a affaire à l'univers des choses spirituelles, qui forme comme l'étage supérieur de la création. Ces choses-là aussi ont un être, une nature. Et nous retrouvons ici le mot nature, mais dans un sens très épuré, et qui en réalité n'a plus qu'une communauté analogique avec la nature telle que nous la rencontrons aux trois premiers degrés de spirituelles, qui forme comme l'étage supérieur de la création. Ces choses-là sans plus rien de sensible ou d'imaginable. Leibniz appelait "royaume des esprits" cet univers de la nature spirituelle, il est au-delà de la nature sensible, mais non pas au-delà de toute nature créable.

Il y a là l'origine d'une équivoque que l'on rencontre assez fréquemment. Certains auteurs nous diront, exposant par exemple la métaphysique hindoue, que c'est une métaphysique du "surnaturel", parce qu'elle traite de ce qui est au dessus de la nature au sens de *nature sensible;* mais il ne s'agit pas là de ce qui est supra-naturel comme transcendant la nature au sens de *nature créable*. Le surnaturel, tel que la notion en a été fixée par la théologie chrétienne, se définit comme ce qui est au-dessus de toute nature (de tout principe naturel d'opération) possible ou créable; ce qui est au-dessus de la nature sensible et physique est encore nature, nature spirituelle; disons que c'est l'univers de la nature supra-physique ou métaphysique. Il ne faut pas croire, comme certaines métaphysiques modernes auraient tendance à le supposer, que lorsqu'on passe au delà de la nature sensible on entre dans un monde où il n'y a plus de nature, où le mot nature perd son sens. Certains refusent même parfois à l'esprit, à l'intelligence, une nature, une essence, une structure, comme si c'était offenser la dignité de l'intelligence et de l'esprit. Il y a là des natures, des structures, des essences,—qui n'ont qu'une communauté analogique avec la nature physique et matérielle.

C'est dans cet univers de la nature supra-physique ou métaphysique que s'enracine le monde de la liberté de choix qui est en même temps le monde de la moralité: la liberté de choix étant une propriété inaliénable des natures spirituelles. De cette liberté de choix, de ce libre arbitre, je n'ai pas à parler ici; mais ce qui importe à notre considération présente, c'est le degré supérieur de liberté de spontanéité qui paraît du même coup. Car en même temps que la liberté de choix paraissent la personnalité et tous les privilèges de la personnalité.

On peut dire qu'à ce moment-là, la liberté de spontanéité devient liberté d'indépendance; cette indépendance se préparait à tous les degrés précédents, mais on ne pouvait encore parler à leur sujet d'indépendance au sens propre, tandis qu'ici nous avons, si imparfaite, si déficiente qu'elle soit, nous avons déjà indépendance au sens propre du mot, parce que maintenant nous avons affaire à des *personnes* maîtresses de leurs actions, et qui, dans la mesure où elles existent et agissent comme personnes, sont chacune comme un tout, ou un univers.

Par l'intelligence et par la volonté n'est-ce pas l'univers tout entier qui va entrer dans l'âme, et y devenir, une fois existant là selon l'être intentionnel et sous un mode immatériel, forme et principe intérieur des actions que l'âme fera librement procéder au dehors? La nature supra-physique de l'intelligent et de l'aimant comme tel s'épanouit en lui dans une activité de surabondance, libre de toute contrainte extérieure, et même—si on peut ainsi parler—de cette sorte de contrainte intérieure que constitue pour chaque être créé sa nature, sa structure constitutive—le mot contrainte est tout à fait impropre ici, mais je l'emploie pour indiquer que cette structure constitutive, cette nature est reçue, et en ce sens elle s'impose à nous, nous ne nous la donnons pas. Dans l'intelligent et l'aimant comme tel, au contraire, toute la réalité extérieure s'intériorise au sein de cette activité immatérielle et intentionnelle qui est sienne et procède de lui.

Considérons la ligne des aspirations transcendantales de la personne comme telle, non pas en tant qu'enfermée dans une nature à tel degré ontologique, mais selon la transcendantalité analogique elle-même de la notion objective de personne. En d'autres termes, considérons la ligne des aspirations "trans-naturelles" de la personnalité comme perfection transcendantale.[2] Que toute mon activité provienne de moi comme de sa source, et soit réglée par moi; que je me suffise entièrement pour vivre, selon cette exigence d'*autarkeia* qui est inscrite dans sa notion, voilà ce que demande en moi la personnalité comme perfection transcendantale, selon une aspiration qui n'est certes pas ce que les philosophes appellent un désir efficace, ni même un désir élicite, mais qui est une aspiration réelle, une aspiration ontologique identique à cette perfection transcendantale elle-même. Que la condition suprême de l'opération d'intelligence et d'amour dans sa flamme la plus actuelle soit la condition de mon existence tout entière! C'est à cette parfaite spontanéité que se porte naturellement, bien qu'inefficace-ment, le désir de la personne prise dans la transcendantalité de son constitutif intelligible; parce que dire personne c'est dire indépendance; la personne se définit par l'indépendance, et la spontanéité dont il s'agit là, c'est le sommet de l'indépendance de la personne.

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[2] Dans les considerations qui suivent, nous ne parlons pas de la personne *qui est moi* mais de *la personne en moi.*

Indépendante dans sa racine métaphysique, du fait qu'elle surgit dans la création comme une substance intelligente et douée de la liberté de choix, la personne, considérée dans la pure ligne de ses aspirations transcendantales ou transnaturelles de personne, demande ainsi à passer à des degrés de plus en plus élevés de liberté de spontanéité ou d'indépendance, mais ces aspirations sont des aspirations au surhumain, qui, lorsqu'elles se réfractent dans la zone des sentiments, nous tourmentent sans nous satisfaire. A la vérité c'est en Dieu seul qu'elles trouvent leur accomplissement. Dans toute personne créée elles sont soumises à de strictes limitations naturelles, et subissent d'inéluctables défaites métaphysiques.

La première de ces limitations ou de ces défaites est celle qui est imposée aux personnes qui ne sont pas de purs esprits, aux personnes telles que la personne humaine, par la nature matérielle avec ses servitudes et avec ses fatalités.—Remarquons ici que le corps fait tellement partie de la personne humaine que saint Thomas enseigne que les âmes séparées ne méritent pas le nom de personnes, parce que la notion de personne implique que ce qui subsiste (avec intelligence et liberté) est une nature complète, et l'âme séparée n'est pas une nature complète, elle demande essentiellement à informer un corps et c'est seulement lorsque l'âme et le corps sont unis que la substance complète ainsi constituée mérite le nom de personne.

Le corps fait donc ainsi nécessairement partie de la personne humaine, et cependant en même temps il la diminue, puisqu'il lui impose une foule de contraintes et de limitations qui viennent de ce que par le corps la personne plonge dans la nature physique et est soumise, à ce point de vue-là, comme l'animal et la plante, à toutes les interactions de ce monde et à toutes les dépendances qu'elles entraînent.

Il y a une seconde sorte de défaite ou de limitation, qui se rapporte cette fois à toute nature créée quelle qu'elle soit; c'est que même les esprits purs dépendent, dans leur vie d'intelligence et d'amour, d'objets et de règles autres qu'eux-mêmes; cette dépendance à l'égard d'objets et de règles autres que soi-même ne mérite évidemment pas le nom de contrainte, ce n'est ni une contrainte extérieure, ni une contrainte intérieure au sens impropre auquel je recourais tout à l'heure lorsque je disais que la nature elle-même est une sorte de contrainte interne, cependant elle fait subir une défaite ou une limitation inéluctable à cette aspiration transnaturelle à l'indépendance qui est intrinsèque à la personne dans sa pure ligne de personne.

Enfin on peut dire qu'il y a comme une sorte de conflit chez nous entre personne et nature, j'entends entre la ligne métaphysique de la personne et la ligne métaphysique de la nature; comme nous le disions tout à l'heure, la nature implique des structures constitutives *reçues* et déterminées *ad unum*; ces structures sont reçues, elles ne viennent pas de la personne comme sujet premier d'opération indépendant; notre intelligence a une nature (supraphysique), notre volonté aussi; elles sont ainsi, en tant que puissances ou facultés, distinctes de cette actuation immatérielle de surabondance, de ce feu actuel qui est leur opération, et qui, comme telle, émane de la personne et marque l'épanouissement de sa spontanéité; la nature de mon intelligence et celle de ma volonté sont reçues, elles ne viennent pas de ma personne.

D'autre part toute nature est déterminée par elle-même, en tant que nature, à un certain effet particulier qui est autre que moi; il en est ainsi même quand ce terme auquel elle est déterminée est la surexistence immatérielle et illimitée de la connaissance et de l'amour. La connaissance est déterminée par sa nature à la surexistence immatérielle du connaître, la volonté est déterminée par la nature à la surexistence immatérielle de l'amour. Mais la personne dans sa pure ligne transcendantale que nous considérons abstraitement, demande à se déterminer elle-même dans son être même,—il ne s'agit pas là d'un désir élicite, mais d'une postulation transnaturelle cachée dans l'être même de la personne; et il s'agit d'une postulation inefficace et qui, prise absolument, est purement et simplement insatisfaisable, sinon en Dieu, mais qui est pourtant surnaturellement satisfaite dans les créatures, d'une certaine manière, je dis *selon l'être intentionnel,* quand elles parviennent à la vision de Dieu, car en voyant l'essence divine la créature devient intentionnellement *Ipsum esse subsistens.* La personne, donc, aspire, d'une aspiration inefficace qui ne fait qu'un avec son être, à se mouvoir ou se déterminer elle-même, si c'était possible, quant à ce qu'elle est, (non plus seulement quant aux formes de son mouvement, ni quant aux fins de son activité, mais encore, au dernier degré de la spontanéité métaphysique, quant à cela même qu'elle est) et quant à son existence,—quant à un terme qui ne soit pas autre chose qu'elle-même.

Nous voyons que cette aspiration selon laquelle l'inférieur, à tous les degrés ontologiques, cherche à se joindre au supérieur, est en définitive une aspiration transnaturelle à rejoindre la condition divine et increée; une aspiration à une perfection de l'être telle que l'essence soit alors identique à l'existence, et que l'existence désignée, d'une façon purement descriptive, comme ce par quoi les choses "sont posées hors du néant," disons l'existence entitative, soit elle-même l'existence de surabondance de l'intelligence et de l'amour, du connaître et de l'aimer; cette existence de connaissance par laquelle le connaissant est soi-même et les choses d'une façon surprasubjective, et cette existence d'amour selon laquelle celui qui aime existe d'une existence meilleure que son existence entitative, existe par mode de don. Leibniz s'est trompé en pensant que pour les choses c'est un *mal métaphysique* de n'être pas Dieu (comme si la condition divine leur était due! Car le mal est *privatio boni debiti*). Mais ce serait une erreur inverse de méconnaître l'aspiration à Dieu et à la condition divine qui traverse tous les êtres et qui explique à la fois le dynamisme de la nature et les convenances, ou, comme on dit de nos jours, les possibilités d'insertion de l'ordre surnaturel et des dons surnaturels. Car c'est à un terme absolument transcendant et absolument impossible à atteindre par les seules forces de la nature qu'aspirent tous les êtres de la nature. S'ils aiment tous Dieu plus qu'eux-mêmes, n'est-ce pas pour le joindre et entrer, si possible, dans la condition de l'aimé?

On nous permettra ici, pour éviter tout malentendu, une courte digression.

Si nous considérons une nature enfermée dans un genre et dans une espèce, elle tend à toute la perfection convenable à son espèce et à son genre, elle ne tend pas à la perfection propre au genre ou à l'espèce supérieurs; et c'est seulement en aspirant à la plénitude dont son genre ou son espèce est capable que l'inférieur cherche ainsi à se joindre au supérieur, *supremum inferius attingit infimum superius.* "Il y a en chaque être," dit saint Thomas, "un désir naturel de conserver son être (*suum esse*, son exister): et il ne conserverait pas son exister, s'il était changé en une nature plus élevée. C'est pourquoi aucune chose constituée dans un degré de nature inférieur, ne peut désirer le degré propre d'une nature supérieure: ainsi l'âne ne désire pas être cheval: parce que, s'il était transféré au degré d'une nature supérieure, voilà que lui-même il cesserait d'exister, *jam ipsum non esset.*"[3]

Mais il en va tout autrement si nous considérons, non plus une nature enfermée dans un genre et une espèce, mais une perfection transcendantale dans sa ligne métaphysique. Par là même qu'un transcendantal n'est pas enfermé dans une espèce et dans un genre, il ne perd pas son être, il ne perd pas son exister en passant aux degrés de ses analogués supérieurs: à le considérer, par abstraction, dans sa ligne métaphysique propre, il est de plus en plus lui-même et il passe à son exister le plus parfait à mesure qu'il passe à des degrés supérieurs. Loin de perdre son être, il le sauve, il l'accroît ainsi. Il aspire donc à la condition supérieure, dans laquelle il se réalise mieux.

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[3] *Sum. Theol.* I, q.63, a.3.

Ce n'est pas moi qui aspire à l'*esse divinum*, je n'aspire pas à être Dieu; ni l'ange ni aucune créature ne peut désirer être *ut Deus par aequiparantiam*. Mais l'*être* en moi aspire à l'*esse divinum*, désire, oui, passer à une condition divine. Et c'est à cause de cela que *moi* j'aspire à ressembler à Dieu, et que toute créature désire être *ut Deus per similitudinem*. Les bons anges, enseigne saint Thomas, ont désiré cela de la bonne manière; les mauvais ont désiré cette chose bonne d'une mauvaise manière, en désirant d'avoir la béatitude finale mais de l'avoir "*per suam virtutem, quod est proprium Dei.*"

Il est clair que l'aspiration du transcendantal *être*, considéré dans sa ligne propre, à l'*esse divinum*, n'est pas une aspiration du sujet lui-même qui a l'être et qui est constitué à tel degré spécifique et générique. Il n'y a dans le sujet créé, aucun désir, même conditionnel et inefficace, d'être Dieu. Mais en tant même que transcendantal et dans cette pure ligne métaphysique l'être tend à l'Etre par soi, se dirige vers lui, veut entrer dans sa condition incréée, parce que c'est ainsi que l'être a la plénitude absolue de sa perfection et de son intelligibilité. C'est là le fondement dernier pour lequel tout sujet créé aime naturellement Dieu plus que lui-même. C'est aussi le fondement dernier de tous les désirs (élicites) conditionnels et inefficaces qui habitent le sujet humain, et dont le principal est le désir de voir la Cause première dans son essence.

Ce que je viens de dire de l'être pris dans sa ligne métaphysique propre, on peut le dire aussi de la personnalité. A raison de son constitutif ontologique radical la personnalité (je ne dis pas ma personne, je dis la personnalité en moi) tend à une existence qui soit elle-même une existence d'intellection et d'amour, qui comporte la spontanéité pure de l'existence d'intellection et d'amour. Il ne s'agit pas là d'un désir naturel ou élicite, si conditionnel et inefficace fût-il, du sujet lui-même, mais d'une tendance ontologique qui se révèle au regard du philosophe lorsqu'il scrute le constitutif formel de cet objet transcendantal qui s'appelle personnalité.

Nous arrivons ainsi à la *spontanéité absolue* de l'essence et de l'existence divine. Il importe de comprendre que l'essence de Dieu, étant strictement identique à son acte d'intellection, consiste dans l'acte de se voir soi-même et dans l'acte aussi de s'aimer. L'erreur extrême d'une philosophie libertiste—c'est là que nous voyons l'importance de la distinction entre liberté de spontanéité et liberté de choix—l'erreur extrême d'une philosophie libertiste serait de confondre cette liberté de spontanéité de l'essence et de l'existence divine elle-même avec une liberté de choix; ce serait dire: Dieu existe parce qu'il le veut librement, ce serait faire dépendre l'existence divine d'un acte de libre arbitre. Ce n'est pas en ce sens-là que l'existence divine est libre, mais si nous considérons la liberté de spontanéité il faut dire que l'existence divine, qui est ce qu'il y a de plus nécessaire et la nécessité par excellence, est en même temps la liberté de spontanéité, d'indépendance et d'exultation par excellence. Il y a en Dieu l'infini de la nécessité et l'infini de la spontanéité, et ces deux choses se confondent; je crois qu'il est très important de comprendre cela parce qu'on a souvent une manière un peu matérielle d'entendre les propositions les plus vraies, et lorsqu'on parle de la nécessité absolue, infinie, de l'essence et de l'existence divine, on oublie parfois que cette nécessité infinie est en même temps une spontanéité infinie; et nous voyons aussi par là qu'il est absurde d'opposer nécessité et spontanéité,—la nécessité s'oppose à la liberté de choix, mais non à la liberté de spontanéité,—puisque nous avons ici tout à la fois le sommet de la spontanéité et de la nécessité.

Cette tendance à matérialiser les notions de la *philosophia perennis* se rencontre parfois chez les scolastiques; elle a conduit la métaphysique intellectualiste-absolue de l'âge classique, avant tout chez un Spinoza, à une conception entièrement faussée de la nécessité divine. Et c'est là comme la limite à laquelle tend toute métaphysique de l'être qui refuse ou méconnaît l'analogie de l'être. C'est pourquoi certains auteurs modernes, M. Bergson par exemple, pensent que la nécessité de l'essence et de l'existence divine telle que la conçoit la philosophie traditionnelle, (qu'ils interprètent à tort dans les perspectives de l'intellectualisme absolu) se confond avec la nécessité spinoziste, ils croient que la nécessité de Dieu, du Dieu d'Aristote ou de saint Thomas, c'est la nécessité d'une essence géométrique qui se poserait elle-même dans l'être, qui impliquerait son existence, comme une essence géométrique implique telle ou telle de ses propriétés. On en reste au domaine géométrique, et on est infiniment loin du domaine divin, on conçoit Dieu d'une manière univoque sur le modèle de la nécessité géométrique ou mathématique, et pas du tout, comme la vérité le demande, d'une manière analogique et qui transcende tout ce que nous connaissons ici-bas. L'aséité divine est tout autre chose, elle est quelque chose d'infiniment autre que la nécessité d'une essence géométrique; elle n'est pas non plus, comme le croyait Descartes, une plénitude d'efficience et de puissance à raison de laquelle Dieu serait *causa sui*. Elle est à la fois la nécessité et la spontanéité infinies de cette surexistence immatérielle qui caractérise le connaître et l'aimer en acte pur.

Il y aurait lieu ici de se reporter au texte de Descartes, notamment aux *Réponses aux premières Objections*. Il s'explique là au sujet de la notion d'aséité divine, et de la façon dont il est parvenu à l'existence de Dieu comme à celle d'un Etre qui se pose lui-même dans l'existence en vertu de sa puissance, de son immensité d'essence. Chez Descartes les deux notions d'infinité et de puissance convergent, elles coïncident dans la notion cartésienne de l'aséité, (nouvelle par rapport à toute la tradition scolastique,) qui permet à Descartes—reprenant un mot de Suarez—de dire que Dieu est *causa sui*, cause de soi. Si on portait cette notion à l'extrême limite, ce qui serait normal quand on l'applique ainsi à l'Acte pur, si on disait que Dieu est *causa sui* dans toute la plénitude de sens comportée par cette expression, on quitterait la ligne de la liberté de spontanéité pour celle de la liberté de choix, on arriverait à l'affirmation que Dieu existe de par son libre choix ou de par la plénitude de liberté de son vouloir, on arriverait à dire que Dieu existe parce qu'il le veut. (Et donc, s'il le voulait il pourrait s'anéantir).

"Mais certes j'avoue franchement qu'il peut y avoir quelque chose dans laquelle il est une *puissance* si grande et si inépuisable qu'elle n'ait jamais eu besoin d'aucun secours pour exister . . ."[4]

Descartes polémique (et sa polémique est extrêmement suggestive et intéressante) contre certains scolastiques, d'ailleurs assez déficients, selon lesquels le mot aséité a un sens purement négatif et signifie simplement "n'être pas causé"; et il explique que cette conception purement négative de l'aséité est quelque chose d'insuffisant, d'indigne de l'Etre divin. On sent ici que Descartes a raison, seulement il se trompe dans la manière dont il explique la vérité qu'il a pressentie. Descartes sent que l'aséité est quelque chose de positif, que ce qui est au sommet de l'Etre ne peut pas être signifié d'une façon purement négative; l'absence de cause, le fait de n'être pas causé implique évidemment une perfection positive. Où est-elle? Pouvons-nous nous en faire quelque idée? Comme Descartes en reste à l'être entitatif, à l'être physique selon lequel une chose est purement et simplement posée hors du néant, il va chercher dans ce domaine le positif de cette perfection de l'aséité. Cela sera pour lui l'immensité de puissance, il faudra dire que Dieu existe en vertu de sa propre puissance, il a une telle force, une telle immensité d'énergie qu'il se donne l'être à lui-même, c'est là ce qui constituera le sens postif du mot "par soi".

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[4] *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Adam-Tannery, VII (Paris, 1904), p. 109.

"Lorsque nous disons que Dieu est par soi, nous pouvons aussi à la vérité entendre cela négativement comme voulant dire qu'il n'a point de cause; mais si nous avons auparavant recherché la cause pourquoi il est ou pourquoi il ne cesse point d'être, et que, considérant l'immense et incompréhensible *puissance* qui est contenue dans son idée, nous l'ayons reconnue si pleine et si abondante qu'en effet elle soit la vraie cause pourquoi il est, . . . nous disons que Dieu est *par soi* non plus négativement, mais au contraire très positivement. Car encore qu'il ne soit pas besoin de dire qu'il est la cause efficiente de soi-même . . ." (ceci est dit pour ménager les susceptibilités de l'Ecole,) on doit pouvoir dire, si l'on entend bien les choses, que Dieu est *cause de soi*; "encore qu'il ne soit pas besoin de dire qu'il est la cause efficiente de soi-même, de peur qu'on n'entre en dispute du mot, néanmoins, parce que nous voyons que ce qui fait qu'il est par soi ou qu'il n'a pas de cause différente de soi-même, ne procède pas du néant, mais de la réelle et véritable immensité de sa puissance, il nous est tout à fait loisible de penser qu'il fait en quelque façon la même chose à l'égard de soi-même que la cause efficiente à l'égard de son effet, et partant il est par soi positivement", c'est-à-dire en vertu de son infinité d'efficience et de puissance.[5]

Descartes n'a pas su découvrir ce qu'il faut opposer à une conception toute négative de l'aséité divine, et la solution qu'il propose: Dieu cause de soi, est intenable; mais ce qu'il y a de vrai dans ce qu'il recherchait, c'est, que l'existence absolument nécessaire de l'*Ipsum esse subsistens* est une existence "volontaire", qu'elle est volontaire comme elle est intellectuelle. Il faut nous habituer à disjoindre la notion de volontaire et la notion de liberté. L'exister divin n'est pas libre au sens de liberté de choix, mais il est volontaire en ce sens que c'est l'existence même selon laquelle une nature spirituelle aime et veut. L'existence divine est souverainement volontaire, car cette existence infiniment spontanée se confond avec l'acte même d'amour, elle s'identifie avec l'acte par lequel Dieu s'aime lui-même,—s'aime lui-même avec une nécessité infinie et une spontanéité infinie; je dis que c'est une existence volontaire au même sens où je dis que c'est une existence intellectuelle, puisque l'existence de Dieu c'est son acte même d'intellection de soi; mais cette existence "volontaire", cette existence qui est un acte de volonté comme elle est un acte d'intellection, n'est pas du tout une existence de libre choix, et ce n'est pas non plus une existence due à une puissance infinie par laquelle Dieu se ferait efficiemment ou volontairement exister lui-même.

On peut remarquer ici que nous sommes avec Descartes dans une ligne platonicienne. Selon une observation que saint Thomas a faite bien souvent,[6] la différence capitale entre les platoniciens et on peut dire non seulement les aristotéliciens, mais aussi les chrétiens, c'est que "Pour les platoniciens la cause première est au-dessus de ce qui est, (*supra ens*), en tant que l'*essence* de la bonté et de l'unité, qui est la cause première, transcende l'être lui-même séparé, *ipsum ens separatum*; tandis que selon la vérité des choses, la cause première est en effet au dessus de ce qui est (*supra ens*), mais en tant que la cause première est *l'exister* infini lui-même, *in quantum est ipsum esse infinitum.*"

Le nom que Dieu s'est donné à lui-même, *Ego sum qui sum*, oblige la philosophie chrétienne à reconnaître cette identité de la cause première avec l'exister infini lui-même, *ipsum Esse subsistens.*

En même temps Aristote nous dit que Dieu est la Pensée qui se pense elle-même, et saint Jean qu'il est l'Amour ou la Charité, un éternel acte d'amour subsistant par lui-même. En d'autres termes,—et c'est ce qui peut le mieux nous faire comprendre à quel point la notion de Dieu est une notion transcendante et analogique, et en même temps à quel point l'existence de Dieu est spontanée,—l'être de Dieu, l'être même par lequel Dieu existe avec une absolue nécessité ontologique c'est ce qu'on peut appeler la surexistence immatérielle d'intellection et d'amour.

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[5] *Oeuvres de Descartes*, loc. cit. p. 110.

[6] Cf. *Comm. in Lib. de Causis*, Lectio vi.

Nous autres nous existons physiquement, et ensuite nous jouissons, par nos puissances ou facultés, de l'existence immatérielle et intentionelle d'intellection et d'amour. En Dieu elles sont identiques et se confondent, c'est l'acte même de connaître et d'aimer qui est l'acte par lequel il existe, et qui s'identifie absolument avec son essence. Si nous pouvions voir ces choses, nous verrions comment au sommet de l'être s'identifient ainsi le comble de la nécessité et le comble de la spontanéité.

Et nous verrions du même coup comment l'exister divin est un exister éminemment et infiniment *personnel*, je veux dire que dans *l'existence* elle-même de Dieu, dans la façon dont il existe, se trouvent accomplis d'une façon intégrale et substantielle et infiniment parfaite tous les voeux, et avant tout le voeu foncier d'*indépendance*, immanents à la personne dans la pure ligne transcendantale de la personnalité.

Greek Works Translated Directly into Latin Before 1350

J. T. MUCKLE, C.S.B.

A LIST of Latin translations of Greek works, the first part of which follows, has been compiled for the use especially of students of patristic and mediaeval philosophy. For the sake of convenience, it has been divided into two parts; the first covers the translations made before the year 1000. In a subsequent number of *Mediaeval Studies* there will appear, it is hoped, the second part extending from 1000 to 1350.

Translations of many works which are not primarily philosophical have been included when it was thought they might indirectly be of use to philosophical students. But the translations are not listed of Holy Scripture, or of Acts of Councils, except some letters and discourses found in the Acts of Councils and published separately. Likewise, the field of liturgy has not been touched and of hagiography only a few *Lives* of general interest are mentioned.

No attempt has been made to list the quotations and short extracts in Latin from Greek works which are found in such number in various Latin authors of both the classical and patristic periods, nor is mention made of treatises composed in Latin in which the author made use of Greek treatises, e.g. some Latin commentaries on the Holy Scriptures, several of Cicero's moral works, etc.

The term translation has been interpreted broadly to include all renderings into Latin from paraphrases to literal translations. The scope and accuracy of Latin translations from Cicero down vary greatly. A study of the purpose and method of early translators would be a useful contribution to scholarship.

In the case of Christian writers not well known an approximate date at least has been given. When there are several editions of a translation, only one or two have been mentioned which one might expect to find in any good library. No doubt some of my readers will know of an early Latin translation of a work not found in the following list but which might well be included. Any suggestions for additions or emendations will be thankfully received and can be given as a supplement when the second part of this compilation is published. It would be a valuable help to students of mediaeval philosophy if some Oriental scholar were to compile and publish a list of Latin translations of treatises written in one of the several Oriental languages. *Mediaeval Studies* would be glad to publish such a list.

In this article the following abbreviations have been used:

PL — Migne, *Patrologia Latina.*
PG — Migne, *Patrologia Graeca.*
CSEL — *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum.*
GCS — *Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte.*
TU — *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristliche Literatur.*
MGH — *Monumenta Germaniae Historica.*
Teuffel, GRL — W. S. Teuffel, *Geschichte der Römischen Literatur,* 3 vols. (6th ed., Leipzig-Berlin, Teubner, 1910-1916).
Bard. GAL — Otto Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der Altkirchlichen Literatur,* 5 vols. (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1913-32).
Harnack, GAL — Adolph Harnack, *Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius,* 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1893-1904).

PART I—BEFORE 1000

PSEUDO-ADAMANTIUS. *Adamantii Dialogus de recta in Deum Fide*. Translated by Rufinus. Edited by W. H. Van de Sande Bakhayzen in GCS, (1901), *Adamantius*; also in PG 11, 1711-1884.

AEGYPTIORUM PATRUM SENTENTIAE. Translated by St. Martin of Bracara. Printed in PL 74, 381-394.

AESCHINES. Cicero translated his speech *against Ctesiphon*. The translation, so far as I know, is not extant.

ALEXANDER-ROMANCE. *Iuli Valeri Alexandri V. C. Polemi res gestae Alexandri Magni translatae ex Aesopo Graeco*. This translation or rather adaptation was made by Julius Valerius perhaps about 300. Edited by B. Kübler, (Leipzig, 1888); cf. Teuffel, GRL 399, III, pp. 208-209. The *Iul. Valerii Epitome* has been edited by J. Zacher, (Halle, 1867). On the *Epitome* in the Metz Ms. 500 cf. Teuffel, *ibid.* p. 209.

ANASTASIUS APOCRISIARIUS. Seventh century. A letter to Theodosius of Gangra was translated by Anastasius Bibliothecarius. Printed in PG 90, 173-194.

ANASTASIUS SINAITA. Fl. 650-700. *Anagogicarum Contemplationum in Hexameron*. Translator unknown. Printed in PG 89, 851-1078.

APOLLONIUS OF RHODES. A free adaptation of his *Argonautica* is the *Argonautica* of Valerius Flaccus. Edited by Bury, (London, 1900). Cf. Teuffel, GRL 317, II, pp. 293 ff.

APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTIONS. A Latin translation was known in the fifth century. The translator is unknown. A fragment of it has been published by A. Spagnolo and C. H. Turner in *The Journal of Theol. Studies*, XIII (1912), 492-514.

ARATUS. The *Phenomina* and *Prognostica* were translated by Cicero, by Germanicus and by Avienus. What is extant of Cicero's translation is in J. C. Baiter and C. L. Kayser's edition of Cicero's works, (Leipzig, 1869), XI, 96-129; and of Germanicus in *Germanici Caesaris Aratea*, Alfredus Breysig, (Leipzig, 1899).

ARCHELAI EPISCOPI LIBER DISPUTATIONIS ADVERSUM MANICHAEUM was translated after St. Jerome's time. PG10, 1405-1528; cf. Harnack, GAL I, 540.

ARISTOTLE. Boethius wrote a commentary on his *Categories* and two on the *De Interpretatione* in which he renders each work by sections in Latin. The commentary *In Categorias Aristotelis Libri quatuor* is in PL 64, 159-294. The *In Librum Aristotelis de Interpretatione Libri duo* is in PL 64, 293-392. The commentary on the same work in six books is in PL 64, 393-640; there is an edition of both the latter by K. Meiser, 2 vols. (Leipsig, 1877-80). It seems that the Latin translations of Aristotle's *Analytica, Topica and Sophistici Elenchi* found in PL 64 are not the work of Boethius. Grabmann (*Geschichte der schol. Methode*, I, 149 ff.) says they are the work of James of Venice in the first part of the twelfth century. Whether Boethius translated these treatises is still a moot question. The treatise in PL 32, 1419 ff. entitled *Categoriae decem ex Aristotele decerptae* is perhaps by Vettius Praetextatus. Cf. Boethius, *De Interpretatione*, Ed. sec. I; PL 64, 393A.

ARRIUS ANTONINUS. Pliny translated some of his epigrams; cf. Pliny, *Ep.* 4, 18.

ASCLEPIUS, THE LATIN. A Latin translation of *Hermes Trismegistus* under the title of *Asclepius* was known by the time of St. Augustine. Some manuscripts have it among the works of Apuleius. The translator is unknown. Edited by Walter Scott, *Hermetica*, (Oxford, 1924), Vol. I, 288-376.

St. Athanasius. *Historia Athanasii* by Theodosius Diaconus is a Latin translation; cf. Bard. GAL III, 63. Printed in PL 26, 1443-50; also edited by Batiffol, *Mélanges de littérature et d'histoire religieuses* I (Paris, 1899), pp. 99 ff.

Babrius. Titianus apparently translated some of his fables. Cf. Ausonius, *Ep.* 16.

St. Basil. The nine *Homilies on the Hexameron* were translated by Eustathius about 440. PG 30, 869-968; PL 53, 865-966.

St. Ambrose in his *Hexameron translates* much from St. Basil's *Homilies on the Hexameron.*

Seven homilies and Letter 46 *Ad Virginem lapsam* were translated by Rufinus. PG 32, 369-382. St. Augustine had a translation of the *Sermo de Jejunio*; cf. St. Aug. *Contra Jul.* 1, 18, PL 44, 652.

A *Commentary on Isaias*, chapters one to sixteen, PG 30, 117-668, formerly attributed to Basil but now held by some to be spurious was translated into Latin. Fragments of this translation are in *Bibliotheca Casinensis* 4, (1880), pars 1, 302-305; pars 2, 391-434; cf. Bard. GAL III, 150, 670.

The abridged translation of St. Basil's two *Rules* was made by Rufinus and published in 203 questions and answers. PL 103, 483-554.

Sermo de Ascetica Disciplina in an old Latin version is found in *Revue Bénéd.* XXVII (1910), 226-233.

Clement of Alexandria. A fragment of his *Hypotyposes*, (Com. on First Peter, Jude, First & Second John), is found in a Latin translation known to Cassiodorus if not made by his order (*Instit.* 1, 8) under the title: *Adumbrationes Clementis Alexandrini in Epistolas canonicas*, edited in GCS, *Clemens Alex.* 3, 203-15; PG 9, 729-742.

Clementinae Recognitiones. This work was translated by Rufinus. Printed in PG 1, 1207-1454; edited by O. von Fritzsche (Zurich, 1873).

St. Clement of Rome. *Epistle to the Corinthians.* A very old and literal translation was made about 200. Edited by G. Morin, *Anecdota Maredsolana* II (Maredsous, 1894). The spurious *Epistle of Clement to James* was translated by Rufinus. Edited by O. von Fritzsche, (Zurich, 1873). This Epistle is not found in the Latin *Recognitiones.*

St. Cyril of Alexandria. Epistle X *Ad clericos Constant.* was translated by Marius Mercator. Printed in PG 77, 69-80; PL 48, 808-818. The seventeenth *Paschal Homily* is found in an old Latin translation in PG 77, 789-800. It used to be attributed to Arnobius Junior.

Two Letters of St. Cyril to Nestorius were translated by Marius Mercator. Printed in PL 48, 801-808; a third translated by Dionysius Exiguus is in PL 48, 831-841 and PL 67, 9-18. *Letters* 45, 46 to Succensus were translated by Dionysius Exiguus. Not edited; cf. Bard. GAL V, 225-6. The *Apologeticus pro duodecim Capitibus* was translated by Mercator and is printed in PL 48, 933-970. Also the *Apologeticus adversus Theodoretum, ibid*, 969-1001. The *Scholia de Incarnatione Unigeniti* was translated by Mercator, *ibid.* 1005-1040.

Demosthenes. Cicero translated the speech of Demosthenes *for Ctesiphon*; cf. Teuffel, GRL 182, 7, I, p. 399. Not extant.

Dictys, The Cretan. An abridged translation was made about 300 by L. Septimius. Edited by F. Meister, (Leipzig, 1872); cf. Teuffel GRL 423, III, pp. 281 ff.

Didymus the Blind. Fourth century. St. Jerome translated his work *De Spiritu Sancto.* Printed in PL 23, 109-162; PG 39, 1031-86. The translation of *Septem Canonicarum Epistolarum* by Epiphanius Scholasticus is in PG 39, 1749-1818.

Didache XII Apostolorum. There is an old Latin version made about 200 of chapters one to six. Published by J. Schlecht, *Doctrina XII Apostolorum*, (Freiburg, i. Br., 1901).

Didascalia Apostolorum. There are fragments of an old Latin translation published in: *Fragmenta Veronensia Latina; Accedunt canonum qui dicuntur Apostolorum et Aegyptiorum reliquiae*. E. Hauler, (Leipzig, 1900).

Dionysius Areopagita, The Pseudo-. The abbot Hilduin translated his extant works; his translation has been edited by G. Théry, O.P.: *Etudes dionysiennes* II (Paris, Vrin, 1937). John Scotus Erigena also translated them; his translation is found in PL 122, 1035-1194.

Dorotheus. Sixth century. The *De Compositione Monachi* may be an eighth or ninth century work based on the conferences of Dorotheus. Cf. Bard. GAL V, 70. Printed in PG 88, 1835-38.

Eusebius of Alexandria. A short sermon attributed to him is found in an old Latin adaptation printed in *Revue Bénédictine*, XXIV (1907), 531-3. *Sermo de Confusione Diaboli*; a Latin syncresis of two homilies of Eusebius of Emesa; cf. *Modern Phil.* II (1904), 261-78.

Eusebius of Caesarea. His *Ecclesiastical History* was paraphrased in nine books by Rufinus. This translation which is not exact was published by Th. Mommsen in the edition of the *History* by Ed. Schwartz, (Leipzig, 1903-09). The second part of Eusebius' *Chronicon* was translated and supplemented by St. Jerome. It is found in PL 27, 223-508; see also J. K. Fotheringham, *The Bodleian Manuscript of Jerome's Version of The Chronicle of Eusebius, reproduced in Collotype.* (Oxford, 1905); critical edition by R. Helm, GCS, *Eusebius* VII, 1, 2.

St. Jerome's work, *De Situ et Nominibus Locorum Hebraicorum Liber* is based on Eusebius' work on the names of places mentioned in the sacred writings; St. Jerome's work is in PL 23, 903-916.

Evagrius Ponticus. Fourth century. Some of his writings were translated by Rufinus. (St. Jerome, *Ep.* 133, 3). Gennadius (*De Script. Eccl.* 11) refers to several works of Evagrius which he translated into Latin or of which he revised an already existing translation. The *Sententiae Coenobiis et ad eos qui in Xenodochiis habitant Fratres*, translated by Rufinus, is in PG 40, 1277-1282.

Expositio Totius Mundi et Gentium, written by a pagan Greek about the middle of the fourth century A.D., was translated by an unkown Christian at an uncertain date (nach Isidor gefertigte? Teuffel, GRL 453, 5, III, p. 403). It has been edited by Riese, *Geog. Lat. Min.* 105 ff.

Firmilian of Caesarea. Third century. A Latin translation of a long letter by him to St. Cyprian is found in CSEL, *Cyprian* III, 1, 2. *Ep.* 75. pp. 810-827.

Flavian of Constantinople. Fifth century. Two letters by him to Pope Leo I in a Latin translation have been published by G. Amelli, *San Leone Magno e l'Oriente* (Rome, 1882; Monte-Cassino, 1894). Cf. Bard. GAL IV, 215.

Galen. Cassiodorus (*Inst.* I, 31) says he left in the library at Vivarium a Latin translation of Galen's *Therapeutics.*

St. Gregory of Nazianzus. Nine of his homilies were translated by Rufinus. They have been edited in CSEL 46, 1.

St. Gregory of Nyssa. His work *On the Formation of Man* was translated by Dionysius Exiguus and is printed in PL 67, 347-408 under the title, *De Creatione Hominis.*

ST. GREGORY THAUMATURGUS. There are two old Latin translations of his *Creed*, one by Rufinus, another anonymous. They are found in: A. Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche* (Breslau, 1897).

HERMAS. The *Pastor* of Hermas was translated twice in early times. The older translation, versio vulgata, is in PG 2, 891-1012. Also: *Hermae Pastor*, A. Hilgenfeld (Lipsiae, 1873); cf. Bard. GAL 1,467. The other translation, *versio Palatina*, has been edited by A.R.M. Dressel, *Patr. Apostol. Opp.* (Lipsiae, 1857); cf. Bard. GAL I, 468.

HERMOGENES. His *Progymnastica* was translated by Priscian; cf. Teuffel, GRL 481, 4, III, p. 491.

HESYCHIUS OF JERUSALEM. Fifth century. A *Commentary on Leviticus* attributed to him is found in Latin in PG 93, 787-1180.

ST. HIPPOLYTUS. The three recensions (or translations) of his *Chronicle* under the title of *Liber generationis* have been edited by Th. Mommsen in MGH Auct. IX, 78 ff.

HOMER. Livius Andronicus translated the Odyssey; cf. Teuffel, GRL 94, 6, I, p. 164. There are references, e.g. in Varro, Gellius and Priscian, to translations of the Iliad by Cn. Matius and Ninnius Crassus. Cf. Teuffel, GRL 150, 2, 3, I, p. 279. The *Homerus Latinus* is a metrical version much abridged of the Iliad. It was done in the first century A.D. and is made up of 1070 hexameters. There have been several editions of it. Cf. Teuffel, GRL 320, 9, II, p. 303.

The *Periochae Homeri Iliadis et Odyssiae* has sometimes been attributed to Ausonius, but the authorship is not certain. It is extant in more than one manuscript. Cf. Teuffel, GRL 421, 2(o), III, p. 272; Nolhac, *Petrarque et l'humanisme* (Paris, 1892), p. 171, n. 5.

ST. IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH. There is an old Latin translation of the Long Recension of his letters and also of the Mixed Recension. There are several editions of them. One is: *Die lateinischen Ubersetzungen des Ignatius* by P. de Lagarde in *Abhandlungen der K. Gesellsch. der Wiss. zu Göttingen*, XXIX, (1872). Cf. Bard. GAL I, 142.

ST. IRENAEUS. The *Refutation and Overthrow of the falsely-named Gnosis* was translated early into Latin under the title *Adversus Haereses.* It is printed in PG 7. G. Mercati seems to have abandoned his thesis that a second translation existed in the ninth century. Cf. Bard. GAL I, 407-8.

ST. ISIDORE OF PELUSIUM. Fl. 400. Forty-nine of his letters are found in an old Latin translation in the *Synodicon adversus tragoediam Irenaei.* They have been edited separately more than once. One edition is: *Quarante-neuf lettres de S. Isidore de Péluse* etc. (Paris, 1911). Cf. Bard. IV. 107. Thirteen of these are also in PG 84, 583-587.

ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM. Anianus, an antagonist of St. Jerome (cf. Jerome, *Ep.* 143, 2), translated some works of Chrysostom to support his own Pelagianism, viz: The seven panegyrics on St. Paul; in PG 50, 471-514. The first twenty-five *Homilies on Matthew*; the first eight in his translation are in PG 58, 975-1058. In old Latin editions of Chrysostom the whole twenty-five are found. Likely Anianus translated the *Homilia ad Neophytos.* This translation has been edited along with fragments of the Greek original in the *Zeitschrift für Kath. Theol.*, XXVIII, (1904) 168-193. Cf. Bard. GAL III, 344.

Mutianus translated thirty-four *Homilies on Hebrews* (Cassiodorus, *Inst.* 1, 8), printed in PG 63, 237-456; and perhaps fifty-five on the Acts of the Apostles (Cassiodorus, *Inst.* 1, 9).

An anonymous translation of two books *De Compunctione* has been published from a ninth century manuscript by William Schmitz, *Monumenta tachygraphica codicis Paris Lat. 2718*, fasc. 2, (Hannover, 1883). An anonymous but old Latin translation of the first of the two exhortations to Theodore of Mopsuestia has been published in *Bibl. Casinensis*, 3 (1877), Floril. 389-411 and again by A. Staerk in *Studien und Mitteilungen aus d. Benediktiner-u. d. Cistercienser-Orden* XXXI, (1910), 1-36; cf. Bard. GAL III, 333.

In some old editions of the works of Chrysostom there is found a series of thirty-eight homilies and of several treatises of which the manuscript tradition goes back to the ninth century. A. Wilmart in his article: 'La Collection des 38 Homélies Latines de Saint Jean Chrysostome' (*Journal of Theol. Studies* XIX, 1917-18, pp. 305 ff.) classifies them. For twelve of the homilies we have the authentic Greek text of St. John in Migne, PG; three others he considers translations of authentic homilies for which we have no Greek text; for five others we have a Greek text but not of St. John, a sixth may be his; another is: *Sermo ipsius Severiani de pace cum susceptus est ab Johanne episcopo.* The treatises found with these homilies are: the two books *De Compunctione* mentioned above, the *De eo quod nemo laeditur nisi a semetipso* and the exhortation to Theodore under the title *De reparatione lapsi.* Wilmart is of the opinion that the Latin versions of all of the above might well be by Anianus.

C. Baur, O.S.B. in his *Johannes Chrysostomus und seine Zeit* II, (Munich, 1930), p. 393, says that Latin translations of the *De Sacerdotio* and '*die Säulenhomilien*' were in existence by the seventh century; and also *op. cit.* I, p. 153, that the *De Sacerdotio* was translated early, perhaps at the begining of the fifth century; he gives no references.

St. Isidore of Seville in his *De Viris Illustribus* 19, 24, PL 83, 1094 says that the Latins had St. John's *In Eutropium.*

JOSEPHUS. The *Jewish Antiquities* were translated in the time of Cassiodorus (*Inst.* I, 17), and also the *Contra Apionem*. The latter has been edited by C. Boysen in CSEL 37, 1898.

The *Jewish War* was translated before the time of Cassiodorus. Perhaps it was by Rufinus, but we are not sure. Cf. Bard. GAL III, p. 554. It has been edited by E. Cardwell, *Flavii Josephi, de Bello Judaico,* II (Oxford, 1837). In the so-called Hegesippus (CSEL 66) the *Jewish War* is worked over, condensed in some parts and supplemented in others, but it can hardly be called a translation.

ST. LEONTIUS. Seventh century. His *Vita S. Joannis Eleemosynarii* was translated by Anastasius Bibl. in the ninth century. Printed in PG 93, 1617-60; PL 73, 337-384.

ST. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR. His work *Ambigua in S. Gregorium Theologum* was translated by John Scotus Erigena. The translation is found in PL 122, 1195-1222. An extract from his Mystagogia in the Latin translation of Anastasius Bibliothecarius in the ninth century is found in *Revue de l'Orient Chrét.* X (1905), 289-313. Cf. Bard. GAL V, 34.

NESTORIUS. *Tractatus Nestorii contra Heresim Pelagianam* is in PL 48, 183-205; it is made up of four sermons. A second version of the last two put together follows; *loc. cit.* 205-214; translated by Marius Mercator. Christological sermons also translated by Mercator are printed in PL 48, 753 ff., also the *Epistola ad Cyrillum* in PL 48, 818-827. Regarding the authenticity and translator of the *Twelve Counter-anathemas of Nes-*

torius printed in PL 48, 910-932, *Nestorii Blasphemiarum Capitula XII*, see Bard. GAL IV, 76 with the references he gives.

The extant works of Nestorius have been edited by Fr. Loofs: *Nestoriana, die Fragmenta des Nestorius gesammelt, untersucht und herausgegeben*, (Halle, 1905).

ORIGEN. Sixteen *Homilies on Genesis*, translated by Rufinus. This translation has been edited by W. A. Baehrens in GCS, *Origen* 6, 1-144. In PG 12, 145-262 we find the text of the same sixteen followed by a seventeenth which Baehrens does not include. He considers it not authentic chiefly because Cassiodorus (*Inst.* I, 1) mentions only sixteen and the manuscripts which contain the seventeenth are later.

Thirteen *Homilies on Exodus*, translated by Rufinus. Edited in GCS *ibid.* 145-279; PG 12, 297-396.

Sixteen *Homilies on Leviticus*, translated by Rufinus. Edited in GCS *ibid.* 280-507; PG 12, 405-574.

Twenty-eight *Homilies on Numbers*, translated by Rufinus. Edited in GCS 7, 3-285 by W. A. Baehrens; PG 12, 583-806.

Twenty-six *Homilies on Josue*, translated by Rufinus. Edited in GCS *ibid.* 286-463; PG 12, 823-948.

Nine *Homilies on Judges*, translated by Rufinus. Edited in GCS *ibid.* 464-522; PG 12, 951-990.

There is one homily on I *Kings* translated into Latin; the identity of the translator has not been handed down; possibly it was Rufinus. Edited in GCS 8, 1-25 by W. A. Baehrens; PG 12, 995-1012. Cassiodorus (*Inst.* 1, 2) speaks of four homilies of Origen on I *Kings*. Cassiodorus (*ibid.*) speaks of a translation of a homily on II *Kings*, perhaps by Bellator. Nothing further is known of it.

Hiliary 'translated' homilies on *Job* probably twenty-two. There is a fragment in St. Augustine *Contra Julianum* II, 27. The translation is lost. Cf. Harnack, GAL I, 355-6.

Nine *Homilies on Psalms* xxxvi-xxxviii, translated by Rufinus. Printed in PG 12, 1319-1410.

Two *Homilies on the Canticle of Canticles*, translated by St. Jerome. Edited in GCS 8, 27-60; PG 13, 35-58.

Three books of a *Commentary on the Canticle of Canticles*, translated by Rufinus. Edited in GCS *ibid.* 61-241; PG 13, 61-198.

Nine Homilies on Isaias, translated by St. Jerome. Edited in GCS, *ibid.* 242-289; PG 13, 219-254.

Fourteen *Homilies on Jeremias*, translated by St. Jerome. Printed in PG 13, 255-542. Two of these are given in St. Jerome's translation in GCS *ibid.* 290-317.

Fourteen *Homilies on Ezechiel* translated by St. Jerome. Edited in GCS *ibid.* 319-454; PG 13, 665-768.

Commentary on St. Matthew. An old Latin version is found covering *Matt.* xvi, 13 (*Tome* 12) to *Matt.* xxvii, 63. The part for which the Greek text is extant is found in GCS 10, 1. 80-703, edited by Erich Klostermann; PG 13, 993-1600. The part for which the Greek is lacking and called *Commentariorum series* is edited in GCS 11 (whole volume); PG 13, 1599-1800. The translator is unknown, perhaps Bellator.

Thirty-nine *Homilies on St. Luke*, translated by St. Jerome. Edited in GCS 9, 1-231 by Max Rauer; PG 13, 1802-1902.

Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, translated by Rufinus. Printed in PG 14, 833-1292.

Cassiodorus (*Inst.* I, 2) speaks of one homily of Origen on II *Paralip.*

He also says (*loc. cit.* 6) that Bellator translated a homily of Origen on each of the two *Books of Esdras*. Nothing is known of them. St. Jerome (*Adv. Ruf.* 2, 14) says he translated seventy homilies of Origen and part of his *Tomes*; in *loc. cit.* 3, 12 he refers to Rufinus' statement that he, Jerome, had translated seventy homilies and some of his short treatises on the Apostle. Cf. Rufinus, Preface to his translation of Origen's *De Principiis*. The references to St. Hilary, St. Ambrose and Victorinus as translators of Origen refer, I think, to treatises based on Origen: (*Hilarius and Victorinus*) *qui tractatus ejus non ut interpretes sed ut auctores proprii operis transtulerunt.* Jerome, *Ep.* 84, 7.

Rufinus in his Preface to his translation of the homilies on the *Book of Numbers* expresses his intention of translating the *oratiunculae* of Origen on *Deuteronomy*. We do not know whether he ever did so. The *De Principiis* of Origen was translated by both Rufinus and St. Jerome. St. Jerome's translation, except some few fragments, is lost. These fragments and Rufinus' translation are edited in GCS *Origenes* 5 (whole volume) and also are in PG 11, 111-414. The fragments of St. Jerome are in the footnotes in the *Berlin Corpus* and in the corresponding place in the text in Migne.

PALLADIUS. Fl. 400. There are two old Latin translations of the *Lausiac History.* The first under the title *Paradisus Heraclidis* is in PL 74, 243-342, also in Rosweyd's *Vitae Patrum*. For the lacunae in this translation cf. *The Lausiac History of Palladius*, 1, 59 ff. by Dom. Cuthbert Butler, (Cambridge, The University Press, 1898). This translation was made before the end of the fifth century. The second translation, not later than the seventh century, is in PL 74, 343-382. For the question whether the *Historia Monachorum* of Rufinus is a translation of a Greek original by Rufinus and its relation to the Lausiac History, see Butler, *op. cit.* 1, 10-38.

ST. PAMPHILUS OF CAESAREA. Died *ca.* 310. Rufinus translated the first book of his *Apology for Origen* made up of five books by Pamphilus to which Eusebius added one. Rufinus' translation is printed in PG 17, 539-614.

PAUL OF SAMOSATA. Third century. Vincent of Lerins speaks of *opuscula* of Paul (*Commonitorium* 25). Nothing further is known of them.

PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA. We have an old Latin version of his *De Vita contemplativa* made about 350. It is printed in Conybeare's edition of Philo: *About the Contemplative Life* (Oxford, 1895), pp. 146-153.

St. Jerome tells us in the preface to his *Liber Interpretationis Hebraicorum Nominum* (PL 23, 815) that for the names in the Old Testament he translated Philo's work on biblical names.

PHILO OF CARPASIA. Fl. *ca.* 400. An old Latin translation of his *Commentary on the Canticle of Canticles* was published by Fr. Foggini (Rome, 1743).

PLATO. Cicero translated the *Timaeus* at least in part. We have extant Cicero's translation of the first part of the *Timaeus* covering about one-third of the whole work. It is found in: Baiter-Kayser, *Opera Ciceronis* VIII (Leipsig, 1869), 131 ff.

Chalcidius also translated the *Timaeus* to 53C, not quite half of the treatise, probably at the beginning of the fourth century. The extracts from the *Timaeus* translated in his commentary on the same often is a different version from the former. Both the translation and commentary are found in A. Mullachius, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* II (Paris, 1868), p. 147 ff., and have been edited by J. Wrobel (Leipzig, 1876).

The *Phaedo* was translated by Apuleius. Teuffel, GRL 366, 8, III, p. 104. I know of no manuscript of this work; it passes out of sight early.

The *Protagoras* was translated by Cicero. Only fragments of this translation are extant.

The *Republic*. St. Albertus Magnus (*Pol.* II, 1) says that there was extant in his day a translation by Apuleius. Fulgentius (*Expositio serm. antiq.* p. 65; edition of Lersch) speaks of *Apuleius de republica*.

Apuleius wrote a book of proverbs which may have been based on Plato. Cf. Teuffel, 366, 1, 8, III, pp. 101, 104.

PLOTINUS. St. Augustine says (*Conf.* VII, 9, 13) that he had access to *quosdam Platonicorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinam conversos*; and also (*Conf.* VIII, 2, 3) that he had read *quosdam libros Platonicorum quos Victorinus . . . . in latinam linguam transtulisset.* What these were is not known. Some modern scholars assert that the reference is to a Latin translation of Plotinus' *Enneads* by Victorinus. I have found no mention of or reference to any such translation in any early Latin writer.

PORPHYRY. His *Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle* were translated by Marius Victorinus and also by Boethius. The latter wrote two commentaries, one based on each translation, containing translations by extracts of Porphyry's work. The commentary based on the translation of Victorinus is in CSEL 48, 3-132 and in PL 64, 8-70: the one based on his own translation is in CSEL 48, 135-348 and in PL 64, 71-158.

PROCLUS OF CONSTANTINOPLE. His letter *Ad Armenios de Fide* was translated by Dionysius Exiguus. This translation is in PL 67, 409-18 and has been edited by Ed. Schwartz, *Acta Concil. Oecum.* 4, 2, 187-195.

RUSTICUS. The collection of documents known as the *Synodicon adversus Tragoediam Irenaei* pertaining to the Nestorian heresy was gathered together by Rusticus a deacon of Pope Vigilius in the latter part of the sixth century. He used the Acts of Councils already translated and likely translated some documents himself. It is found in PG 84, 565-864, in Mansi and in Schwartz, *Acta Conciliorum Oecum.* Tom. I, Vol. 4 (Berlin, 1922-23), Vol. 3, (1929); cf.Bard. GAL V, 283.

SOCRATES, SOZOMEN, THEODORET. Cassiodorus tells us in the preface to his *Historia Tripartita* (PL 69, 880D) that he used the Latin translation of the *Ecclesiastical History* of each of these made by Epiphanius Scholasticus as the basis of his *Historia Tripartita* in twelve books. In it Cassiodorus quotes, now from one, now from another of these three Greek historians using his material freely. But Theodorus Lector had already written a similar synthesis in four books in Greek and Cassiodorus made use of this work for the first book and the beginning of the second of his treatise. Cf. Joseph Bidez, *La Tradition Manuscrite de Sozomène et la Tripartite de Théodore le Lecteur* in TU 32, 26 (1908). The *Historia Tripartita* of Cassiodorus is in PL 69, 879-1214.

THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA. A commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul has been published in an old Latin version by H. B. Swete, *Theodori Mopsuest. in Epistolas Pauli Comm.* 2 Vols. (Cambridge, 1880-82).

THEOPHILUS OF ALEXANDRIA. St. Jerome translates several of his paschal letters and several others. These translations are found among the *Epistles* of St. Jerome, CSEL LV; *Epistles* 96, 98, 100 and 86, 88, 92, 99. Concerning the work of Theophilus which St. Jerome translated, referred to in *Ep.* 114, cf. C. Baur, 'S. Jérome et S. Chrysostome' in *Revue Bénéd.* XXIII (1906), 430-436.

TIMOTHY OF ALEXANDRIA. Fl. 450. Gennadius (*De Script. Eccl.* 72, PL 58, 1102A) tells us that he translated with a *caveat* a libellus of Timothy to the Emperor Leo against the orthodoxy of Pope Leo and the other Western bishops. This translation is not extant.

XENOPHON. Cicero translated his *Oeconomicus* in three books. The extant fragments of his translation are found in J. C. Baiter and C. L. Kayser *Opera Ciceronis* XI (Leipzig, 1869), pp. 50-54.

XYSTUS (Sixtus, Sextius). The so-called *Sententiae Sexti* were translated by Rufinus. This translation has been edited by A. Mullachius, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* I (Paris, 1868), pp. 523-531.

The Symbolism of the Biblical Corner Stone in the Mediaeval West

GERHART B. LADNER

THE purpose of this article is to clarify the meaning attributed in Christian times to the biblical corner-stone, prophetic symbol of the Messiah. It was Our Lord Himself, who according to the synoptic Gospels (*Matt.* xxi, 42 ff., Mark xii, 10f., *Luke* xx, 17f.), applied to His own person *Ps.* cxvii,[1] 22: *The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner.* St. Peter (*Acts* iv, 11f., I *Peter* ii, 4ff.) and St. Paul (*Rom.* ix, 32f., *Eph.* ii, 11ff.) elaborated on Christ's use of *Ps.* cxvii, 22 and combined it with a similar messianic interpretation of two verses of the Prophet Isaias, i.e. *Is.* xxviii, 16, where God promises that He *will lay a stone in the foundations of Sion, a tried stone, a corner stone, a precious stone, founded in the foundation . . .*, and *Is.* viii, 14, where we hear of *a stone of stumbling and rock of offence* to the godless of the Jews.

In recent years various authors have discussed the question where the metaphorical stone-at-the-head-of-the-corner mentioned in the biblical passages was understood to have its place: on any corner of the building or in its foundations or at its peak. Is it a foundation or a coping-stone or just an unspecified corner-stone?

A. K. Coomaraswamy has the merit of having brought the problem to the attention of English speaking mediaevalists.[2] With the help of oriental, particularly of Indian and Egyptian parallels, he attempted to show that the expression corner-stone is not adequate because, according to him, the biblical texts refer to the stone at the top of the edifice (vault, pediment or perhaps, originally, a pyramid).[3]

Some years earlier E. Panofsky, in a different context, had made an observation which, though unknown to Mr. Coomaraswamy, seemed to offer a striking confirmation of the latter's thesis.[4] In a fourteenth century illustration of *Ps.* cxvii, 22 in the Schlettstadt manuscript of the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis*,[5] the *lapis in caput anguli* is represented by a lozenge-shaped figure held by two masons who are putting it on the top of a tower. The corresponding New Testament passage illustrated in the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* is the Resurrection of Christ. Similarly, in two fifteenth century representations of the

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[1] According to the numbering of the Septuagint and Vulgate; *Ps.* cxviii according to the Hebrew.

[2] A. K. Coomaraswamy, 'Eckstein' *Speculum*, XIV (1939), 66 ff.

[3] If in the following study I shall try to prove that the foundation-stone interpretation of the biblical *lapis angularis* was genuine and predominant at least in Christian times, it is not my intention to detract from the value of Mr. Coomaraswamy's interesting parallels taken from oriental coping-stone symbolism; as we shall see, the symbolism of the coping-stone was not lacking in the west either. I have not adopted Coomaraswamy's distinction between corner and angle, as it does not seem to me to contribute to the solution of our problem.

[4] E. Panofsky, 'The Friedsam Annunciation and the Problem of the Ghent Altar Piece,' *The Art Bulletin*, XVII (1935), 449 ff. I should like to thank Mr. Panofsky for drawing my attention to the problem in a letter of his. Panofsky's interpretation of the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* illustration and the other late mediaeval representations, mentioned in his article in this connection, is not affected by this study.

[5] Ed. J. Lutz and P. Perdrizet, *Speculum Humanae Salvationis*, II (Mülhausen, 1909), pl. 63-64. The manuscript is now *Clm.* 146 of the *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek* in Munich.

Annunciation—a painting from Heiligenkreuz of *ca.* 1410-15 in the Vienna *Kunsthistorisches Museum*[6] and a French tapestry of *ca.* 1450[7]—a stone is placed by two angels on top of the wall of a church in the process of construction. In these cases, the setting of the stone was meant to allude to the Incarnation of Christ. In all three cases, the symbolic stone was evidently conceived of as the crowning part of a building and not as a simple corner-stone or as a foundation-stone.

Neither Mr. Coomaraswamy nor Mr. Panofsky were aware of the fact that some of the more recent biblical exegetes, both Catholic and Protestant, had interpreted the biblical *lapis angularis* as coping-stone rather than the simple corner or foundation-stone of the usual interpretation. Already in 1911 G. A. Barton had interpreted the stone of *Ps.* cxvii, 22 as a crowning corner-stone.[8] Later Father Dhorme S.J., in his study on the metaphorical use of the names of parts of the human body in the Hebrew and Accadian languages,[9] had listed the head-of-the-corner of *Ps.* cxvii, 22 as an example of the use of the head-metaphor to designate the top parts of architectural structures. This interpretation was accepted by Father Lagrange in his well-known commentaries on the synoptic Gospels.[10] Meanwhile, without any knowledge of the view expressed by Father Dhorme, J. Jeremias had written a very erudite article on the corner-stone with the express purpose of proving that it should be understood not as the foundation-stone or as a corner-stone of the foundations, but rather as one of the four highest corner-stones or, more probably, as the last stone laid in the building of an edifice,—more exactly as the coping-stone above a portal.[11]

I am not a biblical scholar and therefore I cannot pretend to deal conclusively with the Old and New Testament passages in question. Nevertheless it seems necessary to begin with a brief discussion of them, which, I hope, will not be found entirely without value. I should like to repeat, however, that the chief emphasis is placed in this study upon an investigation of the interpretations of the biblical corner-stone in early Christian and mediaeval tradition.[12] There, at any rate, the identification of the stone-at-the-head-of-the-corner with a corner-stone or foundation-stone is undoubtedly predominant. The interpretation of that stone as being exclusively a coping-stone is rare and represents a special trend, different from the main current of biblical exegesis and of liturgical symbolism, a trend which through the medium of the mediaeval Rabbins ultimately goes back to the era of Hellenistic, Jewish and Christian syncretism. As we shall see at the end of our study, it was this "extraordinary" tradition which was the basis of at least one among the afore-mentioned representations in late mediaeval works of art, in which the "messianic" stone was actually placed on the top of buildings, i.e. of the illustration of *Ps.* cxvii, 22 in the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis.*

Cf. Panofsky, *op. cit.*, fig. 20.

[6] Panofsky, *op. cit.*, fig. 21.

[7] Panofsky, *op. cit.*, fig. 25. The *lapis angularis* looks almost like a cushion, which may be due to a misunderstanding on the part of the maker of the tapestry.

[8] Article *'Corners,'* in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,* IV (Edinburgh and New York, 1911), pp. 119 ff.

[9] *Revue Biblique,* XXIX (1920), 488.

[10] Cf. especially M.-J. Lagrange, *Evangile selon Saint-Mathieu* (Paris, 1927), pp. 417 f. On Origen's interpretation of *Matth.* xxi, 42, which Father Lagrange quotes in support of his thesis, see below p. 59. The Commentary to the Acts of the Apostles, published in the same series as Lagrange's Matthew Commentary, by E. Jacquier, *Les Actes des Apôtres* (Paris, 1926), pp. 128 f., adopts the foundation-stone interpretation of the biblical corner-stone.

[11] J. Jeremias, 'Der Eckstein', *Angelos, Archiv für neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte und Kulturkunde,* I (1925), 65 ff.

[12] The Christian east after the fifth century has not been included in our investigation.

One of the principal reasons for assuming that the corner-stone of *Ps.* cxvii, 22, *Matt.* xxi, 42 etc. had its place somewhere on the top of a structure, is the expression head-of-the-corner. According to the Vulgate the verse reads as follows: *Lapidem quem reprobaverunt aedificantes. Hic factus est in caput anguli. In caput anguli* is the equivalent of the Greek "eis kephalen gonias" and of the Hebrew "lerosch pinna". Now, as Father Dhorme himself has shown in his study cited above, we find among the metaphorical meanings of "rosch" (head) the front parts of buildings, such as facade etc., in addition to their topmost parts.[13] Consequently "rosch pinna"—and similarly "kephale gonias" and *caput anguli*—may well mean the front part or most forward part of an angle or corner. For *caput anguli,* in this sense, see *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae,* s.v. *caput: aedificiorum, arearum finis, pars extrema, angulus,* where also the biblical examples are cited.[14]

From the strictly philological point of view, therefore, there seems to be no reason to see in the *lapis in caput anguli* anything but a corner-stone. When J. Jeremias[15] and Father Lagrange[16] assert, that, when the rejected stone was put to use, it must have been in a higher part of the building, which had meanwhile been continued, they presuppose a very literal metaphor; but the Psalmist, in his poetic imagery, may have been thinking of a stone which was rejected at some time in the past and used later in another building.

On the evidence of *Ps.* cxvii, 22 alone, it is impossible to say where exactly the stone-at-the-head-of-the-corner should be sought. But other Old Testament passages clearly speak of a corner-stone in the foundations.

So for instance the word "pinna" used for corner in *Ps.* cxvii, 22 is closely allied with the architectural term foundation in *Job* xxxviii, 4ff. and *Jer.* li, 25f.

> *Job* xxxviii, 4ff.: *Ubi eras quando ponebam fundamenta terrae? . . . . Super quo bases illius solidatae sunt? Aut quis demisit lapidem angularem* ("pinnathah") *ejus . . . .*
>
> *Jer.* li, 25f.: *Ecce ego ad te mons pestifer, ait Dominus . . . . non tollent de te lapidem in angulum* ("pinna") *et lapidem in fundamenta . . . .*

There can be but little doubt that in these passages the words *angularis* and *angulus* (Septuagint: "[lithos] goniaios" and "gonia" respectively) correctly translate the Hebrew "pinnathah" and "pinna". The translation of "pinna" proposed by J. Jeremias is battlement, because in the Old Testament "pinna" is often used for the corners of the walls of Jerusalem; yet this translation begs the question, as the corners of city walls are not necessarily battlements.[17] Since the metaphor used in *Job* xxxviii, 4ff. as well as in *Jer.* li, 25f. is not taken from that stage in which a building is being completed, but from that in which the foundations are laid, there could be no thought of "pinna" referring to a crowning stone. On the contrary the fact that the corner-stone is mentioned in connection with foundations would rather suggest that a foundation-stone was meant.

The passage from the prophet Jeremias refers to a custom which is well known in the history of Babylonian-Assyrian architecture. Cuneiform inscriptions survive which inform us how in restorations of old temples or palaces the Kings searched for the inscriptions and votive deposits which their predecessors had buried under corner-stones of the foundations. In fact the foundation-inscription itself sometimes exhorts future kings to raise the "memorial tablet" on which it was written, to anoint it and to restore it to its place. It is true that those inscriptions and deposits are not exclusively found under corner-stones and in the foundations, but there is no doubt that the four corners and especially those of the foundations were particularly sacred.[18]

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[13] Dhorme, *op. cit.*, pp. 493 f. See also W. Gesenius, *A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament . . . ,* ed. F. Brown, (Oxford, 1929), pp. 910 f., (although *Ps.* cxvii [cxviii]) 22 is listed under the meaning top of the word "rosch"). Both "rosch" and "pinna" can have the meaning leader, chief, which is a further metaphorical elaboration on the meaning front; cf. Dhorme, *loc. cit.*, Gesenius, *loc. cit.*

[14] *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae,* III (Leipzig, 1906-12), p. 411, ll. 67 f.

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

[16] *Loc. cit.*

[17] Cf. J. Jeremias, *op. cit.*, p. 65. Gesenius, *op. cit.*, p. 819, gives the meaning corner for "pinna" in *Jer.* li, 26 and many other places of the Old Testament. Without entering upon the particularly difficult interpretation of Zc. iv, 7, discussed by J. Jeremias, *op. cit.*, pp. 66 f., it might be admitted that in this case the stone "ha-roscha" (head-stone), which Zorobabel was to lay, could have been intended to mean the coping-stone, although the Vulgate translation: *lapidem primarium* obviously refers to the foundation-stone.

The importance attributed to the stones of the foundations by the ancient Jews is well illustrated in the description of the building of Solomon's Temple in:

> III *Reg.* v, 17: *Praecepitque rex ut tollerent lapides grandes, lapides pretiosos in fundamentum templi et quadrarent eos. . . . .*[19]

The Old Testament passage most relevant to our problem, except for *Ps.* cxvii, 22, is *Is.* xxviii, 16. It is important both for its explicitness and for its being used in St. Paul's and St. Peter's Epistles, along with *Ps.* cxvii, 22.

> *Is.* xxviii, 16: *Idcirco haec dicit Dominus Deus: Ecce ego mittam in fundamentis Sion lapidem probatum, angularem, pretiosum, in fundamento fundatum. . . . .*

It is strange that anybody should think here of a coping-stone in spite of the clear reference to foundations.[20] The Hebrew expression used for corner (stone) is again "pinna", which in the Septuagint was translated by "akrogoniaios", i.e. at the extreme corner. The Greek "akros" can mean either highest or outermost. In view of the fact that *Is.* xxviii, 16 is concerned with foundations, it is evident that the second meaning applies.

The chief purpose of our discussion of Old Testament passages was to clear the way for the study of the Christian interpretation of the biblical corner-stone. As far as the New Testament itself is concerned, the verses *Matth.* xxi, 42ff., *Marc.* xii, 10f., *Luc.* xx, 17f. and *Act.* iv, 11ff. are only of secondary importance, since they consist principally of Christ's quotation of *Ps.* cxvii, 22. That according to Christ (*Matth.* xxi, 44, *Luc.* xx, 18) *whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken, but on whomsoever it shall fall it shalll grind him to powder*,[21] confirms the fact that the corner-stone of *Ps.* cxvii, 22, *in se*, is not specifically located either in the foundations or higher up. Really decisive and most influential for the corner-stone symbolism of the middle ages are *Eph.* ii, 20ff., which is based on the unequivocal symbolism of the foundation-corner-stone in *Is.* xxviii, 16, and I *Petr.* ii, 4ff., in which the corner-stone of *Ps.* cxvii, 22 is fused with the foundation-stone of *Is.* xxviii, 16 and the stone of stumbling of *Is.* viii, 14.

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[18] See for instance G. Perrot and C. Chipiez, *Histoire de l'art dans l'antiquité*, II (Paris, 1884), pp. 324 ff.; L. W. King, *Records of the Reign of Tukulti-Ninib I, King of Assyria . . .* (London, 1904), pp. 31 ff., also about similar Egyptian customs; H. Gressmann, 'Der Eckstein,' *Palästina Jahrbuch des Deutschen Evangelischen Instituts . . .*, VI (Berlin, 1910), 38 ff.; G. A. Barton, Article *Corners*, Hasting's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, IV, pp. 119 ff. (Barton interprets the corner-stones of *Jer.* li, 26 and *Job* xxxviii, 6 as foundations, but that of *Ps.* cxvii, 22 as the crowning stone of a corner); E. Jacquier, *Les Actes des Apôtres*, pp. 128 f. With regard to the sanctity of the four corners of a building (especially of its foundations) or of an altar (see anointments of the corners of altars in the Old Testament and in the Christian rite of church consecration), we may recall the ancient belief in the squareness of the world; see for instance C. P. S. Menon, *Early Astronomy and Cosmology, A Reconstruction of the Earliest Cosmic System* (London, 1932). Concerning the symbolism of the number four and the square in the ancient world see also my article 'The So-called Square Nimbus' MEDIAEVAL STUDIES, III (1941), 15 ff.—J. Jeremias, *op. cit.*, p. 70, stresses the sanctity of the stone over the lintel of portals of temples or palaces in the ancient orient, and especially of the Temple of Jerusalem. But it is difficult to see how "pinna" (corner) can apply to that part of the building.

[19] For the symbolism of square stones in the middle ages cf. 'An Additional Note on Hexagonal Nimbi', printed elsewhere in this volume.

[20] J. Jeremias, *op. cit.*, p. 66, translates the Hebrew equivalent *for mittam in fundamentis* with construct or build, which according to him corresponds to the usual meaning of the phrase; yet even so there remains the *in fundamento . . .* at the end, which J. Jeremias apparently overlooked.

[21] Often connected with *Dan.* ii, 34: *de monte abscissus est lapis sine manibus et percussit statuam et comminuit . . .*, by the old exegetes.

> *Eph.* ii, 19ff.: *Estis cives sanctorum et domestici Dei, superaedificati super fundamentum apostolorum et prophetarum, ipso summo angulari lapide Christo Iesu, in quo omnis aedificatio constructa crescit in templum sanctum in Domino, in quo et vos coaedificamini in habitaculum Dei in spiritu. . . .*

The *summus angularis lapis* is "akrogoniaios" in the Greek original; the term is taken over from the Septuagint translation of *Is.* xxviii, 16 which has "akrogoniaios lithos". In *Eph.* ii, the meaning is evidently metaphorical: Christ is the chief corner-stone of the foundations and, as such, even more important than the rest of the foundations formed by the apostles and prophets; built on this chief corner-stone the Church will grow.[22]

> I *Petr.* ii, 4ff.: *Ad quem* (i.e. the Lord) *accedentes lapidem vivum, ab hominibus quidem reprobatum, a Deo autem electum et honorificatum, et ipsi tanquam lapides vivi superaedificamini domus spiritualis. . . . Propter quod continet scriptura: Ecce pono in Sion lapidem summum, angularem, electum, pretiosum. . . . Vobis igitur honor credentibus; non credentibus autem: lapis quem reprobaverunt aedificantes, hic factus est in caput anguli, et lapis offensionis et petra scandali his qui offenderunt verbo nec credunt in quo et positi sunt.*

This epistle combines *Ps.* cxvii, 22, *Is.* xxviii, 16 and *Is.* viii, 14. It is quite clear that the apostle intends his three quotations from the Old Testament to refer to one and the same foundation-corner-stone which is Christ. Note especially the end of the passage: . . . . *in quo et positi sunt*, in the original: "eis ho kai etethesan"; this cannot refer to a coping-stone, but only to a foundation-stone.[23]

Starting with the exegetical literature,[24] then turning to the liturgy and finally to works of art, we shall now survey the early Christian and the Latin mediaeval tradition regarding the meaning of the biblical corner-stone. Completeness could not be the aim of this study, but I trust the selection of examples will prove to be sufficiently comprehensive.

Among the exegetes there are some who do not specify the location of the biblical corner-stone beyond the fact that it comprehends two walls, joining them in an angle and thus symbolizing the unity of Jews and gentiles in the Church.

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[22] Cf. the lucid explanation of *Eph.* ii, 20 in St. Augustine, *Ennarrationes in Ps.* LXXXVI, quoted below, p. 49 f. See also *I Cor.* iii, 2: *Fundamentum enim aliud nemo potest ponere praeter id quod positum est quod est Christus Iesus.*—J. Jeremias, *op. cit.*, p. 68, maintains that the "akrogoniaios Christos" of *Eph.* ii, 20 is Christ the coping-stone; he refers to *Eph.* iv, where Christ is called the head. But the "organic" symbolism of *Eph.* iv, 15, based on a comparison of the Church with the human body and of Christ with its head (see also elsewhere in St. Paul), is altogether different from the "architectural" symbolism of *Eph.* ii, 20. Both symbolisms were sometimes combined by the Christian exegetes, but, as we shall see (below, pp. 49 ff.), the corner or foundationstone interpretation remained the leading one in the exegesis of *Eph.* ii, 20 and the biblical passages connected with it.

[23] The idea of *living* stones, expounded in *I Petr.* ii, 4 ff, was to become one of the chief notions of mediaeval symbolism of the church building; cf. J. Sauer, *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes und seiner Ausstattung in der Auffassung des Mittelalters* (2nd ed., Freiburg im Breisgau, 1924), p. 103 and pp. 112 ff.; also my article in *Mediaeval Studies*, III, 15 ff.

[24] As regards the exegetical literature on the Old Testament passages discussed above, only commentaries on the most important among those passages, i.e. *Ps.* cxvii, 22 and *Is.* xxviii, 16, are included in the following survey.

This thought occurs for instance in the following authors (listed in approximately chronological order):

St. Athanasius, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PG 27, 480 A.
St. John Chrysostome, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PG 55,355f.
Ps.-St. Jerome, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PL 26, 1257 C:[24a]

> *Hic factus est in caput anguli.* In caput connectens duos parietes: unum de circumcisione, alium de praeputio, in uno novo homine, hoc est in semetipso.

St. Augustine, *Sermo 248, cap.* 2, PL 38, 1159:

> . . . . circumcisionis et praeputii . . . . tanquam duorum parietum de diverso venientium lapis angularis est Christus; see also *Enarrationes in Ps.* cxvii, 22, PL 37, 1499; *In Joannem Evang. Tractatus* 47, cap. 5 and *Tractatus* 51, *cap.* 8, PL 35, 1735 and 1766.

St. Prosper of Aquitaine, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PL 51, 335 A.
St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Matth.* xxi, 42, PG 72, 436 C.
St. Bede, *In Act.* iv, 11, PL 92, 952 D-953 A:

> . . . . Judaei . . . . dum aedificabant pervenerunt ad lapidem angularem qui duos parietes amplecteretur, id est, invenerunt in scripturis propheticis Christum in carne venturum qui duos conderet populos in semetipso. Et quia ipsi in uno pariete stare, hoc est soli salvi fieri, malebant, reprobaverunt lapidem qui non erat aptatus ad unum, sed ad duos. Verum Deus, illis licet nolentibus, hunc ipse posuit in caput anguli, ut ex duobus testamentis et ex duobus populis aedificatio surgeret unius ejusdemque fidei.

Rabanus Maurus, *In Eph.* ii, 20, PL 112, 411 B-D.
Remigius of Auxerre, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PL 131, 731 C.
St. Bruno of Würzburg, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PL 142, 426 B.
Glossa Ordinaria,[25] *In Luc.* xx, 17, PL 114, 332 A:

> . . . . Christus a vobis reprobatus credituris gentibus est praedicandus, ut in se uno angulari lapide duos condat parietes.

St. Bruno of Segni, *In Matth.* xxi, 42, PL 165, 249 D-250 A:

> . . . . *Hic* (i.e. Christ) . . . . *factus est in caput anguli* jungens duos parietes unum ex circumcisione, alterum ex praeputio venientem. . . . .

Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PL 194, 726 D-727 A.

In addition to the texts so far cited, there are other more numerous ones in which the symbolism of the biblical corner-stone is preeminently that of a corner-stone of the foundations. It is true that some of the exegetes, especially St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Ps.* lxxxvi, 1f., and Pelagius, *In Eph.* II, 20, both of whom strongly influenced several later authors (see below), point out that the foundation-stone,—Christ,—is at the same time also the head and the consummation of the Church. But this second interpretation comes, as it were, as an afterthought, based on *Eph.* iv, 15 rather than on *Ps.* cxvii, 22 and the other biblical passages with which we are concerned.

[24a] This is the so-called *Breviarium in Psalmos*, a spurious work which contains material from two genuine works of St. Jerome: the *Commentarioli in Psalmos*, ed. G. Morin, O.S.B., in *Anecdota Maredsolana*, III 1 (Maredsous, 1895), and the *Tractatus sive Homiliae in Psalmos*, ed. Morin, *ibid.* III 2-3 (Maredsous, 1897 and 1903); cf. O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, III (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1923), pp. 620, 641 ff. It must be said, however, that the *Commentarioli* are very brief and do not comment on *Ps.* cxvii, 22, while among the extant *Tractatus* a homily on Ps. cxvii does not appear.

[25] On the *Glossa Ordinaria*, in the development of which Anselm of Laon is the central figure, see the recent excellent summary of B. Smalley, in her book *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1941), pp. 31 ff.

The following references and examples are again given in approximately chronological order.

Eusebius of Caesarea, *In Is.* xxviii, 16, PG 24, 291 A-B.

"Ambrosiaster", *In Eph.* ii, 20, PL 17, 402 B-C:

> . . . . Hic sensus est unde Dominus ait: *Super istam petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam* (*Matth.* XVI, 18). Duos enim populos in se suscepit Salvator et fecit unum in Domino sicut et lapis angularis duos parietes continet in unitate domus firmatos. . . . .

Marius Victorinus, *In Eph.* ii, 20, PL 8, 1261 B-C:

> . . . . Christus . . . . vere angularis lapis: et is est qui in primo collocatus est; vere angulo fundamentum positum duobus lateribus jungit. Hunc lapidem "akrogoniaion" appellavit: non enim tantum angularis, sed qui primus et summus est unde incipit fundamentum anguli qui duo jungit et copulat et unum reddit.

Didymus of Alexandria, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PG 39, 1561 D-1564 A.

St. John Chrysostome, *In Eph.* ii, 20, PG 62, 44.

St. Jerome, *In Is.* xxviii, 16, PL 24, 333 D-334 A:

> . . . . Iste lapis . . . . angularis lapis quia circumcisionis et gentium populos copulavit de quo et in Psalmo dicitur: *Lapidem quem reprobaverunt* . . . . (*Ps.* cxvii, 22). Super hunc lapidem qui alio nomine appellatur petra Christus aedificavit ecclesiam (cf. *Matth.* xvi, 18). . . . .
>
> *In Matth.* xxi, 42, PL 26, 164 A-B:
>
> . . . . Hi . . . . caementarii . . . . acceperunt lapidem quem vel in fundamentis ponant . . . . vel in angulo, ut duos parietes, id est populum utrumque consociet, qui reprobatus ab eis factus est in caput anguli. . . . . De hoc lapide . . . . Isaias: *Ecce*, ait, *imittam in fundamenta* . . . . (*Is.* xxviii, 16).

St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Ps.* lxxxvi, 1f., PL 37, 1101ff.:

> *cap.* 2: *Fundamenta ejus* (i.e. Sion) *in montibus sanctis* (*Ps. lxxxvi*, 1) . . . . qui sunt montes sancti super quos fundata est ista civitas? Alter quidam civis planius hoc dixit, apostolus Paulus . . . . *Superaedificati*, inquit, *super fundamentum apostolorum et prophetarum* (*Eph.* ii, 20) . . . . *cap.* 3: Dicet fortasse aliquis: Si angularis lapis est Christus Jesus, in illo quidem duo parietes compaginantur. Neque enim angulum faciunt nisi duo parietes in unum de diverso venientes: sic et populi duo ex circumcisione et ex praeputio ad pacem Christianam sibimet connexi in una fide, una spe, una charitate. Sed si angulus summus Christus Jesus (cf. *Eph.* ii, 20), quasi videntur priora fundamenta et posterior lapis angularis. Potest ergo aliquis dicere quia magis Christus super prophetas et apostolos incumbit, non illi super illum, si illi sunt in fundamento, ipse in angulo. Sed cogitet qui hoc dicit angulum et in fundamento esse. Neque enim ibi est tantum angulus ubi videtur ut surgat in apicem: a fundamento enim incipit. Nam ut noveritis quia et fundamentum Christus et primum et maximum: *Fundamentum*, inquit apostolus, *nemo potest ponere praeter id quod positum est quod est Christus Jesus* (I *Cor.* iii, 11). Quomodo ergo fundamenta prophetae et apostoli et quomodo fundamentum Christus Jesus quo ulterius nihil est? Quomodo putamus nisi quemadmodum aperte dicitur sanctus sanctorum, sic figurate fundamentum fundamentorum? . . . . In aedificiis istis non potest esse idem lapis in imo et in summo: si fuerit in imo, in summo non erit; si in summo fuerit, in imo non erit. Angustias enim omnia pene corpora patiuntur. . . . . Divinitas autem, quae ubique praesto est, undique ad eam potest duci similitudo. . . . .
>
> (col. 1103) . . . . Ergo fundamentum et lapis angularis ipse (i.e. Christ) est, ab imo surgens si tamen ab imo. Etenim origo fundamenti hujus

> summitatem tenet: et quemadmodum fundamentum corporeae fabricae in imo est, sic fundamentum spiritualis fabricae in summo est. Si ad terram aedificaremur, in imo nobis ponendum erat fundamentum: quia coelestis fabrica est, ad coelos praecessit fundamentum nostrum. Ipse ergo angularis lapis montesque apostoli, prophetae magni, portantes fabricam civitatis, faciunt vivum quoddam aedificium . . . .

St. Augustine in this text expressly reminds us that there are corner-stones not only in the highest part, but also in the foundations of buildings. Commenting on *Eph.* ii, 20, he says that, while the apostles and prophets are the *fundamentum,* Our Lord is the *fundamentum funamentorum*; nevertheless metaphorically Christ can be called *summus,* because of His divine nature which is not limited by space: *ad coelos praecessit fundamentum nostrum.*

Pelagius, *In Eph.* ii, 20, ed. A. Souter, *Pelagius's Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul*, II (Cambridge 1926), p. 356:

> Prophetarum novi testamenti . . . . Christus est fundamentum, qui etiam lapis dicitur [lapis] angularis, duos coniungens et continens parietes. Ideo autem et fundamentum et summus est, quia in ipso et fundatur et consummatur ecclesia.[26]

St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Luc.* xx, 17, PG 72,880 A-C

Theodoretus of Cyrus, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PG 80,1815 B-C

Arnobius the Younger, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PL 53, 506 A-B:

> Judaei . . . . dum aedificant pervenerunt ad lapidem angularen qui duos parietes amplecteretur et duos conderet in semetipso (cf. *Eph.* ii, 15). Et quia ipsi in uno pariete stare volebant, reprobaverunt lapidem qui non erat aptus ad unum, sed ad duos. Videns Deus injustam reprobationem hominum ipse quod probaverat illis nolentibus ordinavit et hunc lapidem ipse per se posuit in capite anguli, ut ex duobus testamentis et ex duobus populis aedificatio surgeret quam increduli relinquentes a Deo derelicti sunt. Credentes autem superaedificant supra fundamentum hoc (cf. *Eph.* ii, 20), quod ex angulari lapide in capite anguli positum utraque constringit et continet . . . .

Cassiodorus, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PL 70,832 B-D:

> Aedificantes enim tendunt semper ad angulum, ut commissorum parietum soliditas impleatur. Judaei vero fidei suae fabricam minime perfecerunt, quoniam ipsum qui erat lapis fortissimus angularis more dementium putaverunt esse temnendum. Dominus autem Christus per tropologiam, sicut innumeris locis constat expositum, ideo lapis dicitur angularis, quia duos ad se populos e diverso venientes gentilium atque Judaeorum tanquam geminos parietes in unam soliditatis gratiam colligavit . . . .
>
> (to v. 23) . . . . Iste quippe lapis, qui est fabricae decora copulatio, fibula parietum, in fundamentis perpetua fortitudo, mirabilis est in oculis fidelium . . . .

Cassiodorus' pupils, *In Eph.* ii, 20[27], PL 68,614 A-B:

> Fundamentum apostolorum et prophetarum Christus est, qui etiam lapis dicitur angularis, ut scriptum est: *Lapidem quem reprobaverunt*

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[26] About this commentary see, in addition to Vol. I (1922) of Souter's edition, Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, IV (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1924), pp. 514 f. Pelagius' Commentary to the Pauline Epistles was not infrequently used in the middle ages (see below: Cassiodorus, Sedulius Scotus, Atto of Vercelli), since in the form given it by an anonymous writer about 530 A.D. (PL 30, 645 ff.), it was attributed to St. Jerome.

[27] This is the Ps-Hieronymus Commentary, mentioned at the end of the preceding note, revised in an anti-pelagian sense under the direction of Cassiodorus; mistakenly the work was attributed to Primasius of Hadrumetum (so in PL 68). Cf. Bardenhewer, *op. cit.*, V (1932), p. 275.

> *aedificantes* (*Ps.* cxvii, 22), duos parietes conjungens et continens. Et fundamentum autem et summus, quia in ipso et fundatur et consummatur ecclesia.

St. Bede, *In Marc.* xii, 10, PL 92,252 A:

> . . . . mali caementarii laborant domui Dei lapidem pretiosum et electum (cf. *Is.* xxviii, 16), qui vel in fundamentis vel in angulo ponendus erat,[28] subtrahere . . . . Cf. the identical passage in Bede, *In Luc.* xx, 17, *ibid.* 577 D.

Sedulius Scotus, *In Eph.* ii, 20, PL 103,200 B:

> Apostoli fundamentum sunt vel Christus fundamentum est apostolorum. Christus est fundamentum qui etiam lapis dicitur angularis, duos conjungens et continens parietes. Ideo hic fundamentum et summus est lapis, quia in ipso et fundatur et consummatur ecclesia.[29] Summus hic angularis lapis, quia populum utrumque continet, sive juxta interpretationem coelestia jungit atque terrena . . . .[29a]

Christianus of Stavelot (often erroneously surnamed Druthmarus), *In Matth.* xxi, 42, PL 106, 1438 A-B:

> . . . . Judaei . . . . suas doctrinas praedicantes reprobaverunt Dominum in sua fide fundamentum ponere . . . .
>
> . . . . sicut lapis in angulo duos parietes ex diverso venientes suscipit, sic suscipit Judaeos Christus et gentes in se credere volentes . . . .
>
> . . . . unus pretiosus in fundamento fundatus (cf. *Is.* xxviii, 16) Christus, velint nolint Judaei . . . .

Florus, *In Eph.* ii, 20, PL 119, 375 D: follows St. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* lxxxvi, 1 f., see above.

Paschasius Radbertus, *In Matth.* xxi, 42, PL 120,733 D-734 A:

> *Lapis . . . . in caput anguli* (*Ps.* cxvii, 22), ut duos in se conjungat parietes . . . . De quo sane lapide Isaias dixerat: *Ecce pono in Sion* . . . . (Is. xxviii, 16) . . . . angularis est lapis iste et fundamentum ecclesiae . . . . Quod mirabile . . . . (*Ps.* cxvii, 23), ut Deus homo fieret et ipse lapis crescendo juxta prophetam ommen terram impleret (cf. *Dan.* ii, 35); qui coelestia simul et terrena jungeret duasque leges in se uno colligeret. Et ideo valde mirabile est . . . . quia caput est coelestis aedificii et fundamentum domui donatum a Deo Patre.

Haimo (of Auxerre?), *In Eph.* ii, 20,[30] PL 117,711D-712 A:

> . . . . Fundamentum apostolorum et prophetarum omniumque fidelium Christus est, quia in fide illius sunt fundati . . . . sicut ipse dixit: *Super hanc petram,* id est super me, *aedificabo ecclesiam meam* (*Matth.* xvi, 18) . . . . Quomodo est Christus et fundamentum et summus lapis? Per hoc quod ab illo incipitur fides et in ipso et ab illo perficitur . . . . Angularis etiam dicitur, quia, sicut angularis lapis duos parietes jungit, ita Christus duos populos in unitate fidei suae conjungendo continet.

Atto of Vercelli, *In Eph.* ii, 20, PL 134,556 C:

> . . . . Fundamentum Christus est: qui ideo lapis angularis dicitur, quia duos in sua fide populos suscipit; ideo autem fundamentum et summus, quia in ipso et fundatur et consummatur ecclesia . . . .[31]

Glossa Ordinaria,[32] *In Eph.* ii, 20, PL 114,592 C:

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[28] Cf. above p. 49: St. Jerome, *In Matth.* xxi, 42.

[29] Cf. above p. 50: Pelagius, *In Eph.* ii, 20.

[29a] Cf. St. Jerome, *In Ephes.* ii, 20, PL 26, 508A.

[30] The Commentaries to the Pauline Epistles and some other books of the Old and New Testaments, usually attributed to Haimo of Halberstadt, are probably the work of Haimo of Auxerre and written about 840-60; cf. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages,* p. 26, note 1. The passage, quoted by me, is influenced by St. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* lxxxvi, 1 f.; cf. p. 49.

[31] Cf. above p. 50: Pelagius, *In Eph.* ii, 20.

[32] See note 25.

> *Ipso summo angulari lapide Christo Jesu*: Etenim in Christo totum innititur aedificium velut in primo fundamento: quod fundamentum in summo est, non in imo ut in corporali fabrica.[33]

St. Bruno of Segni, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PL 164,1144 C-D:

> Venite, inquit ecclesia, et videte lapidem . . . . duos in se conjungens parietes, unum ex circumcisione et alterum ex praeputio venientem, ut fiat *unum ovile et unus pastor* (cf. *Joan.* x, 16) . . . . Hoc lapide reprobato tota corruit synagoga . . . . Quis non miretur quod super hunc lapidem ecclesia tota construitur, quem Judaea insipiens reprobavit?

Hervaeus of Bourg-Dieu, *In Is.* xxviii, 16, PL 181, 265 A:

> In his ergo fundamentis per incarnationis mysterium lapis Christus mittitur, ut omnis sacri aedificii structura superaedificetur (cf. *Eph.* ii, 20) . . . .

Peter Lombard, *In Eph.* ii. 20, PL 192,186, ll. 10-24 and ll. 29-41, almost literally follows St. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* lxxxvi, 1 f.; cf. above pp. 49f.

Among the texts examined, those which fuse the foundation-stone symbolism of Christ with that of Him as the consummation of the Church, have been quoted together with the examples of simple foundation and corner-stone symbolism, for two reasons: first, because in them the foundation-stone interpretation is predominant; second, because, as has been mentioned before, there remains to be discussed a last set of exegetical texts of early Christian and mediaeval origin, which clearly interpret the biblical *lapis angularis* as a coping-stone only; these texts will permit us to explain the peculiar illustration of *Ps.* cxvii, 22 in the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis.*

Before turning to this last part of our study, we now shall briefly deal with the evidence furnished by Latin mediaeval liturgical sources.

The oldest liturgical text I know which speaks of a ceremony on the occasion of the beginning of a new church building is the *Ordo de Aedificanda Ecclesia* of the *Pontificale Romano-Germanicum* of ca. A.D. 950.[34] There, however, we hear only of the consecration of the place where the altar was to be and nothing of the laying and blessing of the foundation-stone. The *Pontificale Romanum* of the 12th century has likewise nothing on the foundation-stone, but only an *Ordo ad Benedicendum Ecclesiam* that deals with the consecration of the church after it had been at least partially completed. In this *Ordo* we find the following prayer:

> Omipotens sempiterne Deus, qui per Filium tuum angularem scilicet lapidem duos e diverso venientes ex circumcisione et preputio parietes duosque greges ovium sub uno eodemque pastore unisti, da famulis tuis . . . . indissolubile vinculum caritatis . . . .[35]

The symbolism used is that of the corner-stone.

A formulary *De Benedictione et Impositione Primarii Lapidis pro Ecclesie Edificatione* can be found in the *Liber Ordinis Pontificalis,* written by William Durandus, Bishop of Mende, about 1292, a work which was to become the basis of the Roman Pontificals of the fifteenth and following centuries; it is inedited.[36] Yet on the evidence of the same author's paragraphs on the building of a church in his famous liturgical handbook *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum* (see below), there is little doubt that the formulary *De Benedictione et Impositione Primarii Lapidis* in the *Liber Ordinis Pontificalis* took the foundation-stone symbolism of the biblical *lapis angularis* for granted, in the same way as does the modern *Pontificale Romanum.*[37] See for instance

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[33] Cf. St. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* lxxxvi, 1 f., quoted p. 50.

[34] Ed. M. Hittorp, *De Divinis Catholicae Ecclesiae Officiis et Mysteriis* . . . (Paris, 1610), pp. 118 f. Cf. M. Andrieu, *Les Ordines Romani du haut moyen âge,* I (Louvain, 1931), p. 185, and *Le Pontifical Romain au moyen âge, I* (*Studi e Testi,* LXXXVI, *Città* del Vaticano, 1938), p. 85.

[35] Ed. Andrieu, *Le Pontifical Romain au moyen âge,* I, p. 179, no. 12.

> *Pontificale Romanum Clementis PP. VIII Iussu Restitutum, Urbani item VIII Auctoritate Recognitum . . . . Alexandro VII Pont. Max. Dicatum,* (Rome, 1663), pp. 261 ff.:
>
> > De Benedictione et Impositione Primarii Lapidis pro Ecclesia Aedificanda (see especially pp. 266 ff.):
> >
> > . . . .
> >
> > Pontifex benedicit primarium lapidem dicens:
> >
> > . . . .
> >
> > V. *Lapidem quem reprobaverunt aedificantes*
> > R. *Hic factus est in caput anguli* (*Ps.* cxvii, 22)
> > V. *Tu es Petrus*
> > R. *Et super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam* (*Matth.* xvi, 18)
> >
> > . . . .
> >
> > Oremus.
> > Domine Iesu Christe . . . . qui es lapis angularis, *de monte sine manibus abscissus* (*Dan.* ii, 35), et immutabile fundamentum: hunc lapidem collocandum in tuo nomine confirma; et tu qui es principium et finis, in quo principio Deus Pater ab initio cuncta creavit, sis, quesumus, principium et incrementum et consummatio ipsius operis,[38] quod debet ad laudem et gloriam tui nominis inchoari . . . .
> > Oremus.
> > Domine sancte Pater omnipotens aeterne Deus benedicere dignare hunc lapidem in fundamentum ecclesiae . . . . *lapidem probatum, angularem, pretiosum in fundamento fundatum* (*Is.* xxviii, 16), de quo dicit apostolus: *Petra autem erat Christus* (*I Cor.* x, 4) . . . .

Long before Durandus we find the foundation-stone symbolism applied to the *lapis angularis* in the liturgical hymn with the *Incipit*: *Urbs beata Hierusalem dicta pacis visio* . . . . which is at least as old as the eighth or ninth century. Its first appearance is in a Pontifical *saec.* viii-ix, from Poitiers, preserved in Paris, *Bibliothèque de l'Arsénal,* Ms 227; there the title of the hymn is: *Sabbato Sancto. Benedicuntur post hoc fontes et baptizantur parvuli.* Later on it was used for the office of the dedication of a church, and therefore is found in Hymniaries and Breviaries.[39] With only some slight alterations it still lives on in the Benedictine Breviary in the *Commune Dedicationis Ecclesiae.*[40] According to the oldest form of the hymn stanza 5 reads:[41]

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[36] Cf. P. de Puniet, *The Roman Pontifical . . . ,* (translated by M. V. Harcourt): Historical Introduction, Confirmation and Ordinations (London, New York, Toronto, 1932), pp. 37 ff.; see especially p. 42: description of *Ms* 733 of the *Bibliothèque Nationale* of Paris, after P. Battifol, 'Le Pontifical Romain, Le Pontifical de Guillaume Durand . . .', *Bulletin d'ancienne littérature et d'archéologie chrétienne,* 1913; also in *Etudes de littérature et d'archéologie chrétienne,* 1919, p. 29). For other manuscripts see de Puniet, *op. cit.* Seymour de Ricci and W. J. Wilson, *Census of Mediaeval and Renaissance Manuscripts in the United States and Canada,* II (New York, 1937), p. 1164, no. 17, list a manuscript of ca. 1400 in the Library of Mr. Acton Grimson at High Point, N.J., containing *Benedictiones Solemnes Pontificales* by William Durandus, which might be identical with the *Liber Ordinis Pontificalis.*

[37] See de Puniet, *op. cit.,* pp. 44 ff., about the use made of Durandus' work by Augustinus Patrizi in his Pontifical of 1485, which in turn was used for the Pontifical of Pope Clement VIII.

[38] Cf. above, pp. 49 ff., especially St. Augustine, *Enarr.* in Ps. lxxxvi, 1 f.

[39] See C. Blume, S.J., *Die Hymnen des 5.-11. Jahrhunderts . . . (Thesauri Hymnologici Hymnarium. Die Hymnen des Thesaurus Hymnologicus H. A. Daniels . . . , Analecta Hymnica Medii Aevi,* LI, Leipzig, 1908), p. 110, no. 102. Cf. also J. Sauer, *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes . . .* p. 115, note 1.

> Angularis fundamentum lapis Christus missus est,
> Qui compage parietis in utroque nectitur,
> Quem Sion sancta suscepit,[42] in quo credens permanet.

Allusions to the corner and foundation-stone of the church-building can also be found in some mediaeval didactic works on liturgy.[43] See for instance the *Speculum de Mysteriis Ecclesiae* attributed to Hugh of St. Victor, where in *cap.* 1: *De Ecclesia*, PL 177, 335B, the verse *Angularis fundamentum lapis Christus missus est,* taken from the old liturgical hymn discussed above, is quoted; continuing, the author follows the exegetical tradition about Christ as the foundation and corner-stone:

> Super hoc (i.e. fundamentum) autem, non praeter hoc fundamentum est apostolorum et prophetarum (cf. *Eph.* ii, 20), sicut scriptum est: *Fundamenta ejus in montibus sanctis* (*Ps.* lxxxvi, 1). Superedificati parietes Judaei sunt et gentiles de quatuor mundi partibus venientes ad Christum.[44]

Siccardus of Cremona, in his *Mitrale,* has a chapter *De Fundatione Ecclesiae* (*Lib.* I, *cap.* 2),[45] in which, probably in conformity with the liturgical prayers of his time, *Eph.* ii, 20 is quoted to connect the foundation-stone of a church-building with Christ as *fundamentum fundamentorum.*[46]

William Durandus of Mende, in his *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum, Lib.* I, *cap.* 1: *De Ecclesia et Eius Partibus,* paragraphs 8 f., follows almost literally Hugh of St. Victor in identifying the biblical corner-stone with the foundation-stone of the church.[47] In *Lib.* VII, *cap.* 48: *De Festo et Officio Dedicationis Ecclesiae,* paragraph 5, however, he repeats an old Augustinian thought[48] in saying that Christ is at the same time *lapis in summo et . . . . lapis angularis et fundamentum.*[49]

It might have been expected that additional information about the exact place given to the biblical corner-stone by mediaeval interpretation could be found in works of art of earlier origin than the late mediaeval representation in the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis.* Yet the result of my investigations in this direction is completely negative. This is due not merely to the fact that only a very small section of the published and even less of the unpublished material of mediaeval illustrations of the relevant parts of Holy Scripture, and especially of the Psalms, was available to me. As is well known, the mediaeval Psalter illustration, which would be of special interest for our problem, is largely limited to a few selected passages from the Psalms. Only one group of Psalter manuscripts, that of the Carolingian Utrecht Psalter and its English copies, has a picture for each Psalm. Yet the illustration of *Ps.* cxvii, 22 in the Utrecht Psalter is of little help to us, as it represents the rejection of the stone and not its reception.[50]

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[40] I am indebted to Dom Eric McCormack O.S.B., for drawing my attention to this fact. See *Breviarium Monasticum . . . pro Omnibus sub Regula S. Patris Benedicti Militantibus* (Malines, 1933): *Commune Dedicationis Ecclesiae, Ad Laudes.* The first part of the hymn is to be found *In I Vesperis.* In the Roman Breviary the hymn is much altered.

[41] Cf. Blume, op. cit., p. 110.

[42] Cf. *Is.* XXVIII, 16.

[43] With regard to liturgical treatises of the earlier part of the middle ages, see the short, but comprehensive survey of V. L. Kennedy C.S.B., in his study The "Summa de Officiis Ecclesiae" of Guy d'Orchelles, *Mediaeval Studies,* I (1939), 25 ff.

[44] *Loc. cit.* 335 B.

[45] PL 213, 17 f.

[46] See above p. 49: St. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* lxxxvi, 1 f.

[47] *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum* (Venice, 1599), fol. 4ʳ f.

[48] Cf. above pp. 49 f.

[49] *Op. cit.*, fol. 308ᵛ.

There remains for us to investigate the source of the illustration of *Ps.* cvxii, 22 in one of the oldest manuscripts of the fourteenth century *Speculum Humanae Salvationis,* where the *lapis angularis* is placed on top of a tower.[51] The quest for the source of the peculiar *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* picture will quite naturally lead us to a discussion of the "extraordinary" mediaeval and early Christian exegetical texts mentioned earlier in this study.[52] These texts completely omit the foundation-stone symbolism in favour of the coping-stone interpretation.

With regard to the two fifteenth century representations of the coping-stone, discovered by Panofsky (see above p. 44), they might perhaps be derived from the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* or another "picture book" of equally wide influence.[53] Yet it should be noted that Panofsky's two fifteenth century pictures connect the coping-stone symbolism with the Annunciation, while in the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* it is tied up with the Resurrection of Christ (see below). It is possible, therefore, that the coping-stone symbolism of the Annunciation pictures is quite independent of the *Speculum* and rather influenced by exegetical texts in which that symbolism is more or less pronounced (see above and below). Among the mediaeval exegetes themselves, there are some who refer the *lapis angularis* prophecy to the Passion and Resurrection of Christ, and others who connect it with the Nativity. For the latter interpretation see for instance the Commentary on the Psalms of Anselm of Laon quoted below, p. 60, which also has the exclusive coping-stone symbolism.[54] It might perhaps be argued that a "Nativity text" may more easily have influenced Annunciation pictures than a "Resurrection text". All this must remain uncertain, but in returning to the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* we shall tread on firmer ground.

It goes without saying that in looking for the origin of the illustration of *Ps.* cxvii, 22 in the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* we have first of all to repair to the text of the work itself. The *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* is written in verse and belongs to the late mediaeval genus of "pictorial bibles" in which events from the New Testament are juxtaposed to several prophetic happenings under the Old Law. In the case which concerns us, a picture of the Resurrection of Christ is put into parallel with illustrations of the following Old Testament passages: The breaking of the gates of Gaza by Samson; the saving of Jonah from the whale; and finally *Ps.* cxvii, 22. The verses which accompany the picture for *Ps.* cxvii, 22, however, contain a story which is not biblical at all and gives us the key to the peculiarity of the pictorial interpretation of the *lapis angularis* passage in the *Speculum*. It is necessary to give the text in full:[55]

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[50] See E. T. De Wald, *The Illustrations of the Utrecht Psalter* (*Prinecton, London, Leipzig,* s.a.), pl. 106. Cf. also A. Springer, 'Die Psalter-Illustration im frühen Mittelalter . . . *Abhandlungen der K. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, Philos.-Histor. Classe,* VIII (1883), 277. J. J. Tikkanen, *Die Psalter-Illustration im Mittelalter,* I, 1-3 (Helsingfors and Leipzig, 1895-1900) does not mention illustrations of *Ps.* cxvii, 22. I could not consult the extant mediaeval copies of the Utrecht Psalter, none of which has been published in its entirety.

[51] *Clm* 146, *saec.* XIV, from Schlettstadt. See the edition of Lutz and Perdrizet, II, pl. 63-64, and the article of Panofsky quoted above, note 4.

[52] See pp. 44 and 52.

[53] Numerous examples of works of art, influenced by the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis,* are studied in Lutz and Perdrizet, *op. cit.* Unfortunately *Ps.* cxvii, 22 has not been illustrated in any of them. Of illustrations of other manuscripts of the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis,* Lutz and Perdrizet reproduce those of the French translation of the *Speculum,* of *ca.* 1450, by Jean Miélot, in *Ms. fr.* 6275 of the *Bibliothèque Nationale* at Paris. There the picture illustrating *Ps.* cxvii, 22 is of a similar type as that in the Utrecht Psalter, which has been discussed above; probably it is the rejection of the *lapis angularis,* that is represented.

[54] *In Ps.* cxvii, 23 f., PL 116, 600 B: Dico *a Domino factum* et *haec dies* (*Ps.* cxvii, 24), in qua natus est Christus et factus: vel in qua facta est praedicta conjunctio populorum (i.e. of the Jews and gentiles) . . . See also Cassiodorus, *In Ps.* cxvii, 24, PL 70, 833 A. For the connection of the *lapis angularis* with the Passion and Resurrection of Christ see for instance St. Bruno the Carthusian, *In Ps.* cxvii, 24, PL 152, 1255 A-B and St. Bruno of Segni, *In Ps.* cxvii, 24, PL 164, 1145 A.

Haec resurrectio Salvatoris nostri jam praetexata
Fuit per lapidem quem reprobaverunt aedificantes figurata.
Temporibus Salomonis cum Templum Dei aedificaretur
Contigit ut quidam lapis mirabilis ibi inveniretur.
Aedificatores nullum locum sibi aptum invenire potuerunt
Et hoc pluries cum magno labore attentaverunt.
Aut fuit nimis longus aut nimis spissus
Aut nimis brevis aut nimis demissus.
Quapropter indignati aedificantes eum abjiciebant
Omnes eum lapidem reprobatum proprio nomine dicebant.
Consummato autem templo lapis angularis ponendus erat
Qui in se duos parietes concludere et totum complere debebat.
Sed non est inventus lapis qui posset illi loco aptari,
Super quo non sufficiebant aedificatores admirari.
Ultimum autem lapidem quem reprobaverunt adduxerunt
Et ipsum aptissimum pro angulari lapide invenerunt.
Ad tam grande miraculum omnes stupebant
Et aliqui magnum futurum per hoc designari dicebant.
Christus erat lapis reprobatus in sua passione,
Sed factus est ecclesiae lapis angularis in sua resurrectione.
Tunc impleta est illa prophetia prophetae magni:
Lapidem quem reprobaverunt aedificantes hic factus est in caput anguli,
A Domino factum est istud et est mirabile in oculis nostris (*Ps.* cxvii, 22 f.).
Quapropter cantatur prophetia haec in festo resurrectionis.
Lapis iste duas parietes in Templo Domini coadunavit,
Quia Christus de populo gentili et Judaico unam ecclesiam aedificavit.
In hoc aedificio pro cemento usus est suo sanguine,
Pro lapidibus autem usus est suo sanctissimo corpore.
O bone Jesu praesta nobis ut in tua ecclesia ita vivamus,
Ut in templo tuo coelesti semper tecum maneamus.

This story claims to know the very occasion on which the *lapis angularis*, first rejected as not fit, finally turned out to be indispensable for the completion of an edifice: it was the building of Solomon's Temple. The author, of course, had a source for his tale: it was the great store house of mediaval biblical knowledge, the *Historia Scholastica* of Petrus Comestor (or Manducator), which was used also elsewhere in the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis*.[56] In the Comestor's paraphrase of *III Reg.* vi, 14 f. (PL 198, 1356 B) we read:

> De interiori schemate superiorum mansionum (of the Temple) non legi nisi quod, dum consummaretur aedificium, positus est lapis in angulo superiori non sine grandi omnium admiratione. Cum enim aedificantes et in fundamento et in muro eum locare niterentur, non

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[55] Ed. Lutz and Perdrizet, *op. cit.*, I, p. 67, vv. 71 ff.

[56] Several instances of this are given in the edition of Lutz and Perdrizet, but the source of our story has not been identified by them.

> est inventus locus ejus donec in angulo superiori et postremus omnium convenientissime positus est secundum quod praedixerat David: *Lapidem quem reprobaverunt aedificantes* . . . . (*Ps.* cxvii, 22).[57]

Petrus Comestor says that he read this elaboration on *Ps.* cxvii, 22 somewhere, but does not tell us where; it does not occur in the Books of Kings or in the *Paralipomena.* But another author who lived almost a hundred years earlier than Petrus, St. Bruno, the founder of the Carthusian order, in mentioning the same story also gives its source.

St. Bruno the Carthusian, *In Ps.* cxvii, 22, PL 152, 1253 D ff.:

> Per reprobationem Christi firmissimi lapidis me salvasti sine quo fundamento nemo potest se Deo templum per virtutes et opera bona aedificare. *Fundamentum enim aliud nemo potest ponere praeter id quod positum est quod est Christus* (*I Cor.* iii, 11) . . . . Qui lapis per hoc quod fuit a Judaeis reprobatus et in mortem datus, *factus est in caput anguli*, cum prius non fuisset caput anguli, id est factus est caput duplicis parietis ecclesiae, parietis scilicet fidelium ex Judaeis et parietis fidelium ex gentibus; qui congrue angulus dicitur. Sicut enim aliquando duo parietes diversi in angulo conveniunt et a quolibet angulari lapide supra posito et caput eorum existente uterque complectitur, ita illi duo parietes, ecclesia videlicet ex Judaeis et ecclesia ex gentibus, quae prius omnino diversae fuerant ab invicem, in fidei unitate convenerunt subditae Christo angulari lapidi qui caput utriusque existit et utramque suo regimine complectitur juxta illud apostoli: *Ipse est pax nostra qui fecit utraque unum* (*Eph.* ii, 12) etc. Illud autem quod de angulari lapide Judaei fingunt, scilicet in templi Salomonis aedificatione lapidem unum fuisse ab aedificantibus reprobatum et ad ultimum in angulo fuisse positum, omnino falsitati videtur accedere, cum in historia nulla legatur.

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[57] See also *Historia Scholastica, in Matth.* xxi, 42, PL 198, 1605 A: Ad litteram traditur fuisse paratus lapis ad templi aedificium, nec tamen congrue in eo poni potuit donec consummato opere in angulo sursum positus est . . . Hic est Christus qui fundamentum est ita quod structurae supereminet (with regard to the last sentence cf. the texts, quoted pp. 49 ff.). See finally *Historia Scholastica, In Act.* iv, 7, *ibid.* 1657 B-C: . . . *factus est in caput anguli*, id est factus est princeps duorum populorum qui in ipso tanquam in angulari lapide sunt uniti . . . To clarify the derivation of the corner-stone legend in the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* from the *Historia Scholastica*, it is necessary to quote a legend about the Holy Cross which occurs in Petrus Comestor's work: *Historia Scholastica, In III Reg.* x and *In I Par.* ix: *De Regina Saba*, PL 198, 1370 C: Tradunt quidem eam (i.e. the Queen of Saba) rescripsisse Salomoni, quod praesentialiter ei dicere timuit, se vidisse scilicet quoddam lignum in Domo Saltus, in quo suspendendus erat quidam, pro cujus morte regnum Judaeorum periret . . . Quod timens Salomon in profundissimis terrae visceribus occultavit illud. Pro cujus virtute aqua mota sanavit aegrotos, quod tamen in libris suis negant se habere Hebraei. Sed quomodo circa tempora Christi in Probatica Piscina (cf. *Joan.* v) superenataverit, incertum est. Et creditur fuisse hoc lignum Crucis Dominicae. Petrus Comestor's Holy Cross and corner-stone legends were combined with one another and with other legendary material by John Beleth, *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum, cap.* 151: *De Exaltatione Sanctae Crucis*, PL 202, 153 B-C: Ferunt ab Adamo Seth filium ejus missum fuisse in Paradisum, qui ramum inde sibi datum ab angelo retulit ad patrem qui statim illius arboris mysterium cognoscens eam terrae inseruit, in magnam arborem procrevit. Postea vero cum in templi aedificatione ex diversis mundi partibus arbores afferrentur, allata est illa et relicta tanquam inutilis. Unde deinceps ad foveas quasdam civitatis posita est, per quam commode transire possit. Hanc cum vidisset regina Saba, noluit transire, sed adoravit. Postea autem rejecta est in Probaticam Piscinam, quae tempore Passionis Christi desiccata fuit, ac tum apparuit lignum, cui, cum aliud non invenirent, Dominum affixerunt.—Jacobus de Voragine, in his *Legenda Aurea*, cap. 68: *De Inventione S. Crucis*, ed. T. Graesse, (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1850), pp. 303 ff., used both Petrus Comestor and John Beleth. The author of the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* again must have known both Petrus Comestor and the Golden Legend, as in his verses about the *lapis angularis* (see above p. 56), he follows the corner stone story of the *Historia Scholastica* as to its content, but, in the choice of his words, is largely dependent upon Jacobus de Voragine's Holy Cross Legend; (for the use made of the Golden Legend in other parts of the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* see Lutz and Pedrizet, *op. cit.*).

> Notandum autem quod tali genere locutionis hic versus sit a propheta compositus: Cum enim posuisset: *Lapidem quem reprobaverunt aedificantes,* et secundum hunc ordinem, quem incoeperat, debuisset addere: fecerunt in caput anguli, hoc ordine dimisso, alio genere locutionis versum finivit, addens *Hic factus est in caput anguli.* In hoc autem removet hoc quod male posset quivis opinari, scilicet Judaeos hac intentione lapidem hunc reprobasse, ut fieret in caput anguli . . . .

St. Bruno, in this text, adopts the combined foundation-stone, corner-stone and coping-stone symbolism which we have also found elsewhere;[58] but in the passage *Illud autem quod de angulari lapide Judaei fingunt . . . . in historia nulla legatur,* he rejects as a Jewish fiction the story which we have met in the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* and in Petrus Comestor.

There is little doubt then that this story was current among St. Bruno's Jewish contemporaries, i.e., that it belonged to Rabbinical literature or perhaps oral tradition. I did not succeed in finding our story in mediaeval Rabbinical writings[59], but its ultimate source can be given. It is the so-called Testament of Solomon, a popular book, written in Greek in hellenistic-oriental surroundings, perhaps in Asia Minor or Egypt, probably in the third century of our era. The writer possibly was a Christian, but the work is based on Jewish tradition.[60] In speaking of the construction of Solomon's Temple, the author says that the king first found it impossible to have the "lithos akragoniaios" moved "eis ten kephalen tes gonias", but finally a captured demon succeeded in doing so, whereupon Solomon quoted *Ps.* cxvii, 22. The whole context leaves no doubt that in this case the coping-stone and the peak of the building are referred to, because the demon carries the stone up the stairs of the temple. J. Jeremias, who quotes this story in his study on the corner-stone,[61] believes that it supports his thesis that the biblical *lapis angularis* is a coping-stone. Yet I do not think that the Testament of Solomon reflects an old tradition, which would invalidate the interpretation given in this study of the Old and New Testament passages in question. The work is clearly a hybrid product of the era of late antique religious syncretism.

As likewise pointed out by J. Jeremias,[62] the biblical corner-stone is also mentioned in a late antique and in an early mediaeval report of pilgrims to Jerusalem, which certainly repeat a local Jerusalemitan tradition.

Itinerarium Burdigalense (A.D. 333), ed. P. Geyer, *Itinera Hierosolymitana Saeculi* IIII-VIII, CSEL 39, 21:

> . . . . interius vero civitati (i.e. Jerusalem) . . . . est angulus turris excelsissimae, ubi Dominus ascendit (when tempted by the devil) . . . . Ibi est et lapis angularis magnus de quo dictum est: *Lapidem quem reprobaverunt* . . . . (*Ps.* cxvii, 22)

Antoninus Placentinus (ca. A.D. 570), *op. cit.* 173 f.:

> Deinde venimus in basilica sancta Sion ubi sunt multa mirabilia, inter

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[58] Cf. above pp. 49 ff. See also St. Bruno the Carthusian, *In Eph.* ii, 20, PL 153, 329 A-B: . . . *super fundamentum,* id est Christum, super quem apostoli et prophetae fundati sunt, *aedificati ipso,* dico, *Christo Jesu* existente *lapide* propter firmitudinem *summo,* id est consummante justitiam vestram, *angulari,* id est utrumque populum, Judaeum et gentilem, in se connectente. Lapis iste, ubi ad litteram fuerit, certum non habemus; fuisse tamen credimus, quod, donec in consummatione utriusque parietis non idonee poni potuit, sed in summo mirabili convenientia utrumque parietem coagulavit. (In this passage St. Bruno seems influenced by the Jewish story which he rejects in his Commentary to the Psalms). Hic lapis significavit Christum, Judaeum et gentilem in perfectione fidei copulantem. Qui Christus, sicut est summus consummator justitiae, sic est et principium justitiae . . .

[59] I am indebted to Rev. E. F. Crossland, Toronto, and to Mr. E. L. Fackenhein, Toronto, for their help in this search.

[60] Ed. C. C. McCowan, *The Testament of Solomon* (Diss. University of Chicago, Leipzig, 1922); see pp. 105 ff. for the date of the work and pp. 108 ff. for authorship and provenience.

[61] *Op. cit.,* pp. 68 f.

[62] *Op. cit.,* pp. 69 f.

> quibus quod legitur de lapide angulare qui reprobatus est ab aedificantibus. Ingresso Domino Iesu in ipsa ecclesia, quae fuit domus sancti Iacobi, invenit lapidem istum deformem in medio iacentem, tenuit eum et posuit in angulum. Quem tenes et levas in manibus tuis et ponis aurem in ipso angulo et sonat in auribus tuis quasi multorum hominum murmuratio.

Contrary to J. Jeremias' assumption, there is nothing in these two texts which would indicate that the *lapis angularis* was identified with a stone on top of a building.

Much more significant than the two pilgrims' accounts is a text from Origen, in which the exclusive coping-stone symbolism occurs. Origen lived in approximately the same period and the same intellectual climate as the author of the Testament of Solomon and may have known his work.

Origen, *In Matth.* xxi, 42, ed. E. Klostermann, *Die giechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte . . . . Origenes Werke,* X (Leipzig, 1935), p. 615 (Latin version, saec. VI ca.):[63]

> . . . . lapidem . . . . reprobatum ab eis Pater conlocabit in totius aedificii caput ut conprehendat duos angulos veteris testamenti et novi et duorum populorum aedificationem . . . .

Further on (*op. cit.,* p. 616) *caput anguli* is identified with Christ as the head of the Church, according to *Eph.* iv, 15.

Of course it is very possible that Origen's symbolism of the highest corner-stone ("akrogoniaios lithos") is merely based on a combination of *Matth.* xxi, 42 and the head-symbolism of *Eph.* iv, 15 and has nothing to do with the Testament of Solomon.

Origen's thought reappears in a scholium to *Matth.* xxi, 42, which probably belongs to the fifth century Ammonius of Alexandria.[63a] Among the Latin Fathers, Hilarius of Poitiers whose indebtedness to Alexandrian thought is well known and who translated Origen, was probably likewise influenced by the latter's interpretation of "kephale gonias", when, in commenting on *Matth.* xxi, 42 (PL 9, 1942 B), he writes:

> . . . . Filius lapis est ab aedificantibus improbatus et in fastigium angularis erectus . . . .

The passages quoted from Origen, Ammonius of Alexandria and Hilarius of Poitiers are the only patristic sources known to me which interpret the biblical corner-stone as coping-stone, to the exclusion of the foundation-stone symbolism. For the mediaeval west I found two more such sources. It is noteworthy that they date from the late eleventh or early twelfth century, the very period in which St. Bruno the Carthusian (died in 1101) discussed the Jewish "coping-stone" story. The first of these passages occurs in a commentary to the Psalter, often attributed to the Venerable Bede, which however does not belong to him and has been plausibly ascribed to Manegold of Lautenbach[64] (died after 1103): PL 83, 1051 A-B (among the dubious works of Bede):

> . . . . quem lapidem aedificantes, id est Judaei, suam justitiam statuere volentes et justitiae Dei non esse subjecti, reprobaverunt et hominem regem elegerunt, hic, inquam, lapis factus est mihi in caput, id est

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[63] The Latin translation of the Matthew Commentary is not less authentic than the Greek text which we possess; see Klostermann, in the Introduction, pp. viii ff.

[63a] PL 85, 1385 A-B. Cf. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur,* iv, p. 83 ff.

[64] Cf. G. Morin, O.S.B., 'Le Pseudo-Bède sur les Psaumes et l'opus super Psalterium de Maître Manegold de Lautenbach', *Revue Bénédictine,* xxviii (1911), 331 ff.; Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages,* p. 33.

> regimini me subjecisti, sicut membrum capiti. Et non solum mihi factus est in caput, sed et multis aliis, quia factus est caput anguli, id est factus est lapis angularis, continens duos parietes ex diverso venientes, sed non diversa sentientes . . . .

The second passage is to be found in a Commentary on the Psalms which, like so many other exegetical works of the middle ages, was for a long time wrongly attributed to Haimo of Halberstadt, but was given back to its real author Anselm of Laon (died in 1117) by a brilliant study of Dom Wilmart:[65] PL 116, 600 A (there attributted to Haimo of Halberstadt):

> . . . . sicut angularis lapis duos conjungit parietes, ita Christus duos conjungit populos, Judaeos et gentes, in eamdem fidem. Cum dicit: in caput anguli, notat Christum esse omnem consummationem nostri aedificii et religionis, quasi lapis positus in consummatione anguli . . . .

Especially in the case of the Ps-Haimo text, influence of St. Bruno's "coping-stone story" might, I think, be considered; for the head-symbolism of Manegold, *Eph.* iv, 15 probably offers a sufficient explanation.

In concluding we may note that the mediaeval version of the "coping-stone story" of the Testament of Solomon, as represented by St. Bruno the Carthusian, by the Comestor's *Historia Scholastica* and by the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis*, contains an elaboration upon the original which was probably influenced by the prevalent foundation-and corner-stone symbolism of the middle ages. According to the mediaeval authors it was not the original intention of the builders to place the stone on the top of the temple, as the Testament of Solomon would have it, but they did so only at the near completion of the edifice, after they first had tried to use it elsewhere in the structure (*Speculum Humanae Salvationis*) or, more specifically, in the foundations or walls (*Historia Scholastica* and St. Bruno the Carthusian, especially in his Commentary on the Letter to the Ephesians, see note 58).

It is also interesting to compare the different "tones" in which the "coping-stone story" is told in the Testament of Solomon, St. Bruno's Commentary to the Psalms, Petrus Comestor's *Historia Scholastica* and the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis*: from late antique demonology we pass through the spiritual and yet critical biblical exegesis of the earlier middle ages to arrive at the piously novellistic and gracefully moralistic vein of a late mediaeval *exemplum*.

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[65] Cf. A. Wilmart, O.S.B., 'Un commentaire des Psaumes restitué à Anselme de Laon', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, viii (1936) 325 ff.

Voluntas, Affectio and Potestas in the Liber De Voluntate of St. Anselm

IMELDA CHOQUETTE

IT is as a step in the larger investigation of the relation between dialectics and revelation in St. Anselm of Canterbury and as an example of Anselmian method, that this study of his treatise *De Voluntate* has been undertaken.

In studying St. Anselm much attention has been given to the content of his treatises, not so much has been devoted to his technique. Yet an examination of Anselmian texts from the point of view of technique would seem far from fruitless in seeking to answer questions raised by the application of the principle *Credo ut intelligam*, e.g. concerning the nature and relation of *fides* and *intellectus*, and the resultant character of his work,—philosophical or theological.

St. Anselm was deeply versed in the works of the Fathers, especially St. Augustine, and in Sacred Scripture. It was his avowed purpose to fulfill St. Augustine's work and to further it. Yet an Anselmian text does not look like one of St. Augustine's: there is a difference in tone, texture and technique of demonstration.[1] For in striving to carry on St. Augustine's work and to seek God through knowledge, Anselm could not use the metaphysical method of Plotinus, not possessing sufficient texts thereof; so he used the only philosophical instrument he was acquainted with, and that was Logic, the Logic of Aristotle as translated and commented on by Boethius. For him then, the understanding of revelation could only mean that understanding which could be acquired through an application of dialectical method. Clearly therefore, an examination of his dialectical method, an analysis of his idea of demonstration, his approach to proofs, should be a helpful adjunct in determining the exact meaning of his thought.

Briefly stated, his usual dialectical procedure is to state a definition which he uses as the basis of subsequent demonstrations. This paper does not intend to go into the convolutions of these demonstrations themselves, but rather to remain at the doorstep of such an investigation,—at the question of his definitions. It is notable in reading St. Anselm that he has an ample supply of these definitions. Where did he get them? How did he arrive at them? The examination of the definitions of *voluntas, affectio* and *potestas* in the *De Voluntate* may give some indication of his usual method and his use of sources in such matters. The expansion and use of these definitions in his other treatises may exemplify, to some measure, his use of that which has been dialectically attained in the solution of theological questions.

The definitions given in the *De Voluntate* are important, however, not only as exemplificative of method, but also doctrinally and in themselves. As we shall see, they enter into the related dialectical treatises, *De Libero Arbitrio, De Casu Diaboli*, and *De Veritate*, as well as into the *Cur Deus Homo*, and the theological work *De Concordia Praescientia et Praedestinationis* and they determine

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[1] D. de Vorges, 'Le Milieu Philosophique à l'Epoque de St. Anselme', *Revue de Philosophie*, XV (1909), 614-615: Tout en adoptant les opinions de St. Augustin, il (Anselme) les démontre souvent d'une manière très différente, non sans certaines subtilités. (Ses) oeuvres sont ainsi pleins d'inspirations élevées de son génie propre et de la lecture assidue des Pères, surtout de St. Augustin, à côté d'arguties logiques dues aux habitudes du milieu où il vivait et renforcées par l'exercice du professorat.

Anselm's whole doctrine on free choice, liberty and satisfaction. There are two texts in which Anselm, himself, shows us their importance in relation to two different problems.

In the first of these, *voluntas* stands as an important link in the progression of thought from truth and justice to free choice, around the treatment of which latter hangs Anselm's solution of the questions of predestination, grace and divine foreknowledge.

> Veritatis vero, quam diffinivimus esse rectitudinem mente sola cognoscibilem, est quaedam species, cuius sedes est in voluntate, quam dicimus iustitiam, quae sic diffiniri potest: iustitia est rectitudo propter se servata. . . . Dicendum est igitur quae sit voluntas, cuius rectitudo dicitur iustitia, et quod sit liberum arbitrium, quo fruatur et sine quo non servatur rectitudo voluntatis propter se.[2]

Again, in the *Cur Deus Homo*, Anselm signalizes the need for a full treatment of *potestas, voluntas* and *necessitas*, this time in order to discuss the question why God became man:

> Est et aliud propter quod video aut vix, aut nullatenus, posse ad plenum inter nos de hac re nunc tractari, quoniam ad hoc est necessaria notitia potestatis et necessitatis et voluntatis et quarundam aliarum rerum quae sic se habent ut earum nulla possit plene sine aliis considerari; et ideo tractatus earum suum opus postulat, non multum, ut puto, facile, nec omnino inutile; nam earum ignorantia facit quaedam difficilia quae per earum notitiam fiunt facilia.[3]

Boso's answer to this may be considered as constituting a promise of a work on the will, and we may consider the *De Voluntate* to be the fulfillment of this promise:

> Sic breviter de his suis locis dicere poteris, ut et quod sufficiat ad praesens opus habeamus, et quod plus dicendum est in aliud tempus differamus.[4]

There seems, therefore, no reason to doubt the authenticity of this treatise, although Eadmer, St. Anselm's biographer, does not list it among the saint's works,[5] nor is it found in the oldest editions of his works.[6] The texts, above quoted, are strong proof of his intention to write a work of this kind, and the doctrine of the treatise itself is undeniably Anselmian.[7]

It is not possible to date this treatise with any precision. Logically it should post-date the *Cur Deus Homo* (1098) in which a work of this type was promised, and precede the *De Concordia*, written in 1107-1108, not long before Anselm's death. The *Synopsis Chronologica* given in the *Patrologia Latina* assigns it to the year 1109. There does not seem to be any positive reason, however, for assigning it to the very last years of Anselm's life.[8]

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[2] F. S. Schmitt, 'Eine Fruehe Rezension des Werkes *De Concordia*', *Revue Bénédictine*, XLVIII (1936), 62. (Henceforward to be referred to as *De Concordia*, edit. Schmitt.)

[3] Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* I, 2; PL 158, 363A.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Eadmer, *Vita Scti Anselmi*; PL 158, 50 ff.

[6] *Histoire Littéraire de la France* IX, p. 423.

[7] It has been questioned of late whether the work, as we have it, came directly from the pen of St. Anselm. Baeumker, Gerberon and Levasti think that it did, the latter considering it to be the beginning of an uncompleted work by the same name. T. F. Baeumker, *Die Lehre Anselms von C. über den Willen und seine Wahlfreiheit* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, X, Band 10, Heft 6, Münster 1912), p. 6; G. Gerberon, *Censura Tractatus de Voluntate*; PL 158, 23C; A. Levasti, *Sant'Anselmo, Vita e pensiero* (Bari 1929), pp. 112-114; Schmitt and Lohmeyer deem its structure to be not exactly Anselmian and are therefore led to call it a compilation made by someone of Anselm's milieu, but certainly springing from a first source. F. S. Schmitt, *Ein Neues Unvollendetes Werk des Hl. Anselm von C.* (Beiträge XXXIII, Band 33, Heft 3, Münster 1936), p. 19. E. Lohmeyer, *Die Lehre vom Willem bei Anselms von C.* (Lucka, 1914), p. 16.

[8] PL 158, 134. The other dates given above are from F. S. Schmitt, 'Zur Chronologie der Werke des Hl. A. von C.', *Rev. Bénéd.*, XLIV (1932), 322-50.

A. The Will as Instrument

The treatise begins abruptly, stating without prelude that the will is said equivocally, and then giving its three-fold meaning. There is no attempt to prove the existence of the will; its existence is not presupposed but rather is taken as self-evident. Indeed such an attempt at proof would be meaningless for Anselm; for what he aims to do is to define and "to have really defined a thing is to really have demonstrated."[9] And so he begins: the will is said equivocally: it is said of the instrument of willing, of the affections of the will, and of the use of the will.[10]

Now Aristotle has said that there are four means by which we may become well supplied with reasonings: the securing of propositions, the power to distinguish between the senses in which a particular expression is used, the discovery of the differences of things, and the investigation of their likenesses.[11] Having taken as self-evident the proposition that man has a will, and having stated that the common term, will, has different meanings, Anselm will now proceed to define each of these meanings, as well as to examine their differences and likenesses.[12]

Of the three meanings of will, Anselm devotes least time here to the primary meaning,—will as instrument or faculty: "the instrument of willing is called the will, as the instrument of seeing, the sight. It is a natural instrument of the soul".[13] This brevity of treatment would seem to indicate that his interest lies rather in the other meanings of will as being more important to his doctrinal purpose, as indeed we shall see them to be.

However, in studying Anselm's doctrine, we may do well to see how elsewhere he expands on this fundamental statement. The will as instrument is a *vis animae qua utimur ad volendum*,[14] or, *qua ipsa anima vult aliquid.*[15] As instrument it is one, whatever we may desire: *solum homine sicut ratio*,[16] and it is always and inseparably in man, although he does not always use it, e.g. when he is sleeping; in which again it is like to sight and reason. For we have the instrument of sight even when we are not seeing, and the reason when we are not thinking.[17] Nor is this instrument subject to possession in a greater or lesser degree, but remains the same whether we put it to good or evil use:

> Nam sicut cum aliquis utitur gladio, aut lingua aut potestate loquendi, non est aliud gladius, aut lingua sive potestas cum rectus est eorum usus, aliud cum non est rectus; ita voluntas qua utimur ad volendum . . . . non est aliud quando quis illa recte utitur, et aliud quando non recte; nec magis nec minus est hoc quod est essentialiter cum est justa quam cum injusta est voluntas. . . . .[18]

This is the will we are talking about when we say that we 'turn the will' to this or that, as to talking or walking.[19] As instrument, the will is an active potency and can be called a self-moving instrument; for strictly speaking it turns itself to what it *vehementer* desires: all that is decided by it comes from the will itself: *sola voluntas determinat quid teneat, nec aliqui facit vis necessitatis ubi*

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[9] Boethius, *De Diffinitione*; PL 64, 891B. Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* II, 7, 92b 20-25; tr. W. D. Ross, Vol. I, (Oxford 1928). (This edition was used for all references to Aristotle in this article.)

[10] Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* I, la: Things are said to be named equivocally when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus a real man and a figure in a picture . . . Cf. Boethius, *In Categorias Aristoteles* I; PL 64, 163D.

[11] *Topica* I, 13, 105a 22-24.

[12] Cf. Aristotle, *op. cit.* I, 15, 106a 2: as regards the number of senses a term bears, we must not only treat of each sense, but we must also try to render their definitions.

[13] *De Voluntate*; PL 158, 487A.

[14] *De Concordia*, edit. Schmitt, p. 63.

[15] *De Concepta Virginali* 4; PL 158, 436C.

[16] *De Concordia*, q.3, 11; PL 158, 535. *De Libero Arbitrio* 7; PL 158, 500.

[17] *De Concordia*, q.3, 11; PL 158, 534.

[18] *Op. cit.* q.1, 7; PL 158, 518 BC.

[19] *Op. cit.*, q.3, 11; Pl 158, 535A.

operatur electio sola voluntatis.[20] It moves all other internal instruments subject to voluntary use, as the hand, tongue or sight, and all external instruments, as a pen or an axe, and it causes all voluntary motions, even moving its own affections: God of course being the first principle of these motions.[21]

This then is the will as instrument: a natural, active, self-moving power, single, inseparable and always present in man. It is in this will that *fortitudo*[22] is present, and it is also here that the *arbitrium*, the element of choice in willing exists: *Hoc arbitrium,id est iudicium in voluntate, in voluntate quae est instrumentum existit.*[23] Again, when St. Anselm says that justice is the rectitude of the will, it is this will he is speaking about:

> Cum ergo dico: iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis voluntatem quae est instrumentum, id est vis animae qua utitur ad volendum, intelligo.[24]

The importance of these distinctions will become more apparent in treating of the affections of the will, which is the next meaning of *voluntas* examined by St. Anselm in this treatise.

B. The Will as Affection

Anselm's treatment of the will as affection is important in relation to his doctrine and revelatory as to his method. Doctrinally it is fundamental, especially in regards to free choice: as to method he shows here an important instance of his use of scriptural and Augustinian sources in his definitions.

Every instrument has not only *quod est* but also its aptitudes and its use. We have seen that the will is, in its primary sense, an instrument. It therefore has its aptitudes and use.[25] The aptitudes of the will are called affections:

> Quoniam ergo singula instrumenta habent et hoc quod sunt et aptitudines suas et suos usus, discernamus in voluntate instrumentum, et aptitudines ejus et usum ejus; quas aptitudines in voluntate possumus nominare affectiones.[26]

The affection of the instrument of willing is also called the will, as for example the love for her son, which is always in the will of the mother. By this affection a mother is always disposed to will the well-being of her son, whether she thinks about it or not.[27] This is the will considered as being drawn, as tending or moving towards something, and is suggestive of St. Augustine's definition of love as the intensification of will,—as a *pondus*, and of the will as the *motus animi.*[28]

There are two principal affections of the will: the affection of willing the useful, *commodum*, and the affection of willing justice. The affection for the useful is always and inseparably present in the instrument; the affection for justice is not always thus present, as for example in the case of the unjust man; nor when it is present is it always inseparable, as is apparent in just men in this life. Sometimes however it is inseparable, as in the good angels and in saints: in saints it is inseparable after this life, in angels, always. By these two affections we will whatever we will. For we will either the useful or the just, and this either for the sake of usefulness or for the sake of justice.[29]

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[20] *Op. cit.*, q.1, 6; PL 158, 517.

[21] *Op. cit.*, q.3, 11; Pl 158, 537A.

[22] For the presence of *fortitudo* cf. *De Libero Arbitrio* 7; PL 158, 499.

[23] *De Concordia*, edit. Schmitt, p. 68.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] *De Concordia*, q.3, 11; Pl 158, 534A: Sicut habemus in corpore membra et quinque sensu singula ad suos usus apta, quibus quasi instrumentis utimur, ut sint manus ad capiendum etc, ita et anima habet in se quasdam vires quibus utitur velut instrumenti ad usus congruos. Est namque ratio in anima qua sicut suo instrumento utitur ad ratiocinandum, et voluntas qua utitur ad volendum. Non enim est ratio vel voluntas tota anima, sed est unaquaque aliquod in anima.

[26] *Ibid.* 534B.

[27] *De Voluntate*; PL 158, 487A.

[28] St. Augustine, *Epist.* 157, 2, 9; PL 33, 677: Animus quippe, velut pondere, amore fertur quocumque fertur. *Confessionum* XIII, 9, 10: PL 32, 849: Pondus meum, amor meum. *Operis Imperfecti contra Juliaum* V, 40; PL 45, 1476: Voluntas enim nihil aliud est quam motus animi, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum vel adipiscendum.

This division is very important, especially as it concerns justice; we will consider it more fully; and first of all as to its source.

The division of the affections which St. Anselm gives here seems to be peculiar to him. The usual Ciceronian distinction was between the *honestum* and the *utile*; the usual Augustinian division was according to *fruor* and *uti*.[30] In the *Monologium*, written in 1076, St. Anselm uses the Ciceronian division:

> nihil solent putari bonum nisi aut propter utilitatem aliquam, ut bona dicitur salus, et quae saluti prosunt; aut propter quamlibet honestatem, sicut pulchritudo.[31]

It is not in the *commodum* side of the division that we are interested here,—it being used for, and in the same sense as, *utile*,—but rather in the *justitia* which replaces *honestas*.[32] A hard and fast answer as to the source of this 'justice' is, of course, out of the question, but by keeping in mind the *fides quaerens intellectum* by which St. Anselm was guided, we may discern some of the possible sources of his thought here. In the treatise *De Casu Diaboli*, St. Anselm says: *Justitiam credere debemus esse ipsum bonum quo sunt boni . . . . injustitiam vero ipsum malum esse.*[33] The *credere debemus* is a clue: this looks like a particular application of the *credo ut intelligam*.

Of the many scriptural texts which could be adduced as possibly influencing the Anselmian terminology here we may consider a few, considering at the same time their use by St. Augustine. In *Ecclesiastes* vii, 30 it is said: *solummodo hoc inveni, quod fecerit Deus hominem rectum.* This is found in *Sermo* 61 of St. Augustine: *Nos boni conditi sumus a bono: fecit enim Deus hominem rectum.*[34] Those who, by the gift of God, are right in heart are the just: *Justi sunt qui rectos sunt corde,*[35] and it is furthermore the just, the *rectos corde,* whom God saves: *Justum auxilium meum a Domino qui salvos facit rectos corde.*[36] So it is under scriptural inspiration that St. Augustine says that to live rightly is to do justice: *facit autem judicium et justitiam qui recte vivit,*[37] and that he asks:

> Quid mirum si delinquendo, hoc est, rectitudinem suam in qua factus erat depravatione mutando, cum supplicio secutum est non posse recta agere? Quamdiu vero in eadem rectitudine stetit in qua poterat non peccare?[38]

So with these texts in mind, it does not seem strange to hear St. Anselm say that that is right which is just:

> si quidquid debet esse, recte et juste est, nec aliud recte et juste est nisi quod debet esse, sicut puto, non potest aliud esse justitia quam rectitudo;[39]

or in the *De Concordia*:

> Instrumentum volendi duas habet aptitudines quas voco affectiones; quarum una est ad volendum commoditatem, altera ad volendum

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[29] *De Voluntate*; PL 158, 487A.

[30] Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, 31, 33; Pl 34, 32: . . . dicimus ea re nos perfrui quam diligimus propter seipsam, et ea re nobis fruendum esse tantum qua efficimur beati, caeteris vero utendum. *Sermo* 177, 8; PL 38, 958: videtur aliud esse uti, aliud frui. Utimur enim pro necessitate, fruimur pro jocunditate; ergo ista temporalia dedit ad utendum se (Deum) ad fruendum.

[31] *Monologium* 1; PL 158, 146A.

[32] *De Casu Diaboli* 12; PL 158, 344: duo bona . . . usu dicuntur: unum bonum est quod dicitur justitia; . . . alterum est quod mihi videtur posse dici commodum.

[33] *De Casu Diaboli* 9; PL 158, 337.

[34] Augustine, *Sermo* 61, 2; PL 38, 409.

[35] *Ps.* xciii, 15.

[36] *Ps.* vii. 11.

[37] *De Civitate Dei* XVII, 4, 8; PL 41, 531; *Jerem.* ix, 23: *in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur, intelligere et scire Dominum et facere judicium et justitiam in medio terrae.*

[38] Augustine, *Operis Imperfecti contra Julianum* VI, 12; PL 45, 1522.

[39] Anselm, *De Veritate* 12; PL 158, 480.

> rectitudinem. Per illam quae est ad volendum rectitudinem, vult rectitudinem et *rectus, id est justus* esse.[40]

It is merely a simplification of language for Anselm to say that this affection is for justice instead of for rectitude, since justice is the rectitude of the will,—[41] rectitude in which man was made and which he must preserve in order to be saved. The *honestas* of the Ciceronian distinction, which is itself a 'rightness' may thus be replaced by *justitia* which is the all-important rightness of the will, whose affections are here in question.

There seem to be grounds for saying, therefore, that this *justitia* has scriptural roots reached through St. Augustine, and that it is, furthermore, something of the nature of *justificatio*.

Having considered the possible source of this distinction, we may now consider the affections themselves. And first of all, the reason why the aptitudes of the will are called affections is that the instrument of willing is affected by its aptitudes. Thus when a man wills very strongly we say that he is affected to willing it: *dicitur hominis anima, cum vehementer vult aliquid, affecta esse ad volendum illud, vel affectuose velle.*[42] These affections exist in man in such a way that even when a man is not thinking of what he wills, if he were to think of it he would desire it either immediately, as for example health, or at a suitable time, e.g. sleep. For no one is ever affected in such a way as to desire ill-health or to wish never to sleep.[43]

This is the will we are talking about when we say that man always has the will *ut bene sibi sit*, and that a saint always has the will to live justly even when he is asleep or not thinking about it.[44]

In contradistinction to will as instrument, which we saw was one, will as affection is two-fold; just as sight has several aptitudes,—for seeing light, and through light, figures and colors,—so the instrument of willing has two aptitudes, i.e. affections, namely, for the useful and for justice. Through his affection for the useful man always desires happiness and to be happy; through his affection for justice man desires justice and to be just. Because of the former he desires, e.g. to work for the sake of life and health, which he deems to be useful; because of the latter he desires to learn, that he may live justly: *ut sciat recte, id est juste, vivere.*[45]

This two-fold division of the affections is complete for it takes care of both what we will and why we will it. Just as every will (instrument) desires something, so it desires it on account of something:

> Omnis voluntas sicut vult aliquid ita vult propter aliquid. Nam quemadmodum considerandum est quid velit, ita videndum est cur velit . . . . Quapropter omni voluntas habet quid et cur: omnino namque nihil volemus nisi sit cur velimus.[46]

But whatever we will is either useful or just or referable to them, and is willed either for the sake of usefulness or justice.[47] For every man seeks the good,[48] and there are said to be two goods and two contrary evils: justice and its contrary, injustice, the useful, and its contrary, the useless. Not all men desire justice nor flee injustice; but not only does every rational nature desire, but also every sentiment thing desires, the useful and avoids its contrary. For no one desires anything unless he thinks it is going to be in some way useful to him.[49]

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[40] *De Concordia*, q.3, 1; PL 158, 536B. Cf. *Ibid.*, q.3, 12; PL 158, 537: Justitia est etiam veritas illa voluntatis in qua arguitur a Domino diabolus non stetisse. (*Joann.* viii, 44: *Ille homicida erat ab initio et in veritate non stetit, quia non est veritas in eo.*) Haec (justitia) favet spiritui concupiscenti adversus carnem (*Gal.* V. 25) et condelectatur legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem (*Rom.* vii, 22) id est secundum eundum spiritum. Per rectitudinem quippe apostoli erant bonus odor Deo (II *Cor.* ii, 16).

[41] *De Concordia*, q.3, 2; PL 158, 523: omnes qui rectos sunt corde, hoc est qui recta sunt voluntate.

[42] *De Concordia*, q.3, 11; PL 158, 534B.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] *De Concordia*, edit. Schmitt, p. 64.

[45] *De Concordia*, q.3, 11; PL 158, 536B.

[46] *De Veritate* 12; PL 158, 481D. *loc. cit.*: Quippe non magis recta debet esse volendo quod debet quam volendo propter quod debet.

[47] *De Concordia*, q.3, 11; PL 158, 536A: Nempe nihil vult voluntas quae est instrumentum nisi aut commoditatem aut rectitudinem. Quidquid enim aliud vult, aut propter commoditatem, aut propter rectitudinem vult, et ad has etiam si fallitur, putat se referre, quod vult. Also *De Casu Diaboli* 4; PL 158, 332.

Now it is clear that of these two affections, the one for justice is in every way superior and pre-eminent, *melior et praeponenda*; for through this affection everything just is just; nor can anyone be happy except through this affection. Even were the affection for the useful on account of justice wholly absent from the soul, nevertheless the soul would be happy through the sole love of justice. It would not be miserable in any way because of the absence of the affection for the useful, for it does not feel the lack of that which it does not desire. On the other hand if only the affection for the useful, through which all just men desire happiness, were present, this affection would make only for wretchedness: for without justice this affection in no way attains to that which it seeks.[50]

In other words, though it is through his affection for the useful that man desires to be happy, he must be directed by justice in his pursuit of happiness and seek the useful through justice, else he will never attain to the state he seeks but find only wretchedness in its stead.[51] For through desiring justice, which is justice itself,[52] man cannot sin; in willing the useful however, he can sin by desiring that which he should not desire.

Is this not a dialectical version of: *Quaerite ergo primum regnum Dei et justitiam ejus ,et haec omnia adjicientur vobis?*[53]

According to Anselm then, the *quaerite* would primarily concern the affections of the will. And we may rightly say of the affection that it seeks or wills, just as we say it of the instrument, for the will as instrument wills what it wills by its affections, and the affection wills through the fact that the instrument wills: just as to see is said both of the man who sees and the sight by which he sees. The affections are, as it were, the instruments of the instrument, for without them it does not operate.[54] The affection for the useful and the affection for justice differ greatly. First off they differ in this, that the affection for the useful is inseparable, that for justice is separable, as it was *in principio* in the angels, in our first parents, and is in us in this life.[55] Secondly the affection for the useful by which we desire happiness *is* not happiness, whereas the affection for justice is justice or rectitude itself:

> Voluntas quidem justitiae est ipsa justitia; voluntas vero beatitudinis non est beatitudo, quia non omnis habet beatitudinem qui habet ejus voluntatem.[56]

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[48] *Monologium* 1; PL 158, 145A: omnes frui solis his appetant, quae bona putant.

[49] *De Casu Diaboli* 12: PL 158, 344B: duo bona et duo his contraria mala usu dicuntur: unum bonum est quod dicitur justitia, cui contrarium malum est injustitia; alterum bonum est quod mihi videtur posse dici commodum et huic malum opponitur incommodum. Sed justitiam quidem non omnes volunt, neque fugiunt injustitiam; commodum vero non solum omnis rationale natura, sed et omne quod sentire potest, vult, et vitat incommodum. Nam nullus vult nisi quod aliquo modo putat sibi commodum.

[50] *De Voluntate*; PL 158, 488B.

[51] *De Cóncordia*, edit. Schmitt, p.66: Beatitudo (est) sufficientia commodorum scil. sanae mentis voluntatem. Miseria vero est indigentia alicuius commodi vel plurimorum, i.e. absentia commodi vel commodorum contra voluntatem carentis.

[52] *De Concordia*, q.3, 11; PL 158, 538B.

[53] *Matt.* vi, 33; *Luc* xii, 31.

[54] *De Concordia*, q.3, 13; PL 158, 539C: Nec incongrue utraque voluntas velle dicitur quia illa vult quae affectio sua vult, et affectio vult per quam illa vult; sicut videre dicitur et homo qui visu videt et ipse visus quo videt. Unde non absurde possumus dicere affectiones ejus voluntatis quam instrumentum dixi animae quasi instrumenta ejusdem instrumenti esse: quia nihil ipsa nisi istis operatur.

[55] *De Libero Arbitrio* 14; PL 158, 506. Also, *De Concordia*, q.1, 6; PL 158, 516: Justa non est naturalis sed fuit separabilis in principio . . et est adhuc in hac vita; non tamen necessitate sed habentium illam propria voluntate.

[56] *De Concordia*, q. 3, 13; PL 158, 538B.

To have and to will justice, and to be just, are simultaneous in time:[57] for no one desires rectitude unless he has it, nor can anyone desire rectitude, i.e. justice, except by means of rectitude.[58]

Furthermore the evil opposed to justice is always nothing: it is neither a quality, action, or any essence, but merely the absence of justice where justice ought to be.[59] The *incommodum* on the other hand is sometimes something, as sorrow, sometimes nothing, as blindness.[60] Again, when we say that a man 'has more will' than another we speak not of the affection *ut bene sibi sit,* for it is possessed equally by all, nor of the instrument of willing, *qui non est in alio majus et in alio minus*, but of his inclination to justice *qua vult juste vivere*; which may be possessed more or less, or not at all.[61]

These affections play an extremely important part in Anselm's theology, for through them proceeds all merit for good or evil, for salvation or damnation. The affection for justice is the mother of all merit and of no evil; the affection for the useful is not always evil but only when it consents to the desires of the flesh against the spirit.[62] In order to show forth their importance an excursus into theology is necessary; which excursus we may permit ourselves on the ground that in so doing we are being quite Anselmian.

It was God's intention in the beginning that man be made just and happy *ad fruendam se* (*Deum*). But man could not be just or happy without desiring justice and happiness.[63] So God gave men the affection for justice, which is justice itself, and that for happiness, which is not happiness. The latter affection was given man for his own use and is permanent.[64] The former was given him for the honor of God but is such that it can be lost. This justice is the *debitum* and sole and whole honor we owe to God, and consists in man's submission to the Divine Will.[65]

In the beginning God so ordered the two affections that the will as instrument should use the affection for justice as a control and guide for the spirit: *ad imperium et regimen, docente spiritu qui et mens et ratio dicitur*, and the affection for the useful, i.e. for happiness, for obeying: *ad obediendum sine omne incommoditate.*[66] But the evil of original sin, which was nothing else but injustice, not rendering to God His due,[67] caused justice to be lost and thus upset the balance; so that the instrument of will was, *per liberum arbitrium,* made evil and became the handmaid of its inclination to the useful:

> hoc igitur modo voluntas instrumentum per liberum arbitrium facta est mala . . . .; voluntas etiam commodi, condita bona, in quantum est aliquid, mala, i.e. injusta facta est, quia non est subdita justitiae sine qua nihil velle debet . . . . Voluntas instrumentum . . . . ancilla facta est suae affectionis quae ad commodum est, quia, remota justitia, nihil potest velle nisi quod illa vult.[68]

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[57] *De Veritate* 12; PL 158, 483A: habere seu velle illam (justitiam) quamvis natura prius sint, quam servare illam, simul tamen sunt tempore. Mox ut habemus et volumus eamdem rectitudinem voluntatis, justitia dicenda est.

[58] *De Concordia*, q.3, 3; PL 158, 523C.

[59] *De Concordia*, q.1, 7; PL 158, 517.

[59] *De Concordia*, q.1, 7; PL 158, 517. *De Conceptu Virginali* 3; PL 158, 435: injustitis nullam habet essentiam quamvis injustae voluntatis affectus et actus, qui per se considerati aliquid sunt, usus injustitiam vocet.

[60] *De Concordia*, q.1, 7; PL 158, 517.

[61] *Op. cit.*, q.3, 11; PL 158, 535B.

[62] *De Concordia*, q.3, 12; PL 158, 537; 538.

[63] *Op. cit.*, q.3, 13; PL 158, 538B.

[64] Cf. Augustine, *Epist.* 155, 2, 6; PL 33, 669: non possumus nolle beatitudinem.

[65] *Cur Deus Homo* I, 11; PL 158, 376: *Anselm*: Non aliud peccare quam Deo non reddere debitum. *Boso*: Quod est debitum quod Deo debemus? *Anselm*: Omnis voluntas rationalis creaturae subjecta debet esse voluntate Dei. Hoc est debitum quod debet angelus et homo Deo; . . haec est justitia sive rectitudo voluntatis . . ; hic est solus et totus honor quem debemus Deo et quem a nobis exigit Deus. Sola namque talis voluntas opera facit placita Deo, cum potest operari, et cum non potest, ipsa sola per se placet, quia nullum opus sine illa placet.

[66] *De Concordia*, q. 3, 11; PL 158, 538.

[67] *De Concept. Virg.* 3; PL 158, 435.

[68] *De Concordia*, q.3, 13; PL 158, 538; 539.

Such was the affect of sin on the *voluntas instrumentum* and on the *voluntas commodi*, and on their relation to each other. So now since the Fall, the will, *motus voluntatis*, is good inasmuch as it is something, but *aliquid malum* inasmuch as it lacks justice.[69] By itself it is incapable of attaining the happiness it seeks;[70] therefore God, by His grace, makes man just so that he can attain happiness; nor can man have this rectitude of will, which is justice, unless God give it to him.[71]

We may give our attention briefly to the exact nature of *justitia* in Anselm's teaching, for it is precisely here that his treatment of the will fits into the progression of thought from truth, which is a *rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis,*[72] to *libertas arbitrii:*

> Veritatis vero, quam diffinivimus esse rectudinem mente sola cognoscibilem, est quaedam species, cuius sedes est in voluntate, quam dicimus iustitiam, quae sic diffiniri potest: iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata. Haec vero diffinitio continet omnem iustitiam . . . . Dicendum est igitur, quae sit voluntas cuius rectitudo dicitur iustitia, et quod sit liberum arbitrium, quo fruatur, et sine quo non servatur propter se.[73]

We have seen above that the will spoken of here is the will as instrument. The justice of which Anselm is speaking here is the truth of action, having its seat in the will, for it is its rectitude. Nor is any other rectitude, except that of the will, justice *per se.*[74] The influence of *Psalms* xciii, 15, seems clear here, namely that the just are all who are right in heart.[75]

The definition of justice is not complete unless we add that it is a rectitude *propter se servata*: for he who serves rightness for another does not love rightness itself, but that for which he serves it:

> qui autem nonnisi coactus aut extranea mercede conductus, vult quod debet (si servare dicendus est rectitudinem) non eam servat propter ipsam sed propter aliud.[76]

Cf. Augustine, *Sermo* 61, 2; PL 38, 409: Nos boni conditi sumus a bono . . Arbitrio autem nostro facti sumus mali.

[69] *De Casu Diaboli* 20; PL 158, 352: Inquantum enim voluntas . . sive motus voluntatis est aliquid, bonum est, et Dei est; inquantum vero justitia caret, sine qua esse non debet, non simpliciter malum sed aliquid malum est :et quod malum est non Dei, sed volentis sive moventis voluntatem est. Cf. Augustine, *Sermo* 61, 2; PL 38, 409: ipse homo voluntate sua se sanare non potuit.

[70] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 488B.

[71] *Cur Deus Homo* II; PL 158, 401; *De Casu Diaboli* 7; PL 158, 336; *De Concordia,* q.3, 1; PL 158, 528: Recte vero velle nemo potest nisi habeat rectitudinem voluntatis, quam nullus habet homo nisi per gratiam. Cf. Augustine, *Epist.* 140; PL 33, 570: justitia Dei non (est) sine gratia; *Sermo* 159, 8; PL 38, 872: Ex Deo est si quid justitiae habemus. *Sermo* 179, 1, 1; PL 38, 915: Justitia nostra ex Deo dono. *De Peccatorum Meritis* II, 18, 30; PL 44, 169: Aut enim justitiam diligimus et (voluntas) bona est, . . aut si omnino non diligimus, non bona est. Restat ut bonum voluntatem habemus ex Deo. *Philipp.* ii, 13: *Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate* . . . Anselm, *De Libero Arbitrio* 10; PL 158, 502C: Et majus miraculum existimo, cum Deus voluntati desertam reddit rectitudinem, quam mortuo reddit vitam amissam.

The balance between the affections *in principio* is further explained in an interesting passage in *De Casu Diaboli* 14; PL 158, 346. The angels, as St. Anselm has explained in chapter 14 of that work, were first given the will (affection) to happiness. (Sed) . . nec potest nec debet esse beatus nisi velit et nisi juste velit: necesse est ut sic faciat Deus utramque voluntatem in illo convenire ut et beatus esse velit, et juste velit. . . Quatenus addita justitia sic temperet voluntatem beatitudinis et resecet voluntas excessum et excedendi non amputat potestatem, ut, cum per hoc quia volet beatus esse, modum possit excedere; per hoc quia juste volet, non velit excedere: et sic justum habens beatitudinis voluntatem, possit et debeat esse beatus; qui non volendo quod non debet velle, cum tamen possit, mereatur ut quod velle non debet, nunquam velle possit.

[72] Anselm, *De Veritate* 11; PL 158, 480A.

[73] *De Concordia*, edit. Schmitt, p.62.

[74] *De Veritate* 5; PL 158, 472D; ibid. 12; PL 158, 482C.

[75] *De Concordia*, q.3, 2; PL 158, 523: *Omnes qui rectos sunt corde*, hoc est qui recta sunt voluntate. Quamvis enim corde credamus et intelligamus, sicut corde volumus, non tamen judicat Spiritus Sanctus illum habere rectum cor qui recte credit et intelligit et non recte vult.

[76] *De Veritate* 12; PL 158, 482D.

To serve the rectitude of the will for the sake of rectitude itself is nothing other than to will what God wishes one to will.[77]

The rectitude of the will is served *propter se* through *libertas arbitrii*:

> (libertas arbitrii habuerunt) ad volendum quod deberat et quod expediret velle. Ergo ad rectitudinem voluntatis habuerunt libertatem arbitrii, quandiu namque voluerunt quod debuerunt rectitudinem habuerunt voluntatis.[78]

Libertas arbitrii belongs to that species of liberty which is a power, which power in turn has four species contained within it. Of these, *libertas arbitrii* is a *potestas servandi*, i.e. *servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem.* Nor can this be said of any other liberty except the *libertas arbitrii.*[79]

The actual preservation of rectitude however is not so much to be imputed to *liberum arbitrium* as to grace:

> Nempe quamvis illa (rectitudo) servetur per liberum arbitrium, non tamen tantum imputandum libero arbitrio quantum gratiae, cum haec rectitudo servatur, quoniam illam liberum arbitrium non nisi per gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem habet et servat.[80]

The concurrence of God's will is impossible without the rectitude of our will, and the latter in turn cannot be possessed except through grace.

C. The Will as Opus: manifestation of the Instrument and its Affections

After this rather lengthy examination of St. Anselm's treatment of the will's affections,—undertaken because of the importance of the distinctions Anselm makes therein in relation to the major works towards which this little treatise points, and into which its definitions enter as bases of argumentation,—we may consider the third meaning of the equivocal term will given in the *De Voluntate*: the will as *opus.*

Will is the *opus* or use of the instrument of willing as vision is the work of the instrument of seeing.[81] In the use of the will we see the relation of the instrument to its affections, for this use is the *opus* of both the instrument and its inclinations: it is the act in which both the faculty and its inclinations are manifested: *est pariter cum ipso instrumento, opus affectionis, sicut acuta visio est visus et acuminis visus.*[82]

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[77] Anselm, *De Libero Arbitrio* 8; PL 158, 501B. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 31, 25; PL 36, 273: Quid est recti corde? Non resistentes Deo. *Op. cit.* 93, 18; PL 37, 1206: (Recto corde) sunt qui volunt quod Deus vult.

[78] Anselm, *De Libero Arbitrio* 2; PL 158, 493.

[79] *De Concordia*, edit. Schmitt, p.68: Libertas arbitrii est libertas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem. Libertas enim arbitrii sub quadam specie libertatis est quae libertas species est potestatis, et quatuor species habet. Alia est enim ad servandum, alia ad adipiscendum, alia ad expellendum, alia ad repellendum. Sub ea specie, quae est ad servandum, est libertas arbitrii, quam diffinivi esse libertatem servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem. In qua diffinitione, ubi posui libertatem potest poni potestas, ut ita dicatur: Libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem quia potestas genus libertatis est. Nec de ulla libertate praeter libertatem arbitrii talis potestas (dicitur). This text, in continuing, makes an important distinction concerning *liberum arbitrium*, which, for being fundamental to an understanding of the classical discussions on the point, seems important enough to reproduce here, though it does not concern the main purpose of this paper. Cum autem dicimus liberum arbitrium, duo sunt quae significamus, arbitrium scil. et libertas, a qua liberum denominatur. Est ergo liberum arbitrium arbitrium potens servare rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem. Sive hoc modo: Liberum arbitrium est arbitrium liberum ad servandum rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem. *Ibid*, l. 39-40: Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter ipsam rectitudinem. I was unable to find a straight-out statement that *liberum arbitrium* is *potestas* in the final recension of the *De Concordia*, PL 158, 507 ff.

[80] *De Concordia*, q. 3, 4; PL 158, 525A.

[81] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 487B.

[82] *Ibid.*

Unlike the instrument which we always have whether we use it or not, and the affections which remain in man even when he is not thinking of what he wishes,[83] the will as use is not ours except when we actually desire something and think of the thing we desire.[84]

This is the will we designate in saying: *modo volo legere*: for here *velle* means to use the will, and this use is the will itself. *Non est enim aliud velle quam uti potestate volendi; sicut idem est loqui et uti potestate loquendi.*[85]

Again unlike the instrument, which is single, and its affections which are two-fold, the use of the will is multiplex: *tam multiplex est quam multa et quam saepe volumus;*[86] in which again St. Anselm likens it to sight.

Anselm now gives three subdivisions of the use of the will. And first the will is either *propter rem*, the thing itself which is desired, as when thinking of health we desire it, or *propter aliud*, as when we wish to ride or take wormwood for the sake of health.[87] In the first case the purpose of our willing is the thing itself; in the second the thing desired is a means to our purpose. We may see an example of this distinction in the definition of justice discussed above: it is rectitude *propter se servata*; rectitude *servata propter aliud* is not justice.[88] St. Anselm also makes a very interesting application of this distinction in the fifth chapter of the dialogue *De Libero Arbitrio*, in relation to lying.[89] In this chapter the Master is trying to make the point that no one unwillingly deserts rectitude of will; *nam omnis volens ipsum suum velle vult.* The Disciple brings up the objection: how about a man who lies lest he be killed, although he does not wish to lie? Just as he lies against his will, *invitus*, so is it against his will that he wishes to lie: *et qui invitus mentiri vult, nolens vult mentiri.* The Master answers by the distinction between *voluntas propter rem* and *voluntas propter aliud.* It is according to these different wills that such a man lies willingly and not unwillingly. He does not will mendacity on account of mendacity itself, since he wills the truth, but he wills it on account of life. Thus he is not willing (deserting rectitude) against his will, for it is in willing to live that he lies; i.e. he is lying *propter aliud*, not for the sake of mendacity but for the sake of life: *non vult mendacium propter se sed propter vitam.*

Thus the Disciple's objection does not hold, because in lying this man wills to desert rectitude *propter vitam*, according to which will he does not lose rectitude unwillingly but willingly. When the Master said that a man cannot lose rectitude against his will, the will here meant is the use of the will *propter aliud.*

The next sub-division of will as use is according as it wills a positive or negative result: *quia aut vult esse aliquid, aut vult non esse*; ut velle esse hominem et velle non esse hominem.[90] For we say that there are six ways of doing, *facere*, and as many of not doing, *non facere.* The will as use can receive the same division as does *facere.* Just as the will wills either that something be or that it not be, so whatever causes something to be, causes it *to be* or to *not be.* So we may say *velle* in the same way as we say *facere esse*, and *velle non esse* as we say *facere non esse.*[91] In his work, *De Potestate*, in a passage in which to be or not to be is most certainly the question, St. Anselm exemplifies these ways from efficient causality. We say,—and he uses *pronuntiamus* here, a striking usage evincing the dialectical nature of this distinction,—*facere* in six ways: in two ways when the cause itself makes the thing to be or not to be, and in four ways when it either makes or does not make another to be or not to be. (In these latter four ways the cause does not act directly or *per se*). For we say that something causes something else to be either:

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[83] *De Concordia*, q.3, 11; PL 158, 534.

[84] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 487: *De Concordia*, q.3, 11; PL 158, 535: *De Libero Arbitrio* 7; PL 158, 500.

[85] *De Concordia*, q.3, 11; PL 158, 518 B C; 534: *De Casu Diaboli* 28; PL 158, 360.

[86] *De Libero Arbitrio* 7; PL 158, 500.

[87] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 487C; *De Libero Arbitrio* 5; PL 158, 496C.

[88] *De Concordia*, q.3, 2; PL 158, 523.

[89] *De Libero Arbitrio* 5; PL 158, 496; 497.

[90] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 487C.

[91] *Ibid.* F. S. Schmitt, *Ein Neues Unvollendetes Werk des Hl Anselm von C.* (Beiträge XXXIII, Band 33, Heft 3, Münster, 1936), p.41; Omnis causa aut est 'esse' aut 'non esse'. Et omne effectum similiter aut est 'esse' aut 'non esse' . . (Henceforward this work will be referred to as *De Potestate*, edit. Schmitt.)

1) because it itself causes the thing to which it is said to cause, as e.g. he who kills a man directly causes him to be dead: *facit per se quod facere dicitur.*
or 2) because it itself does not cause it to not be: as e.g. a man who, having the power of resuscitation, does not use it and thus does not cause a man to not be dead; or as we say a man does evil when he does not prevent evil when he could do so, *non facit non esse.*
or 3) because it makes another to be, as e.g. one kills a man because one orders him to be killed. (This differs from 1 above because of the presence of a medium).
or 4) because it does not cause another to be; e.g. a man, who does not prohibit a killing or does not defend himself, causes the killing: *non faciendo aliud esse, hoc quod dicuntur facere, fecerunt.*
or 5) because it causes another to not be, as e.g. he who deprives a man of his means of defense before he was killed, would cause him to be killed *per aliud, faciendo aliud non esse.*
or 6) because it does not cause another to not be; e.g. a man, who does not remove him who is about to be killed from the vicinity of danger, causes that man to be killed.[92]

The final sub-division of will as use, which St. Anselm gives here, concerns the will as efficient, approving and permitting. Efficient will is that which effects what it wills and would effect it if it could; as for example one desires health in sickness. The will of approbation is that which approves what is and would approve it if it were; as he wills a beggar to be ill-clad who wills him to be well-clad and would approve if he were, but does nothing about it. The will of permission is that which permits to be that which it is said to will and which would permit it if it were,[93] *quamvis reprobans,*[94] as we say that he who can prohibit something and does not, wills what he does not prohibit,[95] and as God wills sin.[96] The efficient will is both approving and permitting; the approving will is also permitting; the permitting will alone cannot rightly be called efficient or approving.[97]

This distinction is important in relation to God's will, which Anselm defines as *quidquid fit et fieri invenitur in creaturis*[98] and he takes the opportunity here[99] for a little exegesis by way of illustrating this distinction. It is according to the efficient will that it is said that *everything that God willed He made*[100] and according to the will of approbation that it is said that *God wills every man to be saved.* For God approves and is pleased that all just men, because they are just, be saved, and nevertheless it would please Him if the unjust, were they just, were saved. Which amounts to saying that God makes no one unjust; everyone has from himself the injustice which damns him; therefore it cannot be said to displease God if a man be just and saved, nor can He be said to oppose the salvation of anyone, but to approve if he were to come to be saved. It is according to the permitting will that it is said: *whom He wills, He saves*;[101] for He permits the sinner to be made hard. The preceding verse: *He hath mercy on whom He wills* is said according to the efficient will.

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[92] *De Potestate,* edit. Schmitt, pp. 29-30. We might note in passing that the bare statement of the fact of these six ways of *facere esse* and *facere non esse* in the *De Voluntate,* is a possible indication that the writing of this work post-dates that of the *De Potestate* in which these six ways are fully described.

[93] *De Voluntate*; PL 158, 487C.

[94] *De Potestate*; edit. Schmitt, p. 38.

[95] *Cur Deus Homo* I, 10; PL 158, 374.

[96] *De Casu Diaboli* 7; PL 158, 336B: credimus nullum hominem posse bonam voluntatem habere, nisi dante Deo; malam vero semper habere posse, sola permissione Dei.

[97] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 487; 488.

[98] *De Voluntate Dei* 1; PL 158, 581B.

[99] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 488B.

[100] *Ps.* cxv, 3.

In the *De Potestate* and the *De Voluntate Dei*, St. Anselm also distinguishes a conceding will; this will is neither efficient nor approving but only concedes and approves of what is said to be willed, as a man concedes that payment be made him in barter, although he prefers money, and as God concedes that a man; *qui non melius proposuit*, take a wife.[102] This conceding will differs from the permitting will in that the latter does not approve or concede what it is said to will, for it is concerned with evil, whereas the conceding will is concerned with the lesser of two goods.

It is interesting to note that the three-fold division of the will, made in the *De Voluntate*, relates directly to the *sex modis facere esse et facere non esse* which Anselm distinguished within the second sub-division of the will as use:

> 'velle' eisdem sex modis dicimus quibus 'facere esse'. Similiter 'velle non esse' totidem diversitatibus quot 'facere non esse' dicimus.[103]

The efficient will relates to the first mode; for he himself who wills efficiently wills that which is said to be willed, as God causes everything He wills.

The permitting will, as not causing to not be, belongs to the second mode of *facere esse*, as God does not by His efficient will make the sinner's heart to be not-hard; and to the fourth mode, as God is said to will that the sinner be hardened because He does not will Him to be softened; *non vult aliud, id est mollitum esse.*

The approving will belongs to the second mode, that does not cause to not be: e.g. God does not wish any man to be not-saved, and to the fourth mode, that does not cause another to be: e.g. God does not wish by His efficient will that a man be damned, *non vult facere unde damnetur.* And even here, in the midst of these purely dialectical intricacies, Anselm reminds us of the fundamental purpose of his dialecticising: this is the answer to be given to those

> qui dicunt Dei voluntatem causam esse quod non sint iusti sed iniusti, et quod non salvantur cum iniustitia, pro qua damnantur, ab ipsis sit nec descendat a voluntate Dei.[104]

Anselm's consideration of the will as use terminates with this subdivision. So far in this treatise he has shown us the will as instrument, *vis animae*, inclining by its affections to the useful (naturally), and to justice (by the gift of God), and manifesting both itself and its affections in its *opus* or use. Which latter is either *propter rem* or *propter aliud*, either wishes something to be or to not-be, and is either efficient, approving or permitting. Now he will treat of *potestas.* What we have already seen of the relation between the affection for justice, which is rectitude *propter se servata*, and the *libertas arbitrium*, the power through which that rectitude is preserved, gives us a strong clue as to at least one reason why it is important to Anselm that this term *potestas* be well-defined.[105]

D. *The Definition of Potestas*

In his consideration of *potestas* Anselm is at his dialectical best. It would be difficult to find a better example of his purely logical method than this passage in the *De Voluntate*.[106] Straight way the starting point is a definition[107]—power is an aptitude for doing:

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[101] *Rom.* ix, 8.

[102] *De Potestate*, edit. Schmitt, p.38; *De Voluntate Dei* 5; PL 158, 584C.

[103] *De Potestate*, edit. Schmitt, p.37.

[104] *Ibid.*

[105] Cf. Also the text from *Cur Deus Homo* I, 2; PL 158, 363A, quoted on the first page of this article.

> potestas est aptitudo ad faciendum. Poni autem hic facere pro omni verbo finito vel infinito, quod frequens usus habet.[108]

For he who speaks or sits or stands when he should, and endures what he should, and is where he should be and at the time when he should be there *bene facit*. (These are finite verbs.) He however who does not speak, sit, nor stand when he should, and neither desires nor endures what he should, nor is where he should be, nor when *male facit*. (These are infinite verbs; the action is not determined or definite, for though for example, the man is not-speaking, we do not know what he is doing: he may be running, singing, etc.) He who does not do what he should *male facit*, and he who does not do what he should not *bene facit*.[109]

Baeumker draws our attention to the fact, here, that these examples are borrowing from the Aristotelian categories of quantity, action, passion, place and time. Also that this illustration is an application of the distinction made above between *facere esse* and *facere non esse*. The result of the five positive actions of man's sitting, speaking, standing and being where and when he should is *facere esse et facere esse bonum*. The result of his acting to the contrary is *facere non esse et facere non esse bonum*. To these is added a sixth case for each: he who forsakes the good, fails in his duty and does not do what he should do *facit non esse bonum*. He who does not do what he should not do *facit esse bonum*. And in this last and negative case, man abstains from evil and still *does* good.

So the five cases of *facere esse bonum* consist in this, that in five different ways man does good through positive action. In the sixth case he does not do evil even when he could. Similarly in the five cases of *facere non esse bonum*, man does evil in five positive ways, and in the sixth, he does not do good, and so fails in his duty.[110]

Facere can be understood to stand for every verb; for everything about which a verb is said, does (*facit*) what is signified by that verb: *qui sedit facit sessionem, qui patitur facit passionem*.[111] Furthermore in the question: *quid facit? facere* stands for any verb that could be answered. If you answer he is reading, you mean: this is what he is doing, he is reading.[112] Again we have scriptural example to follow here, for the Lord in saying: *Omnis qui male agit, odit lucem*, and *qui facit veritatem venit ad lucem*,[113] used *facere* or *agere* to mean any verb whatsoever.[114]

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[106] Schmitt has edited this section as an appendix to the *De Potestate*, pp. 44-45. The edition was made from the same ms. as was used by G. Gerberon, (cod. Parisiensem 14591, fol. 144), in PL 158, 488 ff., and presents no important changes.

[107] Aristotle, *Topica* VII, 3, 153a 8: few if any who engage in a discussion reason to a definition; they always assume something of the kind as their starting point.

[108] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 488C.

[109] *Ibid.* Cf. Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* 3, 16b 6: a verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning carries with it the notion of time. No part of it has any independent meaning, and it is a sign of something said of something else. *Op. cit.* 3, 16b, 13 ff. Such expressions as 'is not-healthy', is 'not-ill', I do not describe as verbs . . ; let them be called infinite verbs, since they apply equally well to that which exists and to that which does not. Cf. Boethius, *In de Interpretatione*, PL 64, 306; 308.

[110] T. F. Baeumker, *Die Lehre Anselms von C. über den Willen und seine Wahlfreiheit* (Beiträge X, Band 10, Heft 6, Münster, 1912), p. 8 ff. Baeumker however identifies these examples with the *sex modis facere et non facere* mentioned above. That this was not Anselm's meaning would have been apparent to him had he had the fragment *De Potestate* edited by F. S. Schmitt. *De Potestate*, edit. Schmitt, p. 25 ff.

[111] *De Potestate*, edit. Schmitt, p. 27.

[112] *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

[113] *Joann.* iii, 21.

[114] *De Potestate*, edit. Schmitt, p. 28: Siquidem et dominus in evangelio ponit facere vel agere, quod idem est, pro omni verbo, cum dicit: *Omnis qui male agit, odit lucem, et, qui facit veritatem venit ad lucem.* Male quidem agit qui facit quod non debet, aut non facit quod debet; quod similiter intelligitur de omni verbo. . . Veritatem autem facit qui facit quod debet et qui non facit quod non debet. . . Hoc modo redigit dominus omne verbum positivum vel negativum in *facere*. *De Veritate* 5; PL 158, 472D:

So *facere* stands here for every verb, be it finite or infinite, and even for *non-facere.*[115] For he who does not love virtue and does not hate vice *male facit*; and he who does not do what he should not do *bene facit*. Evidently then *facere* is used for every verb, positive or negative, and every verb is *facere.*[116]

Power is therefore an aptitude for doing and every aptitude for doing is a power.[117] But we must be careful not to confuse the aptitude *ad faciendum* and the aptitude *faciendi*: for every aptitude for doing is also an aptitude of doing; *omnis aptitudo ad faciendum (potestas) est et faciendi*, but the reverse is not true; *omnis aptitudo faciendi non est etiam ad faciendum*, not every aptitude of doing is also for doing. The *aptitudo scribendi* which is for writing, *ad scribendum*, exists before the writing itself and is called the power of writing. The *aptitudo scribendi* which is in the writing. and according to which we say: he writes well (*apte*), does not precede the writing itself, nor is it the power of writing, but is rather the effect of that power. It is because the power of writing precedes that the writing itself is 'apt', and not because the writing is 'apt' that the act of writing can be performed.[118]

This distinction is paralleled by the distinction in the dialogue *De Casu Diaboli* between the power which actually is, and the power which is not yet actual: *potestas quae jam est in re et potestas quae nondum est in re.*[119] Everything that is, inasmuch as it is, can be; but not everything that is could be before it was. When I ask whether he who desires nothing could will, I am asking about the power which precedes the will, *potestas ante voluntatem*, by which a person can move himself to willing. But you, in answering that if he so will he can, are speaking of the power which comes to be with the act of willing itself, *cum ipsa voluntate.*[120] The power *quae jam est in re* is parallel to the *aptitudo ad faciendum*; the power *quae nondum est in re* parallels the *aptitudo faciendi: aptitudo ad scribendum est etiam ante scribatur, aptitudo scribendi in ipso actu non procedit actum.*[121]

In order to bring into light the importance of this distinction we may apply it to *libertas arbitrii. Libertas arbitrii* is a *libertas servandi rectitudinem propter ipsam rectitudinem*, which is also *ad servandum rectitudinem*. Since it is an aptitude both *faciendi* and *ad faciendum (rectitudinem)*, it is a power, for every liberty is a power;[122] a power *quae jam est in re* et *antequam volitum est*. The act of choice which we indicate in saying: he chooses well, is the effect of this power. It is because the *libertas arbitrii* precedes that the choice is good and not conversely.[123]

Further applying this distinction to the rectitude of the will: just as vision is not acute because one sees acutely, but rather one sees acutely because one's vision (instrument) is good, so the will is not just because one wills justly, but one wills justly because one's will is just.[124] The willing justly (*aptitudo volendi justitiam in actu volendi*) follows the just will (*aptitudo ad volendum justitiam*)

Sed sententia est omnium, quia qui facit, quod debet, bene facit et rectitudinem facit. *Ibid.* 473A: Non enim separat (dominus) illum ab hac veritate sive luce qui patitur persecutionem propter justitiam (*Matt.* v, 10): aut qui est quando et ubi debet esse, aut qui stat vel sedet quando debet, et similia.

[115] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 488C.

[116] *De Potestate,* edit. Schmitt, p. 27. *De Veritate* 5; PL 158, 473A.

[117] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 488C.

[118] *Op. cit.;* PL 158, 488C; 499A.

[118] *De Casu Diaboli* 12; PL 158, 312.

[120] Cf. *De Potestate,* edit. Schmitt, p. 20, note 1.

[121] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 488C.

[122] *De Libero Arbitrio* 3; PL 158, 494A.

[123] Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* 3, 3, 8; PL 32, 1275: voluntas nostra nec voluntas esset nisi in nostra esset potestate. *Operis Imperf. contra Julian.* V, 40: PL 45, 1477A: Et ita homo creatus est ut et nolle posset et velle, et quodlibet horum habet in potestate.

[124] *De Concordia,* q.3, 3; PL 158, 523C: Sicut namque non est acutus visus quia videt acute, sed ideo videt acute quia acutus est: ita voluntas non est recta quia vult recte, sed recte vult quoniam est recte. Cum autem vult hanc rectitudinem, procul dubio recte vult, non ergo vult rectitudinem nisi quia recta est: idem autem est voluntati rectam esse et rectitudinem habere. Needless to say, the same is true of justice.

as the effect, the power. For every power follows on the will. When I say that I can speak or walk, I understand: if I will to do so; if I do not understand this, it is not power I speak of but necessity. For when I say that I *can* be conquered against my will, this is not my power but the power of another.[125] This text is interesting for its linking up of the three notions *potestas*, *voluntas* and *necessitas*, a further elucidation of which St. Anselm had stated was necessary at the beginning of this very treatise.[126]

St. Anselm brings out the force of this distinction again in the *Proslogion*, in relation to liberty and the power of doing evil:

> sic itaque cum quis dicitur habere potentiam faciendi aut patiendi quod sibi non expedit, aut quod non debet, impotentia intelligitur per potentiam, quia qui plus habet hanc potentiam, eo adversitas et perversitas in illum sunt potentiores, et ille contra eas impotentior.[127]

Having clarified the distinction between *aptitudo ad faciendum* and *aptitudo faciendi*, St. Anselm draws attention to the fact that *potestas* was further said to be an aptitude *ad faciendum* and not unrestrictedly (*absolute*) *ad aliquid*. It is not the kind of aptitude to something which is not *ad faciendum*, for such an aptitude is not a power; for example we say that a garment has an aptitude, i.e. it fits the body, but we do not mean that the garment is powerful (*potens*).[128]

The consideration of the term *potestas* ends with an examination of the definition to see if it satisfies the qualifications of a definition anent genus and species.[129] This procedure is in accord with the standards of mediaeval criticism, or should we say, scholastic custom. De Vorges remarks: Nous nous demandérions plutôt si elle (la definition) exprime le caractère intime et fundamental (de *potestas*). Does this remark not indicate rather, de Vorges' failure to understand Anselm's logical realism?[130]

It has been well said that a power is an aptitude for doing because, in that it is called an aptitude it is distinguished from everything that is not an aptitude and in that it is determined *ad faciendum* it is distinguished both from that which is not *ad aliquid*, as for example that aptitude which is in writing and is the effect of the power, and from that which is *ad aliquid non ad faciendum*, as the garment to the body. This definition measures up satisfactorily to the standard set and therefore it has nothing more nor less than it should have: nihil igitur plus vel minus habet haec diffinitio potestatis quam debet.[131]

This definition is made according to the use of power; for whatever can in any way, can by this definition of power, as wood can be cut and man can cut. For the wood can be cut because it has an aptitude for cutting, and man likewise can cut because he has an aptitude for cutting.[132] The definition thus applies to both active and passive power.

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[125] *Cur Deus Homo* II, 10: PL 158, 408C; 409A: Omnis potestas sequitur voluntatem. Cum enim dico quia possum loqui vel ambulare, subauditur, si volo. Si enim non subintelligitur voluntas non est potestas sed necessitas. Nam cum dico quia nolens possum trahi aut vinci, non est haec mea potestas sed necessitas et potestas alterius. Quippe non est aliud possum trahi vel vinci quam alius me trahere vel vincere potest. Cf. *De Libero Arbitrio* 5; PL 158, 498B: *De Casu Diaboli* 12; PL 158, 343 AB; *De Veritate* 8, PL 158, 477ED.

[126] *Cur Deus Homo* I, 1; PL 158, 363A.

[127] *Proslogion* 7; PL 158, 230.

[128] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 489A.

[129] Aristotle, *Topica* VI, 3, 140a, 28: For the genus ought to divide the object from things in general, and the differentia from any of the things contained in the same genus. Servius, *Explanatum in Artem Donati I* (Grammatici Latini IV, edit. H. Keil, Leipzig, 1864), p. 489: Habemus in Aristotelicis et in Stoicis praeceptis et fere omnium hanc esse perfectam definitionem quae separat a ceteri communibus rem et suam proprietatem ostendit. Cf. also Aristotle, *Topica* VI, 6, 143a, 29 ff.

[130] D. de Vorges, 'Le Milieu Philosophique à l'Epoque de St. Anselme,' *Rev. de Philosophie*, XV (1909), 614.

[131] *De Voluntate*; PL 158, 489A. Aristotle, *Topica* 5, 2, 130b 25: in the case of definitions too, there should be no further addition beside the expression which shows the essence. *Ibid.* VI, 1, 139b, 15: (we should examine the definition to see) if the expression used be longer than necessary; for all additional matter is superfluous. *Ibid.* VI, 14, 151b 20: One is bound . . . to discern both any shortcoming in any features that the definition ought to have, and also any superfluous addition. . . .

With this examination of the definition of *potestas* in the light of Aristotelian qualifications for such, the treatise ends as abruptly as it began.

E. *Conclusion*

The study of St. Anselm's treatise *De Voluntate* is useful because this little work exemplifies his method, illustrates his use of his sources in arriving at definitions and, as its contents are used elsewhere, shows his use of that which he has attained through reason in the elucidation of theological questions.

1. As exemplificative of his method, this treatise shows Anselm, the professor of the *Trivium* and the product of his philosophical milieu, distinguishing between the meanings of *will* and clarifying each meaning, that he may use these initially attained and clarified definitions in subsequent demonstrations. We have his own words about one instance in which this particular equivocity should be cleared up, and, as one might have suspected, it concerns the just man:

> quia si dicitur justus homo etiam cum dormit et nihil cogitat, habere voluntatem juste vivendi, eadem voluntas negatur de injusto quae asseritur de justo. Palam autem est quia cum dicimus non esse in injusto dormiente voluntatem juste vivendi, non negatur in eo esse voluntas quam dixi instrumentum: quoniam eam semper habet omnis homo dormiens et vigilans. Quapropter quoniam non alia voluntas pronuntiatur hoc modo in bono esse homine quam illa quae removetur a malo: non significatur in bono esse voluntas quae instrumentum sed illa qua afficitur instrumentum. Quod autem in dormiente nisi somniet non sit voluntas quae est usus dubium non est; quare cum dicitur in dormiente justo voluntas juste vivendi non ibi intelligitur voluntas usus. Non est igitur voluntas affectio, voluntas instrumentum, aut voluntas usus.[133]

Again, for the understanding of such a text as we find in *De Casu Diaboli* 12, a clear definition of the meanings of *voluntas* is necessary:

> Nullus cogitur vel timore vel sensu alicujus incommodo, nec attrahitur amore alicujus commodi ad volendum aliquid, nisi qui prius habet naturalem voluntatem vitandi incommodum aut habendi commodum; quia voluntate se movet ad alias voluntates. . . . . Qui se movet ad volendum prius se vult ita movere. . . . . Quod nihil vult, nullo modo potest se movere ad volendum.[134]

In this single passage we see the will said in all three ways, and the interrelation of these in action: the affection for the useful, the self-moving instrument and the use of the will as well as the power *ad volendum* (*quae jam est in re*) et *volendi* (*quae nondum est in re*).

To sum the treatise up briefly: having stated that the will is said equivocally, Anselm started off with its first meaning, as instrument. Though this is the meaning to which he devotes least time here, merely saying that it is a natural *vis animae*, its importance as well as its place is primary: for it is the will as instrument whose rectitude is justice and in which the *arbitrium*, the element of choice in willing, exists. This brevity of treatment may perhaps be due to his greater interest in the will as affection, especially for justice, and as power, since *libertas arbitrii* is power

> "Was ihn interessiert, was im ganzen Mittelpunkt seines Denkens steht, ist der Nachweis eines einzelnen Punktes in der Lehre vom Willen, nähmlich seiner Wahlfreiheit".[135]

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[132] *De Voluntate;* PL 158, 489A.

[133] *De Concordia,* q. 3, 11; PL 158, 536C.

[134] *De Casu Diaboli* 12; PL 158, 344A.

[135] T. F. Baeumker, *Die Lehre Anselms von*

In its second meaning, as affection, Anselm found the will to be two-fold: the affection for the useful, directed to happiness, and that for justice, directed to the *juste vivere*. Of these the latter is *melior et praeponenda*. It was in this definition that we best saw Anselm's use of scriptural sources for a dialectical purpose; the two-fold division of the will's affections here given is an excellent example of how, in his works, biblical expressions may receive a technical meaning. For as we saw, the affection for justice apparently found its source, through Augustine, in *Ecclesiastes* and the *Psalms*; yet it enters into this and many other works of St. Anselm under a purely dialectical guise and in a dialectical role.

Both of the affections distinguished here were given to man by God in the first place, but the affection for justice was lost through original sin and can now be possessed only by grace. This aspect was not entered into in the *De Voluntate* but, as we saw by pursuit of the subject in other Anselmian works and by inquiry into its source, the distinction has important theological implications and was not made by Anselm independently of theological considerations.

Concerning the third meaning, will as use, in which both the instrument and its affections are manifested, Anselm speaks as a psychologist in saying that the use is equally the work of the will as instrument and as affection, that it exists only in *cogitando rem quam vult*, and that it is efficient, approving and permitting. In distinguishing within this will accordingly as it wills *propter rem* or *propter aliud*, or as it wills *esse aliquid* or *non esse aliquid* and receives the same divisions as *facere*, he speaks as a dialectician. In illustrating the efficient approving and permitting wills from Scripture, he is speaking theologically, and is in the realm of exegesis. As M Gilson has remarked: even in his seemingly most dialectical moments, Anselm the dialectician is always fundamentally Anselm the patristic philosopher, thinking in the light of Faith, putting Scripture aside yet walking through and in it.

It was in the treatment of *potestas* that Anselm was, in this treatise, at his dialectical best. Having started with the definition: *potestas est aptitudo ad faciendum*, he dispelled the confusion between the power, properly rendered by the verbal form *ad faciendum*, and its effect, the *aptitudo faciendi*. Then, having examined his definition to see whether it correctly stated the genus and species of power, he arrived at the conclusion that it was well defined, the definition having neither more nor less than it should.

2. This treatise, as its contents are applied in the theological works of St. Anselm, illustrates his use of the rationally attained in the elucidation of theological problems. The location of the very first text we quoted,[136] and the statement therein of the need for the definition of *potestas* and *voluntas, ut de hac re* (i.e. *de Redemptione*) *tractari*, is illustrative of this point. We have seen several other similarly illustrative texts during our study of the *De Voluntate*; however, at the risk of repetition, it may not be amiss to consider a few more.

Indirectly, of course, all three definitions, *voluntas, affectio* and *potestas*, enter through the dialectical work *De Libero Arbitrio*, into the theological treatise *De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis*. For, as we have twice seen, the instrument is the seat of the will's rectitude, i.e. justice, and of *arbitrium*, the element of choice either of *quod debet* (in which instance the will is power and is just), or of *quod non debet* (in which case the will is impotent and unjust). This rectitude, though preserved through *libertas arbitrii*, is dependent on grace: it is Anselm's purpose in the *De Concordia* to show that free choice, grace and divine foreknowledge are not incompatible.

C. über den Willen und seine Wahlfreiheit (Beiträge X, Band 10, Heft 6, Münster 1912) p. 1.

[136] *Cur Deus Homo* I, 2; PL 158, 363A.

Again, the will as instrument is the seat of fortitude, and it is through an understanding of the equivocity of the will as instrument and *opus* that we may see how the will is stronger than temptation, even when it is overcome by it. The will as instrument remains the same, not being subject to possession in greater or lesser degree, whatever the temptation; it is our use of the will that is stronger or weaker.

> Ille (instrumentum) fortis est, quia fortitudinem habet; actio vero ejus fortis dicitur, quia fortitier fit. Sic intellige voluntatem quam voco instrumentum volendi, inseparabilem et nulla alia vi superabilem fortitudinem habere, qua aliquando magis, aliquando minus utitur in volendo. . . . Unde quod fortius vult, nullatenus deserit oblato eo quod minus fortiter vult; et cum offertur quod vult fortius, statim dimittit quod non pariter vult; et tunc voluntas . . . . actio magis vel minus fortis dicitur, quoniam magis vel minus fortiter fit.[137]

Thus, no temptation conquers the right will; the will can be conquered only by its own power:

> nulla tentatio potest vincere rectam voluntatem. Nam si potest, habet potestatem vincendi et sua potestate vincit. Sed hoc esse non potest, quoniam voluntas non nisi sua potestate vincitur. Quare nullatenus potest tentatio vincere rectam voluntatem, et cum dicitur, improprie dicitur. Non enim aliud intelligitur, quam quia voluntas potest se subicere tentationi. . . . .[138]

The theological application of the will's affections for justice and the useful has already been demonstrated in the body of this paper; the non-dialectical origin of the affection for justice should, strictly speaking, exclude it from this section. However, for the re-entry of this 'dialecticised Scripture' into the service of theology, the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth chapters of *De Concordia*, q.3, may be referred to, chapters wherein the importance of the will's affections is stressed in relation to salvation.[139]

We have already seen the application to lying which Anselm makes of the distinction between the will's use *propter rem* and *propter aliud*. The second sub-division of the will as use, (*facere esse et facere non esse*) is pressed into exegetical use in *Cur Deus Homo* I, 9, in explication of the text: *Proprio autem Filio suo non pepercit Deus.*

> Nam saepe aliquem velle dicimus aliquid quia non vult aliud, quod si vellet, non fieret illud quod dicitur velle: ut cum dicimus illam lucernam velle exstinguere qui non fenestrum claudere per quam ventus intrat, qui lucernam exstinguit. . . . Sic ergo voluit Pater mortem Filii, quia non aliter voluit mundum salvari nisi homo tam magnum aliquid faceret.[140]

This is the second mode of *facere esse*, distinguished in section C.

St. Anselm's exegetical excursus in the *De Voluntate* itself provided us with a theological application of the efficient, approving and permitting wills. Further example of the ulterior motive of his dialecticising may be found in the *Cur Deus Homo* in a text which shows forth the parallel between the second mode of the *opus voluntati facere esse* and the *voluntas approbans.* Anselm is explaining in what sense it can be said that the Son's death was willed by the Father:

> Sicut velle dicimus eum qui facit ut alius velit, ita etiam dicimus eum velle qui non facit ut alius velit sed approbat quia vult: ut cum videmus aliquem fortiter pati velle molestiam ut perficiat quod bene vult,

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[137] *De Libero Arbitrio* 7, PL 158, 500C.

[138] *Op. cit.* 5; PL 158, 498A.

[139] *De Concordia* q. 3, 11-13; PL 158, 534A ff.

[140] *Cur Deus Homo* I, 9; PL 158, 373 BC.

> quamvis fateamur nos velle ut illam poenam sustineat, non tamen volumus aut amamus poenam ejus, sed voluntatem. Ille quoque qui prohibere potest, et non prohibet, solemus dicere quia vult quod non prohibet. Quoniam ergo Patri voluntas Filii placuit, nec prohibuit sum velle aut implere quod volebat recte voluisse ut Filius mortem tam pie et tam utiliter sustineret, quamvis poenam ejus non amaret, affirmatur.[141]

Theological application of *potestas* is made in *De Libero Arbitrio* in relation to sin and temptation. The power of the right will is made manifest in its perseverance in rectitude,—in willing *id quod debet*; in willing *id quod non debet*, it is not conquering but conquered, and not by temptation but by itself.

> Voluntas non nisi sua potestate vincitur. Quare nullatenus potest tentatio vincere rectam voluntatem et cum dicitur improprie dicitur. Non enim aliud intelligitur quam quia voluntas potest se subjicere tentationi; sicut a converso, imbecillis dicitur posse vinci a forti, non sua potestate posse dicitur sed aliena.[142]

The improper use of *potestas* and *impotentia* is again noted in *De Casu Diaboli* 12, in discussing the question: *quod angelus non potuit a se habere voluntatem primam*. In this discussion are brought into play the *aptitudo ad faciendum* and the *aptitudo faciendi*, distinguished in the *De Voluntate* and paralleled by the *voluntas quae jam est in re* and the *voluntas quae nondum est in re*.

> Multa dicuntur posse non sua sed aliena potestate, et multa non posse non sua sed aliena impotentia. De propria igitur potestate loquor cum quaere de angelo, quem novum posuimus fieri, et hactenus iam esse factum ut iam aptus sit ad habendum voluntatem sed nihil adhuc velit: an ipse possit per se velle aliquid . . . . ?[143]

The answer to this question brings in all three meanings of the will: no one is repelled by the useless, or attracted to the useful unless he first have a natural will for avoiding the useless and seeking the useful, by which will he moves himself to willing. . . . .

> Quidquid se movet ad volendum, prius vult se ita movere. Quod ergo nihil vult, nullo modo se potest movere ad volendum. Restat igitur ut ille angelus qui iam aptus factus est ad habendum voluntatem, sed tamen nihil vult, non possit habere voluntatem primam a se.[144]

Having been given the will to happiness by God, the angels could exercise the power, i.e. *aptitudo ad volendum beatitudinem quae jam est in re*, in an act of willing happiness, *aptitudo volendi quae nondum est in re*. This passage also brings out the relation between the will's affection and its use.

In the *Cur Deus Homo*, Anselm again makes use of this distinction between the *aptitudo ad faciendum*, which is *potestas*, and the *aptitudo faciendi*, which is the effect of that power, this time in an exegetical connection.

> Monstravimus in mentiendo duas esse potestas, unam videlicet volendi mentiri, alteram mentiendi; et cum mentiendi potestatem haberet, hoc a seipso habuit ut non posset velle mentiri; idcirco de sua justitia qua veritatem servavit. Similiter est in servando vitam, potestas volendi servare et potestas servandi. Cum ergo quaeritur utrum idem Deus homo potuerat servare vitam suam ut nunquam moreretur, dubitandum non est quia semper habuerit potestatem servandi, quamvis nequiverit velle servare ut nunquam moreretur, et quoniam hoc a seipso habuit, ut scil. velle non posset, non necessitate sed libera potestate animam suam posuit.[145]

Thus, the Son of God laid down His life willingly, not because He did not have the power of preserving it (*aptitudo ad servandum*) but because He did not will to use that power, in an act which would have been its effect, *aptitudo servandi vitam.*

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[141] *Cur Deus Homo* I, 10; PL 158, 374 CD; 375A.

[142] *De Libero Arbitrio* 5; PL 158, 498 AB.

[143] *De Casu Diaboli* 12; PL 158, 343D; 344A.

[144] *Op. cit.* 13; PL 158, 344D.

[145] *Cur Deus Homo* II, 17; PL 158, 419C.

As by pulling on a single thread in a tapestry one may see, to some measure, not only how the cloth is woven but also the part the thread plays in the whole design, so may the study of a single, even minor, work of a great thinker show forth his method and, in itself as well as in its relation to his other works, show how well-woven is the fabric of his thought. It was with this approach that this study of the *De Voluntate* of St. Anselm was undertaken and with this purpose that it was carried out: that by an examination of the definitions he gives therein we might see, not only their own value and further entry into his teaching, but also how St. Anselm worked, and the close interplay of the dialectical and theological 'strands' of his thought. Its pursuit has, perhaps, shown forth the justice of the saint's own answer to his pupil, who was asking him to define *potestas: Si quidem iam a longe prospicio quod ad maiora me vocas, si respondere incepero. . . .*[146]

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[146] *De Potestate,* edit. Schmitt, p. 25.

An Additional Note on Hexagonal Nimbi

GERHART B. LADNER

IN *Mediaeval Studies* III (1941), 43ff., I referred to the symbolism of the perfect number six in St. Bonaventure's writings as a possible source of the first occurence of hexagonal nimbi in the frescoes of the Franciscan Virtues in the Lower Church of S. Francesco at Assisi. The examples given there can easily be multiplied. I shall mention a few cases in which the number six is closely connected with virtues and perfections: St. Bonaventure, *In Festo Omnium Sanctorum Sermo I, Opera Omnia*, IX (Quaracchi, 1901), pp. 598ff., regarding six degrees of sanctity, etc.; *De S. Patre Nostro Francisco Sermo II, loc. cit.*, p. 578, dealing with six degrees of humility; *Apologia Pauperum cap.* 3, 8ff., *loc. cit.* VIII (1898), pp. 246f., concerning six groups of perfections which correspond to the beatitudes enumerated in the Sermon upon the Mount,—perfections that are defined by St. Bonaventure as the microcosmic parallels of the six days of creation; *De Sex Alis Seraphim, loc. cit.*, pp. 131ff., which discusses the six virtues especially needed by Franciscan superiors, corresponding to the wings of the Seraphim which appeared to St. Francis in his stigmatization.

It is therefore scarcely by accident that the hexagonal nimbus first appears as an attribute of Franciscan Virtues. Some further light may be shed on its origin by discussing an *exemplum* which, with slight variations, occurs in two collections of sayings of St. Anselm of Canterbury made by his pupils, i.e. the *Dicta Anselmi* and the *Liber de S. Anselmi Similitudinibus*. The same *exemplum* was also used in a sermon by Anselm's pupil Eadmer. St. Bonaventure not unfrequently refers to the Anselmian *Similitudines*,[1] though not to the *exemplum* with which we are concerned.

I shall first give the text of the *exemplum* as found in the *Dicta* and printed in the interesting article of R. W. Southern, 'St. Anselm and His English Pupils';[2] it was this article which brought this text to my attention.

> Vir bonus quadrato lapidi comparatur, quo edificatur domus Dei, de qua apostolus: *Templum Dei sanctum est quod estis vos* (*I Cor.* iii, 17). Quadratus lapis sex equalia latera habet, qui, ubi ceciderit, in quolibet latere firmiter iacet. Comparatur viro ad perfectam bonitatem venire cupienti. Nam sicut lapis in quolibet sui latere stabiliter iacet, sic viro[3] ad perfectum tendenti providendum est ut in suo proposito stabilis maneat, ne, dum in vita sua in diversa venerit, a sui status firmitate cadat. Denique prosperitas, adversitas, sui libertas, esse sub alterius postestate, in secreto esse, in publico stare, sunt quasi sex latera in quibus humanum genus versatur, sed in quavis parte quicunque fuerit, valde intendendum est, ut in studio cepte bonitatis perseveret.

According to the *Liber de S. Anselmi Similitudinibus, cap.* 174[4] the passage is as follows:

> Quadratus lapis sex aequalia habet latera, in quod horum ceciderit, firmiter jacebit; sic providendum est viro justo ut in suo persistat pro-

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[1] St. Bonaventure, *Opera Omnia*, X (Quaracchi, 1902), p. 266: *Index Locorum SS. Patrum.*

[2] *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, I (London, The Warburg Institute, 1941), 9.

[3] Southern, in his article, has *vero*, probably a misprint.

[4] PL 159, 694 D—695 A. Published among the works of Eadmer. About the Anselmian origin of both the *Similitudines* and the *Dicta* see Southern, *op. cit.*

> posito. Hujus autem latera sex haec sunt: prosperitas, adversitas, sui libertas, subjectio, in secreto esse et in publico; in quibus singulis, si a diabolo impulsetur, stet nec a proposito moveatur.

In the above-mentioned sermon of Eadmer the same idea is used to characterize the perfection of Gregory the Great.[5]

That the good Christian, like a square stone, cannot fall is an Augustinian metaphor and occurs very often in the middle ages (see some references in *Mediaeval Studies*, III, 31, note 108, where the formula: "the square cannot fall" is traced back to the Stoic Cornutus). It is a special application of the Graeco-Roman and early Christian notion of the squareness of the perfect man which forms the ideological back-ground of the so-called square nimbus; it also plays an important rôle in the mediaeval symbolism of the church building the stones of which represent the faithful.[6] Yet the express reference to the six sides of the *quadratus lapis* and their interpretation as six sides of human life, in which the perfect man has to prove the steadfastness of his goodness, seems to be an Anselmian enlargement of the original idea. The *Similitudines* having been used by St. Bonaventure it is probable that they and perhaps also the *Dicta* were known to other Franciscans.

Durandus of Mende in his *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum*, written shortly before the Assisi frescoes were painted, interpreted the square as symbolizing the four cardinal virtues (see *Mediaeval Studies*, III, 43).[7] Now it is true that the number six does not correspond to any of the usual groups of virtues, but we have seen it used by St. Bonaventure to classify degrees of virtues etc.[8] It is therefore not surprising that St. Anselm's idea of the six conditions, in which a perfect or virtuous life must be practiced, should have been employed by Franciscans around 1300 to create the hexagonal nimbus as an attribute of virtues.

That the hexagonal nimbus was a Franciscan invention is confirmed by the fact that in the fourteenth century it occurs in several Franciscan churches but, as it seems, nowhere else, with the sole exception of the doors of the Baptistery of Florence made by Andrea Pisano (see *Mediaeval Studies*, III, 43).

As had been the case with the square nimbus, the original meaning of the hexagonal one, after some time, was forgotten. In addition to the fourteenth and fifteenth century examples in which lozenge-shaped, hexagonal or octagonal nimbi were given to "saints" of the pre-christian era and to allegorical figures (see *Mediaeval Studies*, III, 43ff.), there is, as Professor Ernst H. Kantorowicz kindly reminds me, still another fourteenth century painting in which the nimbus with six angles occurs. In this painting, the Crucifixion by Pietro Lorenzetti in S. Francesco at Siena,[9] the hexagonal nimbus appears around the head of the centurion who gave witness to Christ's divinity, and around that of another, probably the sponge-bearer, who tried to alleviate the Saviour's thirst.[10] These two figures thus were given an intermediate rank in the picture, between the holy companions and the enemies of Christ.

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[5] Ed. A. Wilmart, in *Revue des sciences religieuses*, XV (1935), 207 ff. Cf. Southern, *op. cit.* p. 9.

[6] See J. Sauer, *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes und seiner Austattung in der Auffassung des Mittelalters* (2nd ed., Freiburg im Breisgau, 1924), p. 112 ff.

[7] Cf. also the Franciscan Jacopone da Todi's *Poesie Spirituali* II, *Cantico* 22 (Venice, 1617):

> Alte quattro virtute
> Son cardinal chiamate
> O' nostra umanitate
> Perfece lo suo stato.
>
> Come l'uscio si posa
> Sopra il suo cardinile
> Cosi la vita umana
> In tal quadrato stile.

[8] In the thirteenth century the hierarchy of virtues was by no means restricted to the three theological and the four cardinal virtues. This can be seen not only in theological and philosophical works, but also in poetry and art; see especially Jacopone da Todi, *op. cit.*, III, *Oda* 24, where Poverty is accompanied by seven sisters: *Caritas, Obedientia, Humilitas, Continentia, Castitas, Patientia and Spes.* The selections of virtues in the Assissi frescoes, with which we are concerned, was of course dependent upon the subject of the allegories represented. In the allegory of St. Francis' Marriage to Poverty, *Paupertas* and *Spes* appear with hexagonal nimbi while *Caritas* has the round halo and three flames emanating from her head; the hexagonal nimbus of *Spes* does not surround her head in the usual way, but is seen sideways in a sort of foreshortening. In the allegory of Chastity the figures of *Castitas, Munditia, Fortitudo* and *Poenitentia* have hexagonal nimbi, while in that of Obedience *Obedientia* herself has a quadrilateral lozenge-shaped nimbus and *Prudentia* and *Humilitas* wear hexagonal nimbi. See illustrations in B. Kleinschmidt, *Die Basilika S. Francesco in Assisi* (Berlin, 1926).

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[9] See R. Van Marle, *The Development of the Italian Schools of Painting,* II (The Hague, 1924), p. 358 ff., fig. 239. See also E. Cecchi, *Pietro Lorenzetti* (Milan, 1930).

[10] Cf. M.-J. Lagrange, *Evangile selon Saint Matthieu* (Paris, 1927), p. 531, and *Evangile selon Saint Marc* (Paris, 1929), pp. 434 ff., concerning that compassionate act of a bystander during Christ's Passion.

England's Contribution to the Origin and Development of the Triumphal Cross

PETER H. BRIEGER

THE triumphal cross or the rood was essentially a creation of the romanesque period. The crucifix of monumental size, carved from wood or stone, either alone or between the figures of St. Mary and St. John, was raised to a prominent position high up upon a beam above the entrance into the ritual choir. Thus it proclaimed the Crucified as the Lord and King standing at the threshold of the Holy of Holies, opening through the renewal of His sacrifice the way of salvation.

From the late 11th century onwards the triumphal cross was commonly found in the cathedrals and larger monastic churches in Western Europe. If one can judge from those which still exist either in their original sites, or in museums, their numbers increased with the distance from Italy where the early christian tradition in the arrangement of the ritual choir survived longer than anywhere else, and where the few triumphal crosses of the 12th century seem to have been carved under German and French influence.[1]

The origin of the custom of raising a triumphal cross as well as its significance, still demand a fuller explanation than given so far. It is due partly to the fact that the majority of monumental crosses in existence are German or French or Spanish, partly to the prevailing conception of the insularity of English art, that England's contribution to the growth of this important feature of romanesque art has been almost completely overlooked. If it could be proved with greater certainty than has been done so far, that the origin of the carved and painted monumental cross was to be found in Syria in the 6th century,[2] England could have received the idea from there at the same time, if not even earlier than the rest of Western Europe.

Although in carolingian times, crucifixes of larger size and of precious metal had become fairly common, neither by size nor position did they fulfil the function of the triumphal cross. On the Continent, almost to the end of the 11th century, it was a large simple cross, and not a crucifix, which was placed at the eastern end of the nave behind the altar of the Holy Cross.[3] The crucifix which Bishop Aldric (837-857) gave to the Cathedral of Le Mans, was placed upon the altar in the middle of the church which was dedicated not to the Holy Cross, but to the Holy Trinity.[4] Other references[5] to crucifixes in carolingian sources do not allow any safe conclusion as to their size, even if called *permaxima* as the one given by St. Angelme, Bishop of Auxerre (813-828) to the church of St. Stephen, nor as to their position in the church. Of the two silver crucifixes which Leo III (795-816) had executed for St. Peter's, one was placed *in medio basilicae*, the other *juxta altare majore*, while another silver crucifix given by Leo IV was put *in laeva introitus parte inter columnas magnas*.

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[1] G. De Francovich, 'Una scuola d'intagliatori tedesco-tirolesi e le madonne romaniche umbre in legno.—Crocifissi lignei del secolo XII in Italia', *Bolletino d'arte*, XXIX (1935-36), 207-228; 492-505.

[2] G. de Francovich, 'L'origine du crucifix monumental sculpte et paint', *Revue de l'art*, LXVII (1935), 189: Il semble extrêmement plausible que l'origine du crucifix monumental sculpte et paint doive être recherchée en Syrie, région qui a tant contribué par ses tendances réalistes à la formation de l'iconographie mediévale.

[3] J. Braun, *Der christliche Altar*, I (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1924), p. 405.

[4] *Gesta Aldrici*, MGH SS. XV, 312: In media quoque aecclesia fecit altare, in quo et crucifixum domini nostri Iesu Christi auro et argento mirabiliter fabricatum erexit et ipsum altare in media aecclesia positum in honore sanctae Trinitatis.

[5] See G. de Francovich, *loc. cit.* 204/5. Duchesne, *Liber Pontificalis* II, (1892), p. 11, 13, 129. The crucifix in the Museum of St. Peter, Rome, which Francovich identifies as a XVI century copy of the second crucifix presented by Leo IV, is 5 ft. 5 in. high.

The importance of Cluny in the earlier middle ages suggests the likelihood of finding in its *Customs* the evidence of what was the rule at this time with regard to the triumphal cross. But even Cluny seems to have preserved the carolingian tradition in spite of its rich and impressive elaboration of the ritual and the decoration of the choir. Neither the second nor the third church at Cluny possessed a triumphal cross, at least not until Henry of Blois, Bishop of Winchester, presented his large crucifix of gold sometime before 1149.

In 1075 William of Warenne and his wife Gundrada visited Cluny on their way from England to Rome. 'The keeper of the guesthouse took William and Gundrada into the church where they knelt in prayer, first in the nave of the altar of the Cross above which was the silver shrine of the Pope St. Marcellus, and then in the choir at the high altar above which was the great image of St. Peter, set between golden shrines.' This description by Rose Graham[6] is based on the various *Customs* of Cluny which provide the only evidence of the disposition of the second church of Cluny and it does not mention a triumphal cross. On the Saturday before Easter the whole church was adorned with tapestries on walls and stalls, the triumphal arch was richly decorated and gold tablets with pictures of Saints were placed in front of it.[7] As to a cross or crucifix the *Customs* made a clear distinction between the permanent cross behind the altar of the Cross in the nave and the portable crosses and crucifixes used chiefly at Easter time and the feast of the Exaltation of the Cross. The *Customs* of Farfa mention a crucifix and crosses which on the Saturday before Easter were placed behind the high altar.[8] But all the processions on Sundays and great holidays made a station before the Cross (*ad sanctam crucem*) at the altar of the Cross, before the procession entered the choir. This was prescribed in all the Cluniac *Customs*.[9]

Although the constitutions which Archbishop Lanfranc wrote for the guidance of Prior Henry called in 1077 from Bec to Canterbury, were drawn from the *Customs* of Cluny, Lanfranc introduced an important change. Where the other *Customs* refer to the cross, he mentions the crucifix: the processions make the station *ante crucifixum* and not *ad sanctam crucem*; on five principal feasts all the candles in the choir, presbytery and before the crucifix are lighted whereas on minor festivals only one candle before the crucifix is used; at the reception of a distinguished guest, a carpet is spread before the high altar as well as before the crucifix in the middle of the church.[10]

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[6] Rose Graham, 'The Monastery of Cluny, 910-1155', *Archaeologia* LXXX (1930) p. 144.

[7] *Consuetudines Farfenses*; Albers, *Consuetudines Monasticae*, I, p. 54: Arcum principalem magnis ornamentis instrumentis aptis pro ea re expositis ponant. Fronspicii extrinsecus super januas velamen ponant eglyphinatum ex picturis variis . . . Et ante majorem altare in pertica suspendant et altariola atque auream coronam eademque de capsis faciant, tabulas quiden cum imaginibus sanctorum auro textas ante arcum principalem collocent.

[8] *Consuetudines Farfenses*; Albers, *loc. cit* I, p. 54: Imprimis altaria debent ordinari et evangeliorum textibus auro gemmisque opertis atque aliis argento inclusis in majus scilicet altare necnon et crucifixo vel cruces, quas in lignorum materia post ipsam aram ordinent.

[9] *Consuet. Farfenses*; Albers, *loc. cit.* I, p. 64, 70 et passim; *Consuetud. Cluniacensis antiquores*; PL 149, 654 et passim; St. Wilhelmi, *Constitutiones Hirsaugienses*; PL 150, 923 et passim. It has been impossible to consult the *Consuetudines cenobii Cluniacensis* by Bernard, published by G. M. Herrgott in his *Vetus disciplina monastica* (1726), since this book was not obtainable at any library in America. But Guy de Valous in his *Le Monachisme Clunisien des Origines au XV sc.* (1935) I, has based his description of the ritual at Cluny on all the *Customs*, including those of Bernard and does not mention a crucifix. Professor K. Conant kindly confirmed the opinion that the second minster at Cluny did not have a triumphal cross.

[10] B. Lanfranci Cantuar. Archiep., *Decreta pro ordine S. Benedicti*; PL 150, 452: . . . Exeant ad processionem . . . per majores monasterii portas introeant, ante Crucifixum stationem faciant; finito cantu . . . cantore

The naming of the crucifix in the *Constitutions* of Lanfranc would hardly be sufficient evidence for the existence of a triumphal cross at Canterbury. But in his description of Lanfranc's rebuilding of Canterbury Cathedral after the conquest, Gervasius mentions more than the cherubim crowning the tower over the crossing. Above the screen which divided the choir from the nave there was a transverse beam which supported the great cross, two cherubim and the figures of St. Mary and St. John.[11] Thus Christ Church Cathedral at Canterbury, the centre of the Anglo-Norman church built by Lanfranc in the seven years following 1070 or 1071, possessed in contrast to Cluny not merely a wall separating choir and nave, but a pulpitum, a traverse beam above and the group of the crucifixion between the cherubim, all features of the fully developed *lettner* or *jubé* which on the continent were known only much later in the 12th century. Edmer the Singer in his description of the Anglo-Saxon building built in 1067 and replaced by Lanfranc's church did not mention a rood above the screen which enclosed the choir.[12] If the erection of the rood was due to Lanfranc, it remains to be seen whether it was his own original idea since there is no evidence of such a custom on the Continent, or whether he followed a tradition of the Anglo-Saxon church.

The veneration of the Cross was widespread in Anglo-Saxon times as evidenced by the numerous stone crosses of the 7th and 8th century, and the remains of the Anglo-Saxon poetry devoted to the Cross.

Derived from pagan or christian Celtic customs the Anglo-Saxon stone crosses rose in numbers unparalleled elsewhere in Europe.[13] The native type of monument became richly decorated with the infusion of the Greco-Italian element which became effective under Archbishop Theodore and after the synod of Whitby. The veneration of the Cross and all its manifestations in ritual, poetry and art were not peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon church, but it seems to have taken a deeper root at an earlier time than on the Continent, and to have borne a richer fruit. From the wooden cross which King Oswald erected at Heavenfield in 633 in gratitude for his victory over Cadwalla to the battle-cry: *The Holy Cross, The Cross of God*, shouted by Harold's army when the Anglo-Saxon period closed with the battle at Hastings, the Cross was considered as the standard of faith, as the sign of triumph.

In the Anglo-Saxon cross poetry, its praise was sung in this heroic spirit and at the same time the crucifixion was conceived as an act of triumph. In the *Dream of the Rood* (written in the school of Cynewulf, late 8th or early 9th century) the 'Cross as well as the Crucified is the hero'.[14] The Cross proclaims the crucifixion as an act of free will when 'Christ mounted the cross as a king would mount his throne.'[15]

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statim incipiente antiphonam *Cum inducerent*, canentes chorum intrent; 474: Omnes cerei, qui in coronis sunt, et caetera luminaria quae in choro et presbyterio et ante crucifixum sunt, accendantur. 475: accendantur duae partes cereorum coronae presbyterii et omnia luminaria quae circa majus altare sunt, et cereus ante crucifixum. 481: Secretarius interim extendat unam tapetem, et desuper pallium ante majus altare super priorem gradum, et similiter faciat ante crucifixum in medio Ecclesiae.

[11] Gervasius of Canterbury, (Rolls Series I) p. 10: Supra pulpitum trabes erat per transversum ecclesiae posita, quae crucem grandem et duo cherubim et imagines Sanctae Mariae et Sancti Johannis apostoli sustentabat.

[12] Gervasius, *loc. cit.* p. 8: Inde ad occidentem chorus psallentium in aulam ecclesiae porrigebatur, decenti fabrica a frequentia turbae seclusus.

[13] A. W. Clapham, *English Romanesque Architecture Before the Conquest* (Oxford, 1930), p. 62, n. 2. In the life of St. Willibald (b.c. 700) occurs the statement that: 'it is the custom of the Saxon race that on many of the estates of nobles and good men, they are wont to have not a church, but the standard of the Holy Cross, dedicated to the Lord and reverenced with great honour, lifted up on high.'

[14] R. H. Hodgkin, *A History of the Anglo-Saxons* (Oxford, 1935), p. 461.

[15] W. O. Stevens, *The Cross in the Life and Literature of the Anglo-Saxons* (New York, 1904), p. 74.

No cross was that of wickedness and shame,
But holy spirits, men on earth and all
The glorious creation on it gazed.
Sublime the tree victorious, ...
Then the young hero laid his garments by,
He that was God Almighty, strong and brave;
And boldly in the sight of all He mounted
The lofty cross, for He would free mankind . . . .
A cross upraised I lifted a great King,
Lifted the Lord of Heaven; and dared not bow.[16]

None of the Anglo-Saxon stone crosses bore the corpus although many of them as well as the Irish crosses showed the crucifixion in relief either on the shaft or the crosshead. But the Crucified as the triumphant king, the type predominent in romanesque art, was familiar to the Anglo-Saxon mind. The stone cross of Reculver (Kent), not far from Canterbury, was described by the antiquary Leland who travelled through England under the order of Henry VIII, to compose an inventory of churches, 'lyke a fair column' and had on its fourth stone 'the image of Christ hanging and fastened with iiii nayles, and *sub pedibus sustentaculum*.'[17] This 7th century Reculver cross differed from the rest of the contemporary crosses by its position. It stood not in the open air, but inside the church 'in front, that is on the nave side, of the central archway in the triple arched screen separating nave from chancel,'[17] thus occupying the place held later by the triumphal cross. According to Clapham 'there are traces in several English churches of a plastic decoration of the wall surface above the chancel arch, partly executed in stone and partly in some other material, perhaps stucco, and suggesting by what remains, the scene of the crucifixion.'[18] The angels above the chancel arch at Bradford-on-Avon (10th century) suggest 'the existence of a crucifix between them' (Clapham).

The original position of the draped rood on the eastwall of the south porch at Langford (Oxon) and the external rood at Romsay (Hants) cannot be determined. If their pre-conquest date were accepted, they would be the earliest specimens of the monumental stone crucifix in Western Europe, but it seems unlikely that they could ever have been placed on a beam in the position of the triumphal cross.[19]

It is not until shortly before the close of the Anglo-Saxon period, a few years before the conquest, that there is evidence of a triumphal cross at Beverley, Winchester and St. Austin's Abbey, Canterbury.

Between 1060 and 1069 Aeldred, Archbishop of York, rebuilt the presbytery of the minister at Beverley. 'Above the choir door he also caused to be made a pulpitum of incomparable work of bronze and gold and silver, and on either side of the loft, a higher arch, carrying on its top a cross likewise of bronze and gold and silver, skilfully fashioned of Teutonic work.'[20] If the Archbishop gave such a magnificent fabric to Beverley, it must be assumed that the minster at York possessed a cross of no less splendour.[21] While it is uncertain whether the cross at Beverley was a crucifix, Winchester Cathedral received a complete rood to be placed upon a beam from Stigand, the last Anglo-Saxon Archbishop of Canterbury.[22] In 1064 Stigand also gave a large cross covered with silver to St. Austin's Abbey, Canterbury. There is no reference to a similar gift to his own cathedral, but it does not seem likely that he left it without a cross unless he had found one in place when he occupied the see.

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[16] Translation of the *Dream of the Rood*, W. O. Stevens, *loc. cit.* p. 71f.

[17] G. Baldwin Brown, *The Arts in Early England* (London, 1937), Vol. VI. Part II. *Anglo-Saxon Sculpture.* p. 169.

[18] A. W. Clapham, *loc. cit.* p. 139.

[19] Aymer Vallance, *English Church Screens* (London, 1936), p. 7: 'At Chester there was formerly a venerated rood, concerning which the following story was told. In the year 946 the Governor's wife at Hawarden was kneeling before the rood when it fell, and the weight of it crushed her to death. Her friends accordingly threw it into the sea thinking to make an end of it. But the tide bore it up the river, and cast it ashore at Chester. There, so one account says, the cross was buried on the spot where it was found. Another account says that the Rood was with great solemnity placed in St. John's church.' This account was taken by A. Vallance from a *History of Chester* (1815). It has been impossible to trace its origin.

[20] *Historians of the Church of York*, (Rolls Series II), p. 355: transl. by W. St. John Hope: 'Quire screens in English Churches', *Archaeologia*, LXVIII (1917), 51: Supra ostium chori pulpitum opere incomparabili,

Whether Lanfranc accepted an Anglo-Saxon custom or whether he himself caused the erection of the rood at Canterbury, it must have appeared to him as the visual evidence of a belief of which he was the main supporter against his adversary, Berengar of Tours. Lanfranc was the leader in the eucharistic dispute which had broken out about the middle of the 11th century and disturbed the peace of the Church until the Council of the Lateran in 1079 finally condemned the teaching of Berengar. Berengar and his followers based their denial of the transsubstantiation on the experiences of the senses which testified that bread and wine remained unchanged even after the consecration. Lanfranc in his *Liber de Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, directed against Berengar personally, maintained the real presence of the flesh and blood of Christ in the sacrament of the altar as well as the identity of the historic body with the eucharistic body. To him the Mass was not only symbolically, but in reality, the representation of Christ's death on the Cross. Christ, present in the species of bread and wine, constituted the reality of the sacrifice, at the same time the body of Christ retained its integrity, remained intact and undivided in spite of the continuous repetition of the sacrifice. The eucharistic controversy between Lanfranc and Berengar represented the renewed outbreak of a dispute which had taken place in the 9th century. The liturgical reform under Charlemagne had led to the awareness of the problems involved in the Eucharist and the thoughts of the two opposing parties were laid down in the treatise of Paschasius Radbert and of Ratram: *On the Flesh and Blood of Christ*. It has been noted that the dispute left its traces in the art of the time, how it contributed to give to the representation of the crucifixion its full sacramental value.[23] But at this time its influence can only be found in ivories and book covers produced in art schools close to the royal court as the dispute itself affected only a small group of educated theologians.

But in the 11th century Berengar's doctrine spread much more widely and reached much more deeply. It needed strong measures from the side of the Church to supress it. Could it thus be that there is a connection between Lanfranc's stand on transubstantiation and the rood at Canterbury by which the real presence of Christ as well as the integrity of the body was manifested? It seems more than a coincidence that it was only from the end of the 11th century onwards that the custom of erecting a triumphal cross spread over Western Europe.

The crucifix of Canterbury cathedral, whether set up by Stigand or by Lanfranc, was distinguished, however, from all other representations mentioned

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aere, auro, argentoque fabricari fecit, et ex utraque parte pulpiti arcus, et in medio supra pulpitum arcum eminentiorem crucem in summitate gestantem, similiter ex aere, auro et argento, opere Theutonico fabrefacto erexit.

[21] *York Fabric Rolls*, 150. A mid-thirteenth century list of relics mentions a large cross above the pulpitum, dedicated by Archbishop Roger, which contained inside the body of the Crucifix a number of relics.

[22] W. St. John Hope, *loc. cit.* p. 88: From the Annales of Winchester: de donis Emme regine condidit magnam crucem cum duabus imaginibus, scilicet Marie et Johannis, et illas cum trabe vestita cum auro et argento copiose dedit Wintoniensi ecclesiae. Stigand's cross at St. Austin's, Canterbury described by Thomas of Elmham as: crucem magnam argento undique coopertam in nave ecclesiae super pulpitum erectam.

[23] J. Reil, *Christus am Kreuz in der bildenden Kunst der Karolingerzeit* (Leipzig, 1930), p. 66.

previously, by the addition of the two cherubs on either side of the central figures. Their appearance at such a prominent place at Canterbury flanking the Crucified deserves a further explanation. The cherub or seraph in occidental art was most commonly connected with the *Majestas Domini* in accordance with the visions of Isaias and Ezechiel. Angels at either side of the cross appeared first on the Ampullae from Monza and the Bobbio Cimelie of the 6th century which represent according to Reil the Jerusalemian type of the representation of the crucifixion.[24] It was this type which served as a model for the Irish monks in the 7th and 8th century. The angels who float above the cross arms in the scene of the crucifixion on the cross of Maghera (8th c.?)[25] and in the miniature of the *Epistles* of St. Paul (Wuerzburg)[26] have been called cherubs although it seems hardly possible to identify them as such.

The presence of angels at the consecration of the Host was believed by the Anglo-Saxon church. 'They (the Anglo-Saxons) were made aware that cherubim and seraphim hovered unseen above the altar, in noiseless but most lowly worship:'

> In ipsa domo orationis ubi corpus Domini consecratur, ubi angelorum praesentia semper adesse non dubitatur, ne quid ineptum fiat, ne quid quod nostram fraternamve orationem impediat, totis viribus id agamus. (Bede, *Homil.* I, 22).[27]

This belief was confirmed further by Bede: (*In Lucae Evangelium* VI, 24):

> Quomodo autem posito in sepulchro corpore Salvatoris angeli adstitisse leguntur, ita etiam celebrandis ejusdem sanctissimi corporis mysteriis tempore consecrationis assistere sunt credendi, monente Apostolo mulieres in Ecclesia velamen habere propter angelos.[28]

The relation between cherubs and seraphs and the crucifix, however, had been clearly fixed in carolingian times and most likely under Anglo-Saxon influence. Rabanus Maurus, in his work: *De laudibus crucis*, gave a full explanation for the appearance of seraphs and cherubs which he had placed around the cross. In figure VI, (*Ill.* 1) two seraphs hover above, two cherubs below the cross which is without the figure of the Crucified. They have been introduced, as Raban said, in order to prove with what providential care divine clemency had always procured salvation for the human race since it wished that in the angelic spirits themselves redemption should be foreseen, and it decreed that eternal propitiation should be intimated to the world by the cherubs at either side of the tabernacle.[29]

The seraphs of Isaias with the position of their six wings prefigure the image of the cross while the cherubs of the *Book of Kings* with their outspread wings correspond to the measurements of the human body and represent the figure of Christ on the cross. The seraphs exclaim their 'Holy, Holy, Holy' to summon to the praise of the Holy Trinity all those who lived before the coming of the Saviour, those who lived at the time of the Incarnation and those who until now and until the end of the world, after his ascension, have to be converted to the faith, because they were all redeemed by the one passion of Christ. The cherubs beside the ark and the propitiatorium of the temple demonstrated that the true propitiation lay in the Incarnation of the Saviour.[30]

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[24] Reil, *loc. cit.*, p. 11.

[25] F. Henry, *La sculpture irlandaise* (Paris, 1933), p. 135.

[26] Zimmermann, *Vorkarolingische Miniaturen* III, pl. 213.

[27] D. Rock, *The Church of our Fathers* (1905) I, p. 57. PL 94, 118.

[28] PL 92, 623.

[29] Rabani Mauri, *De Laudibus S. Crucis*; PL 107, 165: In hac itaque pagina crux Domini, simul cum figuris seraphim et cherubim circa se positis, depicta constructaque cernitur. Quae ideo . . . hic introducuntur, ut ostendatur, quanta provisione ac dispensatione, divina clementia humano generi semper salutem suam procuraverit, cum et in ipsis spiritibus Angelicis per propheticam revelationem, speciem redemptionis nostrae ante videri voluit, et per opera prophetica in tabernaculi templique aditis constructa, id est, in ipsis cherubim juxta arcam ultra velum positis, aeternam propitiationem mundo intimare decrevit . . .

Thus the two main reasons for the appearance of seraph and cherub beside the cross were stated by Raban. The cherubs of the Jewish temple were well known to the Anglo-Saxon church through the description of the Venerable Bede.[31]

His interpretation of the ark as signifying the Incarnation and of the cherubs as predicting the propitiation through Christ were repeated by Raban who was only more precise and more detailed in pointing out the relations between the cherubs and the cross. As a pupil of Alcuin whose cross poetry followed along similar lines and who figured on the dedication page of the Fulda Manuscript as presenting Raban to the bishop, Raban must have been well acquainted with the teachings of the Anglo-Saxon church. It is true that neither in Alcuin's own poems in praise of the cross nor in any other of the Anglo-Saxon poems were cross and cherubim brought together with the exception of one poem by Johannes Scotus, the translator of the *Hierarchia Caelestis* by the Pseudo-Dionysius. Friend has shown how much this translation inspired the artists of St. Denis to add the angels to the scene of the crucifixion.[32]

But neither in carolingian ivories, miniatures nor metal works could the figures of angels be identified with cherubs.[33] If they appeared beside the Crucified raised on the triumphal cross inside the church above the altar of the Holy Cross, it could only mean that they stood there not merely as representatives of the angelic hierarchy, but as the cherubs of the Jewish temple framing the Crucified Who had taken the place of the ark. This thought was quite clearly expressed in one of Raban's *tituli: Versus in tabula inter seraphim posita*:

Hic deus est Christus dominus qui regnat ubique
Et cruce confixus, mosica vincula rupit.[34]

The *titulus* does not seem to warrant Schlosser's conclusion that Raban caused a crucifix between seraphs to be placed in an unspecified church,[35] but its meaning could be applied to the rood of Canterbury Cathedral. Neither Bede nor Raban had been forgotten when the crucifix between the cherubim was raised in Lanfranc's new church which was not only the church of the Primate, but dedicated as no other cathedral in England to Christ Himself. The cherub who crowned the tower over the choir proclaimed far and wide the significance of the Church of Christ which was based as the *civitas Christi* on Christ, like the cherubs in the temple were based on the propitiatorium.[36]

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[30] Raban Maurus, *loc. cit.*: Et merito trina voce ad laudem Sanctae Trinitatis omnes electos cohortabantur, hoc est, eos qui ante adventum Salvatoris fuerunt, et qui in praesentia incarnationis ejus vixerunt, quique adhuc usque in finem mundi post ascensionem ejus in coelos ad fidem convertendi sunt; quia omnes una passio Christi simul redemit, de Judaeis videlicet atque gentibus . . . Haec ergo juxta arcam et propitiatorium stabant, quia veram propitiationem in incarnatione Salvatoris humano generi demonstrabant. Haec et in modum crucis alas extensas semper habebant, quia perpetuam nostram redemptionem in passione Christi salvandorum rite intimabant.

[31] Bede, *De tabernaculo et vasis ejus*; PL 91, 406: Recte Cherubim gloriae propitiatorium obumbrare dicuntur; quia testamento crescente per tempus, et multiplicata scientia, propitiationem nobis Domini Salvatoris praedicant; et hanc gratis semper vocibus quasi expansis, ad volatum alis honorare non cessant. Bede's two commentaries on the Tabernacle of Moses and the Temple of Solomon had a great influence on the choice and the significance of fittings in the mediaeval church. The great seven-branched candlestick which Mathilda, daughter of Henry I of England and wife of the Emporer Henry V of Germany presented to Cluny, was made in imitation of the candlestick which Moses had made for the Tabernacle. R. Graham, 'The Monastery of Cluny, 910-1155', *Archaeologia* 90 (1930), 162: 'It stood four feet higher than the bronze candlestick in the cathedral of Brunswick which was, according to tradition, a gift of Henry the Lion, duke of Saxony.'

[32] A. M. Friend, 'Carolingian Art in the Abbey of St. Denis', *Art Studies*, (1923).

[33] Goldschmidt, (*Die Elfenbein skulpturen*, Berlin, s.d. II, 194) reproduces a book cover of a missal from St. Denis of the XI century where two seraphs together with the symbols of the apostles and other figures appear in the outer border around the crucifixion in the centre.

[34] *Poetae Lat. II*, p. 220, N. 55, 5.

[35] J. v. Schlosser, 'Eine Fuldaer Miniaturhandschrift der KK. Hofbibliothek', *Jahrb. der kunsth Sammlungen des Allerh. Kaiserhauses*, XIII (1892), 1-36.

The second reason for the appearance of seraphs or cherubs on either side of the triumphal cross was a liturgical one. In one of his poems in praise of the cross Johannes Scotus let the cross and not, as usual, the *Majestas Domini* shine above the seraphim and cherubim:

O Crux alma nites ultra Seraphim Cherubimque,
Quod est, quod non est, te colit omne super,
Te Domini rerum, Virtutes atque Potestas,
Ordo colit, medium jure tenendo locum.
Angelus, Archangelus, Princeps totusque supremus
Caelestis numerus te colit alta petens.[37]

This enumeration of the angelic orders, inspired by the Pseudo-Dionysius, was at the same time similar to the text of the preface which preceded the canon of the Mass: By whom the angels praise thy Majesty, the dominions adore Thee, the powers tremble, the heavens and the heavenly virtues and the blessed seraphim together rejoice with holy exultation with whom we pray that Thou would vouchsafe us to join our voices, saying with suppliant confession: Holy, Holy, Holy Lord God of Hosts, heaven and earth are full of Thy glory: Hosanna in the Highest.[38]

All the liturgies of the mediaeval church linked the angelic hymn with the renewal of the sacrifice visualized in the crucifixion. The liturgy, of the eastern Church especially, contributed greatly to the introduction of angels into the scene of the crucifixion of the 'byzantine' type in the 6th and 7th centuries. In its most impressive example, the 7th century fresco of the main apse of St. Maria Antiqua in Rome, the crucifix has been raised into the heavens; one seraph and one cherub stand above the right arm of the cross which is surrounded by hosts of angels while a multitude of worshippers crowd around its foot. The historical event of Golgotha had been transformed into a scene of adoration of heaven and earth.[39]

The majority of the eastern liturgies mentioned the cherubim not only in the preface, but in other parts of the liturgy as well, especially in the *cherubicon*, the solemn hymn which was sung while the procession from the prothesis entered the sanctum proper carrying the holy gifts: 'Let us who mystically represent the cherubim and sing the holy hymn to the quickening Trinity, lay by at this time all worldly cares that we may receive the King of Glory, invisibly attended by the angelic orders'.[40]

The cherubic hymn, peculiar to the Constantinopolitan liturgy and others derived from it, is supposed to have been introduced at the command of Justinian about the middle of the 6th century, about the same time the iconostasis was introduced to separate church from choir.[41] The *cherubicon* linked quite clearly the triumphal entry of the King through the triumphal door of the iconostasis with His mystical sacrifice which was to follow. There is no evidence that the *cherubicon* was ever incorporated in the ritual of the Anglo-Saxon church, not even in the 7th century at the time of the closest relationship with the Greek

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[36] Bede, *loc. cit.*, p. 407: Sic autem sunt Cherubim supra propitiatorium positi, quomodo civitas Christi, id est sancta Ecclesia super montem, id est super ipsum Christum esse constituta dicitur: non quod altior illo possit esse civitas sua, sed quod ejus subsidio sustentata proficiat.

[37] Ioannis Scoti, *Opera*; PL 122, 1223-4.

[38] *The Liturgy of the Church of Sarum*, transl. by Ch. Walker, (London, 1866).

[39] Reil, *loc. cit.*, p. 27 ff.: 'Der Golgathavorgang hat sich zu einer Anbetungszene des Himmels und der Erde gewandelt.'

[40] J. M. Neale, *The Liturgies of St. Mark, St. James, etc.* transl. (London, 1859), p. 10.

[41] C. E. Hammond, *Liturgies Eastern and Western* (Oxford, 1878).



Fig. 1



Fig. 3



Fig. 4



Fig. 5



Fig. 2

church under Archbishop Theodore. The Anglo-Saxon liturgies, either Gallican or Roman, did not contain the *cherubicon*; the *trisagion* was reserved for the liturgy of Good Friday. But even though the cherubim did not figure as frequently and prominently as in the eastern church, it could not be maintained that the western church preserved the ideas expressed by the *cherubicon* chiefly through the dogma and not through the ritual.[42] The presence of the cherubim at the celebration of the Mass was assured by the words of the preface. Usually their voices only could be heard in their triumphal hymn of the three times *Sanctus*, while they remained invisible to the human eye. But when they were revealed standing on either side of the King on the Cross, as in Canterbury Cathedral, they expressed clearly and impressively the function of this rood above the altar and the screen in front of the choir. It had become the triumphal cross with all its sacramental implications. But the Canterbury rood with its two cherubim seemed to have remained an isolated example until the 13th century.[43] Then, at the time of the rebuilding of Westminster Abbey under Henry III (c.1250/1) the king wished not only a great cross to be set up in the nave of the church, but he ordered Edward of Westminster to buy two angels in the form of cherubim to be placed on either side of the cross.[44] The king, for reasons unknown, showed a particular preference for the addition of cherubim to the cross. In 1237 the sheriff of Southampton received an order: to cause a beam (*trabem*) to be placed in the chapel of St. Thomas the Martyr in the castle of Winchester to touch (*contingat*) both walls of the seat of the king and the queen, to wit from one wall to the other, and in the middle of the beam shall be erected a cross with images of Mary, John and of two angels.[45] In 1241 the king gave similar instructions with regard to the great rood in St. Peter ad Vincula in the tower of London where two cherubim *cum hyllary vultu et jocoso* were to be added on either side of the cross. In 1244 the bailiffs of Woodstock were ordered: 'in the king's chapel above the altar table to make images of the Crucified, St. Mary and St. John the Evangelist and two angels in the fashion of cherubim and seraphim.' In 1251 during work at Clarendon, images of St. Mary, St. Edward and the cherubim had to be placed in the king's chapel. All those orders with the exception of the one to Edward of Westminster referred to private royal chapels. None of the cherubim of Henry III have been preserved, but a drawing of the great rood of Westminster has survived its destruction. One illumination of the Islip Roll (Lambeth Palace) representing the funeral ceremonies of Abbot Islip in 1532 in front of the high altar and the choir screen gives an outline of the great rood. (*Ill.* 2). On the flanks of the Crucifix between St. Mary and St. John, there stand two cherubim with two pair of wings, one folded in front of their legs, the other rising straight from the shoulders. A wheel is clearly discernible under the feet of the one on the left of Christ. Unless one reckons with a remodelling of the rood and the replacing of some or all of the figures at some time between Henry III's order and the drawing of the illumination in the 16th century, one can assume that the cherubim in the drawing are those set up in 1250/1.

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[42] O. Wulff, *Cherubim, Throne und Seraphim* (1894), p. 24: 'Nach allem laesst sich wohl sagen, dass das Abendland im Gegensatz zum Osten die Vorstellungen vorwiegend durch das Dogma, und nicht in dem Gottesdienst bewahrt hat.'

[43] Durham cathedral possessed a rood with two archangels, described in the Rites of Durham as 'the most goodly and famous Roode that was in all this land with the picture of Mary on the one side and the picture of Johne on the other, with two splendent and glisteringe archangeles, one on the one side of Mary, and the other on the other syde of Johne' (Surtees Soc. 17, p. 32-4) See: Sir William St. John Hope, *loc. cit.* 73: 'Of the date of this rood screen nothing is known, but it may have been a rebuilding of Prior John Wessington (1416-46) of one that had accompanied the 12th century pulpitum.'

[44] *Close Roll*, 35, Henry III, m. 19.: Mandatum est Edwardo de Westmonasterio sicut rex alias mandavit, quod . . . magnam eciam crucem collocari facit in navi ecclesiae Westmonasterii et emat duos Angelos in modum Cherubyn in utroque parte illius crucis collocandos.

[45] *Liberate Rolls*, Henry III. 1237 1244, 1251. See also Aymer Vallance, *English Church Screens* (London, 1936), p. 2.

The whole rood seems to resemble closely the crucifixion group between cherubim in one of the miniatures decorating the Bible of William of Devon written about 1250, possibly in Canterbury,[46] which is the only remaining visible evidence of the 13th century type of rood in England.

But the Cathedral of Halberstadt still possesses a 13th century triumphal cross, (*Ill.* 3) which is in its main features identical with the Westminster rood: the posture of the Crucified, the trefoil endings of the crossbeams and the cherubim with their two pairs of wings standing on wheels. The monumental rood of Halberstadt has been interpreted as one of the most outstanding results of the intense byzantine influence on Saxon art of this time. But the source of inspiration seems to have been much closer, not in the east, but in the west across the channel.

The relations between England and Saxony at the end of the 12th and the first half of the 13th century were particularly close. Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and son-in-law of Henry II of England, spent two three-year periods in exile in England, from 1181-2 to 1184-5 and from 1189 to 1191. His son Otto was the favorite of his uncle Richard I who would have given him the earldom of York if the Yorkshiremen had not objected. As Emperor, Otto IV visited his uncle John in 1207 to ask for his help in his fight against Philip the Stauffer. When after his death his younger brother was created Duke of Brunswick-Luneburg, the relations between the Welffs and the English court did not cease. Under Henry III, there was an almost continuous exchange of messengers as appears from the payments noted in the Liberate Rolls.[47] Master Geoffrey, a clerk of Otto, Duke of Brunswick received regular payments from the exchequer for a number of years.[48] In 1261 the King ordered a golden necklace to be made for his niece engaged to the Duke,[49] and in 1269 the marriage was concluded at Kenilworth in the presence of the King.

There is ample evidence that the political contact between England and Saxony brought with it an influence of English art on that of the domain of the Welffs, at least in the field of manuscript illumination and metalwork.[50]

Although the date of the rood of Halberstadt which has been fixed at about 1220 on stylistic grounds and on the fact that the choir of the cathedral was rebuilt at that time, is actually earlier than that of the order given by Henry III for the purchase of the two cherubim at Westminster, it seems safe to assume that it was inspired by the English example which was not only one of several set up at this time, but had its predecessor in the Canterbury rood.

While the relations between the Westminster and Halberstadt rood could be proved quite conclusively by the drawing of the Islip Roll, one could not proceed beyond a suggestion that the Imerward Crucifix of Brunswick, of the time of Henry the Lion, was likewise inspired by an English example.[51] Its relation to the Volto Santo of Lucca could not be denied, but the Volto Santo was known and copied in many churches in Western Europe in the 12th century.[52] From England comes one of the earliest references to the Volto Santo: William Rufus (1087-1100) was accustomed to swear by the image. The Cluniac Priory of Bermondsey, near London possessed a miraculous Holy Rood. According to the Annals this rood of St. Saviour was found in 1117 near the Thames and may have been a copy or imitation of the Volto Santo. The Bermondsey rood had a more than local reputation; in 1234 Henry III granted some oaks of the Royal Forest to the prior for the new chapel of the rood.[53]

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[46] E. G. Millar, *La miniature anglaise de X au XIII siècle* (Paris-Bruxelles, 1926), pl. 77.

[47] *Liberate Rolls*. Henry III, March 5, September 26, 1229; Apr. 23, Nov. 11, 1243; May 1, 1246; Aug. 28, 1250.

[48] *Lib. Rolls*, Apr. 8, 1230: 'Lib. to Master Geoffrey, clerk of Otho duke of Brunswick, 5 marks for Michaelmas term, in the 14th year, which sum the king granted to him yearly at the exchequer at that term until we shall provide him with an ecclesiastical benefice.'

[49] *Close Roll*, 1262: Mandatum est Rogero de Lyburn quod—faciat unam catlandam auream preci xx marcarum ad opus Markisie neptis nostri quam dux Brunswic in brevi ducturus est in uxorem.

[50] G. Swarzenski, 'Aus dem Kunstkreis Heinrichs des Loewen,' *Staedel Jahrbuch*, VII-VIII (1932).

[51] W. Pinder, *Die Kunst der deutschen Kaiserzeit* I, (1933), p. 276: 'Er wirkt als Person genommen "englisch"; dieses brauchte bei einem Werke aus dem Kreise um Heinrich den Loewen nicht einmal zu verwundern. Waere nicht der Name Imerward auch recht gut als angelsaechsisch denkbar?'

The head of a wooden crucifix at South Cerney (Gloc.), believed to have come from a great rood and attributed to the 12th century, bears, with the linear treatment of hair and beard, the bulging eyes and the drooping moustache, a strong resemblance to the head of the Imerward Crucifix.[54]

The destruction of the English roods and rood-screens after the Reformation has made it difficult to prove in greater detail and accuracy England's contribution to the development of mediaeval sculpture on the Continent. But it seems advisable to review the development especially of north-western German sculpture with regard to its relation to England, instead of looking for its models in France as has been the custom.

The most famous German 13th century rood-screen, the *Lettner* of the west choir of Naumburg Cathedral (*Ill.* 4), provides an outstanding example in this respect. It has been interpreted as the work of a genius influenced by French art. But the Naumburg *Lettner* is the most perfect of a series of rood-screens erected in Saxon-thuringian churches in the later 12th and early 13th century.[55] Their exceptionally large number in this particular limited area points to England where the history of the rood-screen goes much further back than that of the *jubé* in France. None of the 13th century English rood-screens have been preserved completely and *in situ*. But from remains and descriptions we may conclude that there existed a correspondence in the design of the entrance into the church and the entrance into the choir. Thus we may take the design of the centre portion around and above the main door of Wells Cathedral (*Ill.* 5) in order to explain the most peculiar feature of the Naumburg *Lettner*: the overhanging triangular wallplates above the blind arcades. In vain would one search for such a thoroughly unstructural, atectonic element in French 13th century church architecture. But in Wells there are similar triangles which, although formed by mouldings applied to the wall-surface, have as little structural function as the hanging plates of Naumburg. The cutting of the centre door into the main design, the trefoils which connect the colonnettes, the quatrefoils filling the empty spaces: they all are features which occur in variation in Naumburg. By pointing them out it is not intended to introduce the design of Wells as the model of Naumburg;—the capitals of Southwell chapterhouse (c.1294) come nearest to those at Naumburg in the realistic treatment of plants. There no doubt were rood-screens in England which were even more closely related to Naumburg: in any case the design of the Naumburg *Lettner* is more English than French in character.

The crucifix of the centre door of the Naumburg *Lettner* could hardly be called a triumphal cross in the proper sense. Nailed to the post and lintel of the choir door, the Crucified has been brought down from his triumphal height. By this new position He illustrates more impressively than any other known crucifix the words: *I am the door.*[56] At the same time, He has been brought closer to the human sphere making a more direct appeal to human sympathy by the crown of thorns and the expression of suffering and pain on His face, which effect is augmented by the emotions displayed by St. Mary and St. John.

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[52] For sources see: A. Kingsley Porter, *Spanish Romanesque Sculpture* (1928), p. 108-110. E. Panofsky has pointed out the relationship between the Plantagenet tombs at Fontevrault and the tomb of Henry the Lion at Brunswick.

[53] Rose Graham, *English Ecclesiastical Studies* (London, 1929), p. 106-10.

[54] A. Vallance, *loc. cit.* p. 12 Illustrations 1 and 2.

[55] *Ibid.*

This interpretation of the crucifixion as a tragedy occurs frequently in English illuminations of the 13th century, a fact which again indicates the probability of an English contribution to continental art. That the probability cannot be definitely stated as a certainty is only due to the destruction of all the English sculptured roods of the period.

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[56] W. Jantzen, *Deutsche Bildhauer des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig, 1925), p. 258.

The Philosophy of Nicholas of Autrecourt and His Appraisal of Aristotle

J. REGINALD O'DONNELL, C.S.B.

A. *Introduction*

THE correspondence between Nicholas of Autrecourt and Bernard of Arezzo, together with the condemned articles from the *Satis Exigit Ordo,* have been for the most part the basis for the studies on the thought of the former. As they have already been many times utilized, I shall limit this article to an analysis of the treatise entitled *Tractatus Universalis Magistri Nicholai De Ultricuria Ad Videndum An Sermones Peripateticorum Fuerint Demonstrativi* or, as it is more commonly called, the *Exigit Ordo.*[1]

As the full title indicates, it is a critical examination of the teaching of Aristotle and his disciples, especially Averroes. The conclusion drawn from this examination is that the Stagirite, when subjected to a diligent logical scrutiny, is found wanting. At best only varying degrees of probability can be assigned to the conclusions of the Peripatetics.

It is to be noted from the outset that our author had no apparent intention of setting up a positive doctrine for its own sake and which he would accept as a true one, but rather he makes provisory acceptance of theories, both ancient and contemporary, at variance with the teaching of Aristotle, in order to fulfill his main purpose, the discrediting of the Aristotelian system. True he will deviate from both the ancients and contemporaries, if it suits his purpose yet in his writings many of the current problems of the history of philosophy are discussed and utilized. Nicholas was well acquainted with contemporary teaching and disputations, as well as with the much used method of the *quaestiones quodlibetales*; consequently it will be not without interest to the history of philosophy to draw a portrait of Nicholas of Autrecourt from the *Satis Exigit Ordo*, wherein fourteenth century radicalism is given free rein.

The treatise in question was written between the years 1340 and 1345. At the date of composition the author had already fallen into the bad graces of his colleagues and was being subjected to violent attacks.[2] The *amicus veritatis* mentioned in note (2) is identified in the process of condemnation as Nicholas himself.[3] These attacks probably culminated in his citation to the papal court at Avignon by Benedict XII on Nov. 21st, 1340 to answer the charges leveled at him.[4] The condemnation of the articles of the *Satis Exigit Ordo* and Nicholas' retraction took place at Avignon on May 19th, 1346 under Clement V.[5]

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[1] For the edition of this treatise see: J. R. O'Donnell, 'Nicholas of Autrecourt,' MEDIAEVAL STUDIES, I (1939), 179-267. The *incipit* is *Satis Exigit Ordo*; the commonly accepted title *Exigit Ordo* has been taken from the publication of the condemned articles; cf. Denifle, Chatelaine, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II, no. 1124, p. 583. I shall refer to the *Chartularium* as *Chart. U.P,;* to the edition of the *Satis Exigit Ordo* only by page. I have bibliographical indications on p. 180 of the edition. Further ones will be given in full in the notes of this article. I should like to point out some emendations to be made in the edition. P. 181 line 4 hoc est bonum simpliciter judicavi; the *Chart. U.P. loc. cit.* p. 580 quotes Nicholas as writing bonum esse simpliciter scribere istum tractatum. P. 182, note *d* cf. St. Thos, *In Eth. Arist.* Bk. II, lect. 9, XXV (ed. Vives), p. 313. P. 184 1.5 quandoque read quandocumque; *ibid.* n. 7 read 1137b 25. P. 185 n. *k* read infrafactam cf. 188 n. 17, 202 1.7. P. 185 n. 10 read 198b 25 ff. P. 188 n. 19 read 1166 a 1ff. P. 191 n. 30 read 79c. P. 220 1.35 vacu read vacui. P. 221 1. 32 antique read antique. P. 224 n. 154 read 240 a 20ff. P. 266 1.16 read virtutem interiorem particularem et illud . . . cujus accipiuntur, unum . . . *Ibid.* note 247 read M. Grabmann, *Die Introductiones in Logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood* (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Abteilung, Jahrgang 1937, Heft 10, (Munich, 1937), p. 75; William of Ockham, *Summa Totius Logicae* I, 63.

What were the motives which inspired Nicholas to write the *Satis Exigit Ordo*? There are two which seem more or less patent. The first, remote, can be attributed to the fact that he had definitely taken sides in the controversy which had grown up around the doctrine of Aristotle, especially as seen in the so called latin averroist school. However he would not only seek to disprove Averroes, but attack the evil in its very root, the doctrine of Aristotle himself. The second and more immediate motive seems to have originated in his dispute with an unidentified Aegidius or Giles who had written in a letter to Nicholas that it would not be difficult to prove that Aristotle had known a thousand conclusions.[6] Nicholas claims to have examined the writings of Aristotle and found a thousand attempted demonstrations which were in no way cogent, but that on the contrary a probable opinion, if not always a more probable one, could be advanced against each and every one of these demonstrations.[7]

Since the philosophical principles of Aristotle are unsound, to spend the best part of one's life studying them is a criminal waste of time. The duty of each and every one is to teach the Word of God and to live It.[8] If truth is to be had, it should be had quickly. Consequently Nicholas felt conscience bound to write this treatise in order to awaken from their lethargy and to convert those who had to no avail spent years in studying the teachings of Aristotle and his Commentator Averroes, since they were no closer to the truth at the end of their life than when they began, but rather further from it.[9]

Nicholas of Autrecourt has been variously categorized as sceptic,[10] Ockhamist or Nominalist,[11] religious moralist.[12] However these three are not so isolated that traces of all cannot be found in the same man; on the contrary there is a very marked relationship between them. Scepticism with its denial of certitude to natural knowledge, Ockhamism with the overstressing of the Divine Omnipotence to the extent that there can be no guarantee of any constancy in nature, and the intrusion of this doctrine into the realm of knowledge, both lead to a distrust and despair of human reason, which in turns brings about the tendency to rely on Revelation alone. The Gospel is primarily a way of life which leads to salvation, consequently those who cleave to it alone will stress Faith and moral conduct.[13] These were common teachings in the fourteenth century. Nicholas of Autrecourt like every other man was a product of his times. Consequently it will be useful to recall some well known facts concerning the vicissitudes of Aristotelianism[14] which have a bearing on the present article.

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[2] Cum insurrexit amicus veritatis et suam fecit sonare tubam ut dormientes a somno excitaret, emiserunt suspiria, omino fecerunt signa tristitiae, et resumpto spiritu quasi armati ad capitale proelium in eum irruerunt (p. 181).

[3] amicus veritatis, scilicet ipsemet *Chart. U.P. loc. cit.* p. 581.

[4] *Chart. U.P.* II, no. 1041, p. 505.

[5] *Ibid.* pp. 576 ff. Cf. also J. Lappe, 'Nikolas von Autrecourt,' (Beiträge zur Geschichte d. Philosophie d. Mittelalters Band VI, Heft 2, Münster, 1908) pp. 31* ff. Henceforth this work will be referred to as Lappe.

[6] Et breviter non esset difficile declarare scienti doctrinam Aristotelis *mille* conclusiones ab ipso *scitas*, Lappe p. 23*.

[7] Primo inspexi doctrinam Aristotelis et ejus Commentatoris Averrois et vidi quod *mille* conclusiones . . . erant ab eis demonstratae (p. 181). Itaque proposui . . . aliquas conclusiones quas certum fuisse de intellectu Aristotelis . . . ostendere ab eis nullo modo fore *scitas* (p. 198).

[8] Tandem in processu temporis apparerent divini quidam homines qui non totum tempus vitae suae consumerent in logicis sermonibus vel in distinguendo propositiones obscuras Aristotelis vel in quotando commenta Averrois, sed intellectum divinae legis manifestarent populo et radiis suae bonitatis undique diffusis sic viverent quod in conspectu gloriosissimi principis totius naturae apparerent sicut specula sine macula et imagines bonitatis illius. Iste est finis, ista est intentio mea (p. 182).

[9] Haec omnia et plura talia vidit animus meus in quibus esse errorem arbitratus est et deceptionem non modicam, quocirca caritatis zelo ductus opinioni eorum succurrendum existimavi. Scit Deus non amore gloriae sed quia credo quod per inquisitionem ex principiis regnabit veritas in anima et amplius non erit locus falsitati (p. 198).

[10] C. Michalski, *Le Criticisme et Le Scepticisme dans la Philosophie du XIV*^{e} *Siècle* (Cracovie, 1925), pp. 64ff.

[11] J. Hofer, 'Studien über Wilhelm von Ockham.' *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, VI (1913), 664 ff.

[12] E. Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, (New York, 1937), p. 101.

St. Augustine had preferred Plato to Aristotle, yet he conceded a place of eminence to the latter.[15] St. Albert the Great made a knowledge of both Plato and Aristotle necessary for an understanding of philosophy.[16] We have only to read the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas to see the esteem in which he held Aristotle,[17] yet he maintained that it mattered little who said a thing, but rather did he speak the truth.[18] Petrus Aureoli (d. 1322) considered it folly to reject categorically the statements of Aristotle and Averroes, because it was not likely that these two great philosophers spoke without having well considered the problem.[19] These are moderate and reasonable views to which it would be difficult to take exeception. If there had been no other tradition, I think we are justified in doubting whether Nicholas would ever have written the *Satis Exigit Ordo*.

There are however always extremists and the Middle Ages were no exception. Many of the works of Aristotle found their first entrance to Paris by way of the Arabs, especially Averroes in whose writings were extravagant claims for the authority of Aristotle.[20] He was the acme of perfection, set aside by divine providence to teach mankind. To those brought up in the Christian Faith and taught to reverence the Fathers, especially St. Augustine, such statements could not help arousing opposition. But when Parisian Masters began quoting this extravaganza, and even preferring Aristotle to the Faith, the storm broke forth in all its fury,[21] ending in the well known condemnations of 1270 and 1277.[22] Nicholas had heard these eulogies of the Stagirite and like many another, disagreeing with them found in the condemnations a justification for his opinion and a tacit permission to go to any lengths he desired.[23]

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[13] E. Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*, (New York, 1938), pp. 89ff.

[14] Cf. Card. Ehrle, *L'Agostinismo et L'Aristotelismo nella Scolastica del Secolo XIII* (Xenia Thomistica, III, Vatican City, 1925), pp. 517-588. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et L'Averroisme Latin au XIII^e Siecle, *Les Philosophes Belges* VI (Louvain, 1911), pp. 1-63. Pierre Duhem, *Le Système du Monde* IV (Paris, 1916), pp. 91-183 and 310-320. M. Schmeid, *Aristoteles in d. Scholastik* (Eichstätt, 1875). G. H. Luquet, *Aristote et L'Université de Paris pendant le XIII^e Siècle* (Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Sciences Religieuses, VI, 2, (Paris, 1904), Further bibliography is listed in the above works.

[15] Aristoteles Platonis discipulus, vir excellentis ingenii et eloquio Platoni impar, sed multos facile superans, *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 12. This preference is restated by Nicholas of Oresme: Et si comme souvent est dit, il argüoit ycy contre Plato; et toutevoies saint Augustin ou viii^e ou ix^e livre de *La cité de Dieu* prefere et recommande Platon et ses ensuians commes philosophes pardessus touz autres, et tient que leur doctrine entre lez autres des philosophes est plus congrue ou plus concordable a la fois catholique. Menut and Denomy, 'Maistre Nicole Oresme, Le Livre du Ciel et du Monde,' MEDIAEVAL STUDIES, III (1941), 280.

[16] Et scias quod non perficitur homo in philosophia nisi ex scientia duarum 'philosophiarum Aristotelis et Platonis, *Meta.* I, v, 15 (ed. Vives) VI, 313.

[17] M. Riquet, 'St. Thomas et les Auctoritates,' *Archives de Philosophie*, III, 2 (Paris, 1925), 139.

[18] Quidquid autem horum sit, non est nobis multum curandum, quia studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint, sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum, I *de Coelo*, lect. 22 (Leonine ed.), p. 91. Cf. also Hans Meyer, *Thomas von Aquin, sein System und seine Geistesgeschichtliche Stellung* (Bonn, 1938), pp. 4-12.

[19] Sed absurdum et frivolum est dicere, quod tam praeclari philosophi qui sic naturas rerum diligenter exquisierunt, aut falsum dixerint aut improprie locuti fuerint in hac materia, *Quodl*, 153b BC; text quoted in: R. Dreiling, *Der Konzeptualismus in d. Universalienlehre d. Franziskanererzbischofs Petrus Aureoli*, (Beiträge zur Geschichte d. Philosophie d. M.A., Bd. XI, Heft 6, Münster, 1913), 189, note 2.

[20] These texts have been collected together in P. Duhem; cf. note 14 above.

[21] E. Gilson, *La Doctrine de la Double Verité*, (Strasbourg, 1921), pp. 63 ff.

[22] Cf. *Chart. U.P.* I, pp. 487 and 543 ff.

Peter of John Olivi (d. 1298) was outspoken in his scorn for Aristotle and Averroes. Little did he care, he said, what Aristotle, or any other pagan for that matter, thought. It is tiresome to find people simply stating that Aristotle thought this or that, therefore it is true. Aristotle has not proved his doctrine with any cogency, but is nonetheless believed as if he were some contemporary god.[24]

The objections of Nicholas of Autrecourt to Aristotle are very similar to those of Peter of John Olivi. He takes exception to those who use in their discussions a conclusion of Aristotle for the major or minor premise, which, if we are to judge from the amount they wrote on the question, was neither evident nor clearly demonstrated.[25]

William of Ockham had already maintained that many of the conclusions of Aristotle enjoyed only dialectical probability, as for example the principle that whatever moves is moved by another and that there could not be an infinite series in causes. Aristotle's reasoning might appear probable, yet it is not demonstrative.[26] Nicholas of Autrecourt will prove that such is the case for the whole fabric of Aristotelianism.

Gregory of Rimini (fl. 1344), who inspired Nicholas on more than one occasion, claimed that not only were Aristotle's works full of errors, but contradictions as well.[27] Enough of the predecessors of Nicholas had been anti-Aristotelian to make his own position respectable. Neither did this antagonism end there but rather it gathered impetus as time went on.

Pierre d'Ailly (d. 1420) who claimed that Nicholas had been condemned out of jealousy, granted only the value of opinion to the teaching of Aristotle.[28] It was this same attitude of mind which was to reach its culmination in Luther.[29]

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[23] Quod quidem probatur per unam rationem inter ceteras quae fuit longo tempore dicta Achilles et de qua dixit unus sollemnis doctor de Vico Straminum quod, si Aristoteles non fuisset, numquam extitisse inventa (p. 206). This is but a repetition of Averroes: Omnes enim hoc opinantes non credunt nisi propter hoc quod dixit Aristoteles quoniam ita est difficile hoc adeo quod si sermo Aristotelis non inveniretur in eo, tunc valde esset difficile cadere super istum aut forte impossibile . . . III *de Anima* tx. c. 14 *ca. finem.*

[24] Licet mihi non sit cura quid hic vel alibi senserit, ejus (Aristotelis) auctoritas et cujuslibet infidelis et idolatrae mihi est nulla et maxime in eis quae sunt fidei Christianae . . . Breviter hic et ubique habe pro regula quod dicere 'Aristoteles et ejus Commentator ita dixit, ergo ita est' non habet vim argumenti quia nulla habitudo necessaria est inter conclusionem et praemissas . . . Aristoteles nulla sufficienti ratione, immo fere nulla ratione probat suum dictum, sed absque ratione creditur sibi tanquam deo hujus saeculi. For these and similar texts cf. Petrus Joannis Olivi, *Quaestiones in Lib. Sent.* (ed. B. Jansen, Quarrachi, 1922), III, p. 578.

[25] Et si hoc reputaverunt esse principium ut apparet manifeste per Aristotelem quem omnino insequuntur, ita non est longe a verisimilitudine quin in aliis uniformiter se habent ut praecipue argumenta non habentes ut semper usi Aristotelis conclusionibus tanquam principiis, dicant quod homines negant principia ubi homo asserit conclusiones veras licet a consuetis remotas. Tertium signum est in docentibus qui in suis quaestionibus de decem rationibus vix unam plenarie resolvunt, sed solum pro majori propositione vel minori allegant dictum Aristotelis seu ejus Commentatoris, ubi tamen propositiones sicut appareret eorum quaternos intuenti nec sunt notae ex terminis, nec sunt de his quibus assentit naturaliter intellectus nec est aliquod quod experiamur in nobis. Nam doctores qui ad invicem exercitii causa conferunt in determinationibus suis replent quaternos et processus formant longos in verba Aristotelis exponendo (cf. pp. 197-8). For a study of the determinationibus cf. P. Glorieux, *La Littérature Quodlibétique* (Bibliothèque Thomiste, XXI, Paris, 1925), pp. 9ff.

[26] Cf. *Centiloquium*, ed. P. Boehner, *Franciscan Studies*, XXII, New Series, I (1941), 68. The editor casts grave doubts on the authenticity of the *Centiloquium* and the *Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae* (p. 62).

[27] Cui etiam accidit quod in pluribus aliis turpissime erravit et in aliquibus etiam sibi contradixit, I *Sent.*, d. 38, qu. 1, art. 2, tx. quoted in H. Denifle, *Luther et le Luthéranisme* III (2nd ed. Paris, 1916, tr. J. Paquier), p. 228, n. 2, Cf. also H. Elie, *Le Complexe Significabile* (Paris, 1936), pp. 37ff.; cf. note 114.

For Nicholas to attempt to destroy the authority of Aristotle with no intention of replacing that authority by something which he himself would deem better is not intelligible. Aristotle had been accepted by philosophers and presented to the minds of men in order that they might not come to despair of the possibility of the contemplation of truth. Nicholas condemns this only in so far as it had proceeded to an extreme degree.[30] He hopes to replace it by something which he considers certain, not illusory, sterile and chaotic as he felt scholastic philosophy had become. He speaks with scant sympathy of the controversies raging in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[31] He singles out for special mention some of the discussions between the Thomist and Augustinian schools.[32] If his own position were adopted, namely the eternity of things and atomism, such disputes as to whether form constitutes the whole essence of composite being, whether form is primarily the term of generation etc., along with the whole third book of the *De Anima* with the multitude of insoluble difficulties which it contained would no longer have any place.[33] There are grounds for the belief that he really does not mean that these difficulties would cease, if eternity and atomism were accepted, but rather if the whole scholastic system were jettisoned. If endless disputes were the net result of philosophical speculation, then certainly to a man like Nicholas of Autrecourt, Christianity not only could dispense with it, but would be better off without it. If men, like John of Jandun, would be content simply to quote Aristotle as the sum of all truth, even when there were at least apparent contradictions between the conclusions of the Stagirite and the teachings of Faith, then certainly, when a stalemate was reached because of the lack of any attempt at reconciliation, no progress could be made in philosophy. Nicholas has our sympathy, if not our agreement, in turning to a tradition which he saw represented by such illustrious figures as St. Paul who had advised the Colossians to beware of philosophy,[34] Tertullian,[35]

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[28] Si vero obiiciatur quod inter articulos Parisiis condemnatos contra magistrum Nicolaum de Alticuria unus est iste "Hae propositiones 'Deus est' et 'Deus non est' idem significant, licet alio et alio modo," respondeo quod multa fuerunt condemnata contra eum causa invidiae, quae tamen postea in scholis publice sunt confessa, tx. quoted by C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, IV (Leipzig, 1927), p. 112, n. 470. Ex praedicto processu apparet quod in philosophia seu doctrina Aristotelis nullae vel paucae sunt rationes evidenter demonstrativae . . . Item sequitur quod philosophia Aristotelis seu doctrina magis debet dici opinio quam scientia. Et ideo valde sunt repraehensibiles qui nimis tenaciter adhaerent auctoritati Aristotelis, I *Sent.* qu. 3 art. 3, tx. quoted in M. Patronnier de Gondillac, 'Les Arguments Probables chez Pierre d'Ailly,' *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age*, VIII (1933), 66, n. 2.

[29] Fabulator Aristoteles cum suis frivolis defensoribus, cf. Denifle, *op.* et *loc. sit.* (p. 227). for this and many other similar texts.

[30] Advertendum etiam circa unum quod multum est notandum quod aliqua potuit esse causa propter quam reverendi *Patres* qui secuti sunt Aristotelem voluerunt satis permittere quod dicta Aristotelis haberentur in admiratione et quod homines communitatis magnam fidem adhiberunt eis; nam sciverunt quod non omnes ex se nati sunt gaudere bono speculationis, immo si essent sollicitarii, numquam eis occurreret cognitio unius intelligibilis occulti. Nunc si isti non haberent in admiratione dicta Aristotelis ita quod studendo in eis non crederent acquirere unam magnam scientiam, desperarent de fine speculationis et converterent se ad corporales delectationes. Voluerunt ergo permittere quod sic simpliciter incederent in inquisitione. Nunc video quod res est nimis in extremo; nam pauciores satis quam expediret convertunt se ad naturam rei et plures convertunt se ad intellectus hominum (p. 185).

[31] Cf. pp. 204-5.

[32] Cf. Card, Ehrle, 'Der Augustinismus und Aristotelismus in der Scholastik gegen Endes 13 Jahrhunderts,' *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte d. M.A.*, V (1889), 616 ff.

[33] Item apparet quod illa scrupulositas an forma sit tota quidditas compositi aut materia amplius non habet locum; nec illa an forma sit per se et primo terminus generationis (p. 204). Nicholas mentions several of the propositions set forth in the letter of Robert Kilwardby to Peter of Confleto; cf. note 32.

[34] *Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy, Col.* ii, 8.

[35] Miserum Aristotelem qui illis dialecticam instituit artificem struendi et destruendi, versipellem in sententiis, coactam in conjecturis, duram in argumentis, operariam contentionem molestam etiam sibi ipsam, omnia retractantem, ne quid omnino tractaverit, *De Prescriptione Hereticorum*, 6, Florilegium Patristicum, IV, ed. J. Martin, (Bonn, 1930), p. 12.

St. Bernard,[36] St. Peter Damian,[37] all of whom expressed kindred ideas with varying degrees of vehemence, ideas later to be taken up by the author of the *Imitation of Christ.*[38] It is to this tradition that Nicholas entrusts himself. After proving that according to Aristotle there could be no place for rewards and punishments after death and showing how this doctrine could be safeguarded by accepting the eternity of things, he asks that no one believe such reasonings, but rather search the Gospel where the whole truth could be found.[39] Such then, I suggest, was the basic motive for the *Satis Exigit Ordo*, namely the discrediting of Aristotle and through him scholastic philosophy, so that positive theology and the study of asceticism might reign supreme. Nicholas was not alone, neither was he born out of due time, but rather one more exponent of a tradition which neither began with him nor ended there.

Although the fact that he used the adversaries' own weapons, formal logic and dialectics, places him somewhat outside the tradition, nonetheless the ends in view were, I think, identical.

From the very beginning of the treatise Nicholas gives clear expression to his intention of writing nothing which would be contrary to the teaching of the Church[40] or of asserting his opinions contumaciously.[41]

The method which the author adopts is clearly stated and closely adhered to throughout the treatise, namely to examine some of the conclusions of Aristotle to ascertain if they will satisfy the exigencies of dialectical procedure.[42] To do this he takes several of the doctrines which were indubitably taught by Aristotle and attempts to show that they were insufficiently proved. His procedure is to doubt or question these doctrines, rather than to give a clear cut system of his own.[43] Consequently we cannot hope to find in this treatise a well established doctrine proper to the author, but rather only so much as will be sufficient to suit his purpose, that is, a manifestation of the insufficiency of evidence for the position of Aristotle. For this reason the prologues to the *Exigit Ordo* are the most important part of the treatise. Many of the conclusions which he advances as dialectically probable, he declares to be simply false.[44]

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[36] *Pro Dominica III post Pentecosten Sermo*, PL 183, 331-2; here St. Bernard speaks of the versutiae Aristotelis.

[37] Sed ecce daemonibus imperat quem philosophorum studia non exornant, *De Sancta Simplicitate*, ch. 5, PL 145, 699B.

[38] The author of the Imitation devotes Book III, ch. 43 to the vanity of human learning.

[39] Pro Deo rogo ut nullum ad malum ista moveant; nam etsi appareant probabiliora longe mihi videtur positis ab Aristotele; tamen sicut multo tempore visa sunt esse probabilia dicta Aristotelis quorum probabilitas nunc forsan diminuetur, sic veniet unus qui tollet probabilitatem ab istis. Adhaereamus quoque Legi Christi et credamus quod numquam contingit repraemiatio bonorum neque punitio malorum nisi per illum modum qui est expressus in illa Lege Sacra (p. 187); cf. also note 8 above. The text just quoted is used to exemplify Nicholas' resort to the 'vulpine subterfuge;' cf. *Chart. U.P.* II, p. 582; also G. M. Moser, 'Drei Zweifler am Kausalprinzip im XIV Jahrhundert,' *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Spekulative Theologie*, XXVII (1912), 303. However as Nicholas never intended to assert his opinions as more than probable, this can hardly be considered as the vulpine subterfuge. I would be inclined to interpret it as a form of ridicule of those who were actually holding that the opinions of Aristotle were the best reason could do, although in fact his conclusions were contrary to Faith.

[40] Protestor quod nec in isto tractatu nec in aliis aliquid volo dicere quod sit contra articulos fidei vel contra determinationem ecclesiae vel contra articulos quorum oppositi condemnati sunt Parisius etc.; sed solum volo inquirere circumscripta omni lege positiva qualis certitudo possit haberi de rebus et an processus Aristotelis fuerint demonstrativi (p. 182).

[41] Ve michi ego Nicholaus de Ultricuria Virdunensis diocoesis infra scripta vel dicta licet nullum eorum asseruerim animo pertinaci, si aliquid dixi minus bene seu scripsi, paratus sum et semper fui sicut et publice ubi oportuit protestatus sum et potissime hiis ad quos pertinet ea revocare ad mandatum beatissimi patris et domini nostri Clementis summi Pontificis, *Chart. U.P.*, II, p. 576. There is no evidence that these words were part of a formula or put into his mouth, therefore it seems safe to take them at their face value.

[42] Cf. note 40.

[43] Itaque proposui inter cetera contra sic deceptos aliquas conclusiones quas certum fuisse de intellectu Aristotelis et quas in dubium non revocant ostendere ab eis nullo modo fore scitas. In cujusmodi processu erant quam plurimae conclusiones super quibus non determinando sed dubitando inquiretur (p. 198). For determinando cf. Glorieux, *La Lit. Quodl.* II, p. 31.

The conclusions or teachings of Aristotle which Nicholas singles out for scrutiny are: (1) generation and corruption,—to which he will oppose the principle that all things are eternal; (2) the infinite divisibility of the continuum, —Nicholas will try to demonstrate that a continuum is composed of indivisibles, atoms or points; (3) the non-existence of the vacuum,—Nicholas will prove both the necessity and possibility of the existence of a void; (4) the distinction between material substance and quantity,—our author will claim indistinction; (5) the proofs of Aristotle against Protagoras'[45] contention that every thing which was apparent existed and if apparently true was true Nicholas answers point by point; (6) the averroist doctrine of the unity of the intellect he rejects as untenable. The above problems present occasions for the discussion of corollaries and necessitate further proof of details involved in the establishment of his main[46] thesis, the eternity of things.

We are fortunate that Nicholas has given an outline of his involved method of procedure.[47] The eternity of things based on atomism is the example he takes to show us his method at work. First of all he lays down a general rule which will, if accepted, serve as a demonstration that things are eternal. The principle is this: A perfect whole endowed with every perfection and excluding every imperfection should have the component parts of that whole, in as far as it is possible, possessed of the greatest possible perfection.[48] This postulate seems to stem from the principle of plenitude.[49] Against this general assumption there are objections. According to Averroes, the species, not individuals, contributes to the perfection of the universe.[50] Therefore it might be concluded that since individuals do not contribute to the perfection of the universe, it matters little whether they are eternal or generable and corruptible; therefore it can be concluded that it is not necessary that a perfect whole have its parts perfect; therefore the postulate as enuntiated is not true. The next step in the method is to answer the objection. The method to which we are most accustomed is first the stating of the objections, then the setting up of a definite doctrine from which the answers to the objections flow. However the procedure adopted by Nicholas suits his purpose much better, since he is not as interested in establishing positive doctrine as in disproving and answering objections to opinions which he considers only probable.

His first step in answering this objection is to question the truth of the statement of Averroes. It would seem that, according to the principles laid down by Aristotle, individuals do actually contribute to the perfection of the universe, especially when we consider his doctrine on finality.[51] If in nature as in art the details are made to harmonize with the whole, so also must individual things in the universe be considered as belonging to the good order which prevails therein. Again according to authentic Aristotelian doctrine every being in the universe exists for another, consequently the perfection of any one individual redounds to the perfection of the whole, of which that individual is a part. Likewise according to Aristotle nature does nothing in vain; but individuals do exist; therefore they cannot be said to make no contribution to the perfection of the universe. Moreover Aristotle, according to one interpretation at least, taught the eternity of the world;[52] now if the world is eternal, so should its parts be eternal, and individuals certainly are part of the world. Consequently from the very principles of Aristotle himself it can be deduced that the eternity of all things can be held. All the steps of his answer to the objection, he says, are commonly accepted, but he will use them as probable only, not as certain. Again if we take two extreme positions: (1) never does anything exist; (2) every possible being always exists; midway between these two extremes is the mean that sometimes some things exist, sometimes they do not exist. From the first extreme it follows that, since *ens* and *bonum* are convertible terms, there would be a total defect of the good. If, as the mean allows, sometimes somethings exist, sometimes they do not, the universe cannot be continually perfect. Therefore there is one choice left, namely that every possible being always exists. This position satisfies the intellect; we would always feel pain, when things are said to pass into non-existence, if it were not for the fact that we have become accustomed to the idea of generation and corruption.[53]

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[44] Nunc autem secundum declarata supra haec conclusio est probabilis, licet secundum veritatem simpliciter et fidem Catholicam non sit vera, quod omnes res permanentes et successivae sunt aeternae, quare satis potest inferri quod omnes res sunt aeternae. Rationes adductas pro altera parte non oportet multum solvere quia concludunt super probabilitate (p. 225).

[45] Cf. *Meta.* III, ch. 5.

[46] Circa principaliter intentam conclusionem quae est de aeternitate rerum (p. 247); cf. also, pp. 186-7-8, 191, 244 and below note 69.

[47] Ergo ut res reducatur ad medium satis volo ostendere quis sit verus modus occulta inquirendi (p. 185).

[48] Declaratur circa rationem quamdam suprafactam qua dicitur: omne totum perfectum etc., quod distinctio de universali et particulari ibi factam in quadam solutione contra hoc adducta non sufficit, ut diceretur quod particularia non sunt de perfectione universi; declaratur insufficientia rationis ex declaratione principiorum supra quae erigebatur ratio (p. 185); cf. pp. 188 and 202.

[49] Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 30a ff. and 40a ff.; Aristotle *Meta.* XI, 10, St. Thos, *S. Theol.* I, 25, 6; also A. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1936), pp. 67ff.; A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Greeks* (Marquette Univ. Press, 1939), pp. 21 ff., which is a reply to Lovejoy.

[50] Quia igitur entia sunt plura uno individuo propter diminutionem sui esse, quoniam intentio fuit in hoc ut remanerent in specie aeterna, cum impossibile fuerit numero . . . I *de Coelo* tx. c. 98; cf, also II *de Gen. et Corr.* tx. c. 59, II *de Anima* tx. c. 34. St. Thos. *Contra Gen.* III, 75 *ca. fin.*

Still another phase of his technique is to prove that Aristotle taught doctrines which were undoubtedly condemned in 1277 and as a consequence contrary to the teaching of the Church. For example Aristotle claimed that in a dead man there was neither good nor evil;[54] this theory was, in addition to being condemned in 1277, contrary to the belief in heaven and hell.

The next step is to show that, if the eternity of all things be accepted as probable, all these difficulties will disappear. The eternity of things fits in better with the concept of the good, and is therefore preferable to the notion of generation and corruption. Everything which does not imply a contradiction is possible;[55] when it is objected that the existence of corruptible things entails no contradiction, therefore they are possible, he answers that there is a contradiction contained in the notion of corruption, once we admit that the universe is always equally perfect.[56]

Another argument for eternity is taken from Averroes,[57] according to whom no truth could remain forever hidden from the human intellect. But if things are not eternal, how are we ever going to know why a thing endures only so long and no longer.[58] If we grant eternity, this question cannot even be asked. Again if we pass into non-existence when we die, how can we be expected to give up our life for the common good? Nicholas here seems to indicate that there are no philosophical proofs for immortality. A *sure* answer to this last question can be found in the Gospel, or a *probable* one, if we accept the opinion that all things are eternal.

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[51] Cf. II *Phys.* chs. 5-8, especially for what follows.

[52] Cf. St. Thos in I *de Coelo* lect. 22; Siger of Brabant, *De Aeternitate Mundi* (ed. W. J. Dwyer, Louvain, 1937), pp. 26 and 42; also M. Gierens, *Controversia de Aeternitate Mundi* (Textus et Documenta Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Series Philosophica VI ,Rome, 1933); herein are collected the texts on the problem of the eternity of the world from Plato to Suarez.

[53] Cf. pp. 185-6.

[54] Unde ipsemet videtur intendere in *Ethicis* (1100 a 11) quod mortuis neque bonum neque malum inest (p. 187); Nunc autem occurrunt duo modi dicendi (re. eternity) unus ut diceretur quod transirent ad non esse et postea resurgerent, et licet iste modus esset verius simpliciter, tamen oppositum dicitur fuisse de intentione Aristotelis. Dicit enim in 5 *Phys.* (228a 7 ff.) illa quorum substantia deperit non redeunt eadem numero (p. 191). This position was condemned in 1277; Quod homo post mortem amittit omne bonum, *Chart. U.P.* I, p. 554 art. 15 and 17.

[55] L. Baudry, *Le Tractutus de Principiis Theologiae attribué à G. d'Occam*, p. 45; cf. above note 26

[56] Cf. p. 188.

[57] Et signum ejus est quod habemus desiderium ad sciendam veritatem quoniam si comprehensio esset impossibilis, tunc desiderium esset otiosum et concessum est ab omnibus quod nulla res est otiosa in fundamento naturae et creaturae, II *Meta.* tx. c. 1.

Nicholas bases his proofs for the eternity of things on a doctrine of atomism. So far he accepted it as a fact, but since Aristotle had already disproved the atomism of the ancients, objections could be raised against such a position and these objections he seeks to forestall. Corruption is, according to Nicholas, only a dispersal of the atoms which constitute a thing. There are those who will not accept such a doctrine since it is not possible to show these atoms actually in the process of dispersing. This objection could come from one of two sources, either from those that maintain that nothing is in the intellect which was not previously in the senses, or more probably from the empiricists of Nicholas' own day who refused to accept anything that was not observable by the senses.[59] The objection is absurd, says Nicholas, since even those who raise it will admit that the senses can deceive us. Moreover studying observable phenomena is not the only means of arriving at truth.[60] The remainder of the second part of the first prologue follows the same plan, namely the multiplication of Aristotelian principles opposed to the eternity of things and their refutation one by one; it is the method of the *questiones quodlibetales*.

To summarize: He starts with the concept of the good, which he declares to be fundamental to his system;[61] next he proposes a theory which he will defend as probable, just as probable, if not more so than that of Aristotle; he does not claim this theory to be true for two reasons: (1) the dogmas of Faith and Revelation are the only sure norms of truth and real certitude; (2) there is no need to go beyond pure probability in order to find an adequate substitute for the Aristotelian doctrines. He raises and answers objections by proving the objector's position, if not untenable, at least less probable than his own, either because it is contrary to the Faith or because it presents difficulties altogether impossible of solution, which difficulties either do not arise if one accepts the eternity of things, or at least they can easily be solved.

If at times we find Nicholas stressing empiricism, at another time Revelation, at still another rational demonstration, we are not justified in accusing him of inconsistency. His intention is to examine the conclusions of Aristotle and to subject them to a rigorous test from all possible angles. He has chosen a very fundamental doctrine of Aristotle to attack, one from which many of his conclusions follow, namely that of generation and corruption, and which as a consequence offers many opportunities for refuting the doctrine of Aristotle in general. The arguments used to refute the peripatetic doctrine, because he intends to refute rather than to build, need not be drawn from any definite system of philosophy; consequently we need not be surprised if we find him using the principles of Ockham, Plato, Averroes or even of Aristotle himself against Aristotelianism. What could suit his purpose better than to manifest contradictions latent in the works of Aristotle? Since he seeks only probability the manner of argumentation set forth in the *Topics* is sufficient.

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[58] This is an argument from Algazel, cf. *Averroi Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis*, disp. I, (Venetiis Apud Juntas, 1573) IX, 15r.

[59] Plus certaines que toutes les doctrines philosophiques sont les verités que l'observation et l'expérience nous révèlent; folie donc de leur préférer un physique qu'elles contredisent, cf. Pierre Duhem, *Le Système du Monde*, IV, p. 94.

[60] Cf. p. 189.

[61] Nunc contra aliqua fundamenta supradictorum arguitur; fundamentum erat conceptus boni. Nunc videtur quod ex ipso non possit certitudinaliter argui in rebus quia homines interdum judicant falsa esse vera, et ita est actus individui oblitus, et ita melius videretur ipsum non esse. Dico et licet sit malus vel imperfectus secundum quid, tamen simpliciter melius est ipsum esse quam non esse (p. 196).

If Nicholas of Autrecourt admits only dialectical probability to the system of Aristotle and claims no more for his own, if we may call his own a system, what, may we ask, are his requirements for certitude? Little certitude can be had from things through the natural appearances, and what little certitude can be had, would be had quickly if men would turn to things rather than to the sayings of Aristotle and his Commentator Averroes.[62] For a real demonstration it is required that we proceed from things which are *per se nota* from the terms, from principles to which the intellect naturally gives assent, and from those things which we experience in us, eg. sorrow and joy.[63] In this he is practically quoting William of Ockham.[64] Another source of *philosophical* certitude is the testimony of the senses, a principle which he had already enuntiated in disputations at the Sorbonne[65] and which he often reiterates in the *Satis Exigit Ordo.*[66]

By these requirements he will test the principles of Aristotle throughout the treatise. He feels himself called upon to set aright those in error, especially those who have given too much credence to Aristotle.[67] He promises to avoid certain egregious errors such as depending on blameworthy authorities, being unduly influenced by custom and presuming too much of his own abilities. In this apology he seems to have in mind Roger Bacon.[68]

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[62] Redeundo unde sermo primus cum sic vidi quod de rebus per apparentia naturalia quasi nulla certitudo potest metiri et quod brevi tempore illud quod potest haberi habebitur si homines sic immediate intellectum suum convertant ad res sicut fecerunt ad intellectum hominum Aristotelis et Commentatoris Averrois (p. 181).

[63] Cf. above note 25.

[64] Et vocantur principia prima quae subdividi possunt quia quaedam principia prima sunt per se nota quibus scilicet intellectus statim assentit ipsis terminis apprehensis, ita quod, si sciatur quod significant termini, statim sciuntur. Quaedam autem principia prima non sunt per se nota, sed tamen per experientiam sunt nota . . . *S. Totius Log.* III, 2, 4 (Paris, 1488), fol. 75v. Ad quintum dubium dico quod notitia intuitiva pro statu isto non est respectu omnium intelligibilium etiam aequaliter praesentium intellectui quia est respectu actuum et non respectu habituum. Quod autem ita sit, scimus per experientiam, quia quilibet experitur se diligere et delectari, non sic autem se inclinari ad actus per habitum, quia tantum inclinari posset potentia per deum agentem sicut per habitum inclinantem. Et ergo illa inclinatione quam quilibet experitur in se non potest evidentur cognosci notitia intuitiva habitus inclinans, sed potest tantum cognosci illo modo quo potest cognosci aliquid per rationem et discursum, *Prol. in I Sent.* 1 XX.

[65] Et ideo ad evitandum tales absurditates sustinui in Aula Sorbone in disputationibus quod sum certus evidenter de obiectis quinque sensuum et de actibus meis, Lappe p. 6*.

[66] Sed cum quaeritur: est ista aqua calida? statim recurrunt homines ad actum tactus: cum quaeritur estne hic paries albus? recurritur ad actum visus. Et licet apud quosdam juvenes medium quod magis videretur sufficere esset: quia nigredo inest; ergo albedo non; tamen istud non potest mediare primo apud intellectum quia quod intellectus dicat: adveniente nigredine tollitur albedo, hoc non est nisi quia vidit quod adveniente nigredine desinit apud sensum visus apparitio albedinis, et sic videtur quod illud medium debet dici illud in quod omnia alia tandem resolvuntur, et quod ipsum videtur sufficere (p. 199). Sed quaeres; quid intelligis per cognitionem claram et evidentem? Respondeo: vide qualis potest fieri hic ostensio. Si quaeras quid intelligis per colorem? respondebitur forsan: illud quod videtur; et si quaeras: quid intelligis per videre? istud quid nominis ostenderetur ignoranti per apparitionem oculorum ejus, vel sibi dicendo quod defigeret aspectum suum ad aliquid vel respiceret me defigentem: ecce! sibi dicerem: hoc appello videre; unde meliori modo non posset sibi ostendi (p. 235).

[67] Cf. pp. 182 and 3. He feels that he has been chosen from amongst men to enlighten others. This recalls the definition of the philosopher by Aristotle I *Meta.* 1.

[68] Fragilis et indignae auctoritatis exemplum, consuetudinis diurnitas vulgi sensus imperiti, propriae ignorantiae occultatio cum ostentatione sapientiae apparentis, *Opus Majus*, part 1, ed. J. H. Bridges III (London, 1900), p. 2.

B. The Eternity of Things

In the second part of the first prologue Nicholas has already indicated the form which his refutation of the doctrine of generation and corruption, advocated by Aristotle, would take. It is not an invention of the *Satis Exigit Ordo*, but had already been proclaimed by the author in the rue Fouarre;[69] although it is true that he claimed only the impossibility of disproving eternity, yet for his present purpose that will suffice, since if it cannot be disproved, and at the same time probable arguments can be advanced in its favor, it is at least a defensible opinion. This doctrine will be the vantage point from which he will launch his attack against Aristotle.

Faithful to his plan he first of all adopts eternity and then proceeds to refute the objections made in the name of generation and corruption. This can be done in two ways, either to show that the contrary is true, or to prove that the arguments used to demonstrate the existence of generation and corruption are not cogent. Perhaps it is impossible to prove eternity, but it certainly is possible to show that the proofs for generation and corruption are invalid. To raise as an objection to eternity, that we did see something and now we can no longer see it is not a valid argument; all we are entitled to say is just that, with no right whatsoever to conclude therefrom, that it no longer exists. Its passage to non-existence is not grasped from the terms, neither is it something we experience. Consequently all we can say is, that formerly we actually perceived something and were aware of that perception, but now we no longer perceive it. To conclude that, since we no longer perceive it, therefore it no longer exists, lacks the necessity required for demonstration, because the 'therefore it no longer exists' can be false since a thing can exist without our seeing it, (and according to Nicholas' theory actually is false). To further prove that non-evidence to the senses does not prove non-existence, Nicholas advances three arguments: (1) Things are divisible into particles so small, that once these particles, which compose a thing disperse, they no longer exercise any influence on the senses. Who can say then that these particles, although they cannot be seen, no longer exist? (2) With this argument he links up the problem of the *maximum quod non* and the *minimum quod non* which was much discussed in the *via moderna*.[70] (Nicholas was well aware of this question and used it[71]). Hence it cannot be concluded that, because the thing no longer exercises any influence on the senses, it no longer exists (3) Let us suppose that a white object has turned black; because of this fact we are in no way justified in assuming that the white no longer exists, since it can appear elsewhere. If it is objected that the same thing cannot be in two places at once, he replies that to all appearances it can, and we are limited to appearances. If you place an object in a room and surround that object by mirrors, wherever you look you will see the appearance of the object. However he quickly adds that this argument is a less probable argument. The first one based on atomism he considers as the more probable. The whole universe is composed of atoms, whose local motion explains generation, corruption and change. The congregation of the atoms constitutes generation, their dispersal and separation corruption; alteration or change is caused by a local motion of the atoms which only partially affects the supposit and does not proceed according to its natural operation. I wish to stress the second argument used above, namely the fact of being able to see the same thing from mirrors in different places at the same time. It illustrates two things, first the length to which he will stretch the notion of appearances, and secondly, the emphasis he places on logical demonstration in establishing his probabilism regardless of whether it has a metaphysical or physical basis.

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[69] Item dixi in Vico Straminum quod non potest evidenter ostendi quin quaelibet res sit eterna, *Chart. U.P.* p. 578, art. 26. He intimates that the idea of eternity had not always appeared to him as an argument against Aristotle: Et sic esto quod ponerem generationem et corruptionem in rebus ut communiter, non tamen ponerem materiam primum, et antequam mihi occurrisset conclusio de aeternitate rerum sic dicebam (p. 193).

[70] Et primo notande sunt significationes terminorum. Ut maximum significat sic, scilicet tantum et non maius; et minimum, aliquantum et non minus. Et maximum quod non, id est non tantum sed omne maius, et minimum quod non, id est non tantum sed omne minus, cf. L. Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, III (Columbia Univ. Press, 1934), p. 576 note 43. For a complete discussion of the problem in its historical setting cf. Pierre Duhem, *Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci*, II (Paris, 1909), pp. 24 ff.

[71] Prima conclusio: non est dare minimum visibile quod possit a visu videri, nec maximum visibile quod possit a visu videri. Patet quaestio ad primum membrum quia non est dare ita parvum quod possit videri quin minus eo possit videri sive illud minus sit toti inexistens sive sit per se existens. De minimo inexistenti patet quia, si videtur aliquid visibile, ejus aliqua pars videtur et ita minus visibili; post videtur de minimo per se existenti; hoc idem probatur; nam aliter sequeretur quod esset dare ultimum instans rei permanentis in esse quod post ipsam non esset nec aliquid ejus (p. 268).

Nicholas' return to atomism can have two explanations: first of all, since Aristotle had written long chapters against the ancient atomists, he could find a ready made system to place in opposition to that of the Stagirite; our author's position differs little from that of Democritus and Leucippus.[72] A second reason for adopting atomism is that it fits in so well with an anti-philosophical attitude of mind. If the universe is composed of atoms between which there is no necessary connection, then the world must depend directly on God. It was for this reason that it had been adopted by the Arabian theologians.[73] It was a current doctrine at Paris in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and St. Thomas takes pains to refute it at length.[74] By such a position causality is relegated to the status of an inductive relation rather than analytical. No science can result from such a system and probabilism is bound to result. It was no accident that Nicholas chose atomism as the foundation for his doctrine of the eternity of things.

To the system of generation and corruption then Nicholas will oppose his hypothesis of the local motion of eternal atoms.[75] Even intellection will be explained by the local motion of atoms.[76] Nicholas claims for himself eternity in as much as the atoms which compose his present being will sometime be dispersed, again to be reassembled elsewhere at another time and so *ad infinitum*.[77] Nicholas in no way believes this speculation, since the Faith, his norm of truth teaches otherwise.[78]

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[72] For a collection of the texts from Aristotle on atomism cf. L. Mabilleau, *Histoire de la Philosophie Atomistique*, (Paris, 1895), pp. 168ff. Cf. also K. Lasswitz, *Geschichte d. Atomistik vom M.A. bis Newton* II (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 256-259 wherein is contained a brief account of the atomism of Nicholas of Autrecourt.

[73] Cf. Moses Maimonides, *Guide des Egarés*, tr. S. Munk, I (Paris, 1866), pp. 375ff. also T. J. Boer, *Geschichte d. Philosophie in Islam*, (Stuttgart, 1901), pp. 55ff.

[74] Cf. *Contra Gentes*, I, 87; II, 24: III, 65-69 and 97.

[75] Et secundum hoc quando quaeritur utrum omnes res sint aeternae, diceretur quod 'eas esse aeternas' posset intelligi dupliciter utpote in rebus quae dicuntur generabiles et corruptibiles quod haberent unam productionem quae transiret in praeteritum et ipsa res duraret semper postea; et sic non est verum. Et ita intellexit Aristoteles quod aliquae res sic sunt corruptibiles. Item quod sua existentia semper duraret in eodem loco vel subjecto, et sic non est verum de rebus generabilibus et corruptibilibus, vel quod continue producerentur sive in hoc loco sive in alio, sive in hoc subjecto sive in alio, et sic est verum quod omnes res sunt aeternae (p. 248); cf. also (pp. 200-1).

[76] Possumus tamen dicere quod potest sustineri probabiliter et est probabile quod actus animae nostrae sunt aeternae . . . omne totum perfectum requirit suas partes esse sicut suo modo in istis materialibus in quibus nihil est novum; est tamen ista res aliquando praesens alicui cui prius non erat praesens per motum localem; sic ibi scilicet in anima nostra per motum spiritualem. Et redditur ista res intelligibilis cum considerantur aliqua circa sensus quae confitentur adversarii, scilicet quod species multiplicant se usque ad organum per totum medium (p. 205).

C. *Composition of the Continuum*

The second point of doctrine which is indubitably that of Aristotle and which Nicholas will attempt to refute is that of the infinite divisibility of the continuum. His approach is characteristic. Opinions contrary to that of Aristotle had been taught both by the ancients as well as contemporary philosophers. Thomas Bradwardine (d. 1349) in his *Tractatus de Continuo* lists five opinions which were held concerning the composition of the continuum.[79] From amongst these Nicholas chooses the one which is contrary to that of Aristotle and at the same time consonant with his system of atomism, namely that a continuum is composed of indivisibles, points or atoms. The proofs set forth by Aristotle for his own position are as follows:[80] Suppose we have a line composed of three atoms over which two moveables are to pass, of which one travels twice as quickly as the other. Now when the faster has finished its course, the other one should be half way along its route; therefore it should be half way through the second atom and therefore the atom, posited as indivisible, must in reality be divisible. To reply to this reasoning Nicholas adopts a theory of motion wherein he envisages it as happening by leaps as it were.[81] The moving object goes from one atom to another instantaneously, that is it travels from one atom to another in an instant; when it reaches the second atom it rests there; it is this period of rest which determines the rate of speed of the moving object; the longer it rests the more slowly it travels.

Another of Aristotle's proofs is that, if a continuum were composed of atoms, these atoms much touch each other, otherwise there could never be a continuum. There are two ways of touching each other, either part of one touching part of the other, or the whole of one touching the whole of the other. In the latter case, since the two atoms would completely coincide, there could never be extension. If part of one touches part of the other, they must be divisible. Nicholas answers this argument by saying that it holds only when a point is a body; now the point is not a body, but rather possessed of position and at the same time occupies that position "circumscriptively", hence Aristotle's reasoning is not valid.[82] Nicholas makes no endeavour to explain how an indivisible point can be "circumscriptively" in a place.

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[77] Et si quaeras a me juxta illum *errorem* numquid semper fuerim, dico quod dicendum est consequenter me fuisse intelligendo ut sequitur: quando lapides sunt adunati, tunc dicitur acervus; si separentur, amplius non dicitur acervus, tamen omnis vera entitas quae prius erat est nunc, et quando inter has res est negatio medii secundum locum dicuntur sic, puta acervus (p. 225).

[78] Ista sunt sic dicta secundum apparentia naturalia quibus nunc participamus; scio vero quod *veritas est* et fides Catholica hoc tenet quod non omnes res sunt aeternae nec huic rei videor contradicere quia solum dico quod ista conclusio secundum apparentia naturalia quibus nunc participamus est probabilior opposita (p. 204). This doctrine seems to agree with that of St. Thos. who held that we experience daily the difficulty of grasping things clearly; cf. *Contra Gentes*, I, 3.

[79] Pro intellectu hujus conclusionis est sciendum quod circa compositionem continui sunt 5 opiniones famosae inter veteros philosophos et modernos; ponunt enim quidam ut *Aristoteles, Averroes* et plurimi modernorum continuum non componi ex atomis sed ex partibus divisibilibus sine fine; alii autem dicunt ipsum componi ex indivisibilibus dupliciter variantes quum Democritus ponit continuum componi ex corporibus indivisibilibus: alii autem ex punctis et hii dupliciter quia Pythagoras primus huius sectae et Plato et Waltherus modernus ponunt ipsum componi ex finitis indivisibilibus; alii autem ex infinitis et sunt bipartiti quia quidam eorum ut Henricus modernus dicit ipsum componi ex infinitis indivisibilibus in medietate conjunctis; alii autem ut *Lyncolniensis* ex infinitis ad invicem mediatis, cf. Maximilian Curtze, 'Tractatus de Continuo Bratwardini' *Zeitschrift für Mathematik und Physik* XIII, Supplement (1868), 88ff. I have taken the liberty to correct the italicized words from the text of Curtze as all were evident.

[80] Cf. VI *Phys* ch. 1 ff.

[81] Cf. pp. 206 ff.

Still another argument to prove the infinite divisibility of a continuum is taken from the experiment in which a small wheel, composed of say four indivisibles, is placed inside a larger wheel, composed of a hundred indivisibles; let both the wheels move together. The question is then asked: When the larger of the wheels has moved through the distance of one indivisible, through how much has the small one passed? The answer is that it must be less than an indivisible, therefore the indivisible must in reality be divisible. To refute this proof Nicholas returns to his theory that motion takes place by instantaneous leaps. From the four points of the small wheel let four straight lines be drawn perpendicularly to the large wheel; only four such lines can be drawn. It is not till the larger wheel has passed over the complete distance between the points where the straight lines meet it that that small wheel can be said to have moved, and then it moves the distance of one indivisible and so on until both complete a revolution.

Another argument against the composition of a continuum from indivisibles is that a line of an unequal number of points could never be divided exactly into half without dividing one of the points. To this Nicholas replies that since a point is so small, there would be no appreciable difference in the length of lines, one of which is composed of one point less than another; therefore a line composed of five points can be divided three and two and for all practical purposes this will be a division into halves.

Aristotle's reasons having been refuted, it now remains for Nicholas to give some positive justification for his own opinion.[83] Since he has given enough proofs to make his own position at least probable and since there are some real difficulties militating against the acceptance of the infinite divisibility of the continuum, therefore it should be held that the continuum is actually composed of indivisibles. The arguments advanced in favor of the composition of the continuum of indivisibles can be summed up as follows: By division we mean that something exists outside another; now infinite division means that something exists outside another to infinity; therefore when there is an infinite number of parts, there could never be a continuum which would not be infinite in extension; which is manifestly false. Therefore one of the premises must be false, and since only the one premise is questionable, namely that there is infinite division in a continuum, it must be held that there cannot be infinite division. If it is objected that this division is in potency only, the answer will be that once we have affirmed an entitative actuality of anything, we are not permitted to deny that affirmation unless there be a new concept as a basis for the denial. Now we must affirm an entitative actuality to the continuum, and so also to its parts. If this is done, it must be admitted that it will be impossible to deny infinite extension once infinite division is assumed.

Again every continuum is possessed of a certain magnitude and no matter how small a portion we subtract from that magnitude it reduces it by just that much; so also if we begin with a certain magnitude, infinitesimal as it may be, if we add to that magnitude even the smallest portion possible and keep adding to it to infinity, it is impossible that the result will not be an infinite extension.

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[82] Ex quibusdam aliis fit ratio quaedam; ex non quanto fieret quantum si ex punctis continuum componeretur, quia continuum quantum est; punctum autem non est quantum. Aut ergo per quantum intelligis ipsum compositum seu ipsam extensionem, et sic punctum non est quantum; tamen secundum istum intellectum: ex non quanto potest fieri quantum, quemadmodum ex non compositis compositum; vel per quantum intelligis habens propriam situalitatem et esse circumscriptive, et sic concedo quod punctum potest dici quantum et tunc non poteris secundum hoc concludere ex non quanto fieri quantum (p. 208): Cf. Pierre Duhem, *Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci*, III, 33. Situalitas seems to embrace the notions of both situs and locus.

[83] Nunc autem inducere sequitur aliquas pro intenta conclusione rationes. Primo quidem magis dubitando, secundo magis dando intellectum quaesiti (p. 209).

Again if we place a sphere on a flat surface, the sphere will touch the surface at a point. Let this sphere move over the plane surface. Since they touch at a point, the sphere must pass over a distance equal to the point of contact before it passes over a greater distance; because it is impossible that it pass over a distance less than the point of contact, it must pass over the plane surface point by point; therefore the surface is composed of points. If it is objected that there can never be a body so spherical and a surface so flat that they contact at exactly a point,[84] the answer will be that the point is still there accidentally, and so must move, accidentally at least, over a distance equal to itself, therefore over a point; therefore the argument still holds.

As a conclusion Nicholas states that since he is interested only in probability, the above proofs will suffice; and so he will leave the complete proof to those who hold as true that a continuum is composed of indivisibles.[85]

Nevertheless for the sake of argument (*causa exercitii*) he will add a few more arguments to show the absurdity of the position of Aristotle. From these proofs he draws two conclusions which he admits to be extraordinary and uncommon.[86]

The first of the unusual conclusions is that a circle traced in the dust (or on a blackboard) is composed of a finite number of points; the second is that of this circle no matter how small a portion is taken there can always be a smaller one, yet this in no way means that actually there is no magnitude beyond which there can be nothing smaller.[87]

The general conclusion to this whole chapter is that the entirety of Book VI of the *Physics* of Aristotle is unacceptable.

D. The Vacuum

In order to explain motion, augmentation and change the ancients had found it necessary to posit the existence of the void; Aristotle not only denied the existence of the vacuum, but added that its position defeated the very purpose for which it was invented.[88] They had defined the vacuum as that in which there was no body but in which there could be one. As we would expect then Nicholas, in general following the ancients, although departing from them in many details, will attempt to prove the existence of a vacuum.[89] In this our author is at variance with most of his contemporaries.[90] Although reviving many of the arguments of the ancients, nevertheless he denies the existence of a separate preexisting vacuum, and allows only for vacuities between the atoms which make up any body. It is by the contraction and expansion of these vacuities that the fact of local motion, augmentation etc. can be explained.[91]

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[84] Cf. L. Baudry, *Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae*, p. 129; cf. also St. Thos *in* III *Meta. lect.* 7, (ed. Vives) XXIV, 433.

[85] Hujus rationis et consimilium, ut puta, illius de rota suprafactae et talium plenam solutionem relinquo quibusdam qui hanc tenent conclusionem de continuo quam posui ut probabilem, quoniam res quae dicuntur imaginationis minus bene veniunt ad spiritum meum quam res intellectus quae dicuntur majoris abstractionis (p. 212).

[86] The common opinions concerning the continuum are treated in K. Lasswitz, *op. cit.* I, 187ff.

[87] Si igitur vera sunt quae in dictis solutionibus dicta sunt, ponerentur duae conclusiones in problemate de compositione continui, videlicet quod continuum non componitur ex semper divisibilibus, et in hoc recederetur ab opinione communi; secundo quod continuum demonstrabile ad sensum vel imaginationem, ex punctis finitis non componitur et in hoc fieret recessus ab opinione omnium eorum qui posuerunt continuum esse compositum ex indivisibilibus. Et secundum ista verae sunt propositiones sicut quod qualibet magnitudine data seu demonstrata ad sensum vel imaginationem contingit dare minorem, saltem nihil videtur obstare, et tamen cum hoc verum erit dicere quod in re est aliqua magnitudo qua non est dare minorem (p. 213); cf. note 70. Evidently Nicholas is making the distinction between a continuum or line according to the mathematical and physical definitions.

[88] Cf. IV *Phys.*, chs. 6ff.

The first argument that Nicholas borrows from the ancients is that, unless the existence of a vacuum is taken for granted, it must be admitted that, when local motion occurs, either two bodies will be in the same place at the same time, or that, when one thing moves, everything else must move; for example, if the first car of a train is moved, all the other cars must likewise move.

Another argument of the ancients, which Nicholas uses, is that, since somethings actually do contract and expand, there must be voids between the parts which make up those things.

The objections to the existence of the vacuum raised by Aristotle,[92] and amplified by Averroes,[93] are next answered one by one. Aristotle had argued that in motion there must be a proportion between the speed and the resistance of medium; since in a vacuum this would not be possible, there could never be motion through a vacuum, as in it there would be no resistance. Therefore if there be motion in a vacuum, it must necessarily be instantaneous, which is impossible. Such reasoning has no force against Nicholas, since first of all there can be motion in an instant; secondly as he does not admit a separate preexisting vacuum, there can be resistance due to the difficulty of expansion and contraction of the vacuities between the atoms in the medium.[94] If it is objected that, however large the extent of the vacuum be, motion through it would still have to be in an instant, Nicholas replies that there is an essential quality of motion which can never be taken from it, namely that a moving object must pass over part of the space to be crossed before completing the passage, and since the speed of the moving object is determined by the amount of rest taken, it can happen that the rest is so short that several indivisibles together will in this case take on the character of a single indivisible. Therefore even if the motion is exceedingly fast, both because of the aforementioned essential quality of motion and the fact that a continuum is always composed of indivisibles, granting that these indivisibles are sometimes grouped so that they take on the character of one indivisible, it cannot be said that the motion through the vacuum is in an instant. Therefore Aristotle's argument against Nicholas is not valid.

Although the experiment with the water clock[95] induced the ancients to posit a separate preexisting vacuum, the arguments of Aristotle against them have no force against Nicholas, since they were destined against a system positing a separate preexisting vacuum, which he does not admit. However he quotes what he calls a subtle explanation of the fact that the water did not flow into the inverted clock, namely that the universe is so well ordered that every part of it is filled to its due measure which cannot be increased or decreased.[96]

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[89] Cf. pp. 218 ff. It is interesting to note that Crescas (d. 1410) was convinced of the necessity of positing a void. He like Nicholas revived the theories of the ancients. However I feel there is this difference, namely that Crescas was convinced his position was correct, whereas our author advanced it only as probable, cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Crescas Critique of Aristotle* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1929), pp. 141 ff and 391 ff.

[90] Cf. A. G. Little, *Commemorative Essays, Roger Bacon*, ch. 10, (Oxford, 1914), pp. 241 ff., art. Pierre Duhem, *L'Horreur du Vide;* also K. Lasswitz, *op. cit.* I, 201-8.

[91] Primo est videre quod ista ratio non est contra modum ponendi vacuum quo usus sum, nec Aristoteles voluit adducere; nam non ponimus vacuum separatum praeexistens per quod fieret motus sed inter partes corporis; et quando corpus localiter debet moveri, illae partes coeunt se et magis appropinquantur (p. 219).

[92] 213*b* ff.

[93] IV*Phys.* tx. c. 72 ff.

[94] Nicholas does not take into consideration the chief objection that Aristotle made to the position of the ancients and which he considered as rendering invalid their entire theory of the vacuum, namely that they had been led astray because they regarded things full of air as empty, only because they had not recognized the sense perceptibility of air and so did not know anything was there (IV *Phys.* ch. 6). However Nicholas does speak clearly of the relative densities of air and water, and does actually consider air to rarefy and condense like any other body (pp. 218 and 220).

[95] Cf. The Loeb Classical Library, *Aristotle, The Physics*, Vol. I, p. 330, note c: "Think of the water-clock as an open vessel with a small aperture at the bottom. When it is empty invert it, place your finger over the aperture and force the inverted vessel into water. Unless you remove your finger the water will not rise into it, thus showing that it is not really empty, but filled with air which keeps out the water." Cf. also Averroes IV *Phys.* tx. c. 51.

Another argument of the ancients was that a vessel full of ashes would hold as much water as if there were no ashes in the vessel; therefore there must be a vacuum. Averroes claimed that they were simply deceived.[97] Nicholas replies to this that Averroes was no respecter of the truth if he denied a fact so evident.[98] To the arguments of the ancients who claimed that a vacuum was necessary to explain augmentation Aristotle had replied that they were simply self contradictory. This, says Nicholas, is merely a statement and in no way a proof.

Augmentation, movement, expansion and contraction are all explained by our author as being due to the voids between the atoms.[99] No where does he expressly say whether he considers a vacuum to be a space filled only with air, as Aristotle contended was the case with the ancients, yet the inference is that he held it to be absolute.[100]

E. *Material Substance and Quantity*

Both Aristotle[101] and Averroes[102] had clearly held substance and quantity to be distinct. The peripatetic definition of quantity with which Nicholas was familiar is that quantity is something inhering in and distinct from substance.[103]

Nicholas denies the distinction and adopts the position of William of Ockham,[104] a position which had not been well received at the university of Paris.[105] By way of proof Nicholas resorts to the principle of economy.[106] To all appearances material substance and quantity are one and the same thing, and since there must not be a multiplication of entities without necessity, and likewise because probable arguments can be set forth to prove that they are identical, they should not be held to be distinct. Consequently the burden of proof rests with those who claim the distinction. Again those things which appear to be in total agreement and identical should be considered as one, unless there are cogent reasons for believing otherwise. Any good Aristotelian should accept this argument since it is the same one used by Aristotle to prove that *ens* and *unum* are convertible terms; when one is generated, so also the other; when one moves, likewise the other.[107] This same reasoning should also prove that a subject and its proper passion are not distinct, for example fire and heat, as also the different qualities generally attributed to the elements. For the same reason the qualification of two things as two cannot be distinct from the two things themselves.[108]

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[96] Cf. A. G. Little, *op. cit.* p. 256.

[97] Cf. IV *Phys.* tx. c. 56.

[98] Cf. p. 221.

[99] Videatur primo quid intellectus erit in augmentatione. Pone corpus aliquod compositum est ex indivisibilibus quattuor *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*; dico quod inter ista indivisibilia sunt vacuitates; perpone inter *a* et *b* per unum indivisibile; dico quod ad adventum rei convenientis quasi dilitabant se ita quod quodammodo elongabant se, puta *a b* per vacuitatem duorum indivisibilium, et ibi recipient intra se illud quod est conveniens suae naturae, et sic fiet augmentatio (p. 221).

[100] Et forsan erit super hoc conveniens responsio ut dicamus quod partes aliquae aeris quae erant quasi retro corpus, quod movebantur, aliqualiter dilitant se, ita quod minus coeuntes replent locum et hoc usque ad aliquam quantitatem, non tamen in infinitum (p. 220); cf. also note 99.

[101] Cf. IV *Meta.* ch. 13.

[102] Cf. VII *Meta.* tx. c. 8.

[103] Circa quaestionem de substantia materiali et quantitate eo modo quo dicitur: quantitas est una res inhaerens substantiae materiali distincta ab ipsa; quaerendum est utrum distinguantur ad invicem (p. 222).

[104] Dico ergo hic tenendo quod quantitas non dicit aliquam rem absolutam vel rem respectivam aliam a substantia et qualitate; dico tunc quod quantitas non est aliud nisi extensio rei habentis partes a quarum una ad aliam potest esse motus localis, ita quod sicut in secundo dictum est de duratione quod duratio nihil positivum dicit ultra rem durantem, sed est quaedam vox vel conceptus significans principaliter ipsam rem durantem et connotat successionem actualem vel potentialem ,ita quod significat rem coexistentem successioni actualiter vel quae coexisteret successioni, si esset; ita extensio vel quantitas non dicit aliquam rem absolutam vel respectivam ultra substantiam et qualitatem, sed est quaedam vox vel conceptus significans substantiam principaliter puta materiam vel formam vel qualitatem corporalem, IV *Sent.* 4F.

[105] Cum noviter ad intelligentiam doctorum hujus Universitatis venit quod aliqui asserebant ut probabile quod substantia materialis et quantitas non distinguentur realiter, a majoribus ipsorum audivi quod contra tales non erat dignum arguere quoniam principia negabant per se nota (p. 197).

[106] Et advertendum quod quia pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate sufficit tenentem identitatem scire respondere ad argumenta contraria conclusioni; unde et illi qui ponit distinctionem incumbit onus probandi (pp. 222-3).

As a corollary of the above conclusion Nicholas will deny any distinction between the object in motion and motion itself.[109] Although the term motion has many implications,[110] yet in the final analysis all we are entitled to say is, that in motion there is a moving object which at one time coincides with a certain terminus, from which the moving object begins its passage to another terminus, between which and itself there is an intervening space. Since space is composed of indivisibles as also time, the moving object passes from one indivisible to another in an instant and there rests for a certain duration, the length of which is determined by its speed. The only observation possible then is that the moving object at one time coincides with a terminus, at another coincides with another terminus and so on for all the termini or indivisibles through which the object has to pass before reaching the ultimate term of its motion. Hence at one time the object coincides with one terminus and later it no longer coincides with that terminus, but there is an intervening space between the two; finally the object and the last term of the motion coincide between which term and the moveable there was formerly an intervening space.[111] Consequently, since motion and the moving object to all appearances never are separated, we must conclude that they are identical. To separate the moving object and motion and at the same time admit that motion is continuous is to revive the argument of the ancients that when something is turning from non-white to white, there must be a time when that thing is neither white nor non-white.[112] This difficulty Aristotle never succeeded in solving[113] The inference is that Aristotle could not answer all the difficulties which his system involved, consequently we have no right to demand that Nicholas solve each and every detail of his exposition, especially since he did not have the temerity to demand more than probability for his own position.

Another argument to prove the distinction between motion and the object in motion is that an object which was at rest yesterday is in motion today; therefore yesterday's object could not be said to be motion as it was not in motion yesterday. Hence we must conclude a distinction between them. To answer this Nicholas says that the truth of a proposition of the present is measured by the truth of a proposition of the past. This principle is basically Aristotelian, yet seems to be interpreted according to the mind of Gregory of Rimini.[114] If it were ever true that the object moved and such a *complexum* could be formulated, then the proposition will remain true, even if the moving object should cease to exist. Now according to the doctrine of Aristotle, the truth of the present entitles us to speak of the past and the future. Therefore since the *complexum* is the object of knowledge, which *complexum* is the whole process of arriving at truth, once the *complexum* is true, then the truth remains no matter the condition of the moving object. Hence the objection has no force. It is not correct to speak of motion as fast or slow, but rather that the object moves quickly or slowly and the more quickly it moves, the more it happens that several indivisibles take on the character of a single indivisible.[115] In motion there can then be nothing new acquired, but only a change in the relative positions of the object moving and the term of the movement, by the disappearance of the intervening space.[116]

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[107] III *Meta.* ch. 2.

[108] Cf. L. Baudry, *Tract. de Principiis Theologiae*, p. 23; Secundum predicta ponit quod numerus non est alia res a numeratis quia Deus non potest facere hoc et hoc quin faciat duo et dualitatem, *ibid.* p. 105; cf. also Plotinos, VI *Enn.*, 1, 4; Arist. *Meta.* XII, 9.

[109] Nunc dico quod nomine motus non importatur aliquid omnino distinctum ex parte rei loco negatione medii et sic de aliis; nam per ista omnibus aliis realitatibus remotis poterit vere salvari quidquid apparet in rebus (p. 224).

[110] Nam ut dictum fuit hoc praedicatum movetur importat multas complexiones. Significat quod mobile se habet ad aliquid per negationem medii ad quod prius sic se habebat. Nunc de mobili quando dicimus ipsum quiescere non potest illud vere dici, et si potest dici, tamen secundum quod importat hoc praedicatum movetur non sic potest dici, scilicet et ipso sic se habente partes unius contradictionis non possunt verificari (p. 225).

[111] Nunc autem per hanc orationem: mobile movetur ad *b*, importatur primo et ultra connotat quamdam carentiam ipsius *b* et dicit quamdam habitudinem inter mobile et ipsum *b* quae oritur ex hoc quod mobile quod movetur indistinguitur aliquo modo ab ipso *b* per sublationem medii intercepti. Dico ergo quod mobile quod est in *a* quod debet pertransire spatium *b c d* non movetur ad *b* cum non sit in *b* negatio ipsius *b*, nec ante *b* quia tunc non movetur; et sic erit primum in motu, cujus oppositum videtur dicere Aristoteles in 6 *Phys.* Sed quando est in *c* movetur ad *d*; movetur dico per illa quae importat motus de quibus statim dixi quae concurrunt; nam ab aliquo indistinguitur localiter a quo prius non, et ipso sic se habente partes unius contradictionis non possunt verificari, praecipue si sit mobile velocissimum; et ad *c* potest quia ibi est carentia indistinctionis ab ipso *c* quam habebat post (p. 214).

[112] Cf. Aristotle, VI *Phys.* ch. 9 (240 a 20 ff.).

[113] Cf. p. 224.

Against Aristotle he maintains also that there is no distinction between the length of a substance and a long substance.[117] This same qualification is true of all the categories.[118] It is not at all true that they represent ten different things outside the mind; but because we never completely comprehend anything, it is possible to have ten different concepts of the same thing and consquently to make ten different predications.[119]

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[114] The principle from the *Perihermeneias* (18b 9 ff.) that "if a thing is now white it was true to say before that it will be white, so that it was always true to say of anything generated that it either is or will be, but if it was always true to say that it is or will be, it is impossible that it is not" can be applied to the moveable moves; this interpreted according to the mind of Gregory of Rimini guarantees the eternity and incorruptibility of the proposition necessary for logical correctness; "Un second argument en faveur de la deuxième conclusion précitée de Gregoire de Rimini s'énonce comme suit: si la relation qui unit Sortes et Platon est de telle nature que Sortes est le père de Platon, il est vrai de dire que Sortes a engendré Platon. Or si 'Sortes a engendré Platon' pris comme un tout, significativement, est considéré comme une entité, celle—ci est ou bien déité ou créature, ou bien une entité qui n'est ni déité ni créature, ni l'une et l'autre en même temps. Mais cette dernière hypothèse ne saurait être admise, car elle serait hérétique puisque le Symbole des Apôtres a précisé que Dieu est le Créateur de toutes les choses visibles et invisibles, et que par conséquent toute chose visible ou invisible qui n'est pas Dieu est faite par Dieu. La première proposition de l'alternative ne saurait davantage être retenue, car étant donné que la déité et tout ce qui est déité ont toujours été, il faudrait donc admettre que 'Sortes a engendré Platon' ait toujours été, et par conséquent ce complexe fût avant que Sortes et Platon fussent, ce qui reviendrait à dire que ce complexe eût été vrai s'il avait été vrai que Sortes ait engendré Platon. Gregoire répousse également les deuxième et troisième propositions de l'alternative précitée, car, dit il, si nous supposons qu' après que Sortes ait engendré Platon, l'un et l'autre et toutes les créatures existantes à ce moment viennent à cesser d‘être, la proposition 'Sortes a engendré Platon,' si elle était alors formulée, demeurait cependant vrai, H. Elie, *Le Complexe Significabile*, p. 33. Cf. *ibid.* (pp. 37 ff.) for the various influences of Gregory of Rimini on Nicholas of Autrecourt.

[115] Resolvamus ergo: motus est velox vel tardus, id est, mobile movetur velociter vel tarde, et illa propositio potest dici esse vera sine omni tali realitate, quae imaginatur inexistere tali rei. Per hoc enim quod aliquod mobile se distinguit ab aliquo termino sic quod pauciores partes contradictionis possunt verificari quam sunt illae quae possunt verificari in alio mobili indistinguente secundum locum ab illo termino, dicitur hoc mobile velocius moveri alio; et quanto pauciores possunt verificari, tanto movetur velocius (p. 226). Sicut aliquod indivisibile non venit ut ens formatum ad sensum vel imaginationem sic nec unum indivisibile sollitarie sumptum induit rationem pertransibilis, sed plura simul, et quanto mobile moveretur citius seu velocius, tanto plura erunt in ratione unius pertransibilis apud ipsum, et secundum hoc attenderetur velocitas et tarditas motus; quae omnia consideratione modica non egent (p. 213).

[116] Sensus primae propositionis qua dicitur: per motum acquiritur aliquid, debet esse: mobile quando movetur acquirit aliquid, et illud acquirere posset bene et male intelligi; nam si intelligas quod ponatur aliqua res nova in esse, falsa est; si intelligas aliquid pro quanto indistinguit se localiter per negationem medii intercepti, vera est (p. 226).

[117] Cf. *Cat.* ch. 6.

[118] Similiter accipiamus duo in coordinatione quantitatis quae dicuntur differre specifice, lineam et superficiem. Dico quod non oportet quod ista differunt realiter quia ut dictum est quantitas non distinguitur a substantia materiali et similiter nec species ejus, puta longitudo a substantia longa . . . (p. 227).

Are we to conclude then that material substance is quantity? To answer this question it is necessary to make a distinction. If the terms substance and quantity are signs for things outside the mind then it is true to say that substance is quantity; but if the terms are signs of concepts, then substance is not quantity. If the thing is conceived simply in itself and for itself, there is the concept of substance; but if conceived as having parts, it is the concept of quantity.[120]

F. The Apparent Exists and if Exisiting as True is True

In his discussion of the indistinction between material substance and quantity, the basic argument was that, since they appear indistinct, therefore they are indistinct. It remains then to prove that there is justification for believing the appearances. The disciples of Heraclitus as well as the followers of Democritus and Protagoras, primarily physicists, had maintained the truth of the apparent even to the point of admitting the necessity of predicating truth and falsity of the same thing. Against these Aristotle had stated that such a postion involved an absurdity.[121] Nicholas of Autrecourt reaffirms many of the positions of those early Naturalists, saying that Aristotle had neither solved their difficulties nor answered their proofs. Likewise since experimentation was assuming such importance in the fourteenth century, Nicholas felt he could find contemporary support from among the empiricists for his position. Consequently due to his fidelity to the postion of the ancients coupled with this rather crude empiricism he had a two-edged sword with which to attack. Again it is not a new invention, but the reassertion of an opinion already publicly proclaimed in the rue Fouarre.[122] He will hold as probable, and more probable than the position of Aristotle, that what appears exists and if appearing as true is true.[123] Unless we are to admit absolute scepticism, it must be granted that what appears exists, and if appearing as true is true. There can be an error of judgement, but never in the appearances.[124] For example some say that it is better to live in pleasures of the body than in the contemplation of truth. Again some will say that it is perfectly evident that there are ten categories, while others maintain that such a position is absurd. All are perfectly convinced of their beliefs and sure of the appearances, and actually that is the way the things do appear to them. The fact of disagreement lies in a defect of the intellect. Every good intellect is in conformity to a certain measure, which measure is the apparent.[125] In other words our intellect has as its source of truth the apparent, and if our intellect fulfills its function properly it will grasp and judge correctly phenomena. The fact that there are errors should not be surprising, since the intellect often gives assent to many things to which it should not. For example many agree that Rome is a great city, yet this is evident only to one, who actually is in Rome.[126] To the objection that sweet things sometimes taste bitter to a sick man, he replies that this happens because of little particles or atoms affixed to the tongue or the organ of taste of the sick man, which either interfere with the sensation of taste or which are actually what the man tastes.[127] There are those who would accept the truth of the maxim: "everything which appears as true is true," provided we make the qualification that the sense organ is healthy, that we are at a proper distance from the object and that the medium is properly disposed for sensation. Of these Nicholas asks two questions: How do we know these three qualifications are necessary? How do we know that, if present, they do suffice?[128] If these questions expect the answer, that we simply do not know, then we can see here a strong note of scepticism, which seems to be borne out by the fact that only the first intellect has full certitude.[129] To avoid such a position of scepticism, he reverts to the concept of the good, saying that just as the taste cannot rejoice in what is bitter, neither can the intellect find satisfaction in what is false.[130]

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[119] Si etiam ponimus aliquod ens esse hominem, ponimus implicite ipsum esse animal, et tunc intellectus abstrahit conceptum a conceptu donec deveniat ad conceptum simplicem; et sic abstrahendo invenit decem conceptus simplices qui includuntur in omnibus aliis, et ipsi et ea in quibus includuntur sunt medium respectu omnis inquisitionis scientificae; et istos duos conceptus primos vel res sic conceptas appellat decem praedicamenta; et si per decem praedicamenta vis aliud intelligere, puta decem res ex natura rei distinctas, negarem simpliciter. Nec sequitur: decem conceptus; ergo decem res quarum primo sunt isti conceptus; nam forsan verum est si haberemus conceptum perfectissimum de re, ille conceptus non compateretur aliquando conceptum ejusdem rei, ita quod tunc teneret argumentum: tot conceptus, ergo tot res. Nunc autem solum partialiter capimus res et ita nihil prohibet quin ejusdem rei habeamus plures conceptus (p. 226); cf. Wm. of Ockham: Intellectus autem noster pro statu isto nihil cognoscit clare intuitive et perfecte, et ideo non potest discernere hoc a quolibet alio, *Prol. in I Sent.* 1 UU.

[120] Res concipitur secundum se et ille est conceptus substantiae; concipitur ut habens partes et ille conceptus importatur per hunc terminum quantitas (p. 227); De substantia materiali et quantitate satis concedimus quod sunt diversa in esse objectivo . . . (p. 250).

[121] Cf. III *Meta.* chs. 4-6.

[122] Item dixi semel in Vico Straminum quod non potest evidenter ostendi quin omnia que apparent sint vera, *Chart. U.P.*, II, p. 578, art. 31.

[123] Dico igitur quod haec conclusio est probabilis quod omne illud, quod apparet proprie et ultimate, est, et quod apparet esse verum est verum. Pono istam conclusionem ut probabiliorem opposita, non ut veriorem (p. 228).

[124] Ex praedictis igitur videtur probabilis conclusio proposita ut licet actus judicandi et assentiendi stent cum falsitate, actus ultimate apparentiae non, et quare sicut de aliis esset una persuasio quia apparentia talis est *principium fundamentale omnis veritatis scitae a nobis*, et ita tolleretur certitudo si sic esset quod staret cum non esse; sed non sic in actu judicandi qui, etsi quando sit falsus, poterit judicium quodammodo rectificari per istum actum (p. 230); cf. above note 119; also (p. 228). Teneo ut supra quod quidquid apparet in pleno lumine est verum et quod hominibus in pleno lumine non possunt contraria apparere; nam alias oporteret arguentem recipere hoc pro medio: omne illud quod apparet mihi est verum, et non illud: omne quod apparet est verum (p. 234).

As a corollary of the above discussion Nicholas treats the problem of whether the same thing can be seen both clearly and obscurely. His answer is that never can the same thing be seen both clearly and obscurely.[131] If we take two whites one of which presents a clear vision, the other obscure, then by withdrawing further and further from the first, eventually our vision of it will coincide in clarity or obscurity with that of the second. Because time is a continuum, it is, according to Nicholas, composed of indivisibles or instants, hence each instant constitutes a new act of vision. But for whatever instant there exists in us the act of seeing an object, we see that object, and for whatever instant there does not exist in us the act of seeing the object, we do not see the object. Now because each instant constitutes a new act of vision, we never actually do see the same thing, but a new thing as it were; and so in the case of the white, it is no longer the same white, but one already grown darker. Hence the argument holds that never is there both a clear and an obscure vision of the same thing.[132] Although the clear white and the obscure one finally do actually coincide, this is because the obscure one is contained in the clear.[133] This same argument will hold for the other faculties of cognition. Each thing is knowable to the full extent of its knowability. There can never be therefore a clear and obscure knowledge of one thing. Radically our knowledge is equal to that of God, although differing in mode since God knows in a preeminent way, otherwise his knowledge would be cheapened (*vilesceret*). It is only this preeminent knowledge which begets real certitude.[134]

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[125] Semper intellectus bonus adaequatus est mensurae suae et ille inter homines est melioris intellectus qui melius scit omnes suos actus dicendi reducere in suam primam mensuram, scilicet in apparentia vel lumen inexistens (p. 233).

[126] Unde de multis judicat intellectus quod sic sunt et eis assentit; quae tamen non dicuntur proprie et potissime sibi apparere quia non sunt ultimate evidentia ut quod Roma est magna civitas, sed videnti qui esset in Roma esset evidens et omnino clarum (p. 228).

[127] Cf. pp. 230-1.

[128] Neque valeret ut supradictum est, si diceretur quod lumen plenum non habet rationem mensurae simpliciter, sed concurrentibus tribus, scilicet debita dispositione organi, medii et debita distantia objecti . . . (p. 231).

[129] Et forsan finaliter oporteret quod non habemus plenam certitudinem de rebus, immo solum eam habet intellectus primus qui est mensura omnium intellectuum (p. 232). Omnis actus dicendi formatus in pleno lumine, quantum lumen potest esse plenum apud hominem, est verus (p. 231). Et quod talis res quam cognitionem appellamus sit similitudo objecti, hoc nescimus per viam experientiae; non enim cum intuemus actum videndi albedinis apparet nobis quod sit albedo vel aliquid simile albedini. Amplius quaelibet similitudo videtur deficere a perfectione rei cujus est similitudo (p. 243); cf. also above notes 62 and 119.

[130] Et apparet propter quid hujus conclusionis quia sicut gustus non est natus maxime delectari in amaro, sic nec intellectus in falso, praecipue quia falsum est malum intellectus (p. 236).

[131] Propono hoc problema an res eadem omnino possit videri clare et obscure . . . contrarium tamen mihi videtur esse verum secundum rationem naturalem qua participamus pro praesenti statu . . . est igitur conclusio prima quod cognitio clara et obscura numquam possunt esse respectu ejusdem rei (p. 238).

A second corollary to the above discussion is the problem of dreams and products of the imagination. Two difficulties present themselves for solution. Either it is necessary to admit that all that appears to be true is not true, since dreams can be very vivid, or we are forced to admit that all things are not eternal inasmuch as the events of a dream are found upon awakening to be a pure fiction. To the first difficulty Nicholas replies that only that is evident which appears in full light.[135] Since the events of a dream do not appear thus, therefore they need not be verified when we are awake. At first sight this seems to be in contradiction to the maxim that there cannot be an obscure and clear vision of the same thing. Such however is not the case, since things which are imaginable are not comprehended by any other faculty, just as what is visible is not audible etc. There can be no contradiction between the evidences of the different faculties. It remains true then to say that what appears to be true is true, simply from the fact that it does appear. More than this we cannot conclude; neither may we question the fact nor the truth of the appearance.

Are these products of dreams and the imagination generable and corruptible? Beings of the imagination have a real existence both before existing in the imagination and enduring after the act of imagination, for just as every faculty presupposes the existence of a proper object, which exists before the act of that faculty and endures after the act, eg. the object known existed before being known and will still exist after it has passed into oblivion, so too does the imagination have its proper object existing independently of the imagination. The fact then that the event of a dream is not verified upon awakening has nothing whatever to do with the case, since things which are imaginable are not comprehensible by the other faculties.[136]

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[132] Septima decima conclusio est quod si unus respiciat aliquod visibile de prope et alius a remotis magis, poterit dicere alteri: tu non vides illud quod ego video, et erit hoc verum licet reputare possint se idem videre, eo quod visiones sunt propinquae; similiter de auditu et similibus dicendum est (p. 240).

[133] Nona conclusio est quod ubi est albedo clarissime ibi est omnis albedo inferioris gradus (p. 239); si duo videntes eandem rem vel intelligentes, quorum unus habet visum clariorem vel intellectum non idem vident de re ,sed unus videt albedinem claram magis re, sed unus videt albedinem obscuram, et tamen illae albedines in esse subjectivo sunt una albedo, et illud quod quaerit quilibet videre, quando aspiciunt, idem est in numero subjective, licet veniat ad eos secundum diversum esse objectivum; et secundum istum modum dicendi posset sustineri probabiliter quod albedo et nigredo sunt unum in esse subjectivo (p. 262).

[134] Et sequitur tertia conclusio quod omnes res aequaliter clare concipiuntur, quaelibet juxta suam obscuritatem, quia secundum quod dictum est, quaelibet res concipitur quantum est conceptibilis et quantum clare est conceptibilis (p. 239). Undecima conclusio est quae sequitur ex secunda: ex quo concipit intellectus humanus quicquid concipit quantum est conceptibile de illis quae cognoscit, tantam habet certitudinem sicut Deus; nam aequalis est Deo in radice, scilicet in actibus videndi in complexis per quorum complexionem redditur principium et conclusio (p. 239).

Deus igitur non est comprehensivus omnium nisi secundum eminentias eorum utpote comprehendit albedinem secundum clarissimum esse; hominem similiter et sic alia, (p. 240); cf. note 129. This seems to refer to the principle of Aristotle that some things are by nature more knowable than others, cf. I *Phys.* 1 (184 a 17).

[135] Sed per dicta supra videretur quibusdam tolli certitudo sicut per dicta aliorum; nam secundum supra ad probandum aliquid esse non sufficeret dicere: apparet mihi esse verum, quia in somno apparet aliquid quod non est verum; sed oportet assumere illud quod apparet in *pleno* lumine (p. 232).

[136] Et similiter dicendum est in intelligi-

When we say this white exists, it is already the product of a judgement as well as an object of the intellect, but when we add the qualification that it formerly did not exist, the addition can only be made with reference to the senses. What we really mean is that now we see an object which we previously did not see; we cannot say that because we did not see it before that it did not exist. Consequently we say that an object which we sense simply exists, no other qualification being necessary, since the object of sense presupposes the object of the intellect etc. Therefore just as the object of sensation does not pass into non-existence when no longer sensed, so also the object of the imagination. This guarantees the chief conclusion, namely the eternity of things, since even beings of the imagination are neither generable nor corruptible.[137]

All knowledge then is of an existing thing; this Nicholas will maintain against both Bernard of Arezzo and William of Ockham, which latter he quotes as holding only intuitive knowledge to be of an existing thing whereas abstract knowledge is indifferent to being and non-being.[138]

The only distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge for Nicholas of Autrecourt is in the degrees of clarity. Intuitive knowledge is more clearly grasped by us.[139] Our intuitive knowledge is in respect to that of God abstract, God's knowledge alone being simply intuitive.[140] We can never comprehend anything fully, since the being of a thing as an object of knowledge never fully adequates the being of the thing in itself.[141] According to Nicholas the *esse objectivum* of a thing embraces the circumstances of that object.[142] Hence if we

bilibus; nam ut supradictum est nihil intelligibile sentitur sicut nihil sensibile intelligitur; sed intelligibilia habent suum esse proprium distinctum sicut sensibilia, et ita erit verum quod quaelibet virtus praesupponet suum subjectum esse et nulla constituet ipsum; unde ut sensibilia puta visibilia praecedunt et necessario habent praecedere visum, sic imaginabilia imaginationem (p. 241). The mathematician deals with quantitative objects which exist as complete individuals in the realm of the imagination. Hence the possibility of the composition of a continuum from indivisibles is safeguarded, if a point according to a mathematical definition has a reality quite apart from its existence in the imagination, cf. St. Thos. *in VI Eth. Nich. lect.* 7, (ed. Vives), XXV, 503.

[137] Si quaeratur de esse existentiae quod attribuitur objecto imaginationis vel intellectus, utrum sit distinctum, diceretur quod sic formaliter propter causam dictam supra; non autem realiter quia ibi non est possibilis separatio . . . Et si quaeratur propter quid res dicitur simpliciter existens quando existit secundum esse quod comprehenditur a sensu, responsio in hoc erit quod illud esse praesupponit esse imaginationis et esse intellectus, et ideo tunc est verum dicere quod ipsa res existit secundum omne sui esse et ita simpliciter et universaliter existit (p. 241).

[138] Apparet quod illa propositio non est omnino vera quae dicit: cognitio intuitiva est rei existentis ut existens et abstractiva non; unde est indifferens ad esse et non esse (p. 252); cf. Ockham *Prol. in I Sent.* I, 1AA; II *Sent.* 16JJ; here Nicholas of Autrecourt answers both Bernard of Arezzo and Wm. of Ockham; the former had maintained the following proposition: notitia intuitiva non requirit necessario rem existentem, cf. Lappe p. 2*; this proposition of Bernard was based on Ockham: ex istis sequitur quod intuitiva notitia tam sensitiva quam intellectiva; potest esse de re non existente, *Prol. in I Sent.* 1HH; this was based on the fact that God could do immediately what He does through secondary causes, but naturally intuitive knowledge did require the existence of the thing: *naturaliter* cognitio intuitiva non potest causari nec conservari objecto non existente, *Quodl.* VI, 6; cf. also II *Sent.* 15E.

[139] Quaelibet cognitio est rei existentis, sed in hoc est differentia quia intuitiva est rei existentis sub esse claro magis . . . (p. 242).

[140] Nostra intuitiva etiam posset dici abstractiva respectu cognitionis Dei quae intuitiva simpliciter diceretur, *ibid.*

[141] Quodlibet enim esse objectivum videtur deficere a perfectione quam habet res in se secundum esse subjectivum quod habet, *ibid.*, cf. note 129.

[142] Per esse objectivum intelligo illud esse objecti quod habet quamdam copulationem et indivisionem cum actu, ita quod ubicumque ponitur actus, ponetur et illud esse objectivum, ut cum quis inriparia existit in navi et videtur sibi quod ripa movetur; in quocumque poneretur talis actus videndi, veniret objectum secundum tale esse (p. 243).

Unde isti quaerunt ut cognoscant eam (rem) in suo esse subjectivo primo et fundamentali in quo radicaliter habet esse, et tantum, quantum possunt, se appropinquant per collectionem multorum esse objectivorum. Et considerandum quod apud unum hominem secundum diversos intellectus est unum esse objectivum quod est quasi esse subjectivum respectu aliorum esse objectivorum subsequentium ut, cum aliquis non habituatus vidit primo Socratem, habuit unum esse objectivum confusum quia multa esse objectiva confundit in se; nam postea comparet eum ad Platonem et habet unum esse objectivum, videlicet homo, post comparans ad asinum habuit aliud esse objectivum, scilicet animal et sic de aliis (p. 264).

see an object in motion, the *esse objectivum* of that object will grasp the thing as moving; also if we see a thing in a bright light and clearly or in a shadow and obscurely, these facts will be contained in the *esse objectivum*. This same notion can be applied to the transcendentals. A thing considered as good will have one *esse objectivum*, as true another etc. These are not two different things, but only two *esse objectiva* which embrace the guise under which a thing is considered or viewed. Likewise the *esse objectivum* will embrace the position of the thing, eg. if we see white in England or in Paris the *esse objectivum* will contain the thing as being in England or in Paris. From this he will deduce still another argument to safeguard the eternity of things. Suppose black replaces the white in England; it is commonly supposed that the act whereby we saw that white is thereby corrupted. However this need not be so, since the fact of the white being in England is already embraced in the *esse objectivum*, which presents a different *esse objectivum* from the white in Paris; therefore there can be but one *esse subjectivum* for what are apparently two whites. It is also the same act numerically by which we see the white in Paris and the white in England, consequently when black replaces the white in England it need not be argued that the act by which we saw that white is corrupted, since it is numerically the same by which we see the white in Paris, which is totally similar to it.[143] If the position is adopted that a supernatural cause could conserve the vision of white after it had disappeared, Nicholas replies that this would be pure deception.[144] Again it could be objected that in fact there are two whites, and this we cannot deny. To this objection Nicholas answers that we do not discern number in white but only white.[145] Besides we cannot distinguish between two whites which are totally similar; we of necessity see all whites which are exactly similar by one and the same act. This argument is based on the fact that a natural cause, which has in its power to produce several effects, will produce all at once or none, since there is no more reason why it should produce one than the other.[146] Hence we see the white of England in the white of Paris, even though it has disappeared in England since the one white is contained in the other and so on *ad infinitum*.[147] If asked why the white disappeared in England Nicholas will reply that it is because of the withdrawal of a principle if you wish so to name it, which determines the white to be in a certain place, which principle is usually called the principle of individuation.[148] Just exactly what that principle is Nicholas is not prepared to say; let those, who make much of it, do that. As far as he is concerned it is only a determinant which causes a nature to be in a certain place, and other than that has no operation.[149] Hence there is little that can be said about it. If we judge the nobility of things by their operation and classify them by their activity, then the position of Nicholas is logical, granted his first principles. Since action bespeaks a nobility in the tendency of every being to actualize its potentialities, then lack of activity indicates imperfection. By the nobility of the activity we judge the nobility of the cause. In this Nicholas is in opposition to Durandus of St. Pourçain and William of Ockham who denied that any inference could be made of the cause from the effect.[150]

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[143] Pone quod sit albedo Parisius et una in Anglia; probo quod, quando succedit nigredo in subjecto in quo erat albedo quae erat in Anglia, quod albedo non corrumpitur; et primo induco probationem istius conclusionis quod per eundem actum numero videtur albedo quae est Parisius et albedo quae est in Anglia totaliter similis (p. 244); cf. also note 133.

[144] Cf. above note 138. St. Thos. used the argument that God could preserve whiteness without a subject; which whiteness would exist as an intelligible form such as Plato attributed to separate forms, cf. *Quodl.* VII, 4, 10.

[145] Cognoscens clarissime duas albedines divisas subjecto vel duo continua cognoscit clare numerum inesse eis; sed cognoscens albedines Parisius et Angliae non cognoscit numerum inesse eis, et tamen utramque clare cognoscit . . . igitur non est dualitas in eis (p. 246).

[146] Causa naturalis naturaliter agens continens aequaliter plures effectus vel neutrum illorum producit vel omnes simul; non enim est ratio quare magis unum quam reliquum (p. 247); Omnis causa non impedibilis equaliter respiciens omnia sive infinita, si agat aliquid eorum in uno instanti et non aliud est contingens et libera, quia ex quo non impeditur et equaliter respicit omnia eque primo, non videtur ratio quare plus producit unum quam aliud nisi propter suam libertatem, Wm. of Ockham, II *Sent.* 4 and 5.

[147] Cf. p. 247.

[148] Et si quaeras quare deficit esse in Anglia, dicam quod hoc est propter recessum localem vel quasi cujusdam principii determinantis rem ad essendum in certo ubi quod communiter appellatur principium individuativum rei, et compositum ex tali principio sic determinante naturam non potest esse in pluribus locis (p. 244-5).

Another possible objection is of Plotinian origin;[151] if there were two whites exactly alike, then one would be superfluous.[152] This doctrine was succinctly stated by St Augustine.[153] To this objection Nicholas replies that he has already disproved a plurality of exactly similar things. Also if there were a plurality of similar things, it need not follow that they be corruptible. Besides since plurality is posited as a manifestation of the first being, therefore a plurality of exactly similar things either makes more than one superfluous, or manifests a greater perfection; if this latter alternative is true, then plurality should be multiplied to infinity. Consequently it seems absurd to posit a plurality of exactly similars, and therefore the white of England is the same identical white as the totally similar one in Paris.

G. *The Intellect*

The final problem in the treatise deals with questions pertaining to the intellect.[154] The first of which has to do with the unity of the intellect for all men, an Averroist doctrine condemned in 1277.[155] Nicholas bases his refutation of this position on the fact that every faculty or power produces an operation adequate to its nature, and on the fact that there cannot be diverse effects from the same cause. But it is evident that there are diversities of intellectual activity both by reason of extension and profundity. This is evidenced if we consider the manifest differences between the acumen and experience of a man and a boy.

No more is there one intellect with regard to all intelligibles, since there are many who have scarcely ever formulated a syllogism in their life. Consequently if there is but one intellect, it would mean that many have not exploited that intellect to its fullest degree; therefore it would be necessary to conclude the existence of something idle and vain in nature.

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[149] Quid autem sit illud principium contractivum naturae, hoc habent dicere adversarii qui illud ponunt; apud me non est nisi quoddam determinativum naturae ad essendum in certo loco et ipsius non est aliqua operatio (p. 245).

[150] Ex effectu numquam possumus devenire in perfectam cognitionem causae quantum ad suum quod quid est in speciali nisi dupliciter: Uno modo ratione similitudinis, quando effectus est ejusdem speciei cum sua causa. Alio modo ratione virtutis, quando scilicet effectus demonstrat totam virtutem causae. Tunc enim per virtutem causae cognoscimus essentiam, Durandus of St. Pourcain, *in Sent. Theol. Petri Lombardi Comm.* lib. I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 2 n. 11, text quoted in E. Hochstetter, *Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham*, (Berlin, 1927), p. 159 n. 2. For Nicholas the effect is always of the same species as the cause and the cause always acts to the full extent of its power. Illud quod est causa non potest ex quocumque causato in particulari cognosci, W. of Ockham I *Sent.*, d. 1 q. 4G.
The principle that we know things from their operations is many times utilized by Nicholas eg. (p. 190, lines 23-9). A man and a child cannot be of the same species (cf. Aristotle VIII, *Meta.* 8), since their activity is not parallel; hence if they were of the same species, either one of them does not produce its full activity and hence there is something idle in nature (cf. note 57) or we must admit a child and a man are not of the same species, but only considered through custom to be such (pp. 252-3).

[151] III *Enn.* 2, 11-12.

[152] Item unum individuum non excludit aliud quod si dicas: hoc non esset nisi quia alterum superflueret, et ita tantum est bonum unum esse quantum si par rerum (p. 193). Item vel est aequalis perfectionis existere duo sicut unum, et tunc alterum superflueret vel majoris in duobus et tunc existere oporteret infinita talium vel mundus non haberet esse completum (p. 246).

[153] Quoniam non aequalia omnia fecisti, ideo sunt omnia, Confessions, VII, 12.

[154] The manuscript is incomplete breaking off in the middle of a sentence: Et advertendum est.

[155] Cf. *Chart. U.P.* I, p. 545, art. 32; Averroes, III *de Anima*, tx. c. 5. (Venetiis apud Juntas, 1574) VI, fol. 149v.

To prove more fully this discussion, Nicholas treats the question as to whether a cause can produce effects which are specifically diverse. A cause can never have more than one effect.[156] It is a principle to which he often resorts.[157] His proof is as follows: If a cause could have more than one effect, then it would be impossible ever to have any notion of the cause from a consideration of the effect or to come to any knowledge of the relative perfection of different causes. This perpetual ignorance of a truth which the intellect desires to know is contrary to the notion of good. Again if a cause did not act to the full extent of its capability, there would be something vain or useless in nature, which is contrary to the principles of Aristotle himself and to the good order of the universe. We should posit the existence of everything which contributes to the beauty and harmony of the universe provided there is no contradiction; but one cause directly corresponding to one effect is possible and seems to contribute to the harmony and good order of the universe; therefore its existence should be granted.

From this principle there follow some conclusions which our author claims to be extraordinary.[158] Fire cannot be caused by fire, since a small spark can start a great conflagration. Nicholas' own explanation is based on atomism; fire is caused by the congregation of fiery bodies together with a pyretic power in the combustible material itself.[159] Simply speaking the cause must be more perfect than the effect. It cannot be objected that a less perfect cause can produce a more perfect effect in a better disposed subject. It is also false to maintain that the act of knowledge is caused by the object and a vital power of the soul. Likewise it follows that the first agent is not productive of all things, since there is one effect of one cause and that effect must correspond to the nature of the cause.[160] There could never be a finite effect of the first agent naturally speaking, since it would be a waste of power to have an infinite cause produce a finite effect.[161] We conclude that Nicholas does not admit a proof by natural reason that God created the world.

Not only does Nicholas of Autrecourt apply this reasoning to the intellect, but also to the will. When faced with a choice, it is one will which chooses, another which rejects. There can be then no problem of the freedom of the will.[162]

As an objection to the principle, that there can be but one effect of one cause, it can be pointed out that a thing can be seen more clearly from close up than from a distance. Nicholas has already proved that the same thing cannot be seen both clearly and obscurely. But if the fact is admitted there is the explanation that in vision there is a twofold power, one of which is more corporeal, uniting the spirits[163] and the visual rays in such a way that by this union the species are brought to the sense of sight; the second power is more spiritual, whose duty it is to elicit the act of vision. Now in the one who sees from afar the action of the corporeal power is weaker, and so it is not a question of being produced by the same power as that producing the vision in the one seeing from close up; therefore it cannot be said that two different effects flow from the same cause.[164]

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[156] Et ex istis regulis quod una causa non possit habere plures effectus specie diversos, et quod unus effectus non potest produci nisi ab una causa, sequuntur multa contra consueta enuntiari (p. 256).

[157] Cf. pp. 237, 247, 255 ff.

[158] Cf. above note 156.

[159] Ex istis sequitur quod ignis non producitur ab igne . . . A quo igitur producetur? Potest dici quod a virtute ignitiva et calor a virtute calefactiva inexistente rei calefactibili. Et secundum hoc esset mirabile ex quo est virtus calefactiva praesens et calefactibile quare non semper calefacit, praecipue quia illud, quod dicitur de causa sine qua non (Ockham IV *Sent.* 1G; Cicero *de Fato* III, 111) non videtur mihi nisi sermo non habens rationem (p. 256). Quando ignis dicitur produci quantum ad veritatem non est nisi adventus aliquorum corporum calidorum et frigiditas per recessum illorum et adventum corporum frigidorum . . . (p. 257).

[160] Quod ab uno primo agente non potest esse multitudo effectuum, *Chart. U.P.* I, p. 546, art. 44.

[161] Apparet quod si primum ens sit virtutis infinitae, nullus effectus potest produci ab ipso naturaliter quia quicumque effectus productus est finitus et ita nunquam indiget virtute infinita, sed sibi sufficit virtus finita perfectior, et ita infinitas in agendo esset ibi superflua (p. 259).

[162] Et secundum hoc apparet quod quaestio de libertate voluntatis cessat . . . (p. 260).

Accordingly it will be impossible for the intellect which comprehends universals to grasp singulars, otherwise it would have either to exceed itself in comprehending universals or act deficiently in grasping singulars. Perhaps it will be necessary to posit three intellects, one to grasp one extreme, one to apprehend the other extreme, and still a third power to grasp the difference; yet since the power which grasps the difference will comprehend one of the extremes, there need be but two powers; however from the fact that they do coincide in the manner of knowing, that is abstractly, they can be reckoned as one power.[165] From this point of view the active and possible intellect can be called one intellect. The possible intellect knows things as abstracted from such determinants of nature as time, place etc. by way of a certain causation proceeding from itself and acting in conjunction with the active intellect.[166] The *esse objectivum* of the more noble faculty or power of the intellect and the *esse objectivum universale* are so closely related to the one *esse subjectivum* that they can be reciprocally predicated of each other. The object of the intellect and the thing considered apart from place and time etc. that is the universal *objectivum esse* have a corresponding universal *esse subjectivum* which is in fact the quiddity of singular things as posited by Plato.[167] This quiddity or *animal universale* of Plato Aristotle would admit only as posterior to individuals. Nicholas maintains that Aristotle was correct in his criticism of Plato provided it was assumed that Plato meant an existence for this quiddity separate from individuals and extramental. This is but a restatement of Henry of Ghent.[168]

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[163] The doctrine of the mediation between the soul and body of a spirit is referred to by St. Thos., *S. Theol.* I, 76, 7; for an account of the doctrine cf. Alfred of Sareschal, *Liber Magistri Alvredi de Sareshal ad Magistrum Alexandrum Nequam de Motu Cordis*, ed. C. Baeumker, (Beiträge zur Geschichte d. Philosophie d. M.A., Bd. 23, Heft 1-2, Münster, 1923), 1-96; cf. also Hugh of St. Victor, *De Unione Corporis et Spiritus*, PL 177, 287-9. In Nicholas (p. 187).

[164] Circa actum videndi est considerare duplicem virtutem, unam magis corporalem unitivam spirituum et radiorum visualium in quibus unitis vel quibus unitis fit delatio speciei usque ad organum visus, sive sit propter receptionem speciei, sive propter quodcumque aliud, certum est quod ad actum videndi praerequiritur talis unio spirituum, postea consideranda est quaedam virtus animae eliciens actum videndi; tunc ergo diceretur quod remotus qui videt rem ita clare sicut propinquus bene habet inaequalem virtutem et diversam, loquendo de virtute corporali unitiva spirituum, et sic effectus ejus est differens; nam quando aliquis a remotis magis distat, si aeque clare velit videre objectum, tanto requiritur unio spirituum perfectior et radiorum visualium (p. 265); cf. above note 131.

[165] Virtus autem cognoscitiva singularium non potest cognoscere universalia, quia tunc ageret supra se; nec e contra. Et dico quod una virtus animae, quocumque nomine vocetur, ponet differentiam, et illa non cognoscit nisi istud conceptibile, scilicet differentiam; extrema vero erunt cognita a duabus aliis virtutibus animae . . . Unde non solum concluditur una virtus animae sed tres, licet possint dici una virtus; nam quasi ordinantur ad unum . . . Similiter non dicitur nisi unus intellectus quia in modo cognoscendi conveniunt omnes, scilicet in hoc quod est cognoscere abstracte (p. 266).

[166] Videtur quod sit per modum cujusdam causationis, et talis virtus posset dici intellectus possibilis quem concomitatur intellectus agens faciens intellectionem, et istae virtutes ambae possunt dici, cum quaelibet agat aliquid abstractum, intellectus agens et sic in generali una virtus; in speciali tamen sunt duae virtutes (p. 266).

[167] Et quia esse objectivum animae superioris quod venit apud virtutem interiorem particularem et illud esse objectivum animae universale habuit sic habitudinem propinquam ad esse unum subjectivum respectu cujus accipiuntur, unum attribuitur alteri in praedicatione, puta universale singulari . . . (p. 266).

[168] Aristoteles multum nititur contrariari Platoni imponendo ei quod universale posuerit separatum a particulari quasi aliquid extra mentis notitiam . . . Sed cum Plato

Because then the object of the intellect, that is of the more noble power of the intellect, is so close to the universal *esse objectivum* divorced from all consideration of time and place and known abstractly, it can be said that *Socrates est homo*. Here Socrates is the object of the intellect and being such is considered as Socrates without determination of place and time; thus our concept closely adequates the universal *esse objectivum* for which there is a corresponding *universale esse subjectivum*. Therefore *Socrates* can be called *homo* without resorting to the manifold distinctions between the different *suppositiones*.[169] For Nicholas there are but two *suppositiones*, a material one such as *homo* is a two-syllabled word, and a formal one, when the term stands for the thing signified by the term. Thus in the proposition: *homo currit*, the term *homo* can stand for the *universale esse subjectivum* even though only one individual is actually running. But because one individual is actually running the proposition *homo currit* is valid even granting that the term *homo stands* for the universal *esse subjectivum*. What is known is divorced from time and place; this is practically equivalent to the universal *esse objectivum* to which there corresponds the *esse subjectivum universale*; therefore by the principle of economy all the useless inventions of a multiplicity of *suppositiones* can be dispensed with. The popular fallacy, solved by the diversity of supposition generally, Nicholas will reduce to a simple *fallacia accidentis: Socrates est homo; homo est species; ergo Socrates est species. Homo* as a universal *esse subjectivum* can be attributed to Socrates, but it is applicable to more than Socrates, since Plato is also contained therein.

H. Conclusion

This treatise was not without effect, yet we feel the effect was other than Nicholas would have wished. Besides having many of its principles and conclusions condemned, the *Satis Exigit Ordo* was partially responsible for a letter, written on May 20th, 1346, the day after the condemnation of Nicholas, to the *Magistri* and *Scholares* of the faculty of Arts of the University of Paris, by Clement VI, wherein was condemned the tendency to treat Aristotle and his Commentators with contempt, whose doctrine ought to be followed when it is not in contradiction to the Faith, whereas, on the contrary, the Masters and Scholars had turned to sophistry and *apparent opinions*, from which no fruit can be gathered.[170]

It is unfortunate that the only known manuscript of the *Satis Exigit Ordo* is not complete. Perhaps he wrote a conclusion in which he summed up his position and answered many of the questions we should like to ask. There is one uppermost in our mind: To what extent did he believe what he had written? I think we are allowed to believe him when he himself says that he did not accept the doctrines and authority of Aristotle and his Commentator. Yet the system which he offers as a substitute he asserts only as probable; again, since evidence to the contrary is lacking, it seems we should believe him. On more than one occasion it has been pointed out in the course of this article that Nicholas definitely stated that he did not believe his own demonstrations.

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non sic posuit universale separatum a re cujus est, sed solum in mentis notitia ubi veram rationem universalis habet, non singularis . . . et nihil omnino concludunt rationes Aristotelis contra Platonem, Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* IX, 15, tx. quoted from J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand* (Paris, 1938), p. 94, n. 3. Cf. Aristotle 402b 7.

[169] For Suppositio cf. William of Sherwood in ed. of M. Grabmann, *Die Introductiones in Logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood*, p. 75; also William of Ockham, *S. Tot. Log.* I, 63 and 70.

[170] Cf. *Chart, U.P.*, II, no. 1125, p. 588.

Aristotle had laid down the principle of generation and corruption; to this Nicholas opposed the eternity of things. From then on it was a case of building up a probable proof, which would be logically sound, to defend the thesis which he put as a starting point, from which he could parallel throughout the principle of generation and corruption. From the position of generation and corruption certain conclusions naturally followed. If one started with the eternity of things, likewise certain conclusions would naturally follow, and these would be contrary to those of Aristotle. Once the first principles of each were granted, it remained to pursue those principles to their *logical* conclusion. If Nicholas could defend each position logically, he would achieve his purpose and could present his system as just as probable as that of Aristotle; once this were done, it would be possible to maintain that the conclusions of Aristotle were not so cogent, that it would be unreasonable to accept another system. Philosophical speculation can never be a sure norm of truth; perhaps a practical service can be rendered by it, but no more. There is a sure norm, why not adhere to it: *adhaereamus Legi Christi.*

It does not seem right to label Nicholas of Autrecourt as a probabilist. His probabilism was adopted only as a controversial device. No more should he be labelled a mediaeval Hume; it is one thing to deny causality, another to deny its demonstrability. The problems discussed in the *Satis Exigit Ordo* vary from those of the letters, yet there is one unmistakeable link between them, namely the stressing of the weakness of all demonstration, as a result of which rational knowledge can have only the force of opinion.

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ROBERT J. SCOLLARD, C.S.B.

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132 Matthaeus de Aquasparta. In II, IV Sententiarum. fol. 1-309.
133 Adam de Wodham. In libros Sententiarum. fol. 1-138.
138 Quaestiones disputatae. fol. 1-292.
152 Nicholas Ockham. In libros Sententiarum. fol. 1-62.
154 Innocent V (Petrus de Tarentaria). In I Sententiarum. fol. 1-125.
155 In III Sententiarum. fol. 1-104.
157 Franciscus Mayronis. Quodlibet I. fol. 1-125.
158 Quaestiones theologicae. fol. 1-355.
160 In I Sententiarum. fol. 1-137.
161 Robert Halifax. In libros Sententiarum. fol. 1-121.
162 Robert Carew. In I Sententiarum. fol. 1-146.
172 William Alnwick. In I-III Sententiarum. fol. 1-112.
176 Ricardus Rufus. In III-IV Sententiarum. fol. 1-216.
179 Franciscus Mayronis. Quaestiones theologicae. fol. 1-80.
183 Antonius de Rodigio. In IV Sententiarum. fol. 1-291.
186 Quaestiones. fol. 1-131.
187 Quaestiones Scotistae. fol. 1-62.
198 Robert Holcot. In IV Sententiarum. fol. 1-196.
199 Alexander V (Petrus de Candia). Quaestiones theologicae. fol. 1-325.
576 In IV Sententiarum. fol. 1-17; 69-157.
647 William of Ockham. Summa totius logicae. fol. 1-135.
666 William of Ockham. Summa totius logicae.

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40 (126) Robert of Melun. Summa theologica. fol. 1-117.
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314 (110) Raymundus Bequin; Jacobus de Appamiis. fol. 1-92.
316 (117) William de la Mare. In I-II Sententiarum. fol. 1-113.
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333 (6 suppl.) Summa theologica. fol. 1-165.
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1071 Arnaldus de Tolosa; Gonsalvus Hispanus; Joannes Sapiens; Thomas de Bailly; Anonymous. fol. 1-156.
1087 (342) William of Ockham. De potestate ecclesiastica. fol. 134-208.
1091 (106 suppl.) In libros Physicorum Aristotelis. fol. 1-286.

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Can. 36 (P.II.26) Summa 'Magister Gratianus in hoc opere' (Summa Parisiensis). fol. 1-100.
Ed. II. 16 Bernold von Constanz. Micrologus. fol. 87-105. Photostat.

BASEL. *Universitäts-Bibliothek.*
F. II. 25 William of Ockham. Summa totius logicae.

BERNE. *Biblioteca Bongarsiana.*
310 Nicolas Oresme. De Spheris; De celo et de mundo. fol. 1-152.
The De celo et de mundo is being edited by A. D. Menut and A. J. Denomy. The first part has appeared in Mediaeval Studies III (1941) 185-280.

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755 (1508) Bombolognus de Bononia. In III Sententiarum. fol. 1-103.
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167 Jacobus de Viterbio; Jacobus de Appamiis. fol. 1-223.
426 Averroës. Commentaria in Aristotelem. fol. 1-190.

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I.F. 184 Anfredus Gonterus. In I-II Sententiarum. fol. 1-709.

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80 Hugo de Sancto Charo. Filia Magistri. fol. 133-173.
98 Albertus Magnus. Super libros Dionysii Areopagitae. fol. 1-279.
109 Nicholas Trivet. In libros Augustini De Civitate Dei. fol. 88-256.
175 Durandus de Sancto Porciano. In libros Sententiarum. fol. 1-194.
176 Durandus de Sancto Porciano. In libros Sententiarum. fol. 1-233.

177 Gerardus de Abbatisvilla. De cogitatione; Quodlibet XIX. fol. 1-52.
178 Hugo de Sancto Charo. In libros Sententiarum. fol. 1-139.
180 Humbertus de Prulliaco. In libros Sententiarum. fol. 1-162.
181 Jacobus de Altavilla. In libros Sententiarum. fol. 1-264.
185 Petrus de Falco; Ricardus de Media Villa. fol. 1-106.
186 Innocent V (Petrus de Tarentaria). In I-III Sententiarum. fol. 1-407.
187 Innocent V (Petrus de Tarentaria). In IV Sententiarum. fol. 1-187.
189 Quaestiones super Sententias; Dissertationes variae. fol. 1-298.
191 Robert of Melun. Summa theologica. fol. 1-305.
192 Quaestiones diversorum doctorum super Sententias. fol. 1-166.
208 Odo Rigaldi. In I-III Sententiarum. fol. 1-488.
220 Godefroid of Poitiers. Summa theologica. fol. 1-138.
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234 Petrus Cantor. Distinctiones. fol. 1-157.
247 Robert de Courçon. Summa theologica. fol. 1-153.
303 Simon de Hinton. Compendium theologiae. fol. 1-41.
424 Robert Kilwardby. De ortu scientiarum. fol. 1-70.
491 Egidio Colonna; Correctorium corruptorii; Godefroid de Fontaines; Hervaeus Natalis; Robert Kilwardby; Thomas Aquinas; Thomas of Sutton; Anonymous. fol. 1-315.
497 William of Ockham. Summa totius logicae. fol. 1-40.
498 William of Ockham. Summa totius logicae. fol. 1-135.
502 Walter Burley. Commentarium super Ethicas. fol. 1-185.

503 Claricon; Richard Kylmington; John Rodington; Anonymous. fol. 1-115.
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10295-10304 Life of Saint Barbara in Old French. fol. 59-63. Edited by A. J. Denomy in MEDIAEVAL STUDIES I (1939) 148-78.
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176 Voie de Paradis et la Voie de Infer. fol. 1-65.

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Amplon. O 7 Plato. Phaedo; Meno. fol. 1-28; 57-60.
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Amplon. Q 257 William of Ockham. Summa totius logicae. fol. 1-71.
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Conv. Sopp. 123 Roger Marston. Quodlibeta I-II. fol. 114-58.
Plut. 17 sin. cod. 7 John Peckham; Guilelmus de Barlo. fol. 37-51; 91-95.
Plut. 17 sin. cod. 8 Bartholomaeus of Bologna; John Peckham; William de la Mare. fol. 1-7; 77-179.
Plut. 30 cod. dext. 2 Hugo de Castro Novo. In I Sententiarum. fol. 1-93.

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Palat. 639 Plato. Phaedo. fol. 59-75.

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292 Conradus de Ebraco. In I-II Sententiarum. fol. 1-170.
293 Conradus de Ebraco. In III-IV Sententiarum. fol. 1-132.
296 Adam de Wodham. In libros Sententiarum, abbreviata per Henricum de Oyta. fol. 1-267.
307 Thomas of Buckingham; Jacobus Asculanus; Gregorius de Arimino. fol. 1-50; 97-246.
317 Thomas Bradwardine. De causa Dei contra Pelagium. fol. 1-342.
342 Heinrich von Oyta. In libros Sententiarum. fol. 1-182.
361 Franciscus Mayronis. De virtutibus. fol. 1-131.
388 Heinrich von Oyta. Quaestiones theologicae. fol. 1-138.

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15 Ralph Niger. Opera. fol. 1-86. Cf. G. B. Flahiff. Ralph Niger in MEDIAEVAL STUDIES II (1940) 104-26.
23 Ralph Niger. Digestum in librum Numerorum. fol. 1-80.
24 Ralph Niger. Digestum in Leviticum et Deuteronomium. fol. 1-80.
26 Ralph Niger. Moralia Regum. fol. 1-29.

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LONDON. *British Museum.*

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15231 Vie de Sainte Agnes. Edited by A. J. Denomy. The Old French Lives of Saint Agnes. Cambridge, Mass., 1938. (Harvard Studies in Romance Languages, v. 13)

17375 Vie de Sainte Agnes. fol. 337-39.

35179 Judicial writs; cases and judgments. fol. 31-39.

Arundel Mss.

367 William of Ockham. Summa totius logicae. fol. 1-153.

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Cleopatra C.10 Ralph Niger. Chronica I. fol. 2-55.

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106 Robert Kilwardby. De conscientia. fol. 353-64.

5431 Robert Kilwardby. De fide. fol. 261-64.

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6. E. V. Robert Grosseteste. Hexameron. fol. 140-84. Photostat. Opening paragraphs edited by G. B. Phelan in HOMMAGE A M. LE PROFESSEUR MAURICE DE WULF. Louvain, 1934. pp. 172-79.

11. B. III. Robert Grosseteste. De decem mandatis. fol. 319-28. Quaestiones theologicae. fol. 334-37.

13. A. XII. Ralph Niger. Chronica II. fol. 1-39.

20. D. VI. Vie de Sainte Agnes. fol. 68-71. Edited by A. J. Denomy.

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2005 Joannes Gerson. De mystica theologia. fol. 156-57; 173-74; 180-82; 185; 203. Photostat.

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761 Joannes Buridanus. Quaestiones de celo et de mundo. fol. 49-86.

817 Alfarabi. De intellectu. fol. 169-72. Photostat.

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9559 Siger de Brabant. Opera. fol. 1-150.
12612 Bernold von Constanz. Micrologus. fol. 94-112. Photostat.
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287 Guilelmus Arvernus. De bono et malo; De paupertate spirituale. fol. 1-58; 200-16. Photostat.
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IX 156 (214) Philippus cancellarius. Summa. fol. 1-212.

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3472 Avicenna. De celo et de mundo. fol. 79-88.
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3003 Sermones. fol. 1-7.
3228 Guido Terreni; Joannes de Poliaco; Anonymous. fol. 1-155.
3892 Huguccio. Summa decretorum. fol. 1-217.
3967 Vincentius Hispanus. Super decretales. fol. 1-215.
4131 William of Ockham. Summa totius logicae. fol. 1-161.
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11867 Thomas of Capua. Summa dictandi. fol. 48-119.
12330 Durandus de Sancto Porciano. In libros Sententiarum. fol. 1-227.
12519 Anselmus de Lucca. Collectio canonorum. fol. 41-225.
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14145 Guilelmus Antissiodorensis. Summa de divinis officiis. fol. 41-76. Photostat.
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14526 Stephen Langton; Martin; Petrus de Falco; Anonymous. fol. 60-275.

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14569 Jacobus de Viterbio. Quodlibeta I-II. fol. 119-187.

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14726 Quaestiones et Quodlibeta. fol. 130-230.

14886 Petrus Pictaviensis; Simon de Tournai. fol. 1-180.

14891 Guido, abbot of Aumône. Summa de diversis quaestionibus theologiae. fol. 176-212.

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15605 Odo de Chateauroux. In epistolas S. Pauli. fol. 1-155.

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16082 Avicenna. De celo et de mundo. fol. 237-92.

16110 Franciscus de Marchia. Quodlibet I. fol. 125-47.

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16406 Alexander de Hales; Guilelmus de Melitona; Laurent de Fougères; Odo de Chateauroux; Anonymous. fol. 1-230.

16581 Plato. Phaedo. fol. 95-163.

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44 Matthaeus de Aquasparta. Quodlibeta; Quaestiones disputatae. fol. 75-315.
95 Vitalis a Furno. Quaestiones; Quodlibeta. fol. 10-95.

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61 Robert Kilwardby. In II Sententiarum. fol. 191-267.
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209 Martin. Summa theologica. fol. 1-235.
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269 Jacobus de Viterbio; Petrus de Alvernia. Quodlibeta. fol. 84-194.
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296 Augustinus de Ancona. In I Sententiarum. fol. 1-214.
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640 Stephanus Tornacensis. Summa in decretum. fol. 1-164.
661 William of Ware. In I-III Sententiarum. fol. 1-114.
662 Bernardus de Arvernia. Contra dicta Henrici de Gandavo. fol. 1-188.
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718 William of Ockham. In I Sententiarum. fol. 1-140.
767 Petrus de Aterrania. In I Sententiarum. fol. 1-262.
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829 In IV Sententiarum. fol. 1-126.
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39 Guido Terreni. Quodlibeta I-VI. fol. 14-241.
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298 Bernardus de Arvenia. Improbationes. fol. 1-225.
328 Guido Terreni. Quaestiones super libros ethicorum. fol. 1-42.
361 Ricardus de Media Villa; William de la Mare; Bartholomaeus of Bologna. fol. 1-173.
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942 Petrus Aureoli. In II Sententiarum. fol. 1-96.
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1040 Thomas Bradwardine. De causa Dei contra Pelagium. fol. 1-315.
1073 Petrus de la Palu. In II Sententiarum. fol. 1-189.
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1377 Tancredus. Apparatus ad compilationes I-III. fol. 2-98. Photostat.
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12993 Ricardus Rufus. In I-II Sententiarum. fol. 1-320.
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574 Missale Romanum. fol. 143-52. Edited by V. L. Kennedy in Mediaeval Studies II (1940) 204-22.
1126 Thomas of Sutton; Robert Cowton. fol. 1-45; 93-157.
2071 William of Ockham. Summa totius logicae. fol. 12-48.

Codices Palatini Latini.

328 Udo. Summa theologica. fol. 1-80.
331 Romanus de Roma. In I-II Sententiarum. fol. 1-96.
482 Bernold von Constanz. Micrologus. fol. 1-45. Photostat.
483 Bernold von Constanz. Micrologus. fol. 1-43. Photostat.
612 Eustachius. Opera. fol. 1-106.

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2048 Missale Romanum. fol. 1-60. Edited in part by V. L. Kennedy in Mediaeval Studies II (1940) 204-22.

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431 Thomas of Sutton. In libros Sententiarum. fol. 1-164.

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Early Dominican and Franciscan Legislation Regarding St. Thomas

MAUR BURBACH, O.S.B.

IN this study I propose to examine the regulations of the general chapters of the Dominican and Franciscan Orders up to the time of the canonization of Thomas Aquinas in 1323. From the proceedings of these chapters I shall select only those passages which have a direct bearing on my subject, namely, the history of Thomism and the personal reputation of Thomas until his canonization as a saint of the Church. I shall follow chronologically the general chapters of the Dominican Order since, as might be expected, their legislation is far more extensive than that of the Franciscans. The Franciscan legislation will be introduced into the study when the occasion arises.

Since we are to examine only this relatively small portion of the documents that would have to be considered for a complete treatment of the history of Thomism during the period proposed for this study, we must avoid exaggerating the importance of the light they may throw on the question as a whole. The general chapters, for example, do not issue doctrinal decisions. The regulations which they lay down are for the most part purely of a disciplinary nature. They may be specific about practical matters (for example, in prescribing what the provincial may eat), but they do not determine what specific doctrines are to be adhered to. Hence they do not reveal, nor shall we endeavor to trace historically, doctrinal tendencies.

These regulations, however, do reveal the official position of two of the most powerful organizations within the Church in the thirteenth century. Further, the individuals engaged in the struggle for and against Thomism were largely members of these two Orders, and were bound to obey the decrees of the general chapters.

The annual[1] general chapter of the Dominicans had unlimited power over the whole Order.[2] To appreciate the influence of a Dominican chapter, it is sufficient to recall that by the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Order had eighteen provinces extending from Spain to Scandinavia[3] and that its members numbered about 12,000 in 1337.[4] Since each province sent one delegate (*diffinitor*) to the chapter, these annual gatherings would be thoroughly representative of the intellectual and religious life of Europe. With these facts in mind, we will turn to the *Acta*[5] to see what they have to say about St. Thomas and his writings. We shall examine the pertinent acts, make the general observations their content warrants, determine insofar as possible the motives which prompted them and the effects that followed.

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[1] That these general chapters should convene annually was agreed upon at the first general chapter of the Order, which was held at Bologna in 1220 and over which St. Dominic presided. Cf. Quétif-Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum* I (Paris, 1719), p. 20. From 1275 to 1325 the general chapter failed to convene only three times: in 1284, 1295, and 1299.

[2] *Constitutiones* II, 8: Predicti autem duodecim provinciarum diffinitores duobus annis, et duodecim priores provinciales tertio anno, cum magistro ordinis omnia diffinient et constituent et tractabunt. . . . Isti autem diffinitores habebunt plenariam potestatem super excessu magistri ordinis corrigendo, vel de eo penitus removendo. Ipsorum vero sententia tam in his quam in aliis inviolabiliter observetur, ita quod a nemine ab illorum sententia liceat appellari. The constitutions in force during the period with which this study is concerned were those compiled and arranged by Raymond of Pennafort. On the whole they agreed with the redaction edited by H. Denifle, 'Die Constitutionen des Predigerordens in der Redaction Raimunds von Penafort', *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte*, V (1889), 530-564. This is the edition here quoted, p. 556.

[3] G. R. Galbraith, *The Constitution of the Dominican Order* (Manchester, 1925), gives on page 266 a list of the provinces founded before 1360 with the dates of their foundation and the number of houses in each province in 1277.

[4] This was the number at that time according to Sebastien de Olmeda who gives it as

(1) *Chapter of Valenciennes, June 1, 1259*[6]

The acts of the chapter of Valenciennes do not mention St. Thomas by name but we know that he was delegated at this chapter to work out, with the collaboration of Albert the Great, Bonushomo, Florentius, and Peter of Tarantasia, a curriculum of studies to be adopted by the entire Order.[7] This recognition of St. Thomas, at the age of thirty-four, as an intellectual leader within the Order, is confirmed by the action of the provincial chapters of Naples (1260)[8] and Anagni (1265).[9] Later, in 1272, he was placed in full charge, as to place, personnel, and number of students of the *studium generale* of theology by the provincial chapter of Florence.[10]

(2) *Chapter of Milan, June 1, 1270*

> Since Friar Bartholomew of Tours has disobeyed an order of the Master and also his preceptorial letters, since he has made a certain testament whence grave scandal has come to the Order, and since in making this testament he has blamed the Master of the Order to excuse himself, which facts have been made known to us by the letters of our beloved brethren Friar Thomas, Friar Robert, and Friar Latinus, and again by the letters of Friar Michael, prior of Lille, and Friar Lambert of Liege, who were appointed inquisitors in the matter, we enjoin on him twelve days on bread and water, and six psalters. Further, we deprive him of the office of preacher general, of voice in all the affairs of the Order, of the right to become a prelate in the Order, unless these

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the approximate figure revealed by the census taken under Benedict XII. Cf. Fontana, *Monumenta Dominicana* (Rome, 1674), pp. 207-208 as referred to by P. Mandonnet, 'Preachers (Order of)', *Catholic Encyclopedia* XII (New York, 1911), p. 358.

[5] The *Acta* of the general chapters have been edited by B. M. Reichert, *Acta capitulorum generalium 1220-1303* (Rome, 1898) and *Acta capitulorum generalium 1304-1378* (Rome, 1899). P. A. Walz has collected and published separately with helpful footnotes the decisions of the general chapters which refer to the cult and doctrine of St. Thomas. I use this edition entitled, 'Ordinationes capitulorum generalium de Sancto Thoma eiusque cultu et doctrina', *Analecta Sacri Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum*, XVI, (1923-1924), 168-173.

[6] General chapters were held at Whitsuntide according to the constitutions. Quétif-Echard, *Scriptores*, I, pp. xvi-xx, list the general chapters held during the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries indicating in each case the place and date, and adding also other interesting notes. This table will be used throughout our study for this information.

[7] Quétif-Echard, *Scriptores*, I, p. 272: . . . capitulo generali Valencenis junii I celebrato (Thomas) affuit, vel ut socius Romanae suae provinciae; nam erat capitulum provincialium, vel ob graviores causas a magistro ordinis accersitus. Sane ibidem cum Alberto Magno, Bonohomine Britone, Florentio Gallico, Petro de Tarentasia sacrae theologiae magistris Parisiensibus omnibus cognitor delegatus fuit ad rectam studiorum institutionem, qui simul eas posuerunt leges, quas universus ordo tum amplexatus est. Thomas' presence at the chapter and his hand in the organization of a curriculum of studies for the Order is confirmed by an act of the provincial chapter of Provence in 1261: Apud Valencenas anno Domini MCCLIX de mandato magistri et diffinitorum ad promotionem studii ordinatum est per FF. Bonumhominem, Florentium, Albertum Teutonicum, Thomam de Aquino, Petrum de Tarentasia magistros theologiae Parisius, qui interfuerunt dicto capitulo, quod lectores, etc. Ed. Quétif-Echard, *Scriptores*, I, p. 280.

[8] Cf. Th. Masetti, *Monumenta et Antiquitates veteris disciplinae ordinis praedicatorum II* (Rome, 1864), p. 268. As cited by Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* I (Munich, 1926), p. 335.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Ed. Masetti, *op. cit.* I, p. 136: Studium generale Theologiae quoad locum, personas et numerum studentium plenarie committimus Fr. Thomae de Aquino. As quoted by Grabmann, *loc. cit.*

> penalties be removed by a general chapter. We deprive him also of the vicarship which the Master has given him over the brethren who go on a crusade.[11]

Of all the acts of the general chapters, this is the only one in which St. Thomas is mentioned by name before his death. The text is very vague. We know that Bartholomew was a fellow student of Thomas at the University of Paris, that he was a man of some prominence in the Order, diffinitor at one general chapter, that of London in 1263, and for a short time preacher general.[12] The exact nature of his offense is not known. The chapter and biographers refer to the matter simply with the words: *in facto cuiusdam testamenti.* The text is important for our purpose only in that it indicates the prestige which St. Thomas enjoyed at this time and is interesting in that he is mentioned together with a certain Friar Robert. Reichert suggests that this may have been Robert Kilwardby.[13]

(3) *Chapter of Milan, June 5, 1278*

> We strictly enjoin upon Friar Raymond of Meuillon and Friar John Vigorosus, lector of Montpellier, the obligation of hastening to England for a careful investigation of the acts of brethren who have brought scandal into the Order by disparaging the writings of the venerated Friar Thomas Aquinas. We now give them full authority over superiors and subjects in these matters. They have authority to exile them from the province and to deprive them of every office. If one of these (appointed inquisitors) should by a legitimate reason be impeded, the other shall nevertheless fulfil the charge. Their respective priors shall be bound to provide them with companions who in their judgment are fit to perform this office, and this whenever they are requested to do so.[14]

The immediate significance of this act of the general chapter of 1278 is plain. The authorities of the Order express in vigorous terms their sympathy with the doctrine of St. Thomas and their determination to put an end to the criticism to which it was being subjected in England where Oxford was the center of study. Silence about the continent is an indication that little opposition to the doctrine of St. Thomas within the Order was to be found there at this time. The full implication, however, of the mandate placed on Friar Raymond of Meuillon[15] and Friar John Vigorosus, and the motives which prompted it cannot be seen without reference to the condemnations of 1277 in Paris and Oxford.

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[11] Walz, *Ordinationes*, 168, 169: *Acta c.g.*, t.I, p. 155, 1. 6-19.—Fratri Bartholomeo Turonensi quia ordinationi magistri de consensu suo facte et litteris suis preceptoriis non obedivit et quia in facto cuiusdam testamenti quedam fecit, unde est grave scandalum ordini subsecutum, et quia in facto illius testamenti, in excusationem sue culpe magistrum ordinis inculpavit, sicut patuit nobis de predictis, per litteras dilectorum fratrum fratris Thome, et fratris Roberti, et fratris Latini, et iterum per litteras fratris Michaelis prioris Insulensis, et fratris Lamberti Leodiensis, inquisitorum super hiis deputatorum, iniungimus ei XII dies in pane et aqua, et VI psalteria, et privamus eum sigillo predicatoris generalis, et quod voce in omnibus tractatibus ordinis sit privatus, et quod in ordine non possit esse prelatus, nisi in omnibus hiis cum eo, per generale capitulum fuerit dispensatum, absolvimus eciam eum a vicaria, quam ei commiserat magister super fratres, qui vadunt cum cruce signatis ultra mare.

[12] Cf. P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie de Paris au XIII^{e} Siècle* I (Paris, 1933), p. 105.

[13] Cf. Walz, *Ordinationes*, 169, n. 2.

[14] Walz, *Ordinationes*, 169: *Acta* I, p. 199, 1.1-11.—Iniungimus districte fratri Raymundo de Medullione et fratri Iohanni Vigorosi lectori Montespessulani, quod cum festinacione vadant in Angliam inquisituri diligenter super facto fratrum, qui in scandalum ordinis detraxerunt de scriptis venerabilis patris fratris Thome de Aquino, quibus ex nunc plenam damus auctoritatem in capite et in membris, qui quos culpabiles invenerint in predictis puniendi, extra provinciam emittendi, et omni officio privandi, plenam habeant potestatem. Quod si unus eorum, caso (casu?) aliquo legittimo fuerit impeditus, alter eorum nichilominus exequatur. Quibus priores de sociis competentibus, quos ipsi ad hoc officium exequendum ydoneos iudicaverint, teneantur quandocumque requisiti fuerint providere.

The bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, on March 7, 1277, condemned a series of 219 propositions,[16] some of which were expressions of Thomistic doctrine.[17] Eleven days later, on March 18, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, O.P., condemned a series of 30 propositions relative to grammar, logic and natural philosophy. For the most part the latter were direct expressions of St. Thomas' doctrine on the unity of substantial forms.[18]

The Dominicans at the time were by no means in accord in their philosophical and theological views. St. Thomas had introduced something new into the Order which up to then had clung to the Augustinian tradition. It is easy to understand that the whole school of older Dominicans, which could boast of such personages as Roland of Cremona, the first Dominican to occupy a chair in the University of Paris, Robert Fishacre, Hugh of St. Cher, Peter of Tarantasia, besides Robert Kilwardby, would not bow without some struggle to the upstarts who were, in their opinion, imperilling the faith with their Aristotelian novelties.[19] To be sure, St. Thomas by this time enjoyed wide popularity in his Order, but his writings had never been officially imposed on its members or even recommended to them. In fact they were quite generally considered suspect except by a new school of younger Dominicans and by a few others, e.g. Godfrey of Fontaines and Aegidius of Colonna.[20] But Thomism was gaining ground and, whatever may have inspired the imprudent action of Tempier,[21] there can be little doubt that the Oxford condemnation was the deliberate act of a prudent man. Kilwardby was doubtless prompted by the entreaties of many of his fellow Dominicans,[22] for Oxford was still thoroughly Augustinian, free from the direct influence which St. Thomas exercised on the continent. There can be even less doubt about his sincerity. Contemporary biographers praise him as a man noted for his sanctity and learning, as one versed in the Scriptures and the Fathers of the Church.[23] Kilwardby's writings and training bear witness to a mind keen enough to grasp the situation which confronted him. He had entered the Order of St. Dominic after a course in the liberal arts at Oxford and some time in Paris. At Oxford he was professor of theology, as a Dominican he was provincial of the English province from 1261 to 1272. He was archbishop of Canterbury and primate of the whole of England.[24] His decisions bore weight, and the condemnation[25] of March 18, 1277 may be considered the last stand of the older Dominicans for Augustinianism. In this stand the Dominicans were not alone. They had the support of the Franciscan and secular masters. In fact there can be little doubt that the Oxford and Paris condemnations were not made independently but that Kilwardby knew of the Paris affair and even collaborated with Bishop Tempier. The relation of the condemnations to each other both in time and content indicates this.[26] Kilwardby was aware of the growing popularity of St. Thomas in the Order. He knew too that his condemnation would be a test case and would probably bring some decision from the Dominican governing body.

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[15] For his biography and a discussion of his mission to England see Quétif-Echard, *Scriptores*, I, pp. 434-436.

[16] The condemnation is edited by Denifle-Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I (Paris, 1889), pp. 543-555, no. 473.

[17] As a matter of fact only six of the propositions, namely 81, 96, 129, 173, 191 and 204 are strictly thomistic in doctrine.

[18] Pierre Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroîsme latin au XIII*^{e} *siècle* (Fribourg, 1899), pp. ccxxviii-cclxii. For a detailed treatment of the whole situation, see also Franz Ehrle, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Scholastik', *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, V (1899), 603-35; and D. E. Sharp, 'The 1277 Condemnation by Kilwardby', *The New Scholasticism*, VIII (1934), 306-318.

[19] Cf. Ehrle, *Archiv*, V, 604, 605.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] I do not mean to suggest that there was no reason for action on the part of ecclesiastical authorities. The averroistic doctrines which had been condemned in 1270 were still being taught at the university, threatening the faith and fostering immorality. In fact Pope John XXI on January 8, 1277, sent a letter to Bishop Tempier asking him to investigate and make a report to the Holy See (cf. *Chartularium*, I, p. 541, no. 471). But the condemnation was hasty as its content shows, and beyond the Pope's mandate.

[22] In his letter to Peter of Conflans, (ed. F. Ehrle, *Archiv, V*, 614) Kilwardby says: Scripsistis michi nuper, quod venerabilis pater Dominus Stephanus episcopus Parisiensis vobis significavit, quod ego *de consensu omnium magistrorum Oxoniensium tam regentium quam non regentium, articulos Oxonie condempnavit* (condempnavi?) . . .

[23] William Rishanger, *Chronica Monasterii S. Albani II* (ed. H. Riley, London, 1865), p. 72: Erat nempe de Ordine Fratrum Praedicatorum, qui non solummodo religiosae vitae sanctitate, sed scientia et doctrina, clarissimus habebatur. Nempe ante Ordinis ingressum Parisius rexerat in artibus; cujus in hiis peritiam, praecipue quoad grammaticam et logicam, redacta in scriptis edocent monumenta. Post ingressum vero ordinis, studiosus in divinis Scripturis, originalibusque sanctorum patrum, libros Augustini fere omnes, aliorumque doctorum plurium, per parva distinxit capitula, sententiam singulorum sub brevibus annotando. See also Nicholas Trivet, *Annales Sex Regum Angliae* (ed. T. Hog, London, 1845), p. 278.

A general chapter opened at Bordeaux on the vigil of Pentecost, May 16,[27] only two months after the condemnation, which had been well timed. Many of the members of the chapter must have been on their way before news of what had happened in Oxford reached them. The chapter was silent and the Augustinian contingent of the Dominican Order must have taken new hope. But we have no evidence that the assembled diffinitors did not discuss the Oxford affair, or that they did not judge that action would be imprudent under the circumstances, or that they did not decide upon a *modus procedendi.*

There was good reason for waiting. Pope John XXI was near death and may indeed have died before the general chapter adjourned. To wait until his successor had taken office would certainly suggest itself to the governing body of the Dominican Order. It was not until late in that same year (November 24, 1277) that Nicholas III was chosen for the see of Peter. A member of the third order of St. Francis, the new pope would show particular interest in the Franciscan Order.[28] Only a few months after his coronation, Nicholas III called Kilwardby to the cardinalate (March 12, 1278). The see of Canterbury thus became vacant and the Canterbury monks postulated Robert Burnell, bishop of Bath and Wells and Chancellor of England, for the archdiocese. Pope Nicholas refused the choice in favor of the Franciscan, John Pecham.[29] The Dominican chronicler, Nicholas Trivet, says of him:

> ordinis sui zelator erat praecipuus, carminum dictator egregius, gestus affatusque pompatici, mentis tamen benignae, et animi admodum liberalis.[30]

These promotions must have pleased both the Dominicans and the Franciscans, but for different reasons. Even the Dominican legislative body might well hesitate to insist on the teaching of Thomas at Oxford while the eminent Kilwardby was there. Now the general chapter could act and act it did. It met at Milan on June 5. Two inquisitors were sent to England to examine attacks on the writings of Thomas which were called a *scandalum ordinis*. The powers of the inquisitors were apparently unlimited. Full authority over superiors and subjects, power to exile and depose from any office that any of the brethren might be holding, was as much as any inquisitor could ask.

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[24] Cf. Quétif-Echard, *Scriptores*, I, pp. 374-380.

[25] Kilwardby did not wish his action to be looked upon as a condemnation. In his letter to Peter of Conflans he says: Hoc igitur paternitati vestre notifico, quod dampnatio ibi facta non fuit talis, quomodo solebat esse expressarum heresum, sed fuit prohibitio in scolis determinando vel legendo vel alias dogmatizando talia asserendi; tum quia quidam sunt manifeste falsi, tum quia quidam sunt veritati philosophice devii, tum quia quidam sunt erroribus intolerabilibus proximi, tum quia quidam sunt apertissime iniqui, quia (quidam?) fidei catholice repugnantes. Ed. F. Ehrle, *Archiv*, V, 614.

[26] Cf. Mandonnet, *Siger*, I, p. 234.

[27] Cf. Quétif-Echard, *Scriptores*, I, p. xviii.

[28] According to Quétif-Echard Nicholas III chose John Vercelli, Master General of the Dominicans, to be patriarch of Jerusalem in December, 1277. John steadfastly refused. Cf. *Scriptores*, I, pp. 211; 427.

[29] *Annales Monastici*, III *Annales Prioratus de Dunstaplia* (ed. H. Luard, London, 1866) pp. 278, 279: Monachi Cantuarienses Robertum Burnel, tunc Batoniensem episcopum, in archiepiscopum postularunt; quam postulationem Papa non acceptavit; immo dicitur, quod cassavit. Et contulit illam dignitatem fratri Johanni de Pecham de ordine Minorum, tunc in curia regenti de theologia.

[30] N. Trivet, *Annales*, p. 300. The description given by William Rishanger agrees almost verbatim with that of Trivet. Cf. *Chronica Monasterii S. Albani* II, p. 94.

The Dominican general chapter had spoken on Thomas. Their decision affected hundreds of houses and thousands of subjects, among them many of the outstanding professors in Europe at the time. It was the first official pronouncement in favor of Thomas' doctrine, the answer of the Dominican Order to the condemnations of Paris and Oxford,[31] which had been made only a year and a few months earlier. The official position of the Order was now clear. That individual members should be slow to comply with the wishes of superiors was inevitable, and the legislation of some of the general chapters to follow the one at Milan in 1278 bear witness to some such resistance. But Thomism had scored a victory in the Order, and had taken its first step of conquest in the Church universal.

(4) *Chapter of Paris, May 21, 1279*

> Since Friar Thomas Aquinas of venerable memory has so greatly honored our Order by his praiseworthy manner of life and by his writings, irreverent or unbecoming talk about him or his writings can no longer be tolerated. We enjoin all priors, provincial and conventual, their vicars and all visitors, even though they be of a different opinion, to punish with severity and dispatch all offenders against this ordinance.[32]

The motive prompting this act is clear. The words are mild compared to those of the chapter held the year previous. There was still some dissension over St. Thomas and his writings. But this must now cease. He had brought so much honor to the Order by his sanctity and learning that all irreverence toward him and his writings can no longer be tolerated. In the preceding chapter only England was mentioned as opposing St. Thomas' doctrine. This fact indicates that the opposition was strongest there. The decree of the chapter of 1279, which was binding on all, shows that opposition was dying; that the chapters for the next seven years take no occasion to mention the opposition is further evidence of this.

It may be well to introduce here a short note on John Vercelli, Master General of the Dominican Order at the time within which the two above mentioned general chapters took place. John had won fame as a professor of canon law at Paris before he entered the Order. He continued as professor there after becoming a Dominican. His biographer says of him:

> vir fuit magnae prudentiae et experientiae, fama et opinione praeclarus, ubique in optimis notus omnibus, (*and adds what seems to imply that he was somewhat of a politician:*) omnium vultus et nomina quos semel noverat, quasi memoriter recolebat.[33]

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[31] We need not suppose that the chapter members looked upon their decision as a reaction against the Paris condemnation. They may well have been convinced that the doctrines of St. Thomas did not fall under its censure. But they knew that many had seized the occasion to include the name of St. Thomas among those against whom the condemnation was directed. They were eager to forestall such an interpretation of the condemnation at least in the Order.

[32] Walz, *Ordinationes*, 169: *Acta* I, p. 204, 1.19-25.—Cum venerabilis vir memorie recolende fr. Thomas de Aquino, suo conversatione laudabili et scriptis suis multum honoraverit ordinem, nec sit aliquatenus tolerandum, quod de ipso vel scriptis eius aliqui irreverenter et indecenter loquantur, eciam aliter sencientes, iniungimus prioribus provincialibus et conventualibus et eorum vicariis ac visitatoribus universis, quod si quos invenerint excedentes in predictis, punire acriter non postponant.

[33] Quétif-Echard, *Scriptores*, I, p. 210.

In 1264 he was chosen Master General, an office which he held until his death in November, 1283,[34] in spite of the opportunity to become patriarch of Jerusalem. As we have seen, it was during his term of office that two most important regulations with reference to St. Thomas and his teaching were laid down by the general chapters over which he presided.

It is interesting to recall the extent of the influence these decisions could exercise. At the time of their promulgation, the Dominican Order comprised twelve provinces from Jerusalem to England, and from Sicily to Scandinavia, with a total of 394 houses.[35]

(5) *Chapter of Paris, June 11, 1286*

> We strictly enjoin and command that each and every friar in so far as he is able and capable, devote himself effectively to the study, promotion, and defence of the doctrine of the late venerable master, Friar Thomas Aquinas. Should any persons have attempted openly to do the contrary, whether they be masters, bachelors, lectors, priors or other brethren, whatever their personal opinion, they are by that very fact suspended from their respective offices and the good graces of the Order until they are reinstated by the Master of the Order or a general chapter. Offenders are by all means to be penalized by their superiors or visitors according to the gravity of their offence.[36]

This is the first document which indicates positive action toward a promotion of the doctrine of St. Thomas. Previous regulations had been almost entirely negative in that their purpose was to break down opposition and prejudice, first in England where the traditional doctrine of the older Dominicans was most tenacious, and then throughout the entire Order. Now all are commanded to study, promote, and defend St. Thomas so far as they can. Historians of philosophy generally assign 1309 as the earliest date when Dominican teachers were obliged to teach the doctrines of St. Thomas. The chapter of that date is explicit on the point, but I think we must say that the obligation rested upon Dominican Masters before this time. To tell a professor that he must study, promote, and defend St. Thomas' teaching so far as he is able, would leave both professors and students little choice in the matter.

The tone of the regulation suggests that there was still a current of opposition to Thomism in the Order, and the penalty seems severe. To find an adequate motive for the legislation, however, we must take into consideration the fortune of St. Thomas' works outside the Order at this time. The phrase which commanded every friar "to study effectively, to promote, and to defend" the doctrine of St. Thomas is significant. The Order could boast of no outstanding defender of St. Thomas' doctrine at this time.[37] Nor was there any notable opposition to that doctrine among the Dominicans. If it needed defence, it was defense against attackers not of the Order. And this brings us back to Oxford, to John Pecham, to his condemnations of 1284 and especially that of 1286, the year of the general chapter in question.

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[34] Cf. Galbraith, *Constitution*, p. 259.

[35] *Ibid.* p. 266.

[36] Walz, *Ordinationes*, 169, 170: *Acta* I, p. 235, 1.1-9.—Districtius iniungimus et mandamus, ut fratres omnes et singuli, prout sciunt et possunt, efficacem dent operam ad doctrinam venerabilis magistri fratris Thome de Aquino recolende memorie promovendam et saltem ut est opinio defendendam, et si qui contrarium facere, attemptaverint assertive sive sint magistri sive bacallarii, lectores, priores et alii fratres eciam aliter sencientes, ipso facto, ab officiis propriis et graciis ordinis sint suspensi, donec per magistrum ordinis vel generale capitulum sint restituti, et nichilominus per prelatos suos seu visitatores iuxta culparum exigentiam, condignam reportent penam.

[37] Cf. Ehrle, *Archiv*, V, 609.

The Franciscan John Pecham was on January 25, 1279 chosen by Nicholas III to succeed Robert Kilwardby as bishop of Canterbury. His term of office was a turbulent one. Problems, doctrinal and disciplinary, presented themselves immediately to the new bishop. Pecham's own letters are our chief source for a knowledge of these troubles.[38] On October 29, 1284 Pecham renewed the condemnation which had been made by Kilwardby in 1277. In a letter of December 7, 1284, to the Chancellor of the University of Oxford, he insists that the condemnation was not directed against the Dominicans as an Order and that his purpose was to prosecute the course taken by his predecessor with reference to errors found in the liberal studies, errors which were still a scandal to many. He even expresses his intimate love for the Friars Preachers.[39]

That the very persons who favored Kilwardby's condemnation should now oppose Pecham's is an indication of the effectiveness of the general chapters of 1278 and 1279. Pecham's action gave rise to a storm of protest at Oxford, chiefly from the Dominicans, Richard Clapwell and William of Hothun. The result was a second condemnation. In April of 1286 the king of England, Edward I, summoned to London all the notables, secular and ecclesiastical, of his realm. Pecham took advantage of the gathering and on April 30 presided over a meeting of the bishops in the church of St. Mary of the Bow. Clapwell was ordered to appear. Instead, his provincial, William of Hothun came and insisted that Pecham had no authority to summon Clapwell. The condemnation of eight propositions which followed was an attempt to restate the position of Kilwardby though Pecham had never been able to procure the text of that condemnation.[40]

That is how matters stood when only five weeks later the Dominican general chapter met at Paris and strictly commanded every friar to study, promote, and defend the doctrine of St. Thomas.

The trouble between Pecham and Clapwell persisted. Clapwell was excommunicated, and, according to the annals of Dunstable, went the next year to appeal his case in Rome. Pope Nicholas IV, first Franciscan to occupy the chair of Peter, condemned him to perpetual silence. Clapwell soon after died a wretched death. He had resumed teaching; not at Oxford, however, but at Bologna.[41] As for William of Hothun, the general chapter of Bordeaux in 1287 relieved him of the office of provincial prior in England and appointed him to a chair of theology in Paris.[42] With the departure from Oxford of these two opponents of Pecham comparative peace returned to the university. Not until over twenty years later, in 1309, did the Dominican general chapter again take up the matter of St. Thomas' doctrine.

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[38] These letters were published by Wilkins in his *Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae*, II (1737). They have also been published by C. T. Martin, *Registrum epistolarum fratris Johannis Peckham* (London, 1884). Some of the more interesting ones are reproduced in Denifle-Chatelain, *Chartularium*, I, pp. 624-627. They were re-edited in part by F. Ehrle in his article, 'John Peckham über den Kampf des Augustinismus und Aristotelismus in der zweiten Hälfte des 13. Jahrh.' *Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie*, XIII (1889), 172 ff. These are the editions as listed by P. Glorieux whose article, 'Comment les thèses thomistes furent proscrites à Oxford,' *Revue Thomiste*, n.s. X (1927) 259-291, I use in this part of the study.

[39] Denifle-Chatelain, *Chartularium*, I, pp. 624, 625. . . . nec Ordini eorum (Praedicatorum) nec opinionibus ipsius Ordinis, pro eo quod sunt Ordinis, intendebamus quomodolibet adversari, sed factum predecessoris nostri circa errores ab eo inventos in liberalibus disciplinis, ac dampnatos de consilio magistrorum, et in parte suscitatos denuo in scandalum plurimorum, prosequi justitia mediante. Et subjunximus quod fratrum Praedicatorum Ordinem diligebamus intime, . . .

[40] The list of condemned propositions is given in the *Registrum*, p. 92 ff. The *Annales de Dunstaplia*, (*loc. cit.*, pp. 323-325), give a list of eleven condemned propositions.

[41] *Loc. cit.*, p. 341: Eodem anno (1288) frater Ricardus de Clappewelle, qui anno praecedenti super pluribus transgressionibus fidei correptus fuerat, obtulit se in curia domini Papae. Et ibi impositum est ei perpetuum silentium super suis opinionibus. Postea adiit Bononiam, ipsas haereses renovando: sed ibi incidit in desipientiam et miseriam magnam valde; ita ut, evulsis oculis, vitam cum angustia terminaret. Of Nicholas IV the contemporary chronicler, William Rishanger, says: . . . Nicholaus Quartus, natione Romanus, prius dictus "Frater Ieronimus," de Ordine Fratrum Minorum. Hic, idolum, ut dicitur, Fratrum eiusdem Ordinis, multa privatim statuit, quae faciunt non solum superbire Minores, sed etiam insanire. *Chronica Monasterii S. Albani* II (ed. H. Riley, London, 1865) p. 112.

The opposition to St. Thomas was not limited to individual members of the Franciscan Order, however, for it is at this time that the Friars Minor adopted a so-called official attitude toward St. Thomas. The Order, possibly as early as 1279, officially subscribed to the Paris condemnation of 1277 by forbidding its members to defend any of the theses there condemned.[43] But such an act would not necessarily constitute the adoption of an official attitude toward St. Thomas. The condemnation had not been expressly directed against St. Thomas, though it did censure some of his teachings and was indeed thus interpreted, a fact for which the trip from Cologne to Paris by the aged St. Albert to defend his former pupil is in itself sufficient evidence.[44] We have no reason to suppose, however, that the governing body of the Franciscan Order was more rash than Tempier. As yet their opposition was directed chiefly against Averroism. After all Thomism was quite young and its popularity not too threatening.

But on May 17, 1282 the general chapter of Strassburg[45] met and took a more definite stand. Among the *memorialia* of the Minister General is one ordering provincial ministers not to permit the diffusion of the *Summa* of Friar Thomas except among the more able lectors. Even these are not to have the *Summa* without at the same time having the declarations of William de la Mare. These declarations are not to be put in the margins but in a separate volume and are not to be copied by a lay-scribe.[46]

The identity of the *Declarationes* with the *Correctorium*[47] of William de la Mare is usually taken for granted.[48] The *Correctorium*, at least as to general content, was made late in 1277 or in 1278. It contains one of the propositions condemned on March 7, 1277 and refers to it as follows: *Quod tanquam erroneum nuper condempnatum est Parisius.*[49] The 117 theses of the work concern themselves chiefly with the problems then agitating the minds of the adherents to the Thomist and Augustinian schools, the problems of hylomorphism, of knowledge, of the eternity of the world, and the nature of beatitude. Both in method and in content the *Correctorium* of William de la Mare was a challenge to the doctrine of St. Thomas. The author is impersonal, objective, sincere. The structure of the *Correctorium* shows that William had read, studied, outlined much of St. Thomas' work. That the *Correctorium* was looked upon as a challenge is evident from the *Correctoria Corruptorii* it evoked. It is to be noted that the Minister General did not bann St. Thomas' works from Franciscan houses. He only insisted that the *Summa* was not to be used by everyone, an indication that it was enjoying some popularity. The more able brethern might use it but not without the *Correctorium* of William de la Mare. May not the motive have been similar to that which even later prompted a Dominican provincial chapter to insist that lectors and bachelors use the *Sentences* of St. Thomas rather than the *Summa*?[50] We should hesitate, it seems to me, to ascribe to the Franciscan Order at this time a definite official position against St. Thomas' writings—a quasi-official position against the unrestricted use of the *Summa* is nearer the truth.

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[42] Cf. Glorieux, *Revue Thomiste*, *loc. cit.*, 281.

[43] Cf. M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la Philosophie Medievale* II (6th ed. Louvain, Paris, 1936) p. 248. De Wulf says: Le chapitre général des franciscains tenu à Assise en 1279 interdit aux membres de soutenir les thèses censurées à Paris en 1277, . . . Some of the definitions of the general chapter of Assisi have been edited from a fragment by F. Ehrle, 'Die ältesten Redacionen der Generalconstitutionen des Franziskanerordens,' *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, VI (1892), 49, 50. A supplementary edition was made by A. G. Little, 'Definitiones capitulorum Generalium Ordinis Fratrum Minorum 1260-1282', *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, VII (1914), 682. A third and more complete edition is that of Guiseppe Abate, O.M. Conv., 'Memoriali, statuti, ed atti di Capitoli generali dei Frati Minori dei secoli XIII e XIV', *Miscellanea Francescana*, XXXIII, (1933), 24, 25. None of these editions mention the Paris condemnation. We do, however, find a reference to it inserted into a redaction of the constitutions of the order of this time. Ed. G. Abate, 'Le "Constitutiones Generales Antique" dei Frati Minori nella redazione Assisana del 1279', *Miscellanea Francescana*, XXXV (1935), 58-100. *Rubrica VI^a*, iii (p. 80) reads: Nullus frater audeat opinionem aliquam asserere vel etiam approbare scienter que a magistris nostris communiter reprobatur, nec opinionem singularem cuiuscumque suspectam et calumniabilem, maxime circa fidem vel mores, audeat defensare, "et potissime opiniones a domino Episcopo et a magistris Parisiensibus reprobatas;" et qui contra fecerit, nisi, admonitus per ministrum, resipuerit, ab omni doctrina officio sit suspensus. See Abate's introduction to this edition, especially p. 62.

[44] Cf. *Acta Sanctorum* I, Martii, (ed. Paris, 1865), p. 712, no. 82.

[45] Unlike the Dominican general chapters, the Franciscan chapters convened only every three years.

[46] Ed. P. Geroldus Fussenegger, O.F.M., 'Definitiones Capituli Generalis Argentinae', *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XXVI (1933), 139: Item minister generalis imponit ministris provincialibus, quod non permittant multiplicari Summam fratris Thome nisi apud lectores rationabiliter intelligentes, et hoc nonnisi cum declarationibus fratris Wilhelmi de Mara, non in marginibus positis sed in quaternis; et huiusmodi declarationes non scribantur per aliquem secularem.

[47] The text has been edited by P. Glorieux in 'Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare" ', *Bibliothèque Thomiste*, IX (Le Saulchoir, Kain, 1927).

[48] Cf. F. Ehrle, 'Der Kampf um die Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin in den ersten fünfzig Jahren nach seinem Tod', *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie*, XXXVII (1913), 272 ff; P. Glorieux, *loc. cit.*, ix. F. Pelster has called this identity into question. See his 'Les "Declarationes" et les Questions de Guillaume de la Mare', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, III (1931), 397-411. Pelster's main argument seems to rest on the length of the *Correctorium*, prohibitive of its being marginal notes which the text of the *memoriale* indicates it to have

The Strassburg chapter, however, enacted a definition which at first sight might seem to have been directed against St. Thomas. It ordered all the ministers of the Order to make a report to the Minister General if they found anyone in their provinces pertinaciously defending unsound opinions; the report was to include the opinions and the reasons adduced to support them.[51] A similar regulation is found among the definitions of the next general chapter, that of Milan (1285). This chapter ordered that the ministers are diligently to warn and to correct those who dogmatically assert corrupt doctrines whether they do so privately or publicly. Those who do not revoke such opinions are to be deprived by the ministers of their offices whether lector, preacher, confessor, diffinitor, or counsellor to the chapter. If such punishment, finally, is not effective they are to be deprived of the company of the brethern and even imprisoned, lest the corrupt corrupt and pervert the others.[52] This regulation amplifies the earlier one of the Strassburg chapter. The Franciscan Order was suffering at this time from much internal strife over the doctrines of Peter Olivi and his followers. The general chapters were undoubtedly concerned over this trouble and it is likely that these two definitions were intended as checks to the movement which Peter Olivi was promoting.[53] Evidence that they were directed against St. Thomas' doctrines is lacking.

To conclude the discussion of Franciscan legislation on St. Thomas' doctrine reference must be made to the second redaction of the constitutions of the

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been. It seems to me not unlikely that William was anxious to edit his notes after the chapter had approved of them and asked for their publication *non in marginibus.* Phrases, words even, would in such case become sentences, thus lengthening considerably the original notes without substantially altering their contents.

[49] Cf. Ehrle, *Zeitschrift*, XXXVII, 273.

[50] Cf. *infra*, p. 157.

[51] Ed. Fussenegger, *Archivum*, XXVI, 137: Item mandat capitulum generale omnibus ministris, quod significent ministro, si quos habent in suis provinciis non sanas opiniones pertinaciter defendentes, opiniones ipsorum cum rationibus suis similiter intimantes.

[52] Ed. Ehrle, *Archiv*, VI, 54. Item mandat capitulum generale, quod ministri sint diligentes contra dogmatizantes doctrinam corruptam publice vel occulte, ut eos diligenter moneant et corrigant; et nisi revocaverint et destiterint requisiti privent eos predicti ministri officiis lectionis, predicationis, confessionis, diffinitionis et discretionis ad capitula. Qui sic non destiterint, fratrum societate priventur et tandem incarcerentur, si in suis erroribus perseverent, ne corrupti corrumpant alios et pervertant.

[53] Cf. Ehrle, *loc. cit.*, 52, 53; Fussenegger, *loc. cit.*, 130.

Order, that of 1292. No friar is to dare knowingly to assert or even to approve publicly or privately any false or unsound opinion, or any of those condemned by the bishop and the masters of Paris. No singular, dangerous, or suspect opinion, especially if it pertains to faith and morals, may be defended. Should ministers find offenders in their provinces they are to warn them and diligently correct them. If the guilty do not revoke their error they are to be deprived of their office and disqualified from any official activity. If they remain obdurate they are to be deprived of the company of the brethren, or even imprisoned. In every case offenders are to be reported to the general chapter or the Minister General by the minister provincial, who is to report also the opinions.[54] This provision of the constitutions is a clear echo of the Milan statute and is directed against members of the Order. St. Thomas is implied only very remotely, if at all. On the whole, one looking for anti-Thomistic legislation by the Franciscan Order at this time will be disappointed. It is not my intention to deny or minimize a fundamental divergence between the Franciscan and Thomist schools of thought. That divergence is written large in doctrinal and sometimes personal disputes, such as that in which William of Hothun, Richard Clapwell, John Pecham and William de la Mare figured. In fact the Order was thoroughly anti-Thomist, but the opposition was not given a clearly definite official expression.

(6) *Chapter of Saragossa, May 18, 1309*

> We desire and determine that all lectors and sub-lectors lecture from the works of our venerable doctor, Friar Thomas Aquinas, and solve questions according to his doctrine; that they instruct their students in the same and bind them to study these works with diligence. Should any be found acting contrariwise and unwilling to revoke what they have done after being warned, they are to be punished severely and at once by the provincial priors or Master of the Order that their punishment may serve as a warning to others.
>
> We grant to students living outside their provinces the right to sell their books, with the exception of the Bible and the works of Friar Thomas, to provide for themselves the necessities of life in case recourse cannot be had to their provincial for permission, and in case no other means can be found. They are to obtain the advice or consent of the prior, the masters, the bachelors or lectors, or a greater part of the community.[55]

Aylmer of Piacenza, Master General from 1304 to 1311, presided over this chapter. The text speaks for itself. On the whole it is a repetition of the regu-

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[54] Ed. Ehrle, *Archiv*, VI, 110: Nullus etiam frater audeat aliquam opinionem corruptam, non sanam vel ab episcopo et magistris Parisiensibus communiter reprobatam scienter asserere vel etiam approbare publice vel occulte, nec opinionem singularem cuiuscunque calumpniabilem vel suspectam maxime circa fidem vel mores audeat defensare. Si autem ministri in suis provinciis aliquos tales invenerint, moneant eos, ut corrigant diligenter; et nisi revocaverint et destiterint requisiti, omnibus officiis et legitimis actibus eos privent; et tandem, si in pertinacia sua permanserint, fratrum societate priventur et demum incarcerentur, si in suis erroribus finaliter perseverent; et nichilominus generali capitulo vel generali ministro per provincialem ministrum cum suis opinionibus denuncientur.

[55] Walz, *Ordinationes*, 170: *Acta* II, p. 38, 1.23-29:—Volumus et districte iniungimus lectoribus et sublectoribus universis quo (quod?) legant et determinent secundum doctrinam et opera venerabilis doctoris fratris Thome de Aquino, et in eadem scolares suos informent, et studentes in ea cum diligentia studere teneantur, Qui autem contrarium fecisse notabiliter inventi fuerint nec admoniti voluerint revocare, per priores provinciales vel magistrum ordinis sic graviter et celeriter puniantur, quod sint ceteris in exemplum.

Acta II, p. 39, 1.33; p. 40, 1.5—Concedimus tamen studentibus, qui sunt extra suas provincias nec commode pro huiusmodi licencia possunt ad suos provinciales recurrere, quod pro suis necessitatibus, si aliunde sibi providere non possint, libros suos, biblia dum-

lation promulgated in 1286. During an interval of about twenty years Master Generals followed each other in rapid succession, none of them holding office for much over two years. This fact may help to account for the absence of legislation with reference to Thomism. We can hardly doubt that an undercurrent of opposition persisted and was in fact, gaining ground. Otherwise how can we explain the wave of anti-Thomism which was soon to appear in the Order? I am thinking of Theodoric of Freiberg, Meister Eckhart and especially Durandus of St. Pourçain.

The great respect which the governing body had for the writings of St. Thomas is evident from the fact that they were placed almost on a level with the books of Sacred Scripture. Evidently a friar was to endure starvation rather than part with the Scriptures or the works of St. Thomas.

This general chapter and that of Metz, (June 3, 1313), that of London, (May 26, 1314), and that of Bologna, (May 11, 1315) cannot be understood without reference to Durandus of St. Pourçain. Walz suggested this relation.[56] A recent and thorough study of the whole complicated matter has been made by Joseph Koch.[57]

(7) *Chapter of Metz, June 3, 1313*

> Since the doctrine of our venerable doctor, Friar Thomas Aquinas, is considered the more sound and common, and since our Order is especially bound to abide by it, we strictly forbid any friar openly to lecture, solve questions, or answer objections, contrary to what is commonly held as the opinion of the above-mentioned doctor. Likewise, no one is to express or confirm any singular opinion contrary to the common teaching of the doctors on matters known to pertain to faith and morals except to refute them and at once to answer objections. Those duly found delinquent by their provincial, his vicar, or such as have authority to inquire into these matters are to be deprived of the office of lector or the privilege of study as a punishment. If another course is followed notification of it is to be made.
>
> But if by the publication of such opinions scandal should have arisen, we wish the author to be severely punished and compelled to retract his position. Lectors are to comment on more of the Bible than has been customary and on at least three or four articles of the *Sentences* according to the doctrine of Friar Thomas unless their extreme length makes it impossible or too burdensome. Finally no one is to be sent to Paris for study until he has for three years carefully studied the doctrine of Friar Thomas.[58]

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taxat et fratris Thome operibus exceptis, possint vendere de prioris sui, magistrorum, bacalareorum seu lectorum vel maioris partis consilio et assensu.

Lectio and *determinatio* as well as the corresponding verb forms have a technical meaning in scholastic terminology. The *lectio* was an explanation of a textbook in the classroom; the *determinatio* a detailed solution by the *magister* of the arguments and objections raised in a disputation. Cf. M. Grabmann, *Einfürung in die Summa Theologiae des heiligen Thomas von Aquin* (2nd ed. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1928), pp. 9-11. Eng. tr. by J. Zybura, *Introduction to the Theological Summa of St. Thomas* (St. Louis, London, 1930), pp. 11-13.

[56] Cf. Walz, *Ordinationes*, 170, n. 2.

[57] Joseph Koch, 'Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.', *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, XXVI (1927), 1-436. See especially, 395-436.

[58] Walz, *Ordinationes*, 170-171: *Acta* II, p. 64, 1.27-32; p. 65, 1. 1-12.—Cum doctrina venerabilis doctoris fratris Thome de Aquino sanior et communior reputetur, et eam ordo noster specialiter prosequi teneatur, inhibemus districte, quod nullus frater legendo, determinando, respondendo audeat assertive tenere contrarium eius, quod communiter tenetur de opinione doctoris predicti, nec recitare aut confirmare aliquam (singularem opinionem contra communem) doctorum sentenciam in hiis, quae ad fidem vel mores pertinere noscuntur, nisi reprobando et statim obiectionibus respondendo. Quicum-

This enactment bears witness to renewed opposition to the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Dominican Order. The tone is impersonal and general but there can be little doubt that the chapter members had particular confreres in mind. These, the chapter indicates, were openly teaching doctrines in opposition to those to which the Order had bound itself. The singular opinions advanced were not merely in the form of objections to be refuted, but of doctrines to be accepted. The chapter resolved to use strong measures to terminate the abuse. A more thorough study of the Bible and of St. Thomas' works is to serve as an antidote to error.

A survey of the prominent Dominican teachers of the time reveals Durandus of St. Pourçain as a fitting object of the censure. Durandus was born probably between 1270 and 1275.[59] Of his youth we know little. By 1303 he was a member of the Dominican house in Paris, St. James. The young student, whom later centuries were to designate as *doctor resolutissimus*, studied and wrote at Paris during a troubled period of history. The political strife between Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair was at its height. For the world of science likewise the period was one of unrest. John Duns Scotus had come to Paris in 1302. By 1306 he was leading a revolutionary force that shook the Thomistic structure from top to bottom and threatened its very foundation. Thomism had no comparable defender in its ranks. There were William Petri de Godino and Herveus Natalis, but they had to reckon with such opponents as Theodoric of Freiberg, Meister Eckhart, John Quidort, besides Duns Scotus. Such was Durandus' company; such was the environment in which he produced his *Commentary*.

In 1312 he received his *licentia docendi* and mounted one of the two Dominican chairs of theology in Paris, the sixty-third of his Order to do so. The following spring he was called to the papal Curia at Avignon where he spent four and a half years as *lector s. palatii*. In August of 1317 he was named bishop of the new see of Limoux by Pope John XXII. He had earned promotion, says Koch;[60] but Walz says that the legislation of the general chapters had rendered his position as teacher in the papal school incongruous.[61] On February 14 of the following year he became bishop of Le Puy, and later of Meaux. He died on September 10, 1334.[62]

But now for the conflict between Durandus and his Order. The *Commentary on the Sentences*, made public in 1308, immediately attracted attention and aroused opposition. Durandus showed himself the most violent opponent of Thomism in the ranks of the Dominican Order since the days of Robert Kilwardby. In comparison with him the liberal observations of John Quidort and the criticism of James of Metz were mild. The superiors of the Order could not remain passive without betraying an adopted policy. We can see in the general chapter of Saragossa (1309) a reaction against the writings of Durandus. It

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que autem per provincialem vel eius vicarium, qui super hiis inquirere teneantur, ex certa sciencia in aliquo premissorum inventus fuerit deliquisse, per eosdem, cum eis legitime constiterit, a lectoratus officio vel studio absolvantur in penam: si tamen alias de huiusmodi sit notatus.

Quod si ex talibus opinionibus pertractatis scandalum sit subortum, volumus, quod acrius puniatur et ad revocandum nichilominus compellatur. Lectores quoque de textu biblie plus solito legant et de lectura de sentenciis ad minus tres vel quatuor articulos de doctrina fratris Thome pertractent, prolixitate onerosa vitata. Nullus etiam ad studium Parisiense mittatur, nisi in doctrina fratris Thome saltem tribus annis studuerit diligenter. The phrase enclosed in parentheses is not found in the *Ordinationes* by Walz. Koch, however, gives it (*Beiträge*, XXVI, 411, n. 5). Koch's argument that the regulation of the chapter was directed against Durandus to a great extent rests on this very phrase.

[59] Koch, availing himself of the results of a study by A. Hofmeister in *Papsttum und Kaisertum*, (Munich, 1926), pp. 290, 294, 316, has ingeniously determined this period as the time of Durandus' birth.

[60] Cf. Koch, *loc. cit.*, 409, n. 67.

[61] Cf. Walz, 'Historia Canonisationis Sancti Thomae de Aquino', *Xenia Thomistica*, III (1925), 128.

[62] For these biographical notes cf. Koch, *loc. cit.*, 395-409.

demands that lectors and sub-lectors are to lecture and teach according to the doctrine of Aquinas and thus to instruct their students conscientiously. Should anyone presume to disobey, and refuse to retract, he is to be punished severely and thus to serve as a lesson to others.[63] No doubt it was due to this chapter that Durandus revised his *Commentary*. This new edition appeared in 1311, and the passages that had been most offensive were omitted. In the meantime, however, his standing in the Order had grown progressively worse owing to the fact that imprudent friends had secretly distributed copies of his *primum scriptum* outside the Order.[64] The superiors took a very firm stand. Durandus had hardly exchanged his professorial chair in Paris for that at Avignon when the general chapter of Metz (1313) quite plainly placed itself in opposition to him, though as was customary, without mentioning his name. But the references are so plain that there can be doubt about who was meant. The chapter strictly forbade any member of the Order to dare openly to lecture, solve questions, or answer objections contrary to what common opinion regarded as the doctrine of Thomas; or to express or confirm singular opinions contrary to the common teaching of the doctors on matters of faith and morals, except to refute them at once and answer objections. These words were aimed directly at Durandus. In his *Commentary* he had given expression to many an *opinio singularis* explaining, however, that he did not embrace them because they were so novel. But since he did not refute them the conclusion was that he was in sympathy with them. The regulation of the chapter forbidding the publication outside the Order of *scripta, tractatus, compilationes, reportationes* on any questions before they had been approved and corrected by the General of the Order, and that those already distributed were to be examined and corrected[65] was also directed against Durandus. Why did this blow against Durandus come so late? The reason may be seen in the change of Master Generals. The Master General Aylmer of Piacenza resigned at the general chapter of Naples in 1311.[66] The next year at the chapter of Carcassonne, Berengar of Landorra, Master of theology and provincial of Toulouse, was chosen as successor.[67] Naturally he would hesitate to proceed at once against so famous a confrere as Durandus. In the next general chapter, however, he did.

The explanation, however, is probably less simple. The change of Generals may well have meant also a change of system or policy. Mortier has shown that Alymer resigned unwillingly. He had always opposed the persecution and condemnation of the Templars, therefore the powerful adviser of Clement V, Cardinal Nicholas de Prato, O.P., worked for his deposition. Part of the Order was opposed to the General's zeal to promote study. Nicholas supposedly took advantage of this situation to execute his plan, and succeeded in having him deposed.[68]

Koch modifies Mortier's explanation in a solution which seems more acceptable. He submits that the legislation of the general chapters under Berengar of Landorra shows that he also had a deep interest in the advancement of studies.

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[63] Cf. *supra*, p. 149.

[64] Durandus himself regretted the imprudent curiosity of his admirers. In the conclusion to the third redaction of his *Commentary* he complains: quod in primis dictaveram et scripseram, fuit a quibusdam curiosis mihi subreptum, antequam per me sufficienter correctum. As quoted by Koch, *Beiträge*, XXVI, 68.

[65] Reichert, *Acta*, II, 65: Inhibemus districte, ne scripta, tractatus, compilaciones, reportaciones questionum quarumcumque a fratribus nostris edita vel edenda extra ordinem publicentur, quousque per venerabilem patrem magistrum ordinis examinata fuerint et correcta: communicata vero extra ordinem per eundem examinari et corrigi volumus diligenter. As quoted by Koch, *loc. cit.*, 411, n. 7.

[66] Cf. Mortier, *Histoire des Maîtres Généraux de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs*, II (Paris, 1905), p. 486 ff.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 477.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 469. These references to Mortier's work, since it was not available to me, are borrowed from Koch, *Beiträge*, XXVI, 412.

In this respect he does not noticeably differ from Aylmer. But the latter seems to have been much more tolerant of the opinions of the learned members of the Order. No general chapter was directed against James of Metz. The Church authorities, not those of the Order, initiated measures against John Quidort. Aylmer encouraged the Neoplatonist, Theodoric of Freiberg to write;[69] as he did the Thomist, Herveus.[70] Keeping this in mind, we may well question if Aylmer would have done more than warn Durandus. Berenger of Landorra adopted a more rigorous attitude, which indeed was in accord with Aylmer's regarding the promotion of studies, but which insisted that they must be in accord with the teaching of the Church and St. Thomas, and which required that all works for publication must first be examined by the Master General.

The regulation of the general chapter of Metz (that all writings circulated outside the Order were to be examined and corrected) was at once translated into reality. Before the end of the year 1313 a commission headed by Herveus Natalis was appointed to examine the works of Durandus. John of Naples and Peter of Palude drew up a list of ninety-three objectionable articles. This list was sent to the General of the Order in London, no doubt so that it might be there to receive the consideration of the general chapter of 1314.[71]

(8) *Chapter of London, May 26, 1314*

> Since studies must be reformed with care and due caution we wish and ordain that the provincial chapters provide assistant professors (*cursores*) of the *Sentences* in places having at least fourteen students in the general or even particular course of theology. If they fail to do so they are to be so punished by the Master of the Order as to stand as a lesson for others. This assistant professor is bound to lecture on the whole of the *Sentences* in the course of the year, at least in a general course; the following year he is to have the office of master of studies in the same convent and conduct a disputation once a week if possible. Immediately after Easter he is to begin to lecture on the moral philosophy or some other tract of Friar Thomas or alternately on them until August 1. All students must attend these lectures. He is bound in conscience each year to send an accurate report to the Master of the Order or the general chapter on the following points: what and how much the lectors read, how often they conduct disputations, how the brethren observe the ordinances on study enacted by the general chapter of Metz, and whether the priors promote study and protect the rights of students as we wish them to be protected. Let the master of studies employ the help of the assistant professor (*cursor*) during his lecture (*actu legentis*). If he fulfils all these duties faithfully let him be promoted the following year to a fitting and solemn lectureship. We wish this ordinance to be observed without fail this year.[72]

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[69] Cf. E. Krebs, 'Meister Dietrich', *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, V* (1906), 5-6, p. 26*: Placuit Reverentiae vestrae et ad hoc me hortabimini, ut id, quod conceperam, scripto conferrem. . . .

[70] Cf. *Id.* 'Theologie und Wissenschaft', *Beiträge*, XI (1912), 3-4, p. 1*: . . . opus super hoc a vobis (Aymerico) impositum mihi propter reverentiam vestram et bonum obedientiae sum agressus.

[71] Cf. Koch, *Beiträge*, XXVI, 16-19.

[72] Walz, *Ordinationes*, 171: *Acta* II, p. 72, 1.11-31; p. 73, 1. 1s.—Cum circa reformacionem studii cura et cautela sit diligens adhibenda, volumus et ordinamus, quod in studiis theologie generalibus et etiam particularibus, in quibus dumtaxat XIV sunt studentes, ad provinciale capitulum provisio pertinebit, quod de sufficiencioribus provincie ponantur sentenciarum cursores; et si talem non posuerint, qui ad ea, que sequuntur, sufficiat, per magistrum ordinis taliter puniantur, quod sit ceteris in exemplum. Dictus autem cursor teneatur sentencias integraliter legere infra annum, maxime in studio generali, qui sequenti anno in eodem conventu magistri studencium fungatur officio et semel disputare in qualibet septimana, si sit possible, teneatur. Qui statim post pascha incipiat legere de phylosophia morali vel de aliquo tractatu fratris Thome vel alternatim de istis et continuet saltem usque

The tone of this enactment reflects Berengar of Landorra's interest in the advancement of studies. The course of studies is to be reformed and in it the works of St. Thomas are to figure prominently.

Durandus is not mentioned by name, nor does the chapter refer to him in any particular way. It simply insists that the ordinances drawn up at Metz in the preceding year be observed. Apparently the chapter members were not fully satisfied with the work of the commission. At any rate an additional member, Matthew of Rome, was appointed to help with the task of examining Durandus' writings for anti-Thomist doctrine. The introduction to the list of errors finally drawn up is dated, Wednesday in the octave of Peter and Paul, that is, July 3.[73] The list was given to Durandus, who attempted to justify himself in his *excusationes*. This work also was placed in the hands of Herveus for examination. Durandus took occasion publicly to express his views on the more important censured articles in the next quodlibetal disputes (Advent, 1314). Herveus then undertook a critique of Durandus' *Quodlibet*.[74]

(9) *Chapter of Bologna, May 11, 1315*

> (a) The master of studies shall supervise general studies and shall inform the Master of the Order regarding them, and the provincial and his diffinitors regarding other studies on the following points: what, how much, and how the lectors read and how often during the year disputations are held; further, whether they teach contrary to the common doctrine of Thomas or the common opinion of the Church on matters pertaining to the articles of the faith, good morals, or the sacraments of the Church; and whether they advance reasons against them or anything pertaining to them, and leave them unsolved. About these the master of studies will first warn the offenders with due respect. If the guilty fail to correct their mistakes by revoking them as they ought, he is to refer the matter by word of mouth or in writing to the provincial or his vicar unless the Master of the Order is in the vicinity. If the charge is true, offenders are to be deprived of the office of lector.
>
> The master of studies must also determine whether anything contrary to the doctrine of Thomas or anything in writings or notes of any kind be found to be erroneous, suspicious, or near error. If such be found, the Master of the Order must be informed at once. Lectors, professors in general studies, and other brethren fit for this, are thus bound.[75]

ad kalendas augusti. Ad cuius lectiones omnes studentes teneantur venire. Hic teneatur omni anno super animam suam fidele testimonium perhibere magistro ordinis vel generali capitulo scribere, que sequuntur, videlicet: quid et quantum lectores legerint, quociens disputaverint, quomodo fratres ordinaciones capituli generalis Metensis circa studium servaverint, qualiter priores studium promoverint et libertates studentibus servaverint, quas volumus inviolabiliter observari. Utatur autem predictus magister studencium graciis cursoris actu legentis. Et si hec omnia fideliter adimpleverit, sequenti anno promoveatur ad lectionem ydoneam et solempnem. Hanc autem ordinacionem isto anno volumus inviolabiliter observari.

[73] Cf. Koch, *loc. cit.*, 17, 18.

[74] *Ibid.* 85 ff; 119 ff; 224 ff; 413.

[75] Walz, *Ordinationes*, 171, 172: *Acta* II, p. 81, 1.10-26.—Magister studencium observabit et referet magistro ordinis in studiis generalibus et provinciali et diffinitoribus in aliis studiis, quid, quantum et quomodo lectores legent et in anno quociens disputabunt. Insuper si docuerint contra communem doctrinam Thome aut contra communes opiniones ecclesie, tangentes articulos fidei, bonos mores vel ecclesie sacramenta, aut si contra ista, aut aliquid istorum adduxerint raciones, quas dimiserint insolutas. Super quibus eos primo cum debita reverencia admonebit; quod si se non correxerint debite revocando, provinciali vel eius vicario referat verbo vel scripto, si magister ordinis non fuerit in propinquo; qui si invenerit ita esse, eos absolvat ab officio lectionum.

Advertat eciam magister studencium, si aliquid contra doctrinam Thome aut erroneam vel suspectum seu errori propinquum invenerit in scriptis vel reportationibus quibuscumque. Quod si aliquid tale suo iudicio poterit invenire, statim significare magistro ordini non obmittat. Ad quod faciendum lectores et cursores studiorum generalium necnon et alii fratres ad hoc apti maneant obligati.

This text is little more than a restatement and confirmation of the legislation adopted in the preceding general chapter. The Master General was still anxious about writings contrary to St. Thomas and was determined that even suspicious works be reported to him. Such a regulation could hardly have been directed against Hubert Guidi, a bachelor at Florence, who had given expression to his opposition to the doctrine of St. Thomas on many points in a public disputation. He was punished by the provincial chapter of Arezzo, which asked him to retract his error and deprived him for two years of the office of lector as well as of the privilege of taking part in any disputation. Further, he was transferred to the convent at Pistoia, and a fast of ten days on bread and water was imposed.[76] The superiors of the Order may have seen in Hubert Guidi an example of the influence Durandus, who in spite of his anti-Thomistic views was called to the prominent position of *lector curiae*, was exercising on other Dominicans.

The general chapter of Montpellier (1316) again has reference to Durandus. His *tractatus, scriptus* and *reportationes* did not at once disappear from all the Dominican houses and the danger that the simple might be contaminated by them remained. But the problem is now left in the hands of the provincial priors and their diffinitors. The severity of the legislation then in effect is modified and cases reserved previously to the Master General of the Order are now left in the hands of provincials who are bound, however, to make reports to the Master General.[77] As to the erroneous works in circulation, they were to be subjected to correction according to the regulations of the chapter of Metz. This obligation was placed on the Master General.[78] The standard according to which these works were to be corrected was, of course, St. Thomas, though the provincial chapter of Orthez mentions also Albert the Great and Peter of Tarantasia as models to be followed in the schools.[79]

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[76] Denifle-Chatelain, *Chartularium*, II, p. 174: Quia frater Albertus Guidi, bacellarius Florentinus, hoc anno in conventu Florentio dum disputaretur de *Quolibet* in conspectu multitudinis fratrum, secularium, clericorum et aliorum religiosorum temerarie, non solum in ipsa disputatione, sed etiam in cathedra dum legeret, multa assertive dixit contra sanam et sacram doctrinam venerabilis doctoris fratris Thome de Aquino, quodque in irreverentiam prefati sacri doctoris et contra reverentiam sui lectoris superbe et arroganter multa dixit, quod etiam inauditum est determinando in cathedra contra determinationem ipsius lectoris, prout omnia clare probata sunt tam per suamet verba quam etiam per testimonia veridicorum et scientificorum studentium qui presentes in omnibus extiterunt; ne talis et tanta culpa, sicut non debet, pertranseat impunita et sibi sit ac ceteris fratribus in posterum in documentum pariter et exemplum, non plus sapere quam opporteat sapere set sapere ad sobrietatem, habita super predictis diligenti consultatione cum discretis et scientificis fratribus, imponimus ac districte mandamus eidem fratri Uberto ut illa que sic temerarie et contra veram doctrinam prefati doctoris dixit coram multis sic congregata multitudine fratrum et aliorum licteratorum virorum, secularium, clericorum et aliorum religiosorum studeat illa pure et sincere ac humiliter retractare prout et quando reverendus pater prior provincialis sibi duxerit imponendum, et ipsum per biennium omni lectione omnique disputatione cuiuscumque facultatis ac magisterio studentium et omni actu scolastico privamus. Et ipsum de conventu Florentino removemus et Pistoriensi conventui assignamus et decem dies in pane et aqua jejunandos sibi damus. That Humbert had been punished by this provincial chapter before the general chapter convened, as Koch seems to indicate (*Beiträge*, XXVI, 414), is doubtful.

[77] Reichert, *Acta*, II, 93: Item cum quidam tractatus, scripta sive reportaciones theologie a fratribus nostri ordinis compilati, sine examinacione et approbacione ordinis contra constituciones publicati, fratres a communi et salubri doctrina retrahant, et possint saltem simplicibus dare occasionem errandi, volumus et ordinamus, quod priores provinciales in suis capitulis provincialibus de consilio diffinitorum studeant de tali remedio providere, quod huic defectui salubriter obvietur, dictumque remedium quam cito poterunt, studeant magistro ordinis intimare et ipse videat, si circa tale remedium sit aliquid immutandum. As quoted by Koch, *Beiträge*, XXVI, 415.

[78] *Ibid.*: Magistro etiam ordinis imponimus, quod examen de mandato suo factum ex ordinatione generalis capituli Metis novissime celebrati de predictis tractatibus, reportacionibus, sive scriptis executioni mandet, secundum quod in presenti diffinitorio concorditer est conclusum.

[79] Ed. F. Ehrle, 'Nicolaus Trivet', *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Phil. des Mittelalters*, Suppl. II (1923), 34: . . . iuxta id, quod circa huiusmodi est nobis impositum per Capitulum generale, inhibemus districte lectoribus et sublectoribus universis, quod nullam conclusionem aliquam doctrine communi oppositam in scholis audeant asserere vel docere.

The trouble with Durandus would soon end. In 1317 he was relieved of his obedience when John XXII appointed him bishop of the new see of Limoux. The Order had done its best to check the influence of the *doctor modernus* on the theology of its members. It is interesting to note, in conclusion, that the general chapters make no mention of his death. When other members of the Order died prayers and masses were stipulated. Of Durandus there is no mention. The attitude of the Order may well have been similar to that which found expression in a later legendary epitaph:

Durus Durandus jacet hic sub marmore duro
An sit cremandus? nec ego scio, sed neque curo.[80]

> (b) If possible the master of studies is bound to provide a disputation once a week, and as often as is opportune he is to begin lecturing on the moral philosophy or some other work of Friar Thomas, or these alternately. This is to be done as soon as possible and until the provincial chapter convenes, or at least until August 1, if it has not been held by that time. All students are obliged to come to these lectures, as above prescribed with regard to the lector and assistant professor. The master of studies is to have the help of the assistant professor to do the reading.
>
> Since the general progress of the brethren is advanced by a large number of good books in the common *armarium*, we desire, ordain, and strictly command that the books of questions of Friar Thomas, his commentaries on Sacred Scripture, as well as other questions or useful books which by any title belong to the convent, may not be sold or alienated by anyone in any way whatsoever. They are to be kept in their entirety in the common *armarium*, and are not to be removed by anyone unless there is a duplicate. Convents with general studies or masters of theology are to remain under the watchful eye of the Master of the Order until they have a complete set of the writings of Friar Thomas, especially in theology. We desire the same rule to be observed in regard to concordances of the Bible.[81]

Et ut istud melius observetur, volumus et imponimus, quod cum dictis, scriptis et quolibet doctorum venerabilium fratrum Thome et Alberti et domini Petri de Tarantasia suas legant et continuent lectiones.

[80] Cf. Koch, *Beiträge*, XXVI, 397. For the account of the relation between Durandus and his Order I have followed closely this work by Koch which I recommend for further details.

[81] Walz, *Ordinationes*, 172: *Acta* II, p. 81, 1. 32-35; p. 82, 1. 1-4.—Magister studencium semel in septimana disputare, si commode poterit teneatur, et de phylosophia morali vel de aliquo opere fratris Thome vel alternatim de hiis legere incipiat, quamcicius viderit opportunum, et usque ad suum provinciale capitulum vel saltem usque ad kalendas augusti continuet lectiones, si ante non fuerit suum provinciale capitulum celebratum. Ad quas lectiones omnes studentes teneantur venire, sicut de lectionibus lectoris et cursoris superius est expressum. Utatur autem predictus magister studencium graciis cursoris, qui legit actu.

Ibidem, p. 83, 1. 25-33; p. 84, 1. 1-3.—Cum ad communem profectum fratrum sit utile, quod libri multi et boni in communi armario habeantur, volumus et ordinamus districtius iniungentes, quod libri questionum fratris Thome, scripta supra bibliam secundum ipsum aut alie questiones seu libri utiles, qui ad conventus de cetero quocumque titulo pertinebunt, non possint vendi nec alienari quomodolibet per quemcumque, sed in communi armario integraliter reponantur et, si ad hoc apti fuerint, non possint inde per aliquem amoveri nisi predicti libri fuerint in armario duplicati. In conventibus autem, in quibus sunt studia generalia vel ubi magistri in theologia fuerint, hec precipit magister ordinis diligencius observari, donec omnia scripta fratris Thome et maxime in theologia ibidem integraliter habeantur; quod vult de concordanciis biblie similiter observari. The meaning of "*libri questionum fratris Thome*" is not clear. I feel safe in saying, however, that the expression does not refer specifically to the *Questiones disputatae* or *Questiones quolibetales*. The very method of scholastics was such that their works were divided into questions. Hence the term "*libri questionum*" probably designates St. Thomas' works in general. For the general and specific meanings of *quaestio* in scholastic terminology see, F. Pelster, 'Quaestio', *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, VIII (2nd ed., Freiburg im Breisgau, 1936), cols. 579, 580.

This additional provision of the chapter of Bologna is of special interest since it confirms again the esteem which the works of St. Thomas enjoyed. Among them the commentaries on Scripture, and the works on moral philosophy were especially valued.

We need not be surprised that St. Thomas' masterpiece, his *Summa Theologiae*, is not specifically mentioned in the legislation of general chapters. A long and firmly rooted tradition determined the method followed in the theological schools of the time, a tradition that could not be casually brushed aside in an age which venerated the past. The Bible remained the basic text and the unsystematic *Sentences* of Peter Lombard continued to hold the prominent place it had merited for itself in theological studies. To be a master of theology meant at this time and continued to mean a master of the *Sentences*. The general chapters could not revolutionize this system of study. They could and did bind their subjects, as early as the chapter of Saragossa (1309), to apply to their studies the doctrine of St. Thomas,[82] which surely meant that they were to study his solutions to the problems which the *Sentences* presented. The general chapters indicate a gradual trend away from the *Sentences* and this chapter prescribes lectures on the moral philosophy of St. Thomas, (surely the *Summa* is meant) and other of his works. Convents were to procure especially the *theological works* of St. Thomas. Thus the *Summa* gradually took its place beside the *Sentences*.[83] But tradition was stubborn. The provincial chapter of Perugia (1308) prescribed that lectors and bachelors read from the *Sentences* and not from the *Summa* of St. Thomas.[84] Only at the end of the fifteenth century did the *Summa* achieve in the Order the purpose for which it was written, that is, its use as a textbook in theology.[85]

In view of this strong tradition and attachment to it, the prescription that *all* the works of St. Thomas were to be acquired by the various Dominican houses, and this under the Master General's scrutiny, is the more noteworthy.

(10) *Chapter of Bordeaux, June 3, 1324*

> We introduce the regulation that the venerable doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas be honored uniformly throughout the Order with a duplex office on March 7.[86]

St. Thomas, who died on March 7, 1274, at the Abbey of Fossanova, was canonized on July 18, 1323.[87] The general chapter held at Rouen, May 18, 1320 had expressed the hope that Thomas would be canonized and had enjoined on all provincial priors the sending of as many *florenos* to the next chapter as they had convents in their provinces, leaving the priors to tax the convents as they saw fit.[88]

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[82] Cf. *supra*, p. 149.

[83] Cf. P. Mandonnet, 'Frères Prêcheurs (La théologie dans l'ordre des)', *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, VI, i (Paris, 1924), cols. 889, 890.

[84] *Archives générales O.P.* III, 1, fol. 175: Item volumus et ordinamus firmiter observari quod lectores et baccellarii legant de sententiis et non de Summa Thomae. As quoted by Mandonnet, *loc. cit.*

[85] Cf. Mandonnet, *loc. cit.* The comparative popularity of the *Summa* in the various centuries since the time of St. Thomas is indicated by the fruits of the study of A. Michelitsch, *Kommentatoren zur Summa Theologiae* (Graz und Wien, 1924). Michelitsch in a table on pages 169 and 170 shows that there was one commentary on the whole *Summa* in the fifteenth century; nineteen in the sixteenth; fifty-three in the seventeenth; eleven in the eighteenth; one in the nineteenth, and five in the twentieth. See also M. Grabmann, *Einfürung in die Summa Theologiae des heiligen Thomas von Aquin* (2nd ed. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1928), pp. 36-49. Eng. tr. by J. Zybura, *Introduction to the Theological Summa of St. Thomas* (St. Louis, London, 1930), pp. 43-59.

[86] Walz, *Ordinationes*, p. 173: *Acta* II, p. 151, 1. 13 ff.: Inchoamus, quod de sancto Thoma de Aquino, venerabili doctore, fiat per totum ordinem septima die marcii totum duplex . . . , et illud officium per totum ordinem uniformiter habeatur, . . .

[87] For a history of the canonization of St. Thomas see especially P. Mandonnet, 'La canonisation de saint Thomas d'Aquin', *Mélanges thomistes* (Paris, Saulchoir, 1923) pp. 1-48, and P. A. Walz, 'Historia canonizationis sancti Thomae de Aquino', *Xenia Thomistica*, III (Rome, 1925), pp. 105-165.

The canonization marked an hour of triumph for St. Thomas' works, a triumph which the general chapters might justly presume to share. They had promoted Thomas' doctrine, had done all in their power to defend it against enemies within and outside the Order. Now Thomas was a canonized saint. There would be enemies of his doctrine in the future. But the Pope had said:

> . . . . ipse plus illuminavit Ecclesiam, quam omnes alii Doctores, in cuius libris plus proficit homo uno anno, quam in aliorum doctrina toto tempore vitae suae.[89]

Enemies could no longer oppose the *doctor communis* on the pretext of compliance with the Paris condemnation. On February 14, 1325 the bishop of Paris solemnly revoked that condemnation insofar as it pertained or had been asserted to pertain to the doctrine of St. Thomas.[90] The authority of St. Thomas was now established. A great impetus was given to the study and diffusion of his doctrine, to the formation of a Thomist school for the promotion and defense of the saint's teaching.[91]

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[88] Walz, *Ordinationes*, 172: *Acta*, II, p. 123, 1. 22-27—Cum de canonizacione fratris Thome de Aquino bona spes habeatur, volumus et discricte iniungimus prioribus provincialibus, quod tot florenos ad sequens capitulum generale mittere teneantur, quot fratrum conventus in suis provinciis habeantur; quem florenorum numerum per conventus suarum provinciarum condividant, secundum quod eis videbitur expedire.

[89] *Acta Sanctorum*, I, Martii, p. 680.

[90] Denifle-Chatelain, *Chartularium*, II, p. 281: . . . solempni ac maturo consilio super hoc habito, supradictam articulorum condempnationem et excommunicationis sententiam, quantum tangunt vel tangere asseruntur doctrinam beati Thome predicti, ex certa scientia tenore presentium totaliter annullamus . . .

[91] Cf. Grabmann, 'Die Kanonisation des hl. Thomas von Aquin in ihrer Bedeutung für Ausbreitung und Verteidigung seiner Lehre im 14 Jahrhundert', *Divus Thomas*, I (3rd series, 1923), 233-249.

MAISTRE NICOLE ORESME
LE LIVRE DU CIEL
ET
DU MONDE[1]

TEXT AND COMMENTARY

ALBERT D. MENUT and ALEXANDER J. DENOMY C.S.B.

(CONTINUED)

64*a* **Ci commenche le secunt livre du ciel et du monde ouquel il determine des corps meüz circulairement, ce est assavoir du ciel et de ses parties. Et contient .xxxi. chappitres.**

[SOMMAIRE DES CHAPITRES DU SECUNT LIVRE]

1.—Ou premier chappitre il determine de la duracion du ciel.

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[1] Continued from MEDIAEVAL STUDIES, III, (1941), pp. 185-280. Books III and IV will appear in a subsequent issue and the critical apparatus will complete the edition. For the reader's convenience we repeat some of the explanation of the editorial apparatus, *ibidem*, p. 186.

The hitherto unpublished text of *Du Ciel et du monde* is preserved in the following six manuscript copies:

A Bibl. Nat., *Ms. Franç.* 1082, ff. 1*a*-209*c*.
B Bibl. Nat., *Ms. Franç.* 565, ff. 23*a*-171*d*.
C Bern. Bibl. Bongarsiana, *Ms. 310*, ff. 28*a*-152*d*.
D Bibl. Nat., *Ms. Franç.* 1083, ff. 1*a*-125*b*.
E Bibl. Nat., *Ms. Franç.* 24278, ff. 1*a*-146*a*.
F Bibl. de la Sorbonne, *Ms.* 571, ff. 1*a*-234*d*.

The first printed edition reproduces the text of *A* with the following exceptions:

1. The geometrical figures appearing in the text have been assembled and printed conveniently throughout each Book with suitable references in foot-notes in the order of their appearance; arabic numerals have been inserted at the beginning of chapter headings; proper names have been uniformly capitalized throughout; all abbreviations have been solved and words run together in the text have been separated in accordance with modern usage; punctuation has been supplied, without strict adherence to any rigid system; the original of *A* is retained save in cases where a scribal error is clearly indicated and all textual emendations are indicated by [ ] with the original reading in a foot-note; unless otherwise indicated, emendations are derived from C; unhistorical final 's' is enclosed in ( ); in so far as practical, the rules for the use of diacritical marks recommended by the Committee of the Société des Anciens Textes Français have been followed (Cf. *Romania*, LII (1926), pp. 243-246).
2. Variant readings are included only when a change of meaning is definitely involved and in Latin quotations; graphic variants are noted only when philological significance warrants. Therefore are omitted minute additions and additions, minor repetitions, orthographical errors of minor importance, all inversions, variants of no contextual importance.
3. The translator's commentary is set off from the translated text by indenting the latter; in the original, text and commentary are distinguished only by the words 'Tiexte' and 'Glose' or by suitable abbreviations.
4. References are to folios of *A*. All foot-note references to works in the Aristotelian corpus are from *Aristotelis Opera ex recensions I. Bekkeri*, 10 vols., Oxford, 1837.
5. In the foot-notes, *Guthrie* refers to *Aristotle on the Heavens*, Greek text with English translation by W. K. C. Guthrie (Cambridge, Mass., and London: the Loeb Classical Library, 1938); *Juntas* to the *Quintum Volumen Aristotelis De*

2.—Ou secunt chappitre[2] il preuve encore que le ciel est pardurable par autres motifs.[3]

3.—Ou tiers il met une condicion du mouvement du ciel.

4.—Ou quart il commence a enquerir se ou ciel sunt destre et senestre et les autres differences de posicion et repreuve un opinion.

5.—Ou quint il monstre que toutes les differences de posicion[4] sunt ou ciel, ce est assavoir, desuz et desouz, destre et senestre, devant et desriere.

6.—Ou .vi.^{e} il monstre comment les differences[5] sunt assignees ou ciel.

7.—Ou .vii.^{e} il monstre comment selon le ciel les dites differences sunt en terre.

8.—Ou .viii.^{e} il monstre pourquoy ou ciel sunt plusieurs mouvemens.

9.—Ou .ix.^{e} il monstre que le ciel est de figure esp[er]ique[6] par raison prinse[7] de la priorté de ceste figure.

10.—Ou .x.^{e} il prove ce meïsme par .iii. autres raysons.

11.—[En] le[8] .xi.^{e} il met la quarte rayson a monstrer que le ciel est sperique. /

64b 12.—Ou .xii.^{e} il enquert et met la cause pourquoy le ciel est meü la voie que il tourne plus que l'autre voie converse.

13.—Ou .xiii.^{e} il monstre que le mouvement du ciel est regulier par une rayson.

14.—Ou .xiiii.^{e} il monstre[9] ce meïsme par .iii. autres raysons.

15.—Ou .xv.^{e} il commence a determiner des estoylles et premierement de leur substance et comment elles sunt cause de chaleur.

16.—Ou .xvi.^{e} il monstre que estoylles sunt meües au mouvement des cyelx ou elles sunt et non autrement.

17.—Ou .xvii.^{e} il reprove l'opinion d'aucuns qui disoient que les corps du ciel par leur mouvement font sons melodieus.

18.—Ou .xviii.^{e} il monstre que les cielx par leur mouv[em]ens[10] ne funt aucun son.[11]

19.—Ou .xix.^{e} il tracte de l'ordre des cielx des planetes.

20.—Ou .xx.^{e} il monstre que les estoylles sunt de figure sperique.

21.—Ou .xxi.^{e} il pourpose .ii. fortes questions.

22.—Ou .xxii.^{e} il met la solucion de la premiere question.

23.—Ou .xxiii.^{e} il respont a la secunde question.

24.—Ou .xxiiii.^{e} il commence a determiner de la terre en tant comme elle [est][12] centre du munde, et premierement de son lieu en reprovant[13] aucuns opinions.

64c 25.—Ou .xxv.^{e} il recite aucuns opini-//ons du mouvement de la terre.

26.—Ou .xxvi.^{e} il reprove un opinion de la figure de la terre et met la doubte que plusieurs funt du lieu et du repos de la terre.

27.—Ou .xxvii.^{e} il commence a reprover .v. causes[14] que les anciens metoient du repos de la terre.

28.—Ou .xxviii.^{e} il reprove .ii. autres causes ou opinions du repos de la terre.

29.—Ou .xxix.^{e} il prove par .iiii.[15] raysons que la terre repose ou melieu du munde.

Coelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, Meteorologicorum, De Plantis, cum Averroïs Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis, Venetiis apud Juntas, MDLXXIIII.

[2] *BCEF* omit 'chapitre;' *D* omits 'ou secunt chapitre.'

[3] *BCDEF* il preuve par autres raisons que le ciel est pardurable.

[4] *BCDEF* differences dessus dites sunt.

[5] *BCDEF* les dites differences.

[6] *A* espique.

[7] *BCDEF* raisons prises.

[8] *ADE* ou le.

[9] *BCDEF* pro(u)ve.

[10] *A* mouvens.

[11] *BCDEF* aucuns sons.

[12] *A* omits 'est.'

[13] *B* reprenant.

[14] *BCDEF* il reprouve .iii. causes que aucuns anciens.

[15] *F* .iii.

30.—Ou .xxx.^e^ il monstre que la terre est de figure sperique par .ii. raysons natureles.

31.—Ou .xxxi.^e^ il prove[16] encore que la terre est sperique par .iiii. raysons de astrologie.[17] /

[LIVRE II]

65a *Cy commence le secont livre du ciel et du monde ouquel il determine des corps meüs circulairement, c'est a savoir du ciel et de ses parties, et contient .xxxi. chappitre[s].*[1]

1.—*Ou premier chappitre il determine de la duracion du ciel.*

Tout le ciel ne fu onques fait et ne peut estre corrompu si comme aucuns dient que si peut.

Glose. Ce estoit Plato et ses desciples qui disoient que il fu fait et que il est corruptible.

Tiexte. Mais il est un et pardurable.[2]

Glose. Et a ce prouver il touche ou met .vii.[3] moiens ou raisons.

Tiexte. Car il ne ot onques commencement ne fin de toute sa duracion qui est pardurable, car il a et contient en soy temps infini.

Glose. Car selonc Aristote, tout le temps qui fu et sera est sanz commencement et sanz fin, si comme il appert en le .viii.^e^ de *Phisique.*[4] Et le ciel par son mouvement contient tout le temps aussi comme la cause contient son effit et si comme la mesure contient la chose mesuree. Et donques le ciel est sanz commencement et sans fin. Ce est la premiere raison. Et selon la
65b translacion d'Averroïz, Aristote conclut ainsi: *semper est eternum / sine principio et sine fine per omnia secula.*[5] Il veult dire que le ciel a duré et durera par touz les siecles. Et est a savoir que cest mot *seculum* ou *siecle* est prins en .iiii. manieres: une est pour le monde. Item, Plato appelloit *siecle* la duracion qui estoit avant que le commencement du monde et du temps; et ce est eternité permanente, si comme il fu dit ou .xxiiii.^e^ chappitre[6] du premier. Item, il est dit de la duracion ou espace successive[7] de cent ans; et selon ce di(s)t Ovide que la cornelle vit[8] .iii.^c^ siecles: *trecentum secula cornix,*[9] et entent par ce .iii.^c^ ans. Item, de chascune chose le temps qui contient la duracion de elle ou de sa vie[10] et qui en est mesure est dit son siecle, et est appellé le oziz[o]n[10a] de celle chose, si comme di(s)t Averroïz ou .xxiiii.^e^ chappitre.[11] Et donques la duracion de la chose qui n'a commencement ne fin est un siecle infini. Et pour ce, di(s)t Aristote que le ciel a duré et durera *per omnia secula*, c'est a savoir par touz les siecles finis. Item, pour ce que le siecle du ciel qui est infini[12] contient et comprent touz les autres siecles finiz, il peut estre dit *seculum seculorum*, c'est a

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[16] *E* monstre . . . est de figure sperique.

[17] *A* 64*d* blank.

[1] *A* chappitre; *BCDEF* omit 'Cy commence . . . chappitre[s].'

[2] *BCDE* il est pardurable; *F* il est corruptible.

[3] *BCDEF* il met .vi. *A* is correct; cf. 73*a*.

[4] *Physicorum,* VIII, 1, 251b, 14-26.

[5] *F* secula seculorum. Cf. *Juntas,* 95K.

[6] *BCDEF* .xxviii. *E* omits 'chapitre.' Cf. 34d-35a.

[7] *DE* espace dessus dicte de.

[8] *DE* omit 'vit.'

[9] *DE* cornis. Cf. *Meta.*, VII, 274: 'Oro caputque novem cornicis saecula passae.' Also: *Amores*, II, 6, 35: 'vivit et armiferae cornix invisa Minervae, illa quidem saeclis vix moritura novem.' There are no other references to the crow's age in Ovid.

[10] *BCDE* fin.

[10a] *A* ozizen.

[11] *BCDE* .xxviii. *F.* xxxviii. Cf. *Juntas,* t.c. 100, 68A.

[12] *A* infiniz.

dire le siecle des siecles qui sont finiz, successis et temporelz, lesquelz
65c l'Apostle appelloit *tempora secularia.*[13] Item, pour ce // que pluseurs cielz[14]
sont et le siecle de chascun ciel[15] est infini, il s'ensuit que les siecles des
cielz peuent estre diz en plurier nombre *secula seculorum.* Item, le siecle
successif de une telle chose, posé que elle fust perpetuelle de toutes pars,
ne contient pas le siecle d'une autre chose semblablement perpetuelle; et
pour ce, l'en ne pourroit pas proprement dire que le ciel a duré ou durera
per secula seculorum, mais l'en peut bien dire que il durera *per seculum
seculorum* comme dit est, c'est a savoir par le siecle des siecles qui sont
finiz en quantité et infiniz en multitude. Item, la duracion de Dieu laquelle
est toute ensemble et permanente indivisible appellee eternité, contient
et enclot et excede toutes duracions successives ou temporelles, posé que
elles fussent sanz commencement et sanz fin. Et de Dieu di(s)t l'Apostle:
quod solus habet immortalitatem,[16] c'est a savoir eternité de quoy di(s)t
Ysaïe: *quod ipse Deus est habitans eternitatem.*[17] Et pour ce, il s'ensuit
que de Dieu seulement l'en peut dire proprement que il vit et regne *per
omnia secula seculorum,* car ceste eternité de Dieu contient touz les siecles
qui seroient sanz commencement et sanz fin et desquelz chascun seroit
65d siecle des siecles finiz, comme dit est. Et de *se- / culis*[18] *seculorum* parle
saint Augustin ou .xii.e livre[19] de *La Cité de Dieu.* Item, eternité est dite
aucune fois par equivocacion de duracion successive infinie de toutes pars,
si comme Aristote di(s)t souvent que *mundus est eternus et motus celi
eternus,*[20] *et cetera.* Et selon ce, l'en peut dire de Dieu que il regnera *in
eternum et ultra,*[21] car il regnera tant comme sera duracion successive
ymaginee pardurable et donques *in eternum.* Et regnera en son eternité
permanente laquelle est oultre et contient comme cause et passe toute autre
duracion qui seroit sanz commencement et sanz fin, et donques il regnera
in eternum et ultra. Item, pour ce miex entendre, je met exemple en quantité
corporelle, car se nous appellons le ciel premier celui qui est le plus
pres de nous, ce est le ciel de la lune. Je di que le secont ciel en montant
peut estre dit ciel du premier et le tiers dit ciel du secont et ainsi des
autres, car nous appellons communement le ciel d'une chose ce que est
par desus elle et qui la contient ou queuvre. Et selon ce, l'en peut dire
des cielz que celui qui est par desus un autre ciel et qui le contient est ciel
du contenu. Et par aventure, par ce peut estre entendue l'escripture de
66a Moÿse qui di(s)t: *domini Dei tui*[22] // *celum est et celum celi,*[23] et est possible
que par le premier *celum* il entent le ciel invisible qui est appellé
empireum[24] ou *glaciale,* et par le secont *celum*[25] il entent la noviesme [o]u[26]
octiesme espere qui contient toute la masse des autres cielz qui est entendue,
parce que il di(s)t tiercement *celi* en genitif singulier. Et par voie
semblable, l'en peut exposer ce que di(s)t le Prophete: *celum celi domino,
et cetera.*[27] Item, .ii. ou pluseurs des cielz qui sont plus haut et contiennent
ceulz qui sont plus bas et dedens eulz; et selon ce, il sont cielz de cielz, et
par ce peu(s)t estre exposee l'Escripture qui di(s)t: *si celum et celi
celorum te non capiunt, etc.,*[28] en disant que par *celum* est a entendre le
souverain et desrenier ciel, et par *celi celorum* sont entendus[29] les autres,

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[13] Cf. 2 *Tim.* i, 9; *Tit.* i, 2.

[14] *BCDEF* siecles.

[15] *BC* chascun si elle est; *F* si ele.

[16] *A* immortalitalitatem. Cf. 1 *Tim.* vi, 16: 'qui solus habet immortalitatem.'

[17] Cf. *Isai.* lvii, 15: 'Quia haec dicit Excelsus, et sublimis habitans aeternitatem.'

[18] *B* seculum.

[19] *BCDE* chapitre. *De civitate Dei*, ed. Dombart (Teubner), XII, 19, 480-481.

[20] *E* celi est eternus; *BCDEF* omit 'et cetera.'

[21] *Exodus* xv, 18.

[22] *DE* deum dei tui.

[23] Unidentified.

[24] *B* celum empireum.

[25] *C* selum.

[26] *A* au.

[27] *Psalm* cxiii, 16. *B* omits 'et cetera.'

[28] Cf. 2 *Par.* vi, 18: 'Si coelum et coeli coelorum non te capiunt.' *BCDEF* omit 'etc.'

[29] *BCDEF* sont a entendre les.

comme dit est. Et donques aussi comme le ciel qui contient un autre ciel
est dit *celum celi,* et aussi de pluseurs peut l'en dire *celum celorum* et *celi*
celorum par continence local, semblablement di(s)t l'en des siecles dont[30]
les uns contiennent les autres par continence de duracion, si comme dit
est. Item, aussi comme l'eternité indivisible de Dieu contient toute autre
duracion, semblablement l'immensité indivisible de Dieu contient touz
66b corps qui sont ou qui peuent estre. / Et selon ce, Priscian ou commencement
de sa *Mappemonde* di(s)t ainsi: *nature*[31] *genitor, mundum qui continet*[32]
omnem annue rex celi, etc.[33] Mes par ce que dit est, il sambleroit que
l'eternité[34] de Dieu peüst estre dite siecle de touz siecles, car elle les contient;
et que son inmensité peü[s]t[35] estre dite ciel de touz cielz, car elle
les contient. Et je respon et di que, par aventure, selon la consideracion
desus mise bien entendue, ce ne seroit pas inconvenient; mes pour ce que
communement l'en entent par siecle duracion successive, et par ciel quantité
corporelle, telle maniere de parler comme dit est ne est pas a recevoir,
car l'en ne doit pas dire que Dieu est siecle ne que Dieu est ciel, et il le
convendroit pour ce que Dieu est son eternité et son immensité. Et presque
semblablement dient les docteurs que l'en peüst bien dire que le Filz
de Dieu est creature, ne fust que par ce l'en pourroit entendre que Il fust
pure creature, si comme disoient aucuns heretiques. Item, puisque nous
sommes en ceste matiere, je di que aussi comme hors[36] le monde qui est
fini en extension est l'immensité de Dieu, et meïsme selon Aristote ou
.xxiiii.e chappitre du premier,[37] je di que par raison aussi est ou peut estre
l'eternité de Dieu avant que le monde fust, lequel [est][38] ou peut estre
66c fini en // duracion et ot commencement selon verité; et aussi comme, selon
Aristote, par cest mot *dehors* ou *desus* en cest propos ne est pas denoté
lieu,—car hors le monde ne est aucun lieu,[39] si comme il di(s)t ou .xxiiii.e
du premier,[40]—je di que par semblable raison cest mot *devant* en cest
propos ne denote pas temps, car avant que le monde fust ne estoit aucun
temps.[41] Item, aussi comme tout corps a en soy une trinité de dimensions,
si comme il fu declaré ou premier chappitre du premier,[42] aussi a tout
corps duracion et extension et puissance; et ce est a l'exemplaire de
Dieu le createur qui a en Soy eternité et immensité et toute-puissance.
Et les .iii. choses desus dites qui sont es corps sont finies et distinctees et
divisibles, mais celles de Dieu sont plus que infinies ou simplement infinies
et sont une chose tres simple sanz distinction et du tout indivisible, car
son eternité est sanz succession et son[43] immensité sanz extension et sa[43]
toute-puissance sanz intension. Item, combien que raison naturelle nous
enseigne que en Dieu sont telles choses ou que Dieu est telle chose,
toutevoies nous ne pourrions ce comprendre ne plainnement entendre pour
ce que nostre entendement depent de noz senz naturelz lesquelz sont
corp[or]elz,[44] mais nous les[45] entendons imperfectement. Et pour ce, par
66d aventure, quant / le saint Esperit nous vouloit par son prophete inducer
et mener a la petite cognoissance que nous povons avoir de ces choses,
il nous appelloit enfans et disoit: *laudate pueri Dominum: laudate nomen*

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[30] *F* siecles qui contiennent; *B* omits 'dont;' *DE* quant.

[31] *B* natura.

[32] *BCDE* contines.

[33] *DE* anime. Cf. Dionysii Afri *de situ orbis: sive Geographia Prisciano,* aut Fannio Rhenio interprete liber unicus, Vienna, 1512, p. 3; 'Naturae genitor, quae mundum continet omnem Annue rex coeli positum telluris: et undae . . . '

[34] *F* la trinité.

[35] *A* peut.

[36] *DE* comme est le m.

[37] 34*cd*.

[38] *A* omits 'est.'

[39] *DE* omit 'car hors le monde ne est aucun lieu.'

[40] 34*c*.

[41] *F* lieu; *BCDE* omit 'temps.'

[42] 4*c*.

[43] *DE* sanz.

[44] *A* corpelz; *D* corporeez.

[45] *DE* nous ne les entendons mie perfectement.

Domini,[46] et tantost aprés il nous denote et insinue ces .iii. choses estre en Dieu: et premierement son eternité, par ce que il di(s)t: *sit*[47] *nomen Domini benedictum, ex hoc nunc et usque in seculum*;[48] secondement son immensité, par ce que il di(s)t: *a solis ortu usque ad occasum, laudabile nomen Domini*;[49] et tiercement l'excellence de sa puissance, par ce que il di(s)t: *excelsus super omnes gentes Dominus, et super celos gloria eius.*[50]

Or veul je retourner a parler de ces[t] ciel[51] aprés ce que je me sui un pou dilaté en ceste matiere, pour ce que je ne le ay pas veüe ainsi traitié ailleurs. Je di donques que Aristote touche aprés le secont moien a monstrer que le ciel est pardurable.

> Tiexte. Item, l'en peu(s)t prendre foy de ce par les choses desus dictes.

Glose. Car Aristote a monstré ou sixte et ou .vii.ᵉ chappitre du premier[52] que le ciel ne fu onques fait et que il est incorruptible. Item, es derreniers chappitre[s][53] du premier il a monstré que le monde est perpetuel et sanz commencement. Et le ciel est la premiere et la plus principal partie des 67a elemens du monde. Item, il est plus durable // proprement que ne sont les autres .iiii. elemens, car nulle partie de lui ne est corruptible ne nouvelle et durent toutes sanz crestre et sanz appeticier, mais aucuns des autres elemens ou[54] touz sont continuelment engendrés et corrumpuz, creüz et appeticiéz selon leurs partiez; et ne durent pas par touz temps comme chose permanente mes comme chose successive et qui est une par continuacion, si comme l'en diroit que un fleuve est perpetuel, et toutevoies il n'i a rien de l'eaue qui estoit[55] passés mil ans. Aprés[56] il met le tiers motif.

> Tiexte. Item, encor appert ce que dit est par l'oppinion de ceulz qui dient autrement et qui mettent que le ciel fu engendré ou fait par generacion, car *estre* en la maniere que nous disons est chose possible,[57] et que le ciel soit fait, si comme il dient, ne est pas possible. Se il est ainsi, pour certain ce donne grant inclinacion a ce que nous aions foy de l'immortalité du ciel et de sa pardurableté.

Glose. Il veult dire que a mettre que le ciel est perpetuel il ne s'ensuit quelconque impossible, et a dire que il fu fait d'une matiere qui avoit tousjours duré sanz commencement, si comme aucuns disoient, il s'ensuit chose naturelment impossible. Et contre cest opinion sont les raisons 67b d'Aristote.[58] Mais a dire que il / fu creé de nouvel de nient il ne s'ensuit quelconque impossible. Item, Averroïz recite et approuve un qui disoit que nous tenons plus l'oppinion d'Aristote que des autres en ceste question pour ce que ses paroles sont moins doubteuses et plus loing de contradiction.[59] Item, Aristote di(s)t de l'immortalité du ciel pour ce que selon aucuns anciens, et par aventure selon lui, le ciel est dit immortel pour ce que il vit de vie intellective par les intelligences qui lui sont appropriees.

2.—*Ou secont chappitre il prouve encore que le ciel est pardurable par autres motifs.*

Et pour ce, est ce bien raisonnable chose de soy abandonner aus anciens et maïs[me]ment[1] a crere les paroles de nos anciens peres estre vraies, et que des choses qui ont mouvement aucune soit divine et immortelle, c'est a savoir que elles aient telz mouvemens desquelz ne soit aucune fin, mais que tel mouvement soit plus fin des autres qui ont fin.

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[46] *Psalm* cxii, 1.

[47] *B* omits 'sit.'

[48] *Psalm* cxii, 2.

[49] *Psalm* cxii, 3. *B* outu; *D* ortu caidine usque; *E* ortu et usque. *D* omits 'nomen domini.'

[50] *Psalm* cxii, 4.

[51] *A* de ces cielz aprés; *BCDEF* siecle.

[52] 13*a*-14*d*. *BDE* .viii.ᵉ ch.

[53] *ABCE* chapitre; *F* ou derrenier chapitre.

[54] *BCDEF* omit 'ou;' *DE* autres degréz touz.

[55] *A* esestoit.

[56] *ABCDEF* ans. Glose. Aprés.

[57] *DE* est impossible.

[58] *A* Aristotez.

[59] *Juntas*, t.c. 1, 96B.

Glose. Ce est un motif ou confirmacion par l'auctorité des anciens. Mais contre ce sembleroit estre ce que dist Aristote ou .xxv.^e chappitre du premier ou il dist que tous dient que le monde fu fait et engendré.[2] Je 67*c* respon que // il entent yleuques de touz les philosophes de Grece, car si comme di(s)t Averroïz, Aristote fu le premier des philosophes de Grece qui mist que le monde est pardurable. Mais yci endroit, selon Averroïz, Aristote allegue les philosophes de Caldee qui disoient que le mouvement du ciel est perpetuel sanz commencement.[3] Aprés il met une autre raison.

Tiexte. Item, la cause de ce est car ce que est fin est contenant et contient ce de quoy il est fin. Et le mouvement circulaire du ciel est parfet.

Glose. Si comme il appert par le quart chappitre du premier.[4] Et en un meïsme ordre, ce que est parfet contient ce que est moins parfect.

Tiexte. Et contient les autres mouvemens imparfetz qui ont terme[s][5] et repos.

Glose. Il les contient encor autrement, car il a duré[6] quant il durent et aprés et devant.

Tiexte. Et cest mouvement n'a commencement ne fin.

Glose. Car il est selon ligne circulaire qui est d'une maniere en toutes ses parties, sanz ce que en une soit le commencement de elle plus que en autre fors par signacion voluntaire.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, cest mouvement est sanz cesser par temps infini et est aus autres mouvemens, aus uns cause de leur commencement et des autres il reçoit leur repos.

67*d* Glose. Car / selon Aristote, ce est impossible naturelment que un mouvement commence de nouvel se aucun autre mouvement n'est cause de ceste nouvelleté, et donques convient il que le procés des mouvemens qui sont causes un de l'autre soit infini, et c'est impossible si comme il appert ou secont de *Methaphisique*;[7] ou que un mouvement perpetuel soit cause des autres mouvemens qui ont commencement et c'est le mouvement du ciel. Et di(s)t yci Aristote que aussi il reçoit le repos des autres mouvemens que il conserve; et garde les corps qui se reposent. Et pour ce di(s)t Averroïz que Aristote veult yci dire que des mouvemens pardurables les uns sont cause de la generacion des choses et les autres les conservent.[8] Et selon ce, je dis ou desrenier chappitre du premier que il souffist que les parties de terre qui sont vers le centre soient conservees en estre par l'influence du ciel sanz ce que elles soient jamais corrompues.[9] Aprés il met le sixte motif.

Tiexte. Item, les anciens attribuent aus diex le ciel et le lieu qui est en haut ausi comme lieu lequel seul est immortel.

Glose. Et di(s)t yci Averroïz que toutes loys conviennent et sont a acort 68*a* que Dieu est ou ciel et que Dieu est pardurable. Et il convient // que le lieu de celui qui est pardurable soit pardurable.[10]

Pour mieux entendre ceste chose et aucunes autres qui sont dignes de consideracion, je veul premierement declairer comment Dieu est ou

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[1] *ACD* maisment.
[2] 39*d*.
[3] *B Cadee.* Cf. 40*a* and *Juntas*, t.c. 2, 96F.
[4] 11*a*.
[5] *A* terme.
[6] *BCDEF* il dure quant.
[7] *Metaphysicorum*, II, 2, 994a, 2-7.
[8] *Juntas*, t.c. 2, 96G-H.
[9] 61*b*.
[10] *Juntas*, t.c. 2, 96H.

ciel ou ailleurs, et aprés des autres choses incorporelles ou elles sont et
conment. Quant au premier, les sains docteurs ont determiné comment
Dieu est en ses creatures par grace ou par gloire ou autrement, et comment
elles sont en Lui. Et ce n'appartient pas tant a philosophie comme fait
savoir comment Dieu et les choses incorporelles sont en lieu, car si comme
il appert yci par Averroïz, touz dient que Dieu est ou ciel comme en son
lieu. Je di donques que aussi comme Dieu de neccessité est present sanz
succession en toute duracion passee, presente et a venir par son eternité
indivisible qui contient et passe toute autre duracion et en est cause, si
comme il appert ou chappitre precedent et plus a plain ou .xxiiii.ᵉ chappitre
du premier,[11] semblablement Dieu par sa grandeur infinie sanz quantité et
simplement indivisible appellee immensité est de neccessité tout en toute
68*b* extension ou espace ou lieu qui est ou qui peut / estre ymaginé. Et pour
ce di(s)t l'en que Dieu est touzjours et partout,—*semper et ubique*,—
touzjours par eternité et partout[12] par immensité. Et ce tenoient les paiens,
si comme il appert en une glose ordinaire sus Jeremie ou est allegué un
poëte qui disoit ou livre appellé *Giganchomachie: quo fugis Enchelade,
quascumque accesseris oras* [*sub*][13] *Jove semper eris.*[14] Il vouloit dire que
ce geant Encheladus[15] ne povoit fuir en lieu ou Dieu ne fust. Et selon ce
disoit le Prophete: *quo ibo a spiritu tuo? et quo a facie tua fugiam? Si
ascendero in celum, tu illic*[16] *es: si descendero in*[17] *infernum, ades, etc.*[18] Il
veult dire que Dieu est et ou ciel et en enfer et partout. Et derechief il
di(s)t en Ysaÿe: *celum et terram*[19] *ego impleo.*[20] Et sont a ce pluseurs
autres escriptures et meïsme des paiens, et si comme de Virgile qui dist:
Jovis omnia plena,[21]—tout est plain de Dieu. Et selon les docteurs, Il est
par tout lieu en .iii. manieres, c'est a savoir par presence et par puissance
et par essence. Et aussi comme Dieu ne porroit faire que Il ne fust en
estre par l'espace[22] d'un jour ou d'une heure ou, a parler improprement,
que Il fust en nom-estre par une espace de temps, semblablement ce est
impossible simplement que Il ne soit en tout lieu selon les .iii. manieres
desuz dites, et ne se pourroit departir ne absentir de quelcunque lieu et
68*c* ne peüst estre ymaginé lieu qui soit // privé de la presence[23] de son essence
et que l'en peüst dire 'Dieu n'est pas yci'; et non pas seullement des lieus
de cest monde, mais samblablement en l'espace infinie ymaginee et
immobile. Car se Dieu faisoit un autre monde ou pluseurs hors cestui, ce
seroit impossible que Il ne fust en ces mondes et sanz Soy mouvoir, car
c'est impossible que Il soit meü comment que soit. Et ainsi, par ce que dit
est appert que Dieu n'est pas ou ciel plus que en un autre lieu selon les
.iii. manieres desus mises, ne simplement quant est de soy. Et encor appert
que Il n'est pas ou ciel comme chose enclose ne comme chose comprinse
ou ciel ne comme chose qui n'est pas hors le ciel et hors le monde; et
pour celui disoit Salomon:[24] *si celum, et celi celorum te capere non possunt,
etc.*[25] Or convient donques declairer pourquoy les philosophes et touz dient

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[11] 34*d*.

[12] *B* et semper par.

[13] *A* super.

[14] Migne, *PL* 24, 307: Quo fugis, Encelade? quascumque accesseris oras, / Sub Deo semper eris. An appended note 1 reads: rectius ad metri saltem leges veteres vulgati *sub Jove*. The poet quoted by Saint Jerome is Claudius Claudianus. Editions of Claudianus omit these two lines as spurious. Cf. however *Claudii Claudiani opera omnia*, recensuit N. L. Artaud, II (Paris, 1824), p. 286, n. 1.

[15] *BCDEF* ce grant Ench.; *F* Enchecladus; *B* Enchelade.

[16] *B* illuc.

[17] *DE* ad infernum.

[18] *BCDE* omit 'etc.' *Psalm* cxxxviii, 7-8.

[19] *CD* terra.

[20] *E* implebo. Not in Isaias but in *Jer.* .xxiii, 24.

[21] *E* plena sunt. *P. Vergili Bucolica*, III, 60.

[22] *BCDEF* par l'estante d'un.

[23] *DE* la partie de son essence.

[24] *B* Salamon; *CDF* Salemon; *E* Salmon.

[25] Cf. 3 *Reg.* viii, 27: Si enim coelum, et coeli coelorum te capere non possunt.

que le ciel est le lieu de Dieu, et meïsme la sainte Escripture: *celum celi Domino: terra*[26] *autem, etc*;[27] item: *Dominus in celo sedes eius*;[28] item: *celum sedes mea*;[29] item: *qui habitat in celis*[30] et pluseurs choses semblables. Je di premierement que de toute chose ou cause oculte,[30a] mucie ou latente, l'en[31] seult dire que elle est la ou appert son effit ou son operacion; et quant nous voions un effit merveilleux en excelle[nce][32] de bien ou de 68d biauté ou en quan- / tité ou qualité, l'en seult dire que c'est oeuvre de Dieu. Et pour ce disons nous que aucune cause est la ou appert tel effit. Et selon ce disoit Ovide d'un lieu dont il avoit descripte la biauté: *crederes numen inesse loco.*[33] Et quant une operacion merveilleuse en excellence de bien est faite de nouvel en un lieu, l'en seult dire que Dieu y est venu ou descendu, si comme en l'Escripture est dit: *venit Deus in castra*,[34] et item: *descendit Dominus super montem*,[35] et pluseurs dis semblables, combien que Dieu selon sa divinité ne puisse aler ne venir ne monter ne descendre. Or est il ainsi que de toutes les choses visibles de cest monde le ciel est la plus tres souverainnement merveilleuse en excellence; premierement de quantité, car il est si tres grant que la plus petite estoille fichie que nous puissons vouer est plus grande que toute la terre; et pour ce di(s)t l'Escripture: *a magnitudine speciei et creature, etc.*,[36] et parle de la grandeur du ciel. Item, il est excellenment merveilleux en qualité et biauté, car il est tres parfectement pur et net et cler et plain de lumiere; et pour ce, selon la translacion de Averroïz, Aristote l'appelle corps glorieus ou .vii.^e^ chappitre.[37] Et la sainte Escripture de la biauté et hautesce 69a du ciel di(s)t que elle est en vision de gloire: // *altitudinis firmamenti pulcritudo eius est species celi in visione glorie*;[38] et du soileil di(s)t que ce est un vaiseau merveilleus et oeuvre de Dieu: *vas admirabile, opus Excelsi*;[39] et de la lune que elle resplendist ou firmament glorieusement; et des estoilles comment leur gloire est la biauté du ciel: *species celi gloria stellarum.*[40] Item, en permanence, car le ciel dure et persevere des ce que il fu fait tel comme il est sanz empirer, sanz envillir,[41] sanz crestre, sanz appeticier ne en tout ne en partie et sanz quelcunque alteracion qui tende ou dispose a corrupcion, si comme il appert par le sixte chappitre du premier.[42] Item, en influence et vertu, car par les mouvemens et par les lumieres et par les influences celestielz est gouverné tout cest monde cibas, si comme il appert ou premier de *Metheores*,[43] et est a entendre excepté ce qui depent de liberté, de volenté et souz Dieu, car les cielz sont instrumens de Dieu par lesquelz Il oeuvre selon ce que il Lui plaist, si comme di(s)t Bernardus Silvester: *organa sunt primi, sunt instrumenta suppremi.*[44] Item, le ciel est merveilleux en figure, car de toutes figures ce est la plus parfete que celle qui est sperique et ronde simplement, et est celle qui plus

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[26] *CDEF* terram.

[27] *Psalm* cxiii, 16

[28] *Psalm* x, 5.

[29] *Isai.* lxvi, 1.

[30] *Psalm* cxxii, 1.

[30a] *BCDE* omit 'ou cause;' *F* omits 'ou cause occulte.'

[31] *DE* ou l'en doubte l'en.

[32] *A* excelle; *BCF* celle; *DE* excellent.

[33] *E* inesse in loco. Cf. *Amores*, III, xiii, 8: concedes numen inesse loco. Also III, i, 2: credibile est illi numen inesse loco. Cf. also *Fasti*, III, 296: quo posses viso dicere 'numen inest.'

[34] 1 *Reg.* iv, 7.

[35] Cf. *Exodus* xix, 20: 'Descenditque Dominus super montem.'

[36] *DE* omit 'et.' Cf. *Sap.* xiii, 5: 'A magnitudine enim speciei et creaturae.'

[37] *Juntas*, 16K.

[38] Cf. *Eccle.* xliii, 1: 'Altitudinis firmamentum pulchritudo eius est, species coeli in visione gloriae.'

[39] *Eccle.* xliii, 2.

[40] *Eccle.* xliii, 10. *B* sellarum.

[41] *DF* enveillir; *E* envieillir; *B* omits 'sanz envillir, sanz crestre, sanz appeticier.'

[42] 13*a*.

[43] *Meteorologicorum* I, 2, 339a, 21-23.

[44] *C* *Benardus.* Unidentified, although a like idea is found in his *De Universitate Mundi*: II, 13: De caelo deitas imperat et disponit. Exequuntur iussionem, quas in aere vel in aethere mansitant potestates, terrena quae subiacent gubernantur. Non secus et in homine cautum est, imperaret anima in capite. ed. Barach and Wrobel, Innsbruck, 1876, p. 64.

contient, si comme il appert par geometrie. Et de telle figure est le ciel
69*b* et contient tout autre corps, et ne peut / estre en chose corruptible par
art ne par nature telle rondece ne si parfectement polie comme est celle
du ciel, si comme il sera dit aprés.[45] Item, en velocité, car l'en ne pourroit
penser comme ce est grande admiracion de considerer la velocité ou
ysneleté du mouvement du ciel, attendue la grandeur de lui et du tour
ou circuite que il fait en un jour. Et ne pourroit estre par nature ne par
art en cest monde cibas mouvement tant isnel qui ne fust plus tardif et
plus lent plus de cent mille fois ou regart du mouvement du ciel que le
plus tardif que l'en pourroit appercevoir a l'oeil ne seroit ou regart de
celui. Item, en ordenance car les corps celestielz sont meüz si ordeneement
et si regulierement et par telle mesure que c'est tres grant merveille; et
perseverent touzjours ainsi sanz cesser, sanz avancier, sanz retarder fors
selon l'ordenance establie, et continuent[46] sanz reposer si comme di(s)t
l'Escripture: *estas et hyemps, nox et dies non requiescent.*[47] Et pour ce,
selon Tulles ou livre *De la Nature des dieux*, aussi comme d'un horloge
qui est meü tres ordeneement nul ne diroit que ce peüst estre a cas
d'aventure et sanz avoir esté fait par cause intellective, par plus forte
raison il convient que les mouvemens du ciel dependent d'aucune vertu
69*c* intellective plus haute et plus grande // que entendement humain.[48] Et
ainsi les cielz, par les condicions desus dites, nous monstrent la
magnificence de Dieu et de ses oeuvres: *Celi enarrant gloriam Dei, et opera
manuum eius annunciat firmamentum.*[49] Et c'est la cause pourquoy l'en
dit plus et en especial que Dieu est es cielz combien que Il soit partout;
et aveques ce, pour la noblesce et dignité du lieu du ciel qui est par desus
les elemens, car nous voions que des elemens les plus vilz sont bas vers
le centre et les plus nobles en haut. Et pour ce, nous disons encor que
Dieu est sus les cielz aveques les angelz: *super celos gloria eius*,[49a] et
semble que Aristote ot aucun sentement de ceste verité ou .xxiiii.[*][50]
chappitre du premier ou il di(s)t que les choses qui sont hors le ciel ont
vie tres bonne [et][51] par soy tres souffissante. Or appert donques par ce
que dit est que la raison Aristote devant mise ne conclude pas que le ciel
est pardurable, mes est tres legiere persuasion, car Dieu ne requiert le
ciel ne autre chose pour le lieu de Lui pour ce que Il est partout et dehors
le ciel et dedens par son immensité infinie et indivisible comme dit est, et
n'a mestier pour son estre d'autre chose que Soy. Et est plus et plus
vraiement le ciel en Dieu qui tout contient que Dieu n'est ou ciel, et /
69*d* aussi comme l'eternité de Dieu ne depent de quelcunque duracion successive, semblablement le immensité de Lui ne depent de quelcunque
extension, dimension ou distance local, mais tout depent de Lui, car Il
est cause de tout par sa pure, franche volenté: *omnia quecumque voluit,
fecit.*[52]

Or est bon dire comment les autres choses esperituelles, appellees intelligences ou angelz, sont en lieu et en quelz lieus. Et premierement, aussi comme nulle chose n'a eternité fors Dieu seulement, si comme il fu dit ou chappitre precedent,[52a] semblablement Lui seul a immensité et autre chose non. Et est incomprehensible, c'est a dire que Il ne peut estre compris en quelcunque espace finie ne infinie, car Il est partout comme dit est,

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[45] 102*b*.

[46] *A* continuement.

[47] *Gen.* viii, 22.

[48] *M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta, fasc.* 45, *de Natura Deorum* recognovit O. Plasberg (Bibl. Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), Lipsiae, 1933, II, 38, pp. 87-88; cf. also I, 36, p. 39.

[49] *Psalm* xviii, 2. *B* ennerant; *DE* omit 'manuum;' *BE* annunciant.

[49a] *Psalm* cxii, 4.

[50] *A* xxiiii.

[51] *A* omits 'et.' 34c.

[52] *Psalm* cxiii, 3. *E* fecit Dominus.

[52a] 65c.

et chascune autre chose est en certain lieu ou espace determineement
ainsi que non ailleurs et non pas partout. Mais ce est differentement, car
tout corps occupe et emplist lieu et pour ce ne[53] peuent par nature
pluseurs corps estre en un lieu propre ou precis. Et toutes choses
corporelles et materieles sont divisibles et ont extension et la ou est une
70*a* partie n'est pas l'autre. Mais les choses // esperituelles sont indivisibles
et ne occuppent pas ou raëmplissent lieu, et toutevoies chascune tele est
en certain lieu determineement et non ailleurs; et tel lieu n'est pas
indivisible, car c'est naturelment impossible. Or posons donques premierement,
selon Aristote et Averroïz, que les cielz soient meüz par choses
immaterieles et incorporelles ou esperituelles, appellees intelligences ou
substances separees; donques convient il par raison que ces intelligences
soient la ou sont les corps celestielz que elles moevent. Et chascune
intelligence est toute en chascune partie du ciel que elle meut tant soit
la partie petite, ausi comme l'ame humaine est toute en chascune partie
de corps humain fors tant que l'ame est ou corps par informacion, et
l'intelligence est en son ciel par apropriacion. Et ce dient aucuns de ceulz
qui ensuient Aristote. Or est il ainsi que pour salver les apparences des
mouvemens du ciel lesquelles ont esté apparceües et cogneües ou temps
passé par observacions, il convient par neccessité mettre que aucuns des
cielz sont excentriques et aucuns epycicles. Et aveques ce il convient mettre
que telz cielz sont meüz non pas seulement en leur lieu, mais aveques
70*b* ce sont meüz et transportéz de lieu en autre en espace / ymaginee
immobile. Et ce appert par Ptholomee en l'*A[l]mageste*[54] et par les autres
aucteurs d'astrologie.[55] Et l'intelligence qui meut tout le ciel ensamble
par le mouvement journal ou autre intelligence qui meut .i. ciel particulier
concentrique au monde, tele intelligence selon la philosophie d'Aristote
est tousjours en .i. lieu et du tout immobile. Mais l'intelligence qui meut
un ciel excentrique duquel le centre est meü environ le centre du monde
en la maniere qui est mise en la *Theorique des Planetes*,[56] il convient que
ceste intelligence soit meüe. Et encor appert ce plus clerement de celle
qui meut l'epicicle de son propre mouvement environ son centre, car le
centre de tel epicicle et l'epicicle sont meüs environ le centre du ciel ou
l'epicicle est fichié. Et donques est ainsi meüe son intelligence qui le
meu(s)t. Et pour ce miex entendre, je le declaire en figure en tant
seulement comment il fait a propos, et pose pour exemple que la lune soit
en son ciel epicicle et si est elle, car elle est fichiee pres de la circunference
de son ciel epicicle. Et cest epicicle est fichié ou ciel de la lune et est
meü en son lieu environ son centre, et par ce la lune tourne environ le
centre de l'epicicle. Et cest epicicle n'est pas meü seulement en son lieu
70*c* comme dit est, mais aveques ce // il est meü de son lieu et tourne environ
le centre du monde par le mouvement journal, et encore autrement par
le mouvement de l'excentrique de la lune, *et cetera.*[57] Et pour ce que,
selon Aristote ou .xii.^{e} de *Metaphisque*,[58] le nombre des intelligences est

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[53] *BCDEF* omit 'ne.'

[54] *CF* Tholomee; *AB* en la Mageste. Ed. M. Halma, I (Paris, 1816), I, iii, 170-183. The Middle Ages used the Latin version from the Arabic, translated by Gerard of Cremona about 1175; cf. *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XXI (1910), 75, concerning an earlier version from the Greek.

[55] *BCF* autres anciens d'astrologie; *DE* omit 'et ce appert . . . d'astrologie.'

[56] Fabricius, *Bibl. Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis*, III (Hamburg, 1735), vii, 115, attributes the Theorica planetarum to Gerard Cremona: 'a Gerardo ipso composita.' Cf. *Johannis de Sacro Bosco Sphaera mundi. Gerardi Cremonensis Theorica Planetarum*, Venetiis, per Franciscum Renner de Hailbrun, 1478, ff. 31r, 34v and figura, fol. 37r.

[57] Figure 1, p. 185. *DE* de la lune si comme il appert par ceste presente figure. Et pour ce.

[58] *Metaphysicorum*, XII, 8, 1073a, 23-1073b, 17. Cf. also *Octavum volumen Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem Commentariis*, Venetiis, apud Juntas, MDLXXIIII, t.c. 43 and 44, 326L-328M.

selon le nombre des mouvemens[59] du ciel, et chascun ciel qui a propre mouvement a une intelligence approprie pour soy et pour son mouvement, 70d il convient que une intelligence moeve cest epici- / cle de son propre mouvement que il a environ son centre. Et donques par le mouvement journal et autrement, cest epicicle et son intelligence sont meüs et transportéz de lieu en autre aussi bien comme est la lune, mes par autre maniere. Et ces choses je ay ici notees pour declairier par philosophie et par astrologie une verité consonante a nostre foy et contraire a l'oppinion d'Aristote et d'Averroïz ou .xii.^{e} de *Metaphisique*,[58] ou il mettent que c'est impossible que les intelligences soient meües de quelcunque mouvement, car par leur diz meïsme aveques evidentes demonstracions d'astrologie s'ensuit l'opposite de leur oppinion en ceste partie. Et ainsi, aussi comme Golias, il sont feruz de leur glaive.[60] Mais par aventure, il ne advertirent pas souffissanment a astrologie en ce pas. Et selon verité, nulle intelligence n'est simplement immobile et ne convient pas que chascune soit par tout le ciel que elle meut ne en chascune partie de tel ciel, posé que les cielz soient meüz par intelligences, car par aventure, quant Dieu les crea, Il mist en eulz qualitéz et vertus motivez aussi comme Il mist pesanteur es choses terrestes, et mist en eulz resistences contre ces vertus motivez. Et
71a sont ces vertus et ces resistences d'autre nature et // d'autre ma[t]iere[61] que quelcunque chose sensible ou qualité qui soit ici-bas. Et sont ces vertus contre ces resistences telement moderees, attrempees et acordees que les mouvemens sont faiz sanz violence; et excepté la violence, c'est aucunement semblable quant un honme a fait un horloge et il le lesse aler et estre meü par soy. Ainsi lessa Dieu les cielz estre meüz continuelment selon les proporcions que les vertus motivez ont aus resistences et selon l'ordenance establie. Et pour ce, quant le Prophete ot dit de Dieu: *laudate eum celi celorum*,[62] il dist aprés: *statuit ea in eternum, et in seculum seculi: preceptum posuit, et non preteribit.*[63] Et par aventure, des ce que Dieu crea les cielz, Il ordena et deputa angels qui ainsi les moevent et mouvront tant comme il Lui plaira. Et de ce peut estre entendu ce que il dist en l'Evangille: *virtutes celorum movebuntur.*[64]

Et pour grace de ce, je veul dire sous correction comment les angels sont en lieu et comment il sont meüz. Et premierement, si comme devant dit est, il ne sont pas partout, mais de chascun est certaine quantité de lieu ou d'espace laquelle il ne peut exceder ou estre en plus grant par
71b la vertu que il a de[s][65] sa / creacion ou de sa nature, ne sans divin miracle, combien que, par aventure, il puisse bien estre en mendre. Item, chascun est tout en chascune partie de l'espace ou il est sanz occuper le lieu et sanz le raëmplir, si comme il fu dit devant, et pour ce, pluseurs anges peuent estre en un lieu ou en une espace et chascun de eulz par toute celle espace. Et peut-estre que ainsi estoit de la legion des mauvés angelz que nostre Seigneur mist hors d'un honme, si comme di(s)t l'Evangille,[66] car legion contient vi^{m} vi^{c} lxvi, si comme il est dit en *La Legende saint Morice.*[67] Item, quelcunque ange n'est pas ou corps ou es corps qui sont ou lieu ou il est telement que il soit en eulz par informacion,

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[59] *B* omits 'est selon la nombre des mouvemens.'

[60] Cf. I *Kings*, xviii, 51.

[61] *A* maniere.

[62] *Psalm* cxlviii, 4.

[63] *Psalm* cxlviii, 6.

[64] Cf. *Matt.* xxiv, 29: 'Et virtutes coelorum commovebuntur.'

[65] *AE* de.

[66] Cf. *Marc.* v, 1-20; *Luc.* viii, 26-39.

[67] Cf. *Legenda aurea*, ed. Th. Graesse, Lipsiae, 1850, p. 629: 'Congregantes igitur electam militum legionem, scilicet VI millia DCLXVI, eos ad imperatores miserunt.' Also *Acta Sanctorum* Septembris, VI, Antwerpiae, 1757, "Passio auctore S. Eucherio Lugdunense episcopo:" 'Erat eodem tempore in exercitu legio militum, qui Thebaei appellabantur. Legio autem vocabatur, quae tunc sex millia ac sexcentos viros in armis habebat.'

si comme ame humaine est en son corps, ou par inhere[n]ce[68] ou adherence
ne par apropriacion, tele comme aucuns philosophes dient que les
intelligences sont ou ciel. Et pour ce, un ange peut estre en un lieu sanz
soy mouver nonobstant que en ce lieu pluseurs corps succedent un aprés
l'autre, aussi comme le ray du soleil qui passe par une fenestre n'est
pas meü aveques l'aer que le vent emporte ou chace, mais samble demourer
tout un combien que non soit, car ce n'est pas du tout semblable. Mais
71c par ce peut estre entendue la verité en // cest propos. Item, un ange par
sa volenté peut bien estre meü avecques le corps, lequel corps et l'ange
sont en un lieu ou proceins, et peut l'en dire que l'ange est en ce corps
ou a destre ou a senestre de ce corps. Et de ce dist Remigius ou comment
sus un livre que fist Marcianus Cappella[69] que le[s][70] Grecs disoient que
chascun honme a un tel ange avecques soy lequel les philosophes appellent
prestitem, id est, prepositum: prevost, et que chascun honme mortel a .ii.
autres anges appellés *genius bonus et genius malus*; et le bon quant il
se veult monstrer, il se fait ou forme[71] corps du haut aer, et le mauvés du
bas aer. Item, un ange quelcunque ne peut pas de sa vertu former tel
corps de quelcunque figure, car une porcion de aer de la quantité d'un
pey en touz senz, il ne la pourroit tant estendre que elle fust aussi longue
comme est le dyametre de tout le monde, car l'ange ne pourroit percier
le ciel ne la matiere ne se pourroit tant estendre. Item, quelcunque ange,
quant est de l'espace ou il est et que il tient sanz la occuper comme dit
est, il est vraysemblable que il ne requiert pas quant a ce certaine figure
determineement si comme ronde ou quarree ou beslongue ou tele comme
71d est figure humaine ou autre. Mais / tele espace peut estre indifferentement
de quelcunque figure, et se peut en ceste maniere un ange transmuer de
figure en figure; et la cause est car pour tele transmutacion il ne convient
onques que chose corporelle quelcunque soit par ce en rien transmuee.
Item, se il est ainsi, je pose pour exemple que un ange soit en un lieu ou
espace laquelle, se elle estoit sperique ou ronde, seroit de la quantité d'un
piey en touz sens.[72] Je di que cest ange peut estre ensamble et pour une
fois ou ciel et en terre et yci a Rouen, et a Paris et a Romme et en cent
mille lieus et plus sans ce que il soit en plus grant lieu simplement que
est le lieu ou l'espace desus dite. Et la cause est car tout corps est
divisible sanz fin quant est de soy, si comme il appert ou premier chappitre
du premier.[73] Et par ce, il est, en tant comme corps, figurable indifferenment[74]
de quelcunque figure. Et pour ce, une masse de cire de la quantité
de un p[i]ey[75] en touz sens ou mendre pourroit estre telement figure[e][76]
72a sanz la crestre et sanz ad- // jouster, et si grelle filee que elle attaindroit

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[68] *A* inherece.

[69] *B* ou commencement sus; *DE* marcianus in capella. At present the commentary by Remigius Antissiodorensis on the work of Martianus Capella is unedited. The following manuscripts may be consulted: Bibl. Nat., *MSS. Lat.* 8674, 8786; *Nouv. Aquis.* 340; Bern, *MSS.* 56, 331; Vindob., *MS.* 3222, ff. 76-206. Fragments of the *Grammatica* and *Logicà* have been printed by Hauréau in *Notices et extraits*, 20² (1865), 5-80, in so far as they are related to the commentary by John the Scot; E. Narducci edited the *Arithmetica* in *Bull. di bibliografia e di historia delle scienze mathematiche e fisiche*, XV (1882), 505-580. Cf. M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, I (Munich, 1911), 513-515. Oresme is apparently quoting from a comment by Remigius on Liber II, ¶ 152-153, ¶ 163-166 (ed. A. Dick, Lipsiae, Teubner, 1925, pp. 65, 68), wherein Martianus Capella refers to the Praestes, the good and bad *daemones*, who assume corporeal form and attend men. It is worthy of note that no comment such as Remigius's occurs in the *Annotationes* of John the Scot, utilized by Remigius. Cf. *Johannis Scotti Annotationes in Marcianum*, ed. Cora E. Lutz, Cambridge, Mediaeval Academy of America, 1939, pp. 68-69 and also x-xiii.

[70] *A* le.

[71] *DE* fait en forme; *F* fait en forme de corps.

[72] Figure 2, p. 185.

[73] 3d.

[74] *DE* figurable se puet diviser indiff.

[75] *A* prey.

[76] *ACF* figuré.

au ciel et a la terre et en cent mille lieus, se ainsi estoit que la matiere le peüst souffrir et que vertu naturelle fust qui ce peüst faire, si comme il peut legierement apparoir par geometrie. Or est il ainsi que l'ange en son espace ne requiert quelcunque matiere determineement, mes est indifferenment en quelcunque corps ou avecques quelcunque corps ou matiere sanz la transmuer se il ne lui plaist, si comme il est thouchey devant.[77] Et n'est chose quelcunque qui li resiste que il ne puisse estre en espace figuree telement comment il li plaist sans ce que aucune figure li soit devee[78] ou impossible, si comme il est dit devant.[77] Et ce et autres choses peuent les anges par leur vertu naturele que il ont des leur creacion, mais ceste vertu ou puissance est aucune fois es mauvés anges reprimee et restrainte par le plaisir de Dieu, si comme il appert de Sathanas ou .xx.e chappitre de l'*Apocalipse*.[79] Et par ce que dit est peu(s)t l'en respondre a pluseurs difficultés que font les docteurs en ceste matiere.

Et quant est du mouvement des angelz ou mutacion de lieu, il est dit 72b devant comment selon philosophie teles substances se- / parees ne sont pas immobiles, mes des anges il me samble que l'en peut ymaginer eulz estre mués[80] de lieu en lieu en .iiii. manieres simples; en .ii. par mouvement successif et en .ii. sanz tel mouvement. Premierement, par le mouvement qui seroit fait en la transfiguracion ou transmutacion de figure de l'espace ou est l'ange, de laquelle est faite mencion tantost devant.[81] Et en ceste maniere un ange peu(s)t aler ou soy mettre de nouvel en un lieu sanz soy departir du lieu ou il estoit devant et sanz ce que il le lesse tout. Secondement, un ange peu(s)t delessier du tout et soy departir du lieu ou il est et soy mouver et transporter en un autre lieu par l'espace moienne par laquelle il trespasse. Et ce peut il faire sanz mouver ou alterer ou muer en riens les corps par lesquelz il passe, aussi comme .i. umbre[82] d'une chose meüe qui samble estre meü parmi les corps ou il passe sanz les mouvoir, car ce puet faire l'ange selon verité que fait l'ombre selon apparence ou .i. ray de lumiere. Et pour ce que nul tel corps moien ne autre chose ne fait resistence en ce mouvement, les anges se peuent mouvoir de quelcunque velocité ou isneleté combien que elle soit grande 72c et tant ysnelement comment il leur plaist // et par leur propre vertu, se elle n'estoit restrainte par la volenté de Dieu; et pour ce di(s)t l'Escripture en Ysaïe: *ite angeli veloces, et cetera.*[83] Et c'est la cause pourquoy l'en di(s)t que il volent; de quoy di(s)t Daniel: *Gabriel, et cetera, cito volans*;[84] et Ysaïe: *volavit ad me unus de seraphin*;[85] et saint Jehan:[86] *vidi angelum Dei*[87] *volantem per medium celum.*[88] Et pour ce, feint l'en que il ont elles et sont ainsi peinz. Et aussi disoient les paiens que le mesagier de Joves[89] avoit elles es pieiz, de quoy dist un poëte: *alato qui pede carpis humum, i.e., celer, etc.*[90] La tierce maniere comment un ange mueroit lieu sanz mouvement successif selon ymaginacion seroit que il fust en un lieu et tantost aprés, soudainement et sanz moien, fust en un autre separé et sanz passer par les corps moiens ou par l'espace moienne. Et ce ne pourroit ange de sa propre vertu, mais ce pourroit Dieu faire de sa toute-puissance infinie, si comme il me samble a present; et pourroit faire que ensamble et pour une foiz un ange seroit en pluseurs lieus distans, separéz et

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[77] 71*b*.

[78] *B* donnee.

[79] *Apoc.* xx, 2-3, 7-9; *D* Apocalice.

[80] *BCDEF* meuz.

[81] 71*d*.

[82] *F* un nombre.

[83] *Isai.* xviii, 2. *BCDEF* omit 'et pour ce . . . cetera.'

[84] *Dan.* ix, 21. *F* volens.

[85] *Isai.* vi, 6.

[86] *C* Johannes.

[87] *B* domini.

[88] Cf. *Apoc.* xiv, 6: 'Et vidi alterum angelum volantem per medium coeli.'

[89] *DE* Jovis.

[90] *P. Ovidi Nasonis Fastorum libri Sex*, ed. Herman Peter, (Leipzig, 1874), V, 666 (p. 234); 'Alato qui pede carpis iter.'

desjoinz. La quarte maniere seroit que l'ange fust mué soudainement
d'un lieu en autre lieu distant en passant par tous les moiens ou espace
72d moienne entre ces .ii. lieus, en laquelle es- / pace il seroit par un tout
seul moment ou instant indivisible. Et je cuide que ce soit simplement
impossible, car estre en une espace par tel instant ou moment, c'est non
estre en celle espace, pour ce que en quelcunque chose continue, successive
ou permanente ne est selon verité telle mesure indivisible appellee instant
ou point, si comme je monstrai pieça sus *Sentences*;[91] et ne est mesure
indivisible fors l'eternité de Dieu et son inmensité dont est fait mencion
ou chappitre precedent et ou .xxiiii.ᵉ chappitre du premier.[92] Or ay donques
dit souz correction comme les anges sont en lieu et leur lieu propre ou
plus propre est ou ciel ou sus le ciel, mais par dispensacion divine et par
leur volenté ou pour leurs demerites[93] aucuns sont yci-bas. Et ne sont
pas pour ce loing de Dieu, car Il est partout comme dit est, ne la gloire
des bons n'est par ce en rien diminuee; et pour ce, des anges qui gardent
ceulz qui ont vraie humilité, nostre Seingneur disoit: *angeli eorum in
celis vident semper faciem Patris mei, qui in celis est*—leurs angelz
voient touzjours la face de Dieu le Pere.[94] Item, il est dit comment il sont
meüz et est certain que il habitent ou frequentent aucuns lieus en
73a especial, si comme en la *Legende de saint Michiel* est // escript que il
disoit du Mont de Gargan[95] que il y conversoit et le gardoit: *hunc*[96] *enim
locum in terris in celo, et cetera*;[97] et lessent aucune foiz les lieus ou
il ont conversé et s'en departent; de quoy raconte Josephus que, devant
la destruction de Jerusalem, l'en ouït voiz disantes: alons nous en de ci:
transseamus ab hiis sedibus.[98] Et anciennement, Hermes,[99] en prenostiquant
les maulz qui estoient a venir en Egipte, disoit que la divinité retourneroit
ou ciel, c'est a savoir les bons[100] anges, et ne demorroient fors les mauvés:
divinitas repetet celum-soli nocentes angeli remanebunt.[101] Et se il est ainsi
des ames separees quant a estre en lieu et quant a mouvement,[102] je n'en
di rien quant a present, car il est temps de retourner a propos. Aprés
Aristote met la .vii.ᵉ raison a monstrer que le ciel est perpetuel.

> Tiexte. Item, une raison devant mise tesmoingne que le ciel est ingenerable et incorruptible, et encor fu dit que il est impassible[103] de toute mortelle difficulté.[104]

Glose. C'est a dire que il ne peu(s)t estre alteré ne transmué de quelcunque
mutacion qui tende ou dispose a corrupcion, si comme il peu(s)t apparoir
par ce que fu dit ou sixte chappitre du premier ou ce fu monstré par
raison.[104] Mais le ciel peu(s)t bien estre alteré selon lumiere en aucunes
73b parties, si comme il appert / en l'eclipse de la lune, mais tele alteracion ne

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[91] Clearly a reference to Oresme's commentary on the *Sentences* of which no copy has been preserved.

[92] 35*a*.

[93] *BCF* omit 'demerites;' *DE* requeste; *F* aucuns mouvemens sont.

[94] Cf. *Matt.* xviii, 10: 'Angeli eorum in coelis semper vident faciem Patris mei, qui in coelis est.'

[95] *BC* gargam; *DEF* gargain.

[96] *B* habent.

[97] Cf. *Acta Sanctorum Septembris*, VIII (Antwerpiae, 1762), p. 61: 'Ego enim sum Michaël Archangelus, qui in conspectu Domini semper assisto: locumque hunc in terris incolere, tutumque servare instituens, hoc volui probare indicio, omnium, quae ibi geruntur, ipsiusque loci me esse inspectorem atque custodem.' Cf. Also *Legenda Aurea*, ed. Th. Graesse, p. 643. 'In celo' of Oresme's quotation is an error for 'incolere.' This error appears in all the manuscripts.

[98] *De Bello Iudaico*, VI, 3 (*Flavii Iosephi Opera* recognovit B. Niese, VI, Berlin, 1895, p. 417).

[99] *B* hmez.

[100] *BCDEF* omit 'bons.'

[101] Hermes Trismegistus Asclepius, III, 24b: 'divinitas enim repetet caelum,' *Hermetica*, ed. Walter Scott (Oxford, 1924), I, 340, 1. 25; Asclepius, III, 25: 'soli nocentes remanent (var. remanebunt),' *ibid.*, 344, 11. 3-4. About two pages of text intervene between the first four and the last three words cited by Oresme.

[102] *C* moment.

[103] *F* impossible.

[104] 13*abcd*.

dispose pas a corrupcion. Et selon verité le ciel ne a [en][105] soy ne dehors soy contrarieté ne cause naturelle de sa corrupcion, mais il despent de Dieu le createur qui le conserve et garde en estre et fera tant comme il Lui plaira.

3.—*Ou tiers chappitre il met une condicion du mouvement du ciel.*

> Et le ciel est meü sanz labour ou travail pour ce que il n'est mestier de metre quelcunque neccessité violente qui le detienne en son mouvement et qui empeesche que il ne soit meü d'autre mouvement auquel il soit naturelment enclin.

Glose.[1] Car la cause pourquoy telles choses, comme sont honmes et bestes, ont labour et travail ou poine en mouvant elles meïsmes ou autres choses pesantes est pour ce que pesanteur les encline a reposer ou a estre meües d'autre mouvement aucunement contraire. Et pour ce se lassent elles et se tarde leur mouvement[2] et finablement cesse, car la pesanteur resiste et est meüe par violence. Mais le ciel n'a[3] en soy ne dehors pesanteur ne quelcunque autre chose qui l'encline a repos ou a autre mouvement que
73c le sien, si comme il appert par le quint // chappitre du premier.[4] Et pour ce est il meü sans violence et sans labour et sanz cesser; et pour ce di(s)t Aristote aprés.

> Tiexte. Car toute chose qui a difficulté en son mouvement a plus de labour et de poine de tant comme son mouvement dure plus, et n'a pas tres bonne disposicion.

Glose. Et la translacion d'Averroïz di(s)t ainsi.[5]

> Tiexte. De tant comme telle chose a plus de fatigacion ou de travail, de tant est elle plus loing de bonne disposicion.[6]

Glose. Car ce est meilleur et plus noble condicion mouver sanz labour et sanz poine que autrement. Et pour ce, selon la philosophie d'Aristote, il convient par neccessité que le ciel soit meü par vertu incorporelle ou separee de matiere, car se elle estoit corporelle et materiele et estendue en corps et divisible aussi comme est pesanter ou legiereté, elle ne seroit pas entendement ne volenté ou vertu voluntaire selon philosophie. Et donques convendroit il que ceste vertu corporelle meüst le ciel selon tout son povoir par la plus grande isneleté que elle porroit et a tout son effort,[7] ausi comme nous voions que pesanteur meu(s)t le corps pesant. Et donques se ceste vertu n'avoit resistence, elle mouvroit le ciel soudaine-
73*d* ment en instant ou mo- / ment indivisible; et ce est impossible, si comme il fu dit ou chappitre precedent.[8] Et se elle avoit resistence, elle seroit ou corps meü et non pas dehors, si comme en mouvement droit; et[9] donques seroit le mouvement du ciel oveuques violence et fatigacion ou travail et se tarderoit et cesseroit comme dit est. Et ce est faulz. Et donques s'ensuit il par neccessité que le ciel soit meü par vertu abstrainte ou separee de matiere et incorporelle[10] et que elle ne moeve pas par efforcement, mes par plaisance et par volenté franche laquelle est determinee a certainne velocité ou isnelleté sanz violence et sanz resistence. Et selon Aristote, ceste volenté ne peut estre meüe[11] et meut le ciel telement perpetuelment

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[105] *ACF* omit 'en.'

[1] *BCDEF* omit 'glose.'

[2] *BCF* lessent; *D* pour ce lessent elles et se tarde de leur mouv.; *E* pour ce lessent elles et se tardent de leur mouv.

[3] *A* ne n'a.

[4] 12c.

[5] *Juntas* 96L.

[6] *DE* omit 'Glose . . . disposicion.'

[7] *BCDEF* effect; *A* corrected from 'effect.'

[8] 72*d*.

[9] *BCDEF* omit 'elle seroit . . . droit et.'

[10] *BCDEF* incorruptible; *B* omits 'et.'

[11] *A* meuee.

par neccessité—non pas de constrainte, mes de complaisance. Mes selon
verité, ce n'est pas impossible, si comme il fu touché ou chappitre precedent,
que le ciel soit meü par une vertu ou qualité corporelle qui est en lui et
sanz violence et sans travail, car la resistence qui est ou ciel ne l'encline
pas a autre mouvement ne a repos, mes seulement a ce que il ne soit
meü plus isnelement.[12] Et ne convient pas que tout mouvement ou il a
74a resistence soit fait aveuques labour et travail ne en soy // retardant, car
une pierre ne se traveille pas en descendant ne un feu en ardant. Item,
si comme il fu touché ou chapitre precedent, il est possible que chascun
mouvement du ciel soit sanz resistence et fait par ange duquel la volenté
est muable, car rien n'est intransmuable fors Dieu, et peut estre tel
mouvement tant tardif et tant isnel comme il plait a la vertu motive,
si comme il fu dit devant du mouvement dont les anges se moevent.[13] Et
se aucun opposoit au contraire, en mettant que un ange meüst le ciel ou
soi meïsme selon tout son povoir le plus tost et le plus isnelment que il
onques pourroit, donques convendroit il que il meüst soudainement et
en moment indivisible; et c'est impossible, si comme il est dit devant.
Item, toute vertu cree[e][13a] est finie et terminee,[14] et donques ne peu(s)t
elle pas outre certainne quantité de velocité ou d'isneleté ne de autre chose.
Je respon au premier et di que un ange ne pourroit mouvoir se meïsme
ou le ciel selon tout son povoir ou vertu, mes convient par neccessité que
il se determine par sa volenté a certainne isnelleté, aussi comme une
74b vertu infinie ne pourroit mou- / voir un corps qui avroit resistence finie
selon tout son povoir, car ce seroit par isnelleté infinie laquelle est
impossible; et tout ce appert par le .xii.e chappitre du premier.[15] Et pour
ce, vertu finie ne peu(s)t faire mouvement sanz resistence ne vertu
infinie comment que soit, se l'une et l'autre ne meu(s)t[16] par liberté et
par franche volenté. Et tel resgart a vertu finie a mouvement sanz
resistence comme vertu infinie a a mouvement[17] o resistence. Et donques
se vertu finie meut sans resistence, ce ne peu(s)t estre selon tout son
povoir ne ainsi [de][18] vertu infinie. Et samblablement disons nous que
Dieu ne pourroit faire une creature si parfete que Il ne peüst faire encor
plus parfecte,[19] et donques ne pourroit Il oeuvrer selon toute sa vertu qui
est infinie et plus que infinie. Au secont, je octri que l'ange a vertu
termine[e][20] et finie et ne pourroit mouvoir outre certainne velocité ou
isneleté la ou il avroit resistence certainne; mes a mendre resistence, il
pourroit mouver de plus grant isneleté et sanz resistence a sa volenté
comme dit est. Et pour ce miex entendre, je met un exemple en autre
propos: car une porcion de terre ne peut descendre par si grant isneleté
que elle ne peüst encor par plus grande au double et au quadruple[21] et
74c ainsi // sans fin, posé que la resistence fust diminuee et appeticiee en
proporcions[22] a ce convenables. Mais se la resistence estoit toute et du
tout ostee, ceste terre ne pourroit estre meüe, si comme il fu dit ou
.xxiiii.e chappitre du premier et ou quart de *Phisique*.[23] Et c'est a entendre
se ceste terre n'estoit meüe par vertu voluntaire. Aprés il reprouve .iii.
oppinions anciennes.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, nul ne doit cuider que il soit ainsi comme l'en disoit selon une ancienne fable, c'est a savoir que le ciel, pour le salut et soustenement de lui, a mestier d'un geant appellé Athlas. Et samble que ceulz qui ce dient aient telle oppinion comme eürent aucuns qui furent aprés qui mettoient que le ciel, aussi comme toutes autres choses pesantes et terrestres qui seroient en haut, a neccessité d'aucune chose vive qui le soustienne; et ce baillierent eulz par maniere de fable et n'est pas a crere.

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[12] 70*a*-71*a*.

[13] 72*bcd*.

[13a] *ABCDEF* cree.

[14] *BDEF* determinee.

[15] 21*d*.

[16] *D* veinent; *E* viennent.

[17] *DE* omit 'sanz resistence . . . a mouvement.'

[18] *A* omits 'de.'

[19] *F* omits 'que il ne peüst faire encore plus parfecte.'

[20] *ACD* terminé.

[21] *D* druble; *E* triple.

[22] *BCDEF* porcions.

[23] *Physicorum*, IV, 8, 215b, 12-9, 217b, 28.

Glose. Aucuns dient que Athlas fu un roy es parties de occident en Hespaingne qui fu tres grant astrologien, et ou païs est une haute montaingne qui fu jadis denommee de lui et appelle[e][24] Athlas, et la mer
74d prochaine *Mare Athlanticum.*[25] Et de ce vint en fable / que Athlas soustient le ciel sus ses espaulles ou pour la science du roy ou pour la hautesce du mont; et de ce dist Ovide: *Athlas*[26] *en ipse*[27] *laborat vixque suis humeris cadentem sustinet axem.*[28] Et par aventure, a ceste maniere de parler se conformoit Job, mes en autre entencion, quant il disoit de Dieu: *sub quo curvantur qui portant orbem.*[29] Et aprés, aucuns disoient que il n'est pas ainsi selon verité, mes par ce nous est donné a entendre que le ciel et les estoilles ont necessité d'aucune vertu vive qui les soustienne que il ne cheient aval. Et il ne convient pas, car le ciel n'est pesant ne ligier, si comme il fu dit ou quint chappitre du premier.[30] Et posé que il fust pesant, si pourroit estre naturelment lasus ou il est, si comme il fu monstré ou .xxiiii.^{e} chappitre du premier.[31] Mais a savoir se il pourroit estre meü en circuite sanz violence, c'est une autre question dont je dirai aprés en son lieu.[31a] Aprés il reprouve une autre oppinion.

Tiexte. Item, le ciel n'est pas soustenu pour la velocité ou isneleté de la circungiracion de son mouvement par quoy il se tienne ainsi, pour ce que ceste isneleté excede la propre inclinacion que le ciel a a descendre, si comme disoit Empedocles, car telle
75a violence ne pourroit estre salvee ou durer par si grant // temps.

Glose. Quant un vaisel plain d'yaue est isnelement tourné en circuite puis desus puis desouz, l'eaue demeure ou vaisel sans espandre et sanz cheoir pour la force[32] du mouvement. Et ainsi disoit Empedocles du ciel, comme dit est. Aprés il reprouve par .ii. moiens la tierce opinion d'aucuns qui disoient que l'ame du ciel contraint le corps du ciel par violence a tel mouvement.

Tiexte.[33] Item, encore ne peut l'en dire que par ame racionele[34] le ciel soit contraint a demourer ainsi perpetuelment.

Glose. Supplé: car chose violente ne peut estre perpetuelle. Et selon Averroïz, aucuns disoient ainsi car il leur sembloit que l'ame qui est en .i. corps le fait durer tant comme elle y est.[35] Et donques le corps du ciel qui est si tres noble a en soy ame qui le soustient et le fait durer et estre ainsi meü perpetuelment.

Tiexte. Item, ce n'est pas possible que ame eüst telle vie sanz tristesce et que sa vie fust benëuree, car il convient par neccessité que le mouvement soit o violence se le corps qui est ainsi meü est enclin naturelment a estre meü autrement. Et mouvoir ainsi continuelment sanz vacacion et sanz cesser et sanz avoir remission ne repos de vaquer a prudence ou a speculacion, ce n'est pas bonne vie.

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[24] *A* appellé.

[25] Oresme's relation of the fable follows closely that of Diodorus Siculus, III, 60; cf. *Diodori Bibliotheca Historica* recognovit F. Vogel, I (Lipsiae, Teubner, 1888), 363. The story may have suggested itself to Oresme through St. Augustine's account, *De Civitate Dei*, XVIII, 8, ed. B. Dombart, I (Lipsiae, 1863), 229-230.

[26] *F* Alas.

[27] *B* ipso.

[28] *Metam.*, II, 296-297: 'Atlas en ipse laborat: / Vixque suis humeris candentem sustinet axem.'

[29] *Job* ix, 13.

[30] 12*a*.

[31] 39*b*.

[31a] Cf. 89*c*-90*c*, 98*d*.

[32] *E* fourme.

[33] *DE* omit 'tiexte.'

[34] *BCDEF* raisonnable.

[35] *Juntas*, t.c. 6, 98G.

75b Glose. Car qui / veult entendre a prudence ou a science, il convient cesser de labour corporel.

Tiexte. Et ceste ame qui ainsi mouvroit le ciel n'avroit pas repos en dormant, si comme ont les ames des corps mortelz quant elles ont remission et cessacion du labour[36] du corps.

Glose. Et ainsi elle seroit de pire condicion que ne sont les ames de cibas.

Tiexte. Mais seroit neccessaire que aucun la soustenist et la retenist et contrainsist a mouvoir sanz cesser.

Glose. Car puisque ce labour seroit penible et triste, elle voudroit cesser se elle n'estoit contrainte par autre a perseverer. Et selon la translacion et exposicion d'Averroïz, Aristote fait ici similitude de ceste chose a la fable de Yxion,[37] duquel les poëtes dient que il est en enfer en une roe ou il est contraint a tourner touzjours perpetuelment. Et de ce di(s)t Ovide: *volvitur Yxion*[38] *et se sequiturque fugitque.*[39] Et tele maniere de parler est en l'Escripture, primi Regum xxv: *inimicorum tuorum anima rotabitur,*[40] *quasi impetu*[41] *et circulo funde;*[42] et item: *en circuitu impii ambulant.*[43] Aprés Aristote conclut.

Tiexte. Et donques [se][44] il est ainsi du premier mouvement, c'est a savoir de celui du ciel, comme nous avons dit.

Glose. C'est a savoir que il est fait sanz labour.

Tiexte. Ce n'est pas seulement le miex de ce[45] cuider de sa
75c perpetuité, mais // encore disons nous ceste chose concordablement a la science divine qui est des diex.

Glose. Car les theologiens des paiens disoient que Dieu meut le ciel sanz poine et sanz labour.

Tiexte. Mais c'est asséz parlé de telles choses quant a present.

4.—*Ou quart chappitre il commence [a]*[1] *enquerir se ou ciel sont destre et senestre et les autres differences de posicion et reprouve une opinion.*[2]

Aucuns dient que ou ciel est aucune chose destre et aucune senestre, si comme sont les Pitagoriens, c'est a dire ceulz qui ensuient l'opinion de Pythagoras, car ainsi le dient. Et pour ce convient il considerer[3] se il est ainsi ou autrement.

Glose. L'en doit savoir que .vi. differences de posicion sont, c'est a savoir desus et desouz, destre et senestre, devant et derriere. Et aucune fois Aristote les appelle *principes.* Or disoient les Pythagoriens que ou ciel sont seulement .ii. de ces principes, c'est a savoir destre et senestre, et les autres non. Et Aristote les reprouve en monstrant par .vii. raisons que se ou ciel sont destre et senestre, il convient que les autres differences y soient.

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[36] *BCDEF* omit 'corporel . . . labour.'

[37] *DE* Prescian. The line which Oresme does not translate reads: 'sed necesse est Ixionis cuiusdam fatum detinere ipsam, sempiternum et indomitum.' Cf. *Juntas*, 98B.

[38] *B* volvit; *F* Yxien; *BDEF* omit 'se.'

[39] *Metam.*, IV, 461.

[40] *CDEF* ratabitur.

[41] *DE* in pecu.

[42] Cf. 1 *Reg.* xxv, 29: 'Porro inimicorum tuorum anima rotabitur, quasi in impetu et circulo fundae.'

[43] *Psalm* xi, 9.

[44] *A* omits 'se.'

[45] *BCDEF* omit 'ce.'

[1] *A* omits 'a.'

[2] *Guthrie*, ch. ii.

[3] *DE* commencent il a considerer.

Tiexte. Premierement, car se il convient appliquer ces principes 75*d* au corps de tout le monde, c'est a sa- / voir au ciel qui tout contient, et une partie est destre, il s'ensuit tantost que l'autre soit senestre. Et encore doit l'en plus cuider que devant ces .ii. principes soient ou ciel les autres qui sont premier[s][4] et precedent ces .ii. Or est il determiné ou livre *Des Mouvemens des bestes* pourquoy ces principes sont propres a leur nature, car l'en voit manifestement que il sont es bestes, et aucunes les ont toutes, c'est a savoir destre et senestre et les autres .iiii.[5]

Glose. Les honmes et les bestes parfectes ont toutes ces differences.

Tiexte. Et les autres en ont aucunes et non toutes.

Glose. Si comme, par aventure, aucunes bestes imparfectes et immobiles de soy, qui ont devant et derriere et ne ont destre ne senestre; ce di(s)t Averroïz.[6] Je cuide que telles soient aucunes bestes de mer.

Tiexte. Et les plantes[7] ont tant seulement desus et desouz. Et donques se l'en doit attribuer au ciel aucune de teles choses, c'est raisonnable de lui attribuer ce qui est le premier es bestes, si comme nous avons dit.

Glose. Et desus et desouz sont naturelment premiers que destre et senestre, car il sont plus communs comme dit est.

[Tiexte.][8] Item, .iii. choses ou opposicions sont dont en chascune est aussi comme un principe: une est desus et desouz, l'autre est 76*a* devant et son opposite, la tierce // est destre et senestre. Et est raisonnable que toutes ces choses soient es corps parfectz.

Glose. Et le ciel ou le monde est corps tres parfect, si comme il fu dit ou premier chappitre du premier.[9] Aprés il met comment les choses desus dites sont principes.

Tiexte. Et desus, c'est commencement ou principe de longitude; et destre est principe de latitude;[10] et devant est principe de profundité.

Glose. Ce sont les .iii. dimensions dont fu dit plus a plain ou premier chappitre du premier,[11] car longitude ou mesure de longueur commence desus en venant desouz; et latitude va de destre a senestre; et parfondeur de devant a derriere.

Tiexte. Item, encore appert autrement selon les mouvemens dont aucunes de ces differences sont princ[ip]es[12] es choses qui se moevent, car desus est commencement de augmentacion ou cressance et mouvement local commence de destre. Et mouvement qui est selon aucun sens naturel commence au devant la ou sont les sens.

Glose. Or convient suppleer que la ou sont touz mouvemens, augmentacion precede les autres. Et par ce s'ensuit que ceste difference desus est naturelment premiere que destre. Et donques se destre est ou ciel, desus 76*b* est ou ciel. Aprés / il met en quelles chose ici-bas sont ces differences et en quelles non et comment.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, desus[13] ou desouz et destre et senestre et devant et derriere ne sont pas en toutes choses, mes sont seullement en celles qui ont en soy commencement ou principe de leur mouvement, et qui ont ame.

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[4] *ABC* premier.

[5] *De Animalium Incessu*, IV, 5, 704a, 26-706b, 16.

[6] *D* Adverrois. *Juntas*, t.c. 7, 99C.

[7] *ADE* planetes.

[8] *ABCDEF* omit 'tiexte.'

[9] 6*a*.

[10] *DE* omit 'et destre . . . latitude.'

[11] 4*a*.

[12] *A* princes.

[13] *BCDEF* pour ce se desus.

Glose. Vegetative, comme les plantes, c'est a savoir herbes et arbres; ou vegetative et sensitive, si comme les bestes; ou ces .ii. et intellective, si comme ont les honmes; ou intellective seulement, si comme a le ciel selon aucuns.

Tiexte. Car en quelcunque chose qui ne a ame, nous ne voions que elle ait en soy chose par quoy son mouvement commence plus d'une part que d'autre, car aucunes ne sont onques meües.

Glose. Si comme les parties de terre qui sont vers le centre, selon ce que fu dit ou desrenier chappitre du premier.[14]

Tiexte. Et les autres sont meües, mais c'est samblablement de quelcunque partie, si comme le feu en haut seulement et la terre en bas vers le centre.

Glose. Et une partie de la terre n'est plus devant que derriere, ne destre que senestre quant est de soy; mais sanz distinction, celle que l'en met desouz[15] va devant en descendant quelle que elle soit, et ainsi des autres
76c telles choses. Aprés pour ce // declairer, il oste[16] une doubte en mettant la cause pourquoy l'en attribue ces differences a telles choses qui sont sanz ame.

Tiexte. Mais en ces choses nous disons desus et de[souz][17] et destre et senestre en raportant a nous.

Glose. Et non pas simplement ne absolutement, mais en relation a nous et ou resgart de nous. Et de ce met il aprés .iii. manieres. Une est:

Tiexte. Ou selon nos destres, si comme font les divineurs.

Glose. Anciennement aucuns par le chant et par le vol ou volement des oiseaux divinoient et prenostiquoient d'aversité et de prosperité, de maladie et de santé, selon ce que il vouloient a destre ou a senestre. Et de ce font mencion Ypocras et Galien en .i. livre appellé *Regimen d'Acues*.[18] Et en ceste maniere nous disons que ce qui est a destre de nous ou a nostre destre[18a] est destre, si comme un pilier ou quelque chose. Aprés il met l'autre maniere.

Tiexte. Ou selon similitude a nos destres, si comme sont les parties d'une statue ou ymage.

Glose. Nous disons d'une ymage que une main est destre et l'autre est senestre par similitude a nous et non pas par nature. Aprés il met la tierce maniere.

Tiexte. Ou selon ce que telles choses sont mises devant nous ou
76d contre nous, car / se une ymage est mise devant nous aussi comme en resgardant nous, son destre est devant nostre senestre et semblablement son senestre contre nostre destre et son derriere vers ce que est devant nous. Mais en telles ymages, quant a ce, ne a aucune difference, car s[e elle]s[19] estoient tournees au contraire, nous dirions les parties estre destres que nous disions senestres, et devant ce que nous disions derriere, et desus ce que[20] estoit desouz.

Glose. Si comme qui leur mettroit la teste en bas. Et pour ce, selon nature il n'i a destre ne senestre, etc., fors ou par similitude ou [ou][21] resgart de nous, si comme une colompne est faite destre ou senestre, devant, etc., par remuer ou elle ou nous. Aprés il met la quarte raison.

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[14] 61*b*.

[15] *B* dessus.

[16] *DE* est.

[17] *A* desus et de et destre.

[18] *Hippocratis Opera* recensuit Hugo Kuehlewein, I (Lipsiae, Teubner, 1894), viii, 113, ll. 8-12. Galen's work is edited by D. Carolus G. Kühn (Lipsiae, 1828), and the reference is to ch. xv, 442-445.

[18a] *DE* senestre.

[19] *ABCDEF* se il.

[20] *BCDEF* omit 'que.'

[21] *A* omits 'ou.'

Tiexte. Item, pour ce se doit l'en merveillier des Pitagoriens, car il ne parloient fors seulement de ces .ii. principes destre et senestre et delessoient les .iiii. autres qui ne sont pas moins principalz. Car en toutes bestes, les parties desus a[22] celles desouz et celles devant a[23] celles derriere n'ont pas mendre difference que celles de destre a[22] celles de senestre, mes plus grande, car destre et senestre different seulement en vertu et les autres different en vertu et en figure.

77*a* Glose. Les mem- // bres destres sont de tele figure comme sont les senestres, mais destres sont plus fors et plus abiles a oeuvrer selon commun cor(p)s, et[24] en aucuns honmes est le contraire; en aucuns sont equalz en vertu et sont appelléz en latin: *ambidextri*. Et de telz fait mencion aucunes fois la sainte Escripture.[24a] Et les autres .iiii. principes desus dis different en vertu et en figure, si comme la teste et les piés et devant et derriere. Aprés il met la quinte raison qui est presque telle comme la seconde.

Tiexte. Item, desus et desouz sont en toutes choses qui ont ame et semblablement es bestes et es plantes,[25] mes destre et senestre n[e son]t[26] pas es plantes.[25]

Glose. Et donques desus et desouz sont plus generaulz et, par consequent, premiers en ceste maniere. Et donques sont il ou ciel se destre et senestre y sont, meïsmement car nous ne voions yci-bas chose qui ait destre et senestre que elle ne ait desuz et desouz.

Tiexte. Item, aussi comme longitude est premiere que latitude et devant elle.

Glose. Car selon ymaginacion mathematique, ligne est quantité premiere naturelment qu[e][27] superfice. Et ligne a une seule dimension, c'est a savoir longitude; et superfice a .ii. dimensions qui sont longitude et
77*b* latitude; / et corps en a .iii., longitude et latitude et profundité. Et tout ce appert plus a plain ou premier chappitre du premier.[28] Et ainsi longitude est premiere que latitude.

Tiexte. Or est ainsi que desus est principe[29] de longitude et destre principe de latitude, et le principe de ce que est premier [est premier].[30] Donques est desus premier que n'est destre selon generacion, car premier est dit en moult de manieres.

Glose. Si comme il appert ou quint de *Methaphisique*.[31] Et en un ordre, ce que est premier par voie de generacion est derrenier par voie de perfection et *e converso*. Or avons donques que desus est premier que destre par generacion et par nature selon raison prinse d'ymaginacion mathematique. Et appert par la raison desus mise que les choses esperituelles[32] et incorporelles, comme sont Dieu et les anges et les ames humaines, n'ont destre ne senestre ne les autres differences desus mises, car ces differences sont corporelles et prinses selon dimensions ou mesures corporelles. Et quant la sainte Escripture nomme la destre de Dieu, c'est en autre significacion en denotant la vertu ou la gloire divine.

Tiexte. Item, se desus est principe dont vient mouvement.

77*c* Glose. Ce peu(s)t estre entendu pour ce que la // vertu motive es bestes est desus ou cervel, ou pour ce que desus est commencement[33] de augmentacion ou de cressance, si comme fu dit en la tierce raison. Et augmentacion est naturelment es bestes avant que mouvement local.

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[22] *E* et.

[23] *D* et.

[24] *A* repeats 'et.'

[24a] We have not been able to find definite reference to ambidextrous persons in Scripture. However cf. *Matt.* vi, 3; *Eccle.* x, 2; *Psalm* xvii, 35; lvii, 11.

[25] *DE* planetes.

[26] *A* n'est.

[27] *A* qui.

[28] *4a et seq.*

[29] *BCDEF* est premier que longitude.

[30] *AB* omits 'est premier.'

[31] *Metaphysicorum*, V, 1, 1012b, 34-1013a, 24.

[32] *BCDEF* perpetuelles.

Tiexte. Et destre est dont commence mouvement,[34] et devant est la ou il tent.

Glose. Tout ceci peut estre entendu de mouvement local. Et selon une autre exposicion destre est raporté a mouvement local et devant est raporté a l'alteracion qui est selon les sens des bestes, car telz sens naturelz sont devant.[35]

Tiexte. Et donques, au moins en ceste maniere, desus a une vertu de principe et de priorité ou resgart des autres especes desus dites.

Glose. Et par consequent, il doit estre trouvé ou ciel plus tost que destre.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, l'en doit blasmer les Pitagoriens qui parloient seulement de destre et de senestre et lessoient les autres plus principalz; et aussi pour ce que il cuidoient que il fussent semblablement en toutes choses.

Glose. Et c'est faulz, car il ne sont pas en choses qui n'ont vie fors par similitude ou en relacion, si comme il est dit devant en la tierce raison.

77d 5.—*Ou quint chappitre il monstre que / toutes les differences desus dites sont ou ciel, c'est a savoir desus et desous, destre et senestre, devant et derriere.*

Et pour ce que nous avons determiné devant que toutes telles vertus sont en choses qui ont en elles principe ou commencement de leur mouvement.

Glose. Il entent par principe ou commencement la vertu motive qui est cause efficiente de tel mouvement, si comme l'ame en choses qui ont ame.

Tiexte. Et le ciel est chose qui a en soy ame et vie et qui a en soy principe de son mouvement, il s'ensuit clerement que il a en soy desus et desouz et destre et senestre.

Glose. Il samble que l'opinion d'Averroïz, et d'Aristote selon Averroïz, estoit que, ausi comme les plantes ont vie et ame vegetative et les bestes vegetative et sensitive et les honmes vegetative et sensitive et intellective, que aussi le corps du ciel a en soy seulement ame intellective appellee *intelligence*, laquelle est indivisible et non pas estendue par quantité ne par parties, mes est toute en chascune partie de ce corps. Et la maniere de
78a l'union de ceste intelligence et du ciel declaira Averroïz et un // tracté appellé *De substantia orbis.*[1] Et ceste intelligence ou ame et le corps du ciel font et constituent[2] un suppost vif. Et aucune fois, cest mot *ciel* est prins pour ce suppost contenant le corps du ciel et ceste ame; et selon ce dit ici Aristote: *est autem celum animatum*, si comme nous disons que: *homo est corpus animatum.*[3] [Et ce pourroit estre couloré par la sainte Escripture qui dit de Dieu: *qui fecit celos in intellectu;*[4] et en autre lieu dit du solail: *in circuitu pergit spiritus;*[5] *et iterum: sol cognovit occasum suum.*][6] Mais je demande a celui qui tendroit ceste opinion comment ame intellective peu(s)t vivifier corps sans la sensitive; et toutevoies, la sensi-

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[33] *DE* principe.

[34] *B* est du commence; *DE* dont est commencie mouv.; *F* dont commencie de mouv.

[35] Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 12, 101I

[1] *D* Adverrois. *Averrois Cordubensis Opera*, IX (Venetiis, 1573), *Sermo de Substantia orbis*, IV, 5, ff. 10-11.

[2] *BCDEF* sont et contiennent.

[3] *BCDF* disons quod corpus est animatum;*E* que corpus, cf. *Juntas*, 101M.

[4] *Psalm* cxxxv, 5.

[5] Unidentified. *B* in entuitu; *E* in crecuitu.

[6] *Psalm* ciii, 19. *A* omits 'Et ce pourroit . . . occasum suum;' *B* omits 'suum.'

tive ne peu(s)t estre par nature sanz la vegetative. Item, se tout le corps
du ciel est vif par l'intelligence qui le meut de mouvement journal et le
nombre des intelligences est tel comme est le nombre des mouvemens du
ciel, si comme il est dit ou .xii.^{e} de *Methaphisique*,[7] donques s'ensuit il que
le ciel du soleil qui est aussi comme un membre de tout le ciel, ait en soy
.ii. ames ou intelligences au moins, c'est a savoir une qui le meut o tout le
firmament par mouvement journal, et l'autre qui le meut par son propre
mouvement selon les signes du zodiaque. Et ce est possible. Mais que ces
intelligences soient ames du ciel du soleil et que elles soient unies au corps
78*b* de ce ciel par informacion ou par inherence ou autrement telement / que
ce ciel soit vif par elles, il ne le convient pas, mes samble chose naturellement
impossible, car ainsi il vivroit de .ii. vies[8] intellectives et seroit aussi
comme se .i. honme avoit une ame intellective qui fust par tout son corps
et que oveuques ce, il eüst en chascun membre une autre ame. Et par samblable,
il s'ensuiroit des epicicles des planetes que un fust vif de .iii. ou de
.iiii. vies et .i. autre, par aventure, de pluseurs. Mais peut estre que aucun
diroit que le premier et souverain ciel, qui est meü seulement de mouvement
journal, vit par son intelligence qui lui est propre et qui est en ce
ciel et en chascune partie de ce ciel en la maniere que fu dit ou secont
chappitre,[9] et n'est en quelcunque autre ciel. Mais ce ciel par[10] la grandeur
et par la force et isneleté de son mouvement ravist et trait tous les autres
cielz que il contient et qui sont souz lui et les meut de mouvement journal.
Et chascun autre ciel parcial a sa propre intelligence par quoy il vit et
qui le meut d'un mouvement qui lui est propre. Et en ceste maniere le ciel
epicicle d'une planete a en soy seulement sa propre intelligence qui le meut
par son propre mouvement, et il est porté[11] ou ciel excentrique par autre
78*c* mouvement. Mes // l'intelligence qui est en l'excentrique n'est pas en
l'epicicle, et ainsi ne sont pas pluseurs intelligences en un ciel ou ensamble
ne pluseurs vies, mais une seule. Je respon et di que il ne peut estre ainsi
selon philosophie, car estre ravi ou trait est estre meü o violence. Et donques
le mouvement journal des planetes seroit violent, meïsmement car
il seroit fait par vertu qui est dehors elles ou dehors leurs cielz et contre
leur inclinacion, car elles sont enclines a autre mouvement aucunement
opposite ou contraire au mouvement journal. Et tout mouvement du ciel
est naturel, car autrement il ne seroit pas regulier ne perpetuel. Item, le
premier et souverain ciel qui est ainsi meü est concentrique au monde
selon la concavité de ce ciel, et donques il ne boute et ne tire le ciel qui
est souz soy sanz moien. Et avecques ce, ceste concavité ou superfice
concave est tres parfectement polie, planee et onnie en tant que rien ne
peut estre plus, si comme il sera dit aprés au .xx.^{e} chappitre,[12] et sanz
quelcunque aspreté ou endenteüre. Et donques elle ne free en rien au
ciel d'emprés elle ou desouz elle, mes passe tres souef sanz le ravir ou
78*d* traire avecques soy. Item, po- / sé par ymaginacion que le propre
mouvement des planetes cessast par un jour et que elles fussent meües
seulement de mouvement journal; donques se l'intelligence qui ainsi les
meut est du tout hors leurs cielz, il s'ensuit par samblable que tout le
ciel peu(s)t estre meü par une intelligence qui est du tout hors lui. Et
par consequent le ciel ne seroit pas vif par elle. Et se ceste intelligence
qui ainsi meut les planetes ou cas desus mis est en leurs cielz, posons
donques que ce jour soit passé et que leurs mouvemens propres recommencent;
ceste intelligence ne s'en fuira pas pour ce ou se retraira de

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[7] *Metaphysicorum*, XII, 8, 1073a, 37-1073b, 1.
[8] *BCDEF* .ii. ames.
[9] 67*c*.
[10] *DE* mais cecy est par.
[11] *BE* est pour ce ou ciel.
[12] *CF* .ix.^{e} chapitre. 129*b*.

leurs cielz. Et donques en chascun ciel de planete est une intelligence
qui le meut de mouvement journal et une autre qui le meut de son
propre mouvement. Et ce est bien possible comme dit est; mais que par
elles le ciel soit vif et vive de pluseurs vies intellectives, ce n'est pas
naturelment possible. Item, selon Aristote ou premier de *Metheores*,[13]
le feu en son espere est meü circulairement de mouvement journal et
aussi la plus grant partie de l'espere de l'aer. Et ne peut l'en dire que
ce soit par ravissement et par violence tant pour ce que cest mouvement
79*a* est perpetuel, et que le ciel en sa // concavité est tres parfectment poli
sanz quelcunque aspreté comme dit est. Et donques se le feu est ainsi
meü par une intelligence qui est hors de lui, par samblable peut l'en dire
du ciel. Et se le feu est meü par une intelligence qui est en lui, mais il
n'est pas vif par elle, aussi par samblable peut l'en dire du ciel. Et se
par elle le feu est vif de vie intellective, ce dire est une absurdité en
philosophie et aproche de l'erreur d'aucuns anciens de Caldee qui aoroient
le feu. Et ainsi dire que le ciel soit vif de telle vie, c'est a conforter
l'ydolatrie de ceulz qui aouroient le souleil et la lune, etc. Et avecques ce,
c'est contre raison naturelle, comme dit est. Et pour ce,[13a] il ne convient
pas se un ange meut un corps que, pour ce, il li donne vie ne que il soit
en tel corps par union et informacion ou autrement fors par applicacion
voluntaire ou appropriacion, aussi comme un honme meut la nef ou il
est, fors que l'ange est en lieu ou en corps par autre maniere, si comme
il fu dit ou secont chappitre.[14] Or avons donques monstré contre Aristote
par raison naturelle que le ciel n'est pas vif ne corps animé; et noientmoins
il a en soy desus et desouz, si comme il sera dit aprés.[14a] Mais Aristote en
poursuiant sa matiere oste aprés ce .ii. doubtes. /

79*b* Tiexte. Et ne convient faire doubte comment ce pourroit estre, pour ce que la figure du ciel et du monde est sperique et ronde, car comment peut l'en dire que une partie soit destre et l'autre senestre puisque elles sont toutes semblables?

Glose. Quant a figure et aussi quant a substance ainsi comme sont les parties d'une eaue, fors que les estoilles sont[15] les parties plus espesses.

> Tiexte. Item, il ne convient pas faire telle doubte pour ce que le ciel et ses parties sont meüs touz temps.

Glose. Car pour ce pourroit aucun doubter comme l'en peut dire que une partie du ciel soit destre, car destre est de la ou commence le mouvement, si comme il appert ou livre *Des Mouvemens des bestes.*[16] Et donques ne peu(s)t l'en assigner destre en corps qui est meü sans commencement. Aprés il respont a la premiere doubte.

> Tiexte. Mes il convient ceste chose entendre aussi comme qui ymagineroit une chose de laquelle le destre et le senestre different en figure, et aprés que ceste chose fust composee et mise en figure sperique et ronde. Et ce fait, encor avra ceste chose destre et senestre differenz en vertu, et samblera que non ait pour la similitude de la figure.

Glose. Pluseurs ont escript que quant un petit serpent appellé *ceps* point
79c // un honme tout le corps de cel honme remet et char et olz et devient
ausi comme une masse de pois noir[e][17] et ronde. Et de ce dist Lucain:

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[13] *Meteorologicorum*, II, 3, 340b, 29-341a, 4; 7, 344a, 11-14.

[13a] *ABCDEF* pour ce que il.

[14] 61c.

[14a] 80bc.

[15] *F* omits 'les parties . . . estoilles sont.'

[16] *De Animalium Incessu*, IV, 705b, 13-706a, 13.

[17] *A* noir.

ossaque dissolvens[18] *cum corpore tabificus seps.*[19] Et donques en telle masse l'en ne peu(s)t congnoistre destre ne senestre; et noientmoins, se il povoit estre que elle eüst vie, encore y seroit destre et senestre, etc. Et par ce est declairee l'intencion d'Aristote en ceste partie. Aprés il respont a la seconde doubte.

> Tiexte. Et en ceste maniere doit l'en dire du commencement de son mouvement.

Glose. C'est a savoir condicionelment et par supposicion, car se le ciel eüst esté fait d telle figure comme un honme et puis mis en figure sperique il eüst destre et senestre. Et samblablement est du mouvement.

> Tiexte. Car posé que le ciel n'eüst onques commencement de son mouvement, toutevoies il est neccessaire que aucune difference soit dont il eüst commencié son mouvement se il eüst commencié estre meü, et dont[20] il le recommenceroit se il se arrestoit et reposoit aucune fois.

Glose. Pour entendre ce que dit est et ce que s'ensuit en ceste matiere,
79*d* je pose que un honme soit en estant, ses bras estendus, et que / parmi
son corps du lon[c][21] soit ymaginee une verge droite, immobile aussi
comme un axel, et que cest honme soit meü environ ceste verge de
mouvement circulaire. Je di que cest mouvement est selon ordre deü et
a son droit se la main destre de cest honme tourne et est meüe en venant
vers son devant. Car [s]e[22] cest honme tournoit l'autre voie au contraire,
il se movroit a rebours et contre droite ordenance pour ce que la destre,
qui est plus noble que la senestre, doit aler ou tourner vers le devant
80*a* qui est plus noble naturelment que le derriere.[23] // Or appert clerement
par cest exemple que quant a ceci ne a force ne quelcunque difference
se cest honme commence maintenant estre ainsi meü ou se il commença
passé a mil ans, ou se il a esté ainsi meü sanz commencement, car,
comment que soit, se il estoit meü circulairement l'autre voie, ce seroit
ordre desnaturel,[24] comme dit est: *ordo preposterus*. Et par ce est declairee
l'intencion d'Aristote en responnant a la seconde doubte. Item, l'en doit
savoir que quant a ce propos *desus* est dit en .ii. manieres et *desouz* ausi:
une est a prendre *desus* pour ce mot *haut*, et ainsi en la region des elemens
ce que est le plus loing du centre est plus desus et, du contraire, ce que
est plus bas est desouz. Et ainsi quant un honme a les piés contremont,
nous disons que sa teste est desouz. Et en ceste maniere ou tout le ciel
est desus ou, a parler plus proprement, il n'a ou ciel ne desus ne desous
ne haut ne bas, si comme il fu declairé ou .xxiiii.^{e} chappitre du premier.[25]
Mais *desus* est dit autrement de la plus noble partie d'une chose vive,
et *desouz* de celle qui est a l'opposite selon la premiere dimension. Et en
ceste maniere, la teste d'un honme est le desus de lui, combien que il
80*b* soit ou estant ou gesant ou les piés / contremont, et aussi d'une beste.
Et par aventure, selon ce diroit l'en que la racine d'un arbre est le desus
de l'arbre, car yleuques est principaument la vie de lui et par ce prent
nourissement. Et pour ce di(s)t Aristote que: *radices*[26] *sunt ori similes*;
et di(s)t l'en que honme est arbre reversé: *vides homines velut arbores.*[27]
Et je ay veü un livre de songes ou est dit que: *casus arborum significat*

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[18] *BCDEF* Lucan; *B* dissolvit.

[19] *M. Annaei Lucani Belli Civilis.* ed. Carolus Hosius (Lipsiae, 1913^3), IX, 723, p. 289.

[20] *F* estre et doncques il le rec.

[21] *A* loing.

[22] *A* ce.

[23] Figure 3, p. 185.

[24] *B* de naturel; *F* naturel.

[25] Implied throughout the chapter, but not stated specifically. Cf. 34*b*.

[26] *CDE* radice. *De Anima*, II, 4, 416a, 4.

[27] Cf. *Mark*, viii, 24: Video homines velut arbores ambulantes.


la lune
le ciel
l'epicicle
la lune

FIG. 1
FOL. 70c



FIG. 2
FOL. 71 d



FIG. 3
FOL 79 d


le pole antartique
Ath las
orient
la terre
occident
le pole artique

FIG. 4
FOL. 82 ab


derrenier orient
premier occident
atim
la terre
orient
occident
le bout
le bout
derrenier occident
premier orient

FIG. 5
FOL. 83 a



FIG. 6
FOL. 85 b

mortes hominum.[28] Item, en prenant *desus* et *desous* en la seconde maniere
desus dite, je di que en tout corps meü circulairement, encore posé que
il ne soit pas vif, l'en peut assigner les differences desus mises. Car posé
que une roe estante, aussi comme est la roe du moulin, fust devant moy
et fust meüe en tornant droit vers moy; je di que, selon droit ordre de
mouvement, le desus de ceste roe,—a prendre *desus* en la seconde maniere,
—seroit devant moy a main destre. Et la cause est car qui ymagineroit
que elle fust vive ou que un honme estendu en la maniere devant mise
la meüst par ordre deü, quant cest honme avroit son bras destre ou desus
de la roe,—en prenant *desus* en la premiere maniere,—il convendroit que
sa teste fust devant moy vers ma destre. Et samblablement d'une roe
80*c* jesante, si comme est la // roe du potier, car se elle est meüe ausi comme
en ensuiant le mouvement journal du ciel, cest honme ymaginé en la
roe avroit la teste sous la roe vers le centre du monde; et se elle tournoit
l'autre voie, il avroit sa teste desus vers le ciel. Et ainsi se la roe tourne
en une maniere, sen desus est d'une part; et se elle tourne en autre
maniere, son desus est de l'autre part. Et samblable ymaginacion mettent
Aristote et Averroïz ou ciel, si comme il sera dit aprés.[29] Or appert donques
comment l'en peut assigner desus et desouz en quelconque corps meü
circulairement combien que tel corps ne soit pas vif. Et encore est ceste
difference plus proprement ou ciel, tant pour ce que il est ainsi meü
naturelment, continue[l]ment[30] et ordeneement,[31] tant pour ce que il
n'est enclin a autre mouvement, tant pour ce que ou ciel n'a desus ne
desouz en quelcunque maniere fors seulement ou resgart de cest
mouvement quant aus parties qui sont en equale distance du centre du
monde. Et donques, nonobstant que le ciel ne soit pas vif, il a en soy
desus et desouz. Et se aucun opposoit contre ce que dit est et disoit que
l'ymaginacion desus mise n'est pas vraie, c'est a savoir que une chose
80*d* vive moeve une roe en la maniere desus dite, / ce ne fait empeeschement
a nostre propos, car par telles supposicions condicionelles l'en vient a
cognoissance de verité. Et meïsme en cest chappitre et a cest propos,
Aristote pose que le ciel eüst esté fait de menbres ou parties dessamblables
et que aprés eüst esté mis en figure sperique; et tout ce est naturelment
impossible. Item, il pose que le mouvement du ciel eüst eü commencement
et que il se arresta[s]t[32] et recommençast, laquelle chose il repute impossible.
Item, selon la translacion d'Averroïz,[33] il pose que .i. honme soit
extendu ou ciel et le moeve d'orient en occident, et il n'est pas ainsi;
mais il pose telles choses condicionelment pour nous mener a cognoissance
de verité.[34]

6.—*Ou sixte chappitre il monstre comment les dites differences sont assignees ou ciel.*

Je di que la longitude ou le loing[1] du ciel est la distance qui est selon les poles, et des poles un est desus et l'autre est desouz.

Glose. Et ce prouve il aprés par .ii. raisons.

---

[28] *B* arboris; *DEF* significat mettes hominum. Unidentified; not found in *Somnium Scipionis.*

[29] 81*cd.*

[30] *ACF* continuement.

[31] *D* tant pour ce que il n'est enclin a autre mouvement ordeneement tant; *E* tant pour ce qu'il n'est en celui a autre mouvement ordeneement tant.

[32]. *A* arrestat.

[33] *Juntas*, t.c. 13, 102H.

[34] *DE* add: 'Ci s'ensuit la figure de l'ymaginacion devant dicte et cetera.' No figures are executed in either Ms. at this point.

[1] *BCDEF* lonc.

Tiexte. Car nous voions que la difference des hemisperes est prinse seulement en la distance des poles parce que les poles ne sont pas meüs.

Glose. En grec, *hemi*, c'est *demi*, et *hemispere*, c'est *demie-espere*, et est 81*a* la moitié du ciel // que est desus nous et celle qui est desouz est un autre hemispere.[2] Et ces hemisperes sont distinguéz et congneüs plus principaument par le elevacion de[s][3] poles. Et sont .ii. poles immobiles: un est sus nostre hemispere emprés l'estoille appellee du nort, et l'autre est souz nostre hemispere ou souz nostre ozizon et ne le povons veoir. Et pour ce que il sont immobiles, la ligne qui est ymaginee de l'un pole a l'autre par le centre du monde est appellee en especial le dyametre du monde ou l'essel du ciel et est la plus no[tab]le[4] difference, et pour ce est elle la longueur ou longitude du ciel.[5] Et desus et desouz sont principes de longitude, si comme il fu dit ou chappitre precedent.[5a]

[Tiexte.][6] Item, nous avons acoustumé a dire les costéz du monde non pas ce que est desus et ce que est desouz ne les poles, mais ce que est jouste les poles.

Glose. Vers orient et vers occident.

Tiexte. Aussi comme se le lonc du ciel ou sa longitude fust de pole [a pole],[7] car ce que est es costés est jouste ce que est desus et desouz.

Glose. Il veult dire que orient et occident sont les costés du ciel et les poles sont les bous du ciel. Mais ici est une doubte, car selon ce que dit est, la longitude du ciel est de pole a pole et la latitude seroit d'orient en occident. Et les astrologiens mettent, au contraire, la longitude est 81*b* d'orient en / occident et la latitude de pole a pole. Je respon et di que les astrologiens ne dient onques le contraire de ceste ymaginacion qui est d[e][8] tout le corps du ciel selon son mouvement, mais il ont autre consideracion quant a notifier les lieus et les distances des planetes ou ciel et des cités en terre, car la partie du ciel en laquelle cuerent[9] les planetes entre les .ii. tropiques ou sous le zodyaque a plus grande estente ou distance en procedant de orient en occident et au contraire que en procedant de pole vers pole. Et la plus grant dimension ou distance est communement[10] appellee la longitude ou le lonc de la chose, et semblablement la terre habitable est plus estendue au double et plus en alant d'orient en occident que elle n'est en alant de midi vers septentrion. Et pour ce, le lonc de la terre habitable est d'orient en occident. Et ces .ii. termes, l'en les seult appeller les bouz du monde, et de leur distance sera dit vers la fin[11] de cest secont livre.[12] Aprés il monstre lequel des .ii. poles est desus et lequel desouz.

Tiexte. Et des poles, celui qui est apparent sus nous c'est la partie du ciel qui est desouz, et le pole opposite, qui onques ne nous appert, c'est la partie desus.

81c Glose. Sanz les .ii. manieres qui furent mises ou chappitre // precedent, encore est dit *desus* en autre maniere de ce que est eslevé sus nostre ozizon en nostre hemispere et desouz de ce qui est deprimé souz nostre ozizon. Et en ceste maniere toutes les estoilles que nous voions sont desus et tant plus sont eslevees, et plus sont desus. Et semblablement celles que nous ne povons veoir et sont rescousees, elles sont desouz; et noientmoins, absoluement et simplement, elles sont tousjours equalment desus ou ciel. Aprés il prouve ce que il a dit.

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[2] In *A*, hemispere is uniformly masculine; usually also in *BCF*.

[3] *A* de.

[4] *A* noble.

[5] *DE* omit 'et est la plus . . . du ciel.'

[5a] 77*bc*.

[6] *A* omits 'tiexte.'

[7] *A* omits 'a pole.'

[8] *A* du.

[9] *E* queuvrent.

[10] *BCDEF* continuelement.

[11] *DE* omit 'et de leur . . . la fin.'

[12] Ch. 31, 152*d*-153*b*.

> Tiexte. Car nous disons le destre d'une chose ce dont est le commencement de son mouvement local ou selon lieu, et le commencement du mouvement circulaire du ciel est dont les estoilles lievent. Et donques orient est le destre du ciel et occident le senestre. Et donques se le mouvement commence a destre et de destre s'en va et procede en circuite, il s'ensuit par neccessité que le pole qui ne[13] nous appert pas soit[14] le dessus du ciel,[15] car se le pole qui nous appert estoit le desus du ciel, le mouvement du ciel seroit de senestre en alant vers destre, laquelle chose nous ne disons pas.

Glose. Car si comme il est dit ou chappitre precedent,[15a] tout mouvement
circulaire selon droit ordre procede de destre vers senestre, aussi comme
81*d* se il commençast de destre, nonob- / stant que il soit perpetuel, si comme
il appert par le chappitre precedent. Et ainsi est prouvé lequel pole du
monde est desus et lequel est desouz, et que celui qui est eslevé sus
nous est desouz.

Selon Aristote et Averroïz,[16] pour declairer et entendre ces choses, il
convient ymaginer .i. tres grant honme, aussi comme celui dont fu faite
mencion ou tiers chappitre,[17] et soit nommé Athlas et soit estendu ou ciel
en la maniere que il est yci mis en figure, et moeve le ciel. Et pour ce
que mouvement circulaire selon ordre deü procede de destre en [v]enant[18]
vers senestre, il convient que la destre de cest honme soit en orient et
so[n][19] devant vers midi, car ainsi procede le mouvement du ciel, et sa
senestre sera en occident. Et donques s'ensuit il par neccessité que la
teste[20] de cest honme soit vers le pole antartique qui est souz nostre
ozizon et ne nous appert onques, et que ses piés soient vers le pole [ou][21]
ou pole artique qui tousjours nous appert et est emprés l'estoille du nort.
Mes je argüe contre, premierement car se la partie du ciel qui est au
matin en orient[21a] est destre et elle est meüe continuelment et sera au
vespre en occident, donques sera le destre[22] du ciel en occident et le
senestre en orient et sera Athlas torné ce devant derriere. Et ainsi orient
n'est pas plus destre que occident. Item, se l'en dit que quant la partie du
82*a* ciel qui est en orient s'en // part, elle lesse[23] estre destre et celle qui
82*b* y / vient de nouvel commence estre[24] // destre, aussi comme se Athlas
82*c* ne se meüst mais eüst touzjours son bras destre en orient; donques
s'ensuit il que la partie du ciel qui est au matin destre sera au vespre
senestre et, *e converso*, la senestre destre. Et par consequent, destre et
senestre ne sont ou ciel fors en relacion, aussi comme une colompne est
une fois a destre de moy et autre fois a senestre, si comme il fu dit ou
quart chappitre.[25] Et c'est contre l'intencion d'Aristote. Item, chascune
partie du ciel qui peut lever et rescouser est en orient et lieve en quel
païz que ce soit [et chascune en occident][26] et chascune a midi, si comme,

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[13] *DE* omit 'ne.'

[14] *E* appert qu'il ne soit pas.

[15] *BCDEF* soit dessus le ciel.

[15a] 79*d et seq.*

[16] Oresme refers to Aristotle from the *Vetus translatio* which accompanies Averrois' Commentary. Cf. *Juntas,* 102B: *sed oportet ut imaginetur homo* and Averrois' commentary, *Juntas,* t.c. 13, 102H.

[17] 74c.

[18] *A* devant.

[19] *A* soy.

[20] *BDE* destre.

[21] *A* omits 'ou.'

[21a] *DE* omit 'en orient.'

[22] *B* desus.

[23] *BCDEF* part et lesse.

[24] Figure 4, p. 185.

[25] 76c.

[26] *A* omits 'et chascune en occident.'

pour grace d'exemple, le soleil lieve touzjours en aucun hemispere ou en
aucun païs et resco[u]se[27] en un autre; et ainsi des autres estoilles et
parties du ciel qui seulent lever et rescouser, si comme il peut legierement
apparoir a qui considere la rondesce de la terre. Et donques indifferenment
chascune telle partie est destre et est senestre et devant et
derriere sanz distinction, fors ou resgart de diverses regions ou hemisperes.
Pour telles difficultés evader, il convient mettre une de .iii. voies: une
est que le destre de chascun ciel et chascune partie du ciel[28] [est en une
partie du ciel][29] determineement ou que elle soit, et le senestre aussi,[29a]
et est meüe aveques le ciel. Et dient ceulz qui sont de ceste opinion que
l'estoille est la plus noble partie de son ciel, et en l'estoille et de celle
part est le destre du ciel. Et ainsi Athlas tourneroit avecques le ciel./
82*d* Mais ce ne [se][30] peut soustenir quant au ciel ou sont les estoilles fichiees,
car elles sont semees partout environ, qui ne voudroit signer aucunes de
elles et dire que elles sont les plus nobles; mais ce seroit un dit voluntaire
et sanz raison. Item, et quant aus estoilles fichiees et quant aus planetes,
il s'ensuiroit que le destre du ciel fust aucune fois en occident et que il
ne fust plus en orient que en occident. Et Aristote le met en orient. Une
autre voie est que le destre du ciel est touzjours en un lieu[31] immobile,
ausi comme est le desus, et semblablement des autres differences. Et
ainsi Athlas seroit tousjours fichié et ne se mouvroit. Et pour ce entendre,
il convient supposer que la terre n'est pas habitable tout environ ou tout
en circuite en alant ou en procedant d'orient en occident ou au contraire,
mes vers orient est un terme outre lequel elle est inhabitable et aussi un
autre vers occident. Or ymaginon donques en la terre sous le [c]ecle[32]
equinocial du ciel une porcion de cecle qui procede de l'un bout a l'autre
de terre habitable. Et verité est que ceste porcion est plus grande que
de[mi]-cecle,[33] car les deux bous de terre habitable sont asséz prochains //
83*a* par devers la partie inhabitable, si comme il sera dit vers la fin de ce
secont livre.[34] Et les astrologiens ymaginent ou milieu de ceste porcion
une cité que il appellent Arim. Et pour ce que la partie de terre qui est
habitable est plus noble que la partie inhabitable et la terre est subjecte
au ciel, il s'ensuit que la plus noble partie du ciel est sus la terre habitable
83*b* en tant comme il est possible, consideré[35] que desus ne peut estre[36] / ou
ciel autrement que dit est devant selon le mouvement du ciel.[37] Et
donques le devant du ciel est sus Arym et le destre du ciel en l'orient
d'Arym et le midi d'Arim est le vrai orient[38] immobile, [et le orient
d'Arym est le vrai orient immobile][39] et non pas le premier orient de terre
habitable, car se il estoit le droit destre du ciel et le derrenier occident
fust le droit senestre, destre et senestre ne seroi[en]t[40] pas opposites selon
le dyametre du ciel. Item, se ainsi estoit, Athlas avroit ses mains ausi
comme derriere soy, car il n'a pas grant distance du premier orient au
derrenier occident en procedant par la partie de terre inhabitable, si
comme il est dit devant et appert en figure. Or avons donques comment
desus et destre et devant sont ou ciel, et par ce appert des autres differences
opposites a cestes, et avons que elles sont immobiles. Et par ce
s'ensuit que Athlas est ymaginé fichié et immobile. Et me samble que
ce fu l'oppinion d'Aristote selon Averroïz. Et par ce s'ensuit que quel-

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[27] *A* resconse.

[28] *BCDEF* omit 'et chascune partie du ciel.'

[29] *A* omits 'est en . . . ciel.'

[29a] *DE* ou quel soit et soit le senestre.

[30] *A* omits 'se.'

[31] *DE* ciel.

[32] *A* siecle.

[33] *A* que de un cecle.

[34] 152*d*.

[35] Lacuna in *C* extends from this point to 105*b*.

[36] Figure 5, p. 185.

[37] *DE* omit 'selon . . . du ciel.'

[38] *BDEF* midi.

[39] *AB* omit 'et le orient . . . immobile.'

[40] *A* seroit.

cunque partie du ciel vient de nouvel et succede en cel orient desus dit, elle commence et est faite destre et quant elle s'en depart, elle lesse estre destre, et ainsi des autres differences excepté desus et desouz, car les poles sont immobiles. Et est aussi comme se les parties materieles de la
83*c* main senestre // d'un honme fluoient a la main destre, car elles seroient fetes destres; mes pour ce que ou ciel les parties desus ne peuent estre faites desouz, telle transmutacion n'est pas quant aus poles comme dit est. Et par ce est evadee la premiere difficulté devant touchie. Mes encore demeurent les autres, et pour les evader sont .ii. opinions plus apparentes entre les autres: une est que l'intelligence qui fait le mouvement journal est en chascune partie du ciel, si comme il fu dit ou secont chapitre,[41] et est immobile selon Aristote. Et ceste intelligence a plus grant vertu en orient que [en][42] autre part, si comme il appert parce que les estoilles ont plus forte influence en celle partie que ailleurs. Et pour ce, cel orient est la destre partie du ciel, et quelconque partie succede en cel orient, elle est fete destre comme dit est. Et ainsi le destre du ciel n'est onques en l'occident opposite ne en autre orient. Et par ce appert la response aus .ii. derreniers argüemens. Mais ceste oppinion n'est pas raisonnable, car selon Aristote ou quart et ou quint chapitre,[42a] destre et senestre et les autres differences sont corporelles et de corps ou en corps mobiles et divisibles. Et l'intelligence qui meut tout le ciel est incorporelle et immobile[43] et indivisible. Et donques se elle a autre vertu en une partie
83*d* du ciel et autre / en autre, ce n'est pas par raison de elle; mais se en ce a difference, c'est pour la difference des parties du corps du ciel, si comme l'estoille a plus grant influence que une autre partie. Et par ce appert que teles differences sont ou corps du ciel premierement et principaument et toutes les parties du ciel sont meües, et donques destre et senestre ou ciel ne sont pas immobiles. Et a ce que l'en di(s)t que les estoilles ont plus grant influence en orient, je di que peut estre que une estoille ou planete, quant elle a aucune prerogative et elle est en l'orient d'une region, elle est plus vertueuse que se elle estoit a midi ou au vespre pour ce que elle demeure plus sus celle region, mais c'est samblablement et generaument partout en chascun orient et non pas seulement en l'orient d'Arym. Et donques par ceste raison, orient de Arym n'est pas plus vray orient que un autre. Item, le orient des planetes est l'occident du mouvement journal, si comme il appert ou chapitre ensuiant; et toutesvoies elle[s] n'o[n]t[44] pas plus grant vertu en occident. Une autre oppinion est que par desus les cielz qui sont meüs est un autre ciel immobile duquel
84*a* les parties sont dessamblables en vertu et en influence. // Et samble par raison que il convient que il soit, car autrement l'en ne pourroit reduire a cause celestiel aucunes diversités qui sont en terre selon longitude, c'est a savoir en procedant d'orient vers occident ou, au contraire, sanz aprochier ou esloingnier des poles, si comme pourquoy une partie de la terre selon cest procés est habitable et l'autre non, et pourquoi les plantes[45] et les bestes et les corps et les meurs des gens sont tant differens d'orient en occident qui ont presque un meïsme resgart au soleil et aus planetes et aus estoilles et aus parties des cielz qui sont meüz. Et donques il convient mettre un ciel immobile duquel les parties sont differentes en influence et sont causes des diversités desus dites. Et de ce ciel, la partie qui est en l'orient de Arym est destre. Et des cielz mouvables, chascune partie est faite destre quant elle vient en cel orient immobile, et selon ce sont assignees les autres differences de posicion souvent nommees. Je

[41] 67*c*.
[42] *A* omits 'en.'
[42a] 75*d et seq.*
[43] *BDEF* incorruptible.
[44] *A* elle n'ot. 88*d et seq.*
[45] *BDE* planetes.

di que ceste opinion n'est pas concordable a la philosophie d'Aristote, car
tout corps est mobile[46] ou mouvable, si comme il fu dit ou secont chapitre
du premier,[47] et meïsmement tout corps celestiel, si comme il appert en
84b pluseurs / lieus en cest livre et en autres. Item, se un ciel i[m]mobile[48]
estoit, en tel ciel ne seroit destre ne senestre, car telles differences ne
sont fors en corps qui ont en soy principe et cause de leur mouvement,
si comme il appert par le quart chapitre.[49] Item, il ne convient pas mettre
tel ciel immobile pour les differences desus dites qui sont en terre, car
l'en peut de ce assigner autres causes[49a] selon astrologie, si comme les
conjunctions et autres resgars des estoilles, et les eclipses qui ne sont pas
samblablement en orient et en occident. Et se tel ciel estoit, il ne seroit
pas cause de destre et de senestre es cielz qui sont meüz et qui sont
sous lui, car, posé par ymaginacion que il fust adnullé et que les autres
fussent meüz par mouvement journal, encore convendroit il metre telles
differences ou ciel, car autrement l'en ne pourroit assigner cause pourquoy
il est meü ainsi et non l'autre voie, si comme il sera dit ou .xii.^e chapitre.[50]
Item, le destre du mouvement des planetes est en occident, si comme il
appert ou chapitre ensuiant,[44] et ne convient pas pour ce mettre un ciel
immobile, et par samblable, il ne convient pas mettre pour assigner destre
84c ou mouvement journal. Item, je argüe contre ces .ii. // opinions ensamble,
premierement car se la terre estoit toute couverte d'yaue aussi comme
elle fu ou temps de Noé, encore tourneroit le ciel la voie que il tourne.
Et toutevoi[e]s,[51] l'en ne pourroit assigner ou seroit l'orient d'Arym, mais
seroit orient par tout le circuite indifferanment. Item, se la terre estoit
habitable tout environ en procedant d'orient vers occident ou a[u][52]
contraire, l'en ne pourroit dire que orient fust plus en un lieu que en
autre ne que [un][53] orient fust plus noble ou plus destre que l'autre; et
noientmoins le ciel ne cesseroit pas tourner, si[54] comme il tourne
maintenant. Et donques est maintenant orient par tout le circuite indifferanment.
Item, ceulz qui sont souz le pole[55] ou seroient, ont
perpetuelment la moitié du ciel sus eulz[55a] sanz ce que par mouvement
journal quelconque partie du ciel leur lieve ou rescouse, mais chascune
va et tourne equalment environ eulz; et donques n'est yleucques orient
ne occident determineement et absoluement, ne par consequent destre
ne senestre, mais seulement en relacion d'une partie a autre, si comme
il sera dit aprés, se aucun ne disoit que quant une estoille est ou meridian
de Arym elle est devant et quant elle est en l'orient d'Arym elle est a
destre; mais c'est un dit voluntaire sanz raison, car souz le pole tout est
84d indifferent / quant a ce. Item, se la terre estoit ausi clere ou aussi tra[n]sparente[56]
comme aer fin et pur ou comme l'element du feu est en sa region
au desus de l'aer;—se ainsi estoit, la terre ne feroit quelconque umbre ne
empeeschement que l'en ne peüst veoir equalment toutes les parties du
ciel et seroit tousjours jour sanz nuit: *continuus sine*[57] *nocte dies.*[58] Et
pour ce que la terre est tres petite ou resgart du ciel et aussi comme un
point, toutes les parties du ciel qui sont en circuite en equales distances
des poles resgarderoient equalment la terre partout, et ne pourroit l'en
signer determineement ne absoluement orient ne destre plus en un lieu

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[46] *DEF* immobile.
[47] 6*d*.
[48] *A* iimobile.
[49] 76*b*.
[49a] *DEF* guises.
[50] 104*a*.
[51] *A* toutevois.
[52] *A* a.
[53] *A* omits 'un.'
[54] *DE* ciel ne seroit pas tournés si.
[55] *BDEF* omit 'souz le pole.'
[55a] *DE* omit 'sus eulz.'
[56] *A* trasparente; *B* masparente.
[57] *B* sum; *E* serum.
[58] Unidentified.

que en autre; et toutevoies, le ciel seroit meü aussi comme il est. Et donques ne peut estre telle signacion ou ciel fors en relacion et par tout le circuite indifferanment.[59] Et se aucun disoit que les .iiii. supposicions mises en ces .iiii. raisons sont impossibles, c'est a savoir que la terre soit toute couverte d'yaue ou que elle soit habitable tout en circuite, etc., je respon que nulle de ces supposicions n'est telement impossible que elle encloe ou contienne en soy contradiction selon la distinction de possible et de impossible qui fu mise ou .xxx.^{e} chapitre du premier livre.[60] Et pour 85*a* ce, l'en seult aucune // fois mettre telles supposicions pour declarer la verité aussi comme en disant: se ainsi estoit, ainsi seroit; et ainsi est comme il seroit, etc. Et les supposicions desus mises ne sont pas si impossibles selon la philosophie d'Aristote comme sont celles que il meïsme met en cest propos ou en ceste matiere ou quint chapitre,[61] ou il pose que le ciel eüst esté fait et d'autre figure que sperique et aprés composé en figure sperique, et que il commence estre meü et que il cesse estre meü[62] et que il recommence. Item, de ceste supposicion je argüe quintement au propos devant dit, car se par ymaginacion le mouvement du ciel cessoit par un temps et recommençoit aprés, si comme il fu de fait ou temps de Josué, l'en ne pourroit dire que une partie du ciel commençast estre meüe plus tost que l'autre, mes toutes commenceroient estre meües equalment et semblablement et chascune leveroit en aucun païs ou sus aucun ozizon, si comme il fu touchié devant.[63] Et par consequent chascune seroit destre en aucun lieu et chascune senestre, etc. Je di donques, en recapitulant, que il est monstré devant que la voie n'est pas vraie qui met que le destre du ciel est en une certainne partie du ciel et est meü avecques celle partie. Et aussi est monstré que la seconde 85*b* voie qui met que le destre / du ciel est immobile et que il est perpetuelment en l'orient du milieu de terre habitable ne se peut soustenir par quelconque voie; et samble que ce fu l'opinion d'Aristote selon Averroïz.[63a]

Or veul [je][64] mettre la tierce voie qui est selon raison naturelle et concordable a nostre foy,[65] et pour la entendre, je veul recorder et descrire en figure une ymaginacion ou consideracion qui fu mise en glose aprés le quint chapitre.[66] Et pose que une roe soit estante devant moi et que un homme soit [estendu][67] parmi ceste roe aussi comme en lieu de essel; et soit sa teste devant moy vers ma destre et les piés vers ma senestre et ses bras estendus vers la circunference de la roe aussi comme se il la 85*c* tournoit a ses mains. Je di que, selon droit ordre de // mouvement circulaire, sa destre main doit aler ou mouver vers le devant de lui et la palme de sa main destre devant le dos de celle meïsme main destre. Et donques ceste roe tournera tellement que le desus de elle vendra vers moy ou contre moy, et se la teste de cest honme estoit devant moy vers ma senestre et les piéz de l'autre part,[68] la roe tourneroit l'autre voie au contraire. Mes je di outre que l'en peut ymaginer la main destre de cest 85*d* honme en quelconque partie de la circunference de la roe[69] / sanz difference, et n'est force en quelconque partie que elle soit mes est partout une meïsme raison quant au mouvement, si comme il appert en figure, posé que la roe fust[70] assise autrement que elle n'estoit devant et que une moitié d'elle fust devant moy vers destre et l'autre vers senestre et que

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[59] *DE* omit 'donques ne peut . . . indifferanment.'
[60] 47*b* *et seq.*
[61] 79*cd.*
[62] *F* omits 'et que . . . meü.'
[63] 84*a.*
[63a] Cf. *Juntas*, t.c., 15, 104B *et seq.*
[64] *A* omits 'je.'
[65] *BF* a nostre propos; *DE* a cest propos.
[66] 79*c* *et seq.*
[67] Figure 6, p. 185. *A* omits 'estendu.'
[68] Figure 6 reversed, p. 185.
[69] Figure 7, p. 201.
[70] *B* roe ne fust.

la teste de cest honme fust loing de moy outre la roe et les piés devers[70a]
moy. Car l'en ne pourroit assigner cause ne reson quant au mouvement
pourquoy sa destre fust plus en une partie de la circunference de la roe
que en autre, et aussi de la senestre et des autres .ii. differences. Je di
donques que, posé que ceste roe ne soit pas vive ne meüe par chose vive,
toutevoies par similitude a chose vive qui seroit ainsi meüe, l'en peut
assigner en elle determineement desus et desouz. Mais chascune des autres
.iiii.[71] differences peut estre signee equalment et samblablement par toute
la circunference de la roe sanz quelconque difference fors en relacion de
l'une a l'autre et quant au mouvement, car la partie qui va devant [est
senestre et devant][72] ou resgart de celle qui vient aprés elle, aussi comme
des personnes en une carole. Et donques a propos, se le ciel est corps
86*a* non-vif et sans ame,—et tel est il, si comme il fu dit // ou chapitre
precedent,[73]—je di que desus et desouz quant au mouvement sont ou ciel
par similitude en la maniere que dit est d'une roe, et est le pole antartique
desus et le pole artique desouz ainsi comme di(s)t Aristote.[74] Item, se le
ciel estoit corps vif, si comme veult Aristote, desuz et desouz seroient
distincteement ou ciel en la maniere desus mise et non pas seulement par
similitude, mes realment et selon verité. Item, posé que le ciel soit corps
vif ou non-vif, comment que soit, je di que les autres .iiii. differences ne
sont pas ou ciel realment distinctees ne absoluement, mes tant seulement
en relacion, et non pas en relacion ou en resgart a nous aussi comme une
86*b* colompne est destre ou senestre, mes en relacion et en regart[75] / des unes
aus autres selon le mouvement. Car posé que le ciel soit divisé en .iiii.
parties equales selon .iiii. poinz signés en l'equinoctial, et soit .*a*. et .*b*. et
.*c*. et .*d*., et que le mouvement soit telement que .*b*. precede et vaise devant
.*a*.; je di que se .*a*. est orient ou destre, .*b*. est devant et .*c*. est senestre et
.*d*. est derriere. Mais pour ce que orient peut estre signé partout, si comme
souvent dit est, se .*b*. est orient et destre, je di que .*c*. est devant et .*d*. est
senestre[76] et .*a*. est derriere, et ainsi des autres poins. Item, ces .iiii. poinz
peuent estre signés ailleurs par tout le cecle semblablement et sanz
difference[77] fors que il soient distans equalment. Et donques se Athlas est
ymaginé ou ciel, si comme il fu dit devant, il convient par neccessité que
sa teste soit ou pole antartique et que sez piéz soient par deça en l'autre
pole, mais sa main destre peu(s)t estre ymaginee par tout le circuite sanz
difference, et aussi la senestre contre la destre, et samblablement de son
devant et de son derriere. Et cest Athlas peut estre ymaginé fichié et
immobile ou tourné aveuques le ciel et ne est force ou sa main destre
soit ymaginee estre ou signee, fors que elle vaise vers son devant, et la
senestre au contraire vers son derriere, si comme devant dit est d'une
86*c* roe. // Item, pour ce miex entendre, je pose que une carole de [78] honmes
torne en circuite selon le mouvement journal, car ainsi va elle naturelment.
Et donques chascun de la carole va devant celui qui est a sa destre
et derriere celui qui est a sa senestre. Or ymaginons donques que parmi
ceste carole soit un grant honme qui la moeve toute a ses bras estenduz
aussi comme Athlas est ymaginé ou ciel. Je di que il convient que la
teste de cest honme soit vers le centre de la terre et les piés contrement,
car autrement sa main destre ne iroit pas vers son devant, si comme
elle doit aler selon droit ordre de mouvement circulaire; mais la main

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[70a] *DE* devant.

[71] *F* .iii.

[72] *A* omits 'est . . . devant.'

[73] 78*b*.

[74] *B* omits 'ainsi comme dit Aristote.'

[75] Figure 8, p. 201.

[76] *DE* omits 'Mais pour ce que . . . est senestre.'

[77] *DE* distance.

[78] *A* des.

destre de cest honme peu(s)t estre ymaginee en quelconque partie de la
carole sanz difference. Et se un honme est hors la carole et il la resgarde
devant soy, je di que, en quelconque lieu que il soit, la destre de toute la
carole ensamble est touzjours a sa destre et ausi est la destre du grant
honme ymaginé parmi la carole qui avroit son devant contre cest honme.
Item, je met encore un autre exemple et pose que le desus d'un arbre
soit la racine,[79] jouste ce que fu dit ou quart chapitre,[80] et ymagine que
86*d* cest arbre soit meü circulairement en son lieu et sanz issir / de son lieu.
Et donques convient il, se il est meü selon droite ordenance, que il soit
meü selon le mouvement journal; mais se son desus et son chief ou racine
est contremont, il tourneroit l'autre voie. Et aussi comme il est dit de la
carole, se un honme a cest arbre devant soy qui a la racine en terre
touzjours, le destre de l'arbre selon cest mouvement est a la destre de
cest honme ou qu'il soit, sanz difference. Je conclue donques par les
raisons desus mises que ces .iiii. differences,[81] c'est a savoir destre et
senestre et devant et derriere, ne sont ou ciel fors par similitude. Et posé
que le ciel fust un corps vif, si comme di(s)t Aristote: *corpus animatum*,[82]
encore ne seroient ces .iiii. differences ou ciel absoluement ne realment
distincte[e]s,[83] mais seulement en relacion comme dit est, et chascune
partie qui fait circuite seroit ensamble destre et senestre et devant et
derriere en divers resgars; et les .ii. autres differences seulement[84] seroient
ou ciel absoluement et realment distinctees en la maniere que Aristote les
met es plantes et es arbres ou quart chapitre,[85] qui n'ont pas les autres
differences aussi comme ont les corps vifs et perfecz. Et donques se le
ciel estoit corps vif, il seroit quant a ce aussi comme une beste imperfecte,
87*a* car selon Aristote ou quart chapitre,[85] // aucunes bestes ont aucunes de
ces differences et non pas toutes, et selon les expositeurs, ce sont bestes
immobiles et imperfectes.[86] Et par ce que dit est appert la response aus
argüemens qui furent devant mis, car le premier est contre la premiere
voie de[s][87] .iii. desus dites, et le secont contre la seconde et le tiers est
pour la tierce laquelle je ay de nouvel pensee, et les autres aprés la
pourront adrecier et plus brief declarer.

7.—*Ou septiesme chappitre il monstre comment selon le ciel les dites differences sont en terre.*

> Et les habitans vers le pole antartique sont en un hemispere qui est desus et vers destre, et nous sommes en un hemispere qui est desous et vers senestre. Et c'est le contraire de ce que dient les Pithagoriens, car il tiennent que nous sommes desus et en la destre partie du monde et que les autres, qui sont vers le pole antartique, sont desouz et en senestre. Et le contraire est verité.

Glose. Pour ce miex entendre il convient ymaginer que la moitié de la
superfice de la terre soit divisee en .iiii. quartiers par deux demicecles
desquelz un est sous l'equinocial et l'autre souz le[1] meridian du milieu
87*b* de terre habitable. / Et[1a] donques, selon la seconde voie qui fu mise en
la glose du chapitre precedent,[2] le quartier qui est entre orient et le pole
antartique est desus et destre; et le quartier qui est entre le pole antartique

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[79] *BDEF* soit le desous jouste.

[80] 76*b*.

[81] *B* omits 'que ces .iiii. differences.'

[82] Cf. p. 181, n. 3.

[83] *A* distinctes.

[84] *BDEF* semblablement.

[85] 76*b*.

[86] Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 7, 99C; 75*d*.

[87] *A* de.

[1] *DE* omit 'souz le.'

[1a] Figure 9, p. 201.

[2] 86*a*.

et occident est desus[3] et senestre; et celui qui est entre orient et le pole
artique est desouz et destre; et celui qui est entre le pole artique et
occident est desouz[4] et senestre, car telles sont les parties du ciel souz
lesquelles sont les diz quartiers selon l'opinion d'Aristote. Et Grece, dont
il estoit, est ou quartier d'entre le pole artique et occident, car Grece est
en Europe selon les aucteurs qui descripsent la terre.[5] Et toute Europe
37c et Affrique sont en // [ce][6] quartier, et pour ce, disoit Aristote que nous
sommes desouz et a senestre. Mais ceulz qui seroient droitement souz les
poles ne seroient a destre ne a senestre, mais seroient les uns desus et
les autres desouz. Item, Averroïz di(s)t que par ce que di(s)t Aristote
appert que il avoit opinion que gens habitassent ou quartier d'entre orient
et le pole antartique, mais cel païs est inhabitable, si comme il sera declaré
vers la fin de cest secont livre.[7] Et ne appert pas que Aristote eüst opinion
contraire, car ses paroles sont a entendre sub condicion quant il di(s)t ou
commencement de ce chapitre: les habitans sont en cel païs[8] vers le pole,
etc. Ce est a entendre: se habitans sont en cel païs, il seroient desus et a
destre et nous sommes desouz et a senestre selon son opinion. Mais selon
verité, des .ii. quartiers que il di(s)t estre desouz et qui sont habitables
et non pas en tout, l'en ne peut dire que l'un soit[9] plus destre que l'autre
realment et absoluement, si comme il appert par le chapitre precedent, car
ceulz qui sont vers orient ou resgart de nous sont vers occident ou resgart
d'autres, et nous aussi sommes orientelz ou resgart d'aucuns autres. Et
donques chascun est destre et senestre en divers resgars,[10] car partout est
37d orient et partout est occident, etc., comme souvent dit est. Item, / destre
est plus noble que senestre. Or posons que la terre soit habitee tout environ
en alant d'orient vers occident. Et donques, se il estoit autrement que dit
est, ceulz de Inde seroient en plus noble lieu que[12] ceulz de Babiloine[11] et
ceulz de Babiloine[11] que ceulz de Romme et ceulz de Romme que ceulz
d'Espaingne et a[in]si[13] en procedant; et finablement il s'ensuiroit que ceulz
de Inde fussent en plus noble lieu que eulz meïsmes ne sont, et ainsi des
autres. Et donques Inde n'est pas plus destre absoluement que Babiloine[11]
ou que Romme, ne plus en orient fors seulement en relacion. Et samblablement
38a est Romme en orient ou resgart // d'autre region. Item, il appert en
exemple de ceulz qui sont assis a une table ronde, car se celui qui est a
ma destre est en plus noble lieu que je ne sui et ainsi ensuianment des
autres, donques, en procedant, il s'ensuit que je sui plus noblement assis
que je meïsme ne sui assis. Et donques touz sont assis equalment quant
a ce. Et il est samblablement en nostre propos. Et se aucun disoit que je
pose une chose fause, c'est a savoir que la terre soit habitee tout environ,
je di que ce ne empeesche nostre propos, car se Espaingne est en la fin
de habitacion vers occident, toutevoies se la terre estoit habitee oultre ou
toute en circuite, Espaingne est assise quant au ciel ne plus ne moins
ainsi comme elle seroit. Item, Espaingne est destre et orientele ou resgart

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[3] *DE* dessoubz.

[4] *DE* dessus.

[5] Cf. for example: *Pomponii Melae de Chorographia libri tres*, ed. Gustavus Parthey, I (Berolini, 1867), 18, p. 8; *Dionysius Afri de Situ Orbis: sive Geographia Prisciano*, Venice, 1512, fol. 13ᵛ, 11. 396 ff.; *Rufi Festi Avieni Descriptio Orbis Terrae*, ed. H. Friesemanni, Amsterdam, 1786, p. xxvi, 11. 472-476; *C. Plinii Secundi Naturalis Historia*, ed. D. Detlefsen, I (Berolini, 1866), IIII, 1, p. 162. Oresme could not have been acquainted with Ptolemey's *Georgraphy*, the best of all ancient works, which was not made available until the early fifteenth century. Cf. *Claudii Ptolemaei Georgraphia*, ed. Carolus Müllerus, vol. I, II, 4, p. 72.

[6] *A* omits 'ce.'

[7] Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 16, 105E *et seq.* and 152*d*.

[8] *BDEF* omit 'sont en cel païs.'

[9] *DE* l'en peut dire que l'en soit.

[10] *DE* omit 'ou resgart d'aucuns . . . en divers resgars.'

[11] *DE* Babil(l)one.

[12] Figure 10, p. 201.

[13] *A* aussi.

de ceulz qui sont ou premier orient habitable et est asséz[14] pres de eulz, si
comme di(s)t Averroïz en la fin de cest secont.[15] Item, encore appert par
l'exemple devant mis de ceus qui sont a la table ronde, car se il estoient
.lx. et l'en en ostast .iii. ou .iiii. en faisant une place wide et comme une
brecque, ceulz qui demoureroient ne seroient pas pour ce assis les uns
plus noblement que les autres, mes equalment comme devant. Et d'une
carole ou touz sont equalment, se l'en en ostoit un, celui qui estoit a sa
88b destre seroit le premier, mais c'est pour raison du mouvement. / Et
donques quant a ce que dit est, ceulz d'orient ne sont en rien plus nobles
que nous qui sommes en occident ou resgart de eulz en une maniere. Et
pour ce, disoie je ou chapitre precedent[16] que la voie que je ay mise en
ceste mattiere est concordable a nostre foy, car par ce appert que ceulz
d'orient qui sont mescreans ne se peuent venter que il soient en plus
noble lieu que nous crestiens en resgart au ciel, car nous et eulz sommes
equalz en ce. Mais en autres condicions, leur lieu et eulz sont moins
nobles, car leur habitacion en pluseurs lieus est perilleuse pour la
desordenance et variacion de l'aer et pour la corrupcion des eaues et pour
l'a[n]venimement[17] de diverses manieres de serpens et d'autres bestes
dont Lucan fait mencion.[18] Et tout ce est declairé plus a plain en un livre
appellé *Des Merveilles de Hibernie.*[19] Item, cel aucteur di(s)t que les
monstres desquelz saint Augustin fait question ou .xvi.^{e} livre de *La Cité
de Dieu*[20] naissent en orient et met ou secont chapitre[21] comment le aer de
occident est plus benigne et plus convenable au salu de nature humainne
que n'est celui d'orient. Item, saint Jerome[22] met en une epistre comment
88c orient est envielli[23] et le pueple de la empiré,[24] et que en occident // est
le soleil de justice, et di(s)t ainsi: *quoniam vetus oriens inter se*[25]
populorum furore collisus et cetera[26]*-sequitur huic: in oriente—sol iusticie
oritur; in occidente autem lucifer ille qui*[27] *ciderat, etc.* Et a ceste grace
recevoir, le Prophete exitoit ceulz d'occident ou .xlviii.^{e} Psalme ou il di(s)t
selon le hebreu: *audite hec omnes populi auribus percipite omnes
habitatores occidentis.*[28] Or avons donques que du ciel ne de la terre
quelcunque partie n'est destre ou senestre plus que une autre realment
et absoluement, mais ainsi n'est pas de desus et desouz, car si comme il
fu dit ou chapitre precedent,[29] desus et desouz par similitude[30] sont
distinctéz absoluement, et est le pole antartique desus et celui qui nous
appert est desouz. Et se le ciel estoit corps vif, ainsi seroit il non pas par
similitude, mais realment et proprement. Et donques selon ce, la partie de
terre ou nous sommes est desouz, si comme il appert en la figure devant
mise, et l'autre opposite est desus. Et par consequent, elle est plus noble

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[14] *DE* assise.

[15] *Juntas*, t.c. 111, 171K-L.

[16] 85*b*.

[17] *A* l'avenimement.

[18] *M. Annaei Lucani Pharsalia*, ed. C. E. Haskins (London, 1887), IX, 700-726, pp.343-345.

[19] *B* Hibeine. *Giraldi Cambrensis Topographica Hibernica* (Rerun Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores, V, London, 1867), ed. J. F. Dimock, Distintio I, cap. xxxv, xxxvi, pp. 68-70.

[20] *De Civitate Dei*, ed. B. Dombart, II (Lipsiae, 1877), XVI, 8, pp. 135-137.

[21] Actually chapter 3; cf. *Topographica, ed. cit.*, Distintio II, cap. iii. p. 25.

[22] *DE* Jeroisme; *F* Jeroesme. *Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi Epistolae* (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, LIV, Lipsiae, 1910), recensuit Isidorus Hilberg, XV, ad Damasum, p. 62: 'Quoniam vetusto (*Ms. DS*, vetus) oriens inter se populorum furore conlisus . . . nunc in occidente sol iustitiae oritur; in oriente autem lucifer ille, qui ceciderat, super sidera posuit thronum suum.' Note that Oresme has transposed *oriente* and *occidente*.

[23] *DE* est ou milieu et.

[24] *DE* emprecié; *F* empicey.

[25] *BDEF* omit 'se;' *DE* furorem.

[26] *B* omits 'cetera.'

[27] *E* qui ille.

[28] Cf. *Psalm* xlviii, 1: 'Audite haec omnes gentes: auribus percipite omnes, qui habitatis orbem.' Also Jerome, *PL* 28, 1226: 'Audite haec omnes populi: auribus percipite universi habitatores occidentis.'

[29] *Passim* and especially 86*d*. *B* precedent de desus et de desous.

[30] *BDEF* omit 'par similitude.'

que n'est ceste quant a ce. Mais en recompensacion de ce, ceste partie ou
nous sommes a, ou resgart du ciel, .iii. autres differences ou condicions plus
que equivalentes a celle que dite est: une est car en la partie du ciel laquelle
88*d* est vers nostre pole artique est plus grande / multitude de estoilles fichies
grosses et belles que en l'autre partie, et selon Aristote, l'estoille est la
plus noble partie de son ciel, et ceste difference touche Averroïz.[31] Autre
cause est car celle partie de terre ou celle plage qui regarde le pole antartique[32] en tele distance comme la nostre resgarde le pole artique est desatrempee, car quant nous avons yver, yleuques est esté et *e converso*, et yleuques est yver plus loing[33] et excessif en froit pour ce que adonques est le soleil ou point appellé *aux solis*[34] et est loing de terre. Et aussi est esté yleuques excessivement chaut pour ce que le soleil est pres de terre vers le point appellé *oppositum augis*, et tout le contraire est en la partie ou nous sommes. Et pour ce, elle est attrempee et habitable et l'autre non, si comme il sera plus a plain declaré vers la fin de cest livre.[35] La tierce cause est car combien que celle partie soit desus ou resgart du mouvement journal, aussi est ceste partie desus ou resgart du mouvement des planetes. Et ceste recompensacion met Aristote aprés et dit.

> Tiexte. Mais de la seconde circulacion, c'est a savoir du propre
> mouvement des planetes, les parties ou nous sommes sont desus
> et sont destres, et les parties ou ceulz sont que nous avons dit
> estre desus et destres selon le mouvement journal sont desus[36]
> 89*a* et senestres // selon le mouvement des planetes. Car le principe
> ou commencement du mouvement journal et de celui des planetes
> sont au contraire l'un de l'autre, pour ce que les mouvemens sont
> contraires, en tant que par ce avient et est ainsi que nous sommes
> vers le commencement et vers le destre du mouvement des
> planetes, et les autres sont vers la fin et vers le senestre de ce
> mouvement.

Glose. Il appert par le *Traitié de l'espere* comment le propre mouvement des planetes est de occident en orient[37] aussi comme au contraire du mouvement journal, et non pas proprement au contraire,[38] car mouvement circulaire n'a[39] pas proprement contraire, si comme il appert par le .viii.e chapitre du premier.[40] Mes le propre mouvement des planetes est l'autre voie et non pas encore droitement, car les poles du zodiaque selon lequel est le mouvement des planetes ne sont pas la ou sont les poles du mouvement journal, mes en sont a certainne distance, si comme il appert par le *Traitié de l'espere*.[41] Or posons donques par ymaginacion que le mouvement journal cessast et que le propre mouvement des planetes demourast,[42]
je di que le soleil feroit un circuite environ la terre en un an et la lune
89*b* en un moies / ou pres, et ainsi des autres planetes, chascune en certain
temps. Et seroit leur mouvement d'occident en orient aussi comme au contraire du mouvement journal, si comme dit est, et leveroient en occident. Et telement sont elles meües maintenant de fait selon leur propre

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[31] *Juntas*, t.c. 16, 105G-H.

[32] *ABCDEF* artique. The sense demands 'Antartique.'

[33] *BCDEF* lonc.

[34] Oresme defines the terms *aux solis* and *oppositum augis* in his *Traitié de l'espere* as follows: 'Or est il ainsi que le cercle que le soleil descript en son espere soubz le zodiaque n'est pas concentrique a son centre ailleurs que ou centre du monde, et est excentrique, si comme il appert par exemple en ceste figure cy dessus faite. Et le point de ce cercle qui est plus hault et plus loing du centre du monde est appellé *aux solis*. Et l'autre point contraire qui est au bas et plus pres du centre du monde, est appellé *oppositum augis*.' ed. by L. McCarthy, Thesis, Toronto, 1942, ch. xxvii, ll. 884-892.

[35] 142*c*.

[36] *B* desous.

[37] *B* de orient en occident.

[38] *De l'espere*, *ibid.*, ch. vi. ll. 179-282.

[39] *BDEF* n'est pas.

[40] 14*d*.

[41] *De l'espere*, *ibid.*, ch. vii. ll. 325-345.

[42] *B* omits 'et que . . . demourast.'

mouvement. Et donques, selon la consideracion declaree es chapitres precedens,[43] il s'ensuit que le pole du zodiaque et le pole de leur propre mouvement,—lequel pole est vers le pole artique,—soit desus et que l'autre pole opposite soit desouz. Et par consequent, nous sommes desus ou resgart du mouvement et des cielz des planetes, si comme il appert par l'ymaginacion desus mise. Et par aventure, les cielz et les mouvemens des planetes sont plus nobles que le derrenier ciel meü et que le mouvement journal meïsmement, car le soleil, qui est planete, est le plus noble corps du ciel. Et se ainsi est, nous sommes en plus noble lieu que ceulz qui seroient vers l'autre pole par ceste cause seulement, posé que les .ii. autres devant mises ne fussent pas. Et encore, selon Aristote, nous sommes destres quant au mouvement ou quant aus cielz des planetes.[44] Mais par ce que je ay devant declaré, il appert que en ce n'a destre ne senestre distincteement ne absoluement, et tout ce est equal quant a ce. Or appert
89c donques // pour .iii. raisons que nous sommes en plus noble assiete de terre que ne seroient ceulz qui habiteroient vers le pole antartique. Et devant fu monstré par autres raisons que nous sommes miex colloquiéz ou logiéz que ceulz d'orient.[45] Aprés il recapitule.

> Tiexte. Et en tant soit dit des parties du monde selon distance ou difference de posicion et selon lieu.

Glose. Ce sont desus et desouz et destre et senestre et devant et derriere.

8.—*En le huitiesme chappitre il monstre pourquoy*[1] *en ciel sont pluseurs mouvemens.*[2]

> Comme ainsi soit que mouvement circulaire n'est pas contraire a mouvement circulaire.

Glose. Si comme il appert par le .viii.^{e} chapitre du premier.[3]

> Tiexte. Il convient considerer pourquoy pluseurs telz mouvemens sont ou ciel.

Glose. Car se mouvement circulaire eüst contraire, son contraire fust en estre, et fussent pluseurs mouvemens telz differenz en espece, et fust chose legiere a savoir. Mes or n'est pas ainsi.

> Tiexte. Et convient tempter de loing faire response a ceste question.

Glose. Il di(s)t *de loing* pour ce que les corps du ciel sont loing de nous.

> Tiexte. Mes encore ne sont eulz pas si loing de nous par distance
> 89d local que eulz ne soient moult plus loing en ce / que de leurs accidens nous avons tres petite congnoissance sensibles.

Glose. Car nous n'avons fors la veüe et de loing. Or avons[4] donques .iii. causes de la difficulté de ceste question: une pour ce que le mouvement du ciel n'a point de contraire; l'autre car le ciel est loing de nous; la tierce car nous avons du ciel trop peu d'experience.

> Tiexte. Mes toutevoies, disons de ceste chose. Et la cause de ce est a prendre en la maniere que s'ensuit.

Glose.[5] Aprés il met sa raison qui contient .vi. condicioneles ou .vi. consequences. Premierement, se Dieu a en soy vie pardurable, le ciel est meü pardurablement. Item, se le ciel est ainsi meü, il convient que terre soit. Item, se la terre est, il convient que l'element du feu soit. Item, se ces .ii. elemens sont, il convient que les .ii. autres elemens moiens soient. Item, se les .iiii. elemens sont, il convient que generacion et corrupcion soient. Item, se elles sont, il convient que ou ciel soient pluseurs mouvemens. Ce est l'abreviacion de cest chapitre. Aprés il procede par ordre en ces consequence[s].[6]

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[43] Ch. 6 and 7.

[44] 89*a*.

[45] 88*b*.

[1] *DE* comment.

[2] *Guthrie*, ch. 3.

[3] 14*d*.

[4] *DE* loing. Texte. Avon.

[5] *DE* omit 'Glose.'

Tiexte. Chascune chose de laquelle est aucune oeuvre est pour grace et a fin de son oeuvre. Et l'oeuvre ou operacion de Dieu est immortalité et ceste immortalité,[6a] c'est vie pardurable. Et 90*a* donques il est necessité // que Dieu ait et face mouvement pardurable. Et le ciel est tel corps que il est ainsi meü, car c'est un corps divin. Et pour ce, le ciel, qui est corps circulaire et sperique, a ceste proprieté que par nature il est meü circulairement touzjours sanz cesser.

Glose. La fin pour quoy est toute chose qui a operacion, ce est son operacion. Et pour ce, felicité, qui est operacion, est la fin pour quoi est honme, si comme il appert ou premier et ou .x.ᵉ de *Ethiques*.[7] Et la principal operacion de Dieu, ce est congnoistre et amer Lui meïsme, et c'est vie pardurable et ceste operacion, c'est Dieu meïsme qui est fin de Lui meïsme. Mes Dieu a une autre operacion qui est es choses qui sont hors Lui ou autres que Lui, et selon Aristote, ceste operacion est mouvoir le ciel et gouverner le monde.[8] Or est ainsi que, a parler de ce que est fin principal et de premeraine intencion, Dieu est fin de ceste operacion et de toutes choses. Mais a parler de fin qui est fin de seconde intencion et moins principaument, Dieu est pour ceste operacion comme pour fin de Lui. Item, Aristote appelle le ciel corps divin et Averroïz esperituel, car selon eulz le ciel est corps vif par l'intelligence qui le meut et qui est Dieu, et pour ce est il dit corps divin.[9] Mais ceci fu reprové ou quint chapitre.[10] Aprés il met la seconde consequence.

90*b* Tiexte. / Et pour ce, ne peut l'en dire que tout le corps du ciel, c'est a dire du monde, soit tel et ainsi meü, car par necessité il convient que aucune chose soit permanente sanz mouvement ou resgart du corps qui est meü circulairement, et que elle soit ou milieu de tel corps. Or n'est il pas possible que aucune partie quelcunque du ciel repose sanz mouvement, premierement car, univercelement,[11] chascune est meü[e][12] circulairement avecques son tout et donques ne peut elle reposer en quelcunque lieu. Item, en especial ce ne peut estre ou milieu et ou centre, car se aucune partie du ciel reposoit naturelment ou milieu, il convendroit que elle fust meüe naturelment au milieu se elle en estoit hors, et le ciel est meü par nature circulairement.

Glose. Et donques il ne peut avoir autre mouvement naturel. Et tout ce fu declaré ou tiers et ou quart chapitre du premier.[13]

Tiexte. Et se une partie du ciel reposoit ou milieu hors nature ou contre nature, le mouvement[14] du ciel ne seroit pas perpetuel.

Glose. Car se il estoit perpetuel, il convendroit que ceste partie reposast ou milieu perpetuelment et contre nature.

Tiexte. Et rien qui est contre nature n'est perpetuel, car ce que est hors nature est derrenier et aprés ce que est selon nature, et

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[6] *A* consequence.

[6a] *B* omits 'et ceste immortalite.'

[7] *Ethic. nic.*, I, 7, 1098a, 15-18; X, 6, 1176b, 1-10.

[8] Cf. *Metaphysicorum*, XII, 7, 1072b, 14-30.

[9] *Juntas*, t.c. 17, 106K.

[10] 78*c et seq.*

[11] *DE* uniforment.

[12] *A* meu.

[13] 9*d*.

[14] *DE* omit 'du ciel reposoit . . . mouvement.'

> 90c ce que est hors nature est excés ou deffaute de ce // que est selon nature et generacion.

Glose. Si comme il appert des monstres ou des bestes monstrueuses. Et donques chose desnaturelle n'est pas perpetuelle. Or avons donques que quelcunque partie du ciel ne peu(s)t reposer ou milieu ne par nature ne par violence, et que il convient que aucune chose y repose et ce ne peut estre autre chose que la terre, si comme il sera declaré aprés.[15] Et pour ce il conclut et di(s)t.

> Tiexte. Et donques se le ciel est meü perpetuelment, il est neccessité que la terre soit, car elle est ce qui repose ou milieu. Et ce soit a present supposé, car aprés sera de ce faite demonstracion.

Glose. Ce sera ou .xxix.e chapitre ou il sera monstré que la terre repose ou milieu.[16] Aprés il met la tierce consequence.

> Tiexte. Item, se la terre est, il est necessité que l'element du feu soit, car de .ii. contraires, se un est en estre par nature, l'autre de neccessité est en estre par nature[17] pour ce que, se un contraire est, il convient que aucune nature soit subjecte a lui et a son contraire. Et de .ii. contraires la matiere est une meïsme.

Glose. Choses proprement contraires sont accidens, si comme chaleur et froidure, blancheur et noirté et telles choses. Et la matiere qui est subjecte a un contraire a puissance d'estre subjecte a l'autre contraire, et seroit ceste puissance pour noient se elle n'estoit en aucun temps mise en fait.
90d Et pour ce / di(s)t il que la matiere est une meïsme, et non pas en un temps, mes elle est une fois souz[17a] un contraire et puis aprés souz[17a] l'autre. Or est la terre contraire au feu non pas selon sa substance, mes selon ses accidens, car elle est froide et la matiere de elle peut estre faite chaude et convertie en feu. Et donques se terre est, feu est qui peut de elle faire feu. Aprés il met a ce une autre raison.

> Tiexte. Item, affirmacion est premiere que n'est privacion,[18] si comme chaleur est premiere que n'est froidure, et repos et pesanteur sunt dis par privacion de legiereté et de mouvement.

Glose. Il veult dire que les proprietés ou accidens de la terre contraires a ceulz du feu sont aussi comme privacion et moins dignes que ceulz du feu. Et pour ce, nature doit plus mettre le feu en estre que la terre. Et donques se terre est, par plus forte raison feu est. Item, l'en doit savoir que de touz contraires un est meilleur et plus noble que l'autre, si comme chaleur que froideur, blanc que noir, douz que amer et ainsi des autres. Et samblablement de differences de posicion, si comme il fu dit ou sixte chapitre,[19] car destre est plus noble que senestre et desus que desouz et devant que derriere. Item, par ce que dit Aristote n'est pas a entendre
91a que froideur soit proprement privacion de // chaleur, ne pesanteur de legiereté et ainsi des autres contraires positifs en la maniere que tenebre est privacion de lumiere et repos de mouvement. Mais ainsi parle Aristote pour ce que les contraires moins nobles et mains perfecz approchent plus de privacion que ne font les autres, et pour ce il sont aussi comme privacion ou resgart des autres. Aprés il met la quarte consequence.

> Tiexte. Item, se feu est et terre est, il est neccessité que les corps ou elemens soient qui sont moiens entre ces .ii., car chascun des elemens a contrarieté a chascun des elemens.

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[15] 91c.

[16] 148*d*.

[17] *F* omits 'l'autre de . . . nature.'

[17a] *DE* sans.

[18] *F* Texte. Apres il met une affirmacion et premiere que ne est privacion.

[19] 81*c*.



FIG. 7
FOL. 85c


orient destre
devant
b
derriere orient destre
a
c
devant senestre
e
d
senestre derrinie

FIG. 8
FOL. 86a


pole anturtique
desus destre
desus senestre
orient
occident
destre desouz
senestre desouz
pole artique

FIG. 9
FOL. 87b


Babiloine
Romme
terra
Judé
Espaigne
orient inhabitable
occident

FIG. 10
FOL. 87d



FIG. 11
FOL. 93d



FIG. 12
FOL. 96b


·i·
·iii·
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·vii·

FIG. 13
FOL. 97c


·ii·
·iiii·
·vi·
·viii·
·x·

FIG. 14
FOL. 97c

Glose. C'est a savoir selon aucune qualité, et si comme dit est, la matiere qui est subjecte a un contraire, il convient que elle soit aucune fois subjecte a l'autre contraire. Et tout ce est declaré ailleurs.[20] Et pour ce di(s)t il aprés.

Tiexte. Et ce soit supposé maintenant, et aprés nous essoierons a le monstrer.

Glose. Ou secont livre *De generacione*.[21] Aprés il met la quinte consequence.

Tiexte. Item, se ces elemens sont, il est neccessité que generacion soit.

Glose. Ce monstre il par .ii. raisons.

Tiexte. Pour ce que il n'est pas possible que quelcunque de ces elemens soit perpetuel, car choses qui sont contraires ont action
91b une en l'autre en- / samble et passion une de l'autre et corrompent une l'autre.

Glose. Et les elemens sont contraires selon leurs qualitéz comme dit est, et pour ce, il s'entre-corrompent selon leurs parties, si comme il appert ou secont livre *De generacione*.[22]

Tiexte. Item, ce n'est pas dit selon raison que un corps qui est[23] mobile selon lieu soit perpetuel, et son mouvement selon nature ou naturel ne soit pas perpetuel. Et le mouvement des elemens n'est pas perpetuel.

Glose. Car leur mouvement naturel est selon droite ligne et donques ne peut il estre perpetuel, si comme il appert ou premier livre en pluseurs lieus et en le .viii.e de *Phisique*.[24]

Tiexte. Et donques est il neccessité que generacion soit.

[Glose.][25] Aprés il met la sixte consequence.

Tiexte. Item, se generacion est, il convient de neccessité que un ou pluseurs mouvemens soient autres que le mouvement journal, car les elemens des corps qui sont ici-bas se ont tousjours semblablement selon le mouvement journal, et ne ont onques difference ou resgart de ce mouvement. Et de ce dirons nous aprés plus a plain.

Glose. C'est a savoir ou secont livre *De generacione* vers la fin.[26] Et briefment, si comme di(s)t Aristote ou premier de *Metheores*,[27] ce monde
91c cibas est gouverné // par les mouvemens du ciel. Et se il n'estoit ou ciel fors seulement le mouvement journal, il ne seroit ne yver ne esté ne variacion de lune ne des autres planetes, car elles regarderoient la terre et les autres elemens touzjours en une maniere aussi comme font les estoilles fichiees ou pres. Et donques ne seroit faite ici-bas alteracion de chaut en froit, etc., ne par consequent, generacion. Aprés il recapitule par autre ordre aucunes consequences devant mises.

Tiexte. Or avons donques manifestee la cause pourquoi sont pluseurs corps meüs circulairement, car il est neccessité que generacion soit. Car se l'element du feu est, il convient que generacion soit et se terre est, il convient que le feu et les autres elemens soient et il convient que la terre soit pour ce que se aucune chose est meüe tousjours perpetuelment, il est necessité que aucune chose soit qui repose touzjours et qui ne se moeve.

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[20] *Generatione*, I, 3, 319a.

[21] II, 3, 331a, 1-2. and II, 10, 336a, 12-337a, 32.

[22] II, 4, 331a, 10-332a.

[23] *DE* qui n'est mobille.

[24] *Physicorum*, VIII, 9, 265a, 27-32.

[25] *ABCDEF* omit 'Glose.'

[26] *B* omits 'vers la fin.' *Generatione*, II ,10, 336a, 12-336b, 22.

[27] *Meteorologicorum*, I, 2, 339a, 21-23.

Glose. Il touche toutes les consequences desus mises excepté la premiere.
Or avons donques que la cause pourquoy pluseurs mouvemens sont ou
ciel est generacion des choses qui sont ici-bas. Et selon Averroïz,[28] ceste
cause est final et comme fin, mais non pas comme fin de premeraine
91*d* inten- / cion, mes come fin de seconde intencion, aussi comme l'effit est
fin de sa cause. Mais selon verité, les corps et les mouvemens du ciel sont
principalment et de premiere intencion pour generacion et finablement
pour nature humainne, car meïsme selon Aristote ou secont de *Phisique*[29]
et en pluseurs autres lieus, honme est fin de toutes choses et c'est a
entendre des choses corporelles.

Or me veul je esbatre a examiner ces consequences. La premiere estoit
que se Dieu est, le mouvement du ciel est perpetuel. Je di que il ne
s'ensuit pas, car meïsme selon philosophie, Dieu est fin principal de Lui
meïsme et n'a mestier quant a l'acomplissement de sa perfection de quel-
cunque chose qui soit hors [Lui].[30] Et c'est selon le Prophete qui di(s)t:
quoniam bonorum meorum non eges,[31] car Il est tres perfectement par Soy
souffissant, et de ce di(s)t l'aucteur *Des Causes: primum omnium per se
dives*.[32] Et pour ce, se de sa franche et liberale volenté Il espant de son
bien et de sa grace en ses creatures et fait aucunes choses pour elle[s][33]
secondairement et comme pour fin de seconde intencion, si comme nous
disons: *qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem, etc.*,[34] ce ne
redunde et ne fait en rien a sa bonté ne a sa perfection. Car se Il //
92*a* creoit anges et ames glorifiees autant en nombre cent mille fois comment
il sont, sa bonté ne crestroit pour ce en rien, et ne apeticeroit en rien se
Il adnichiloit toute creature; tout aussi comme se Il creoit cent mille
mondes ou se Il adnichiloit cestui et tout[e][35] autre creature, ja pour ce
ne seroit en rien creüe ne appetizee l'immensité de Lui de laquelle fu dit
ou premier chapitre.[36] Et briefment, c'est simplement impossible que
quelcunque autre chose soit requise ou face addicion a la perfection de Lui
laquelle ne depent de quelcunque chose. Item encore, pour ce miex
entendre, je met .ii. gros examples: un est du feu qui est lasus en son
espere pres du ciel de la lune, si comme il fu dit ou tiers chapitre du
premier[37] et en pluseurs autres lieus, car ce feu ne art ne eschaufe ou
altere quelcunque autre chose et ne produit nul effit, et toutesvoies il
n'est pas moins perfect que le feu de cibas qui art les busches ou telles
choses. Item, le soleil quant eclipsé est, aucuns lieus sont en terre ou il ne
espant pas sa lumiere, mais pour ce n'est il pas moins perfect en soy que
autrefois. Et de ce disoit Johannes Damascenus: *quod quamvis tunc*[38] *sol
ad tempus videatur deficere*,[39] *ipse tamen semper in se retinet indeficientis*[40]
92*b* *luminis claritatem*.[41] Et par trop plus forte / raison, la perfection de Dieu
ne peut crestre ne amen[u]isier[42] par quelcunque chose que Il face hors
Lui ne autrement, car elle est simplement infinie et plus que infinie. Et
donques appert par ce que dit est que il ne s'ensuit pas se Dieu est que
le ciel soit et, par consequent, il ne s'ensuit pas que le mouvement du ciel
soit, car selon verité, tout ce depent de la volenté de Dieu franchement
sanz ce que il soit aucune neccessité que Il face ou produise telles choses

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[28] *Juntas*, t.c. 21, 108L-M.

[29] *Physicorum*, II, 2, 194a, 34-35.

[30] *A* omits 'lui.'

[31] *Psalm* xv, 2.

[32] Cf. *Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift Ueber das reine Gute bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de causis*, ed. O. Bardenhewer (Freiberg, 1882), ch. 20, p. 182: 'Primum est dives per se ipsum et est dives maius.'

[33] *A* elle.

[34] From the Credo of the Mass.

[35] *A* tout.

[36] 65*a et seq.*

[37] 9c.

[38] *DE* omit 'tunc.'

[39] *B* videatur in se ipso deficere.

[40] *DE* semper ipse retinet ibi defficientis luminis.

[41] Unidentified.

[42] *AE* amenisier.

ou ait faites et productes perpetuelment, si comme il fu plus a plain declaré en la fin du .xxxiiii.ᵉ chapitre du premier.[43] Item, encore ne s'ensuit il pas se le ciel est que il soit meü, car si comme dit est, Dieu le meut ou fait mouver purement voluntairement. Et selon verité, ce monstra Il ou temps de Josué, quant le soleil se arresta par tant de temps comme dure un jour, car de ce di(s)t l'Escripture: *et una dies facta est quasi due.*[44] Et est vraisamblable que lors cessa le mouvement journal de tout le ciel et des planetes et non pas le soleil seulement. Et pour ce disoit le Prophete en recitant ceste chose: *sol et luna steterunt in habitaculo suo, etc.*[45]

La seconde consequence estoit que se le ciel est meü perpetuelment, 92*c* il convient que la terre // repose ou milieu du ciel. Je di que non, premierement car nous voions que une roe, si comme la roe du moulin, est meüe toute sanz ce que ou milieu de elle [repose][46] quelcunque partie de elle ne autre chose fors seulement[47] un point indivisible lequel n'est rien fors selon ymaginacion, combien que aucune chose repose hors la roe sus quoy elle est meüe. Et donques il ne s'ensuit pas se le ciel est meü circulairement que la terre ou autre chose repose ou milieu, car posé que elle y repose et que le consequent soit vray, toutevoies la consequence n'est pas bonne, car mouvement circulaire, en tant comme tel, ne requiert pas que aucun corps repose ou milieu du corps ainsi meü. Item, il n'est pas impossible simplement et qui encloe contradiction, mes est possible a ymaginacion que la terre fust meüe avecques le ciel par mouvement journal, aussi comme est le feu en son espere et la plus grant partie de l'aer selon Aristote ou premier de *Metheores*.[48] Et combien que nature ne peüst ainsi mouver la terre, toutevoies est ce possible en la seconde significacion de possible et de impossible mise ou .xxx.ᵉ chapitre du premier.[49] Or donques, posé que la terre fust meüe avecques le ciel ou au contraire du mouvement du ciel, il ne s'ensuit pas que pour ce le / 92*d* mouvement du ciel cessast. Et donques ce mouvement, quant est de soy, ne requiert pas de neccessité que la terre repose ou milieu. Item, ce n'est pas impossible que toute la terre soit meüe d'autre mouvement ou d'autre maniere: Job .ix.ᵉ, *qui commovet terram de loco suo*,[50] car autrement les parties qui sont vers le centre ne pourroient venir au lieu de leur corrupcion et seroient perpetuelles, laquelle chose ne peu(s)t estre par nature selon Aristote, combien que a ce fu[st][51] souffissanment respondu en la fin du premier livre.[52] Et donques est ce chose neccessaire selon la philosophie d'Aristote que la terre soit aucune fois meüe et est impossible que elle repose tousjours. Et le mouvement du ciel est perpetuel selon Aristote. Et donques il ne s'ensuit pas se le ciel est meü que la terre repose. Item, a celui qui di(s)t que il convient que aucun corps repose ou milieu du corps meü circulairement, je demande de quelle quantité il convient que tel corps soit et l'en ne pourroit assigner ou designer quantité si petite que mendre, combien que fust, ne souffisist par samblable raison. Et donques se toute la masse des elemens estoit meüe avecques le ciel, aussi comme est le feu en son espere et l'aer en partie, et seulement une 93*a* tres petite porcion de terre reposast ou centre, // il souffiroit. Et par consequent, le mouvement du ciel ne requiert pas de neccesité que toute la terre repose. Item, le ciel est meü par une vertu motive laquele ne le

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[43] 58*b*. *BF* .xxxiii; *DE* .xxx.

[44] *DE* quasi vidue. Cf. *Eccle*. xlvi, 5: 'et una dies facta est quasi duo.'

[45] *Hab*. iii 11.

[46] *A* omits 'repose.'

[47] *A* fors que seulement.

[48] *Meteorologicorum*, I, 3, 340b, 29-341a, 4; 7, 344a, 11-14.

[49] 48*b*-49*a*.

[50] *Job* ix, 6.

[51] *A* fu.

[52] 60*d*-62*c*.

ciel ne dependent en rien de la terre quant a ce mouvement, car la terre
ne fait a ce appoement ne aide ne confort. Item, nature ne pourroit faire
que l'espere ou masse des .iiii. elemens qui est contenue dedens le ciel
fust adnichilee et que l'espace ou elle est fust wide, mais ce n'est pas
chose simplement impossible, si comme il fu dit en la fin du .xxiiii.^{e}
chapitre du premier.[53] Et ce posé par ymaginacion, le ciel ne lesseroit pas
pour ce estre meü. Et donques la consequence n'est pas bonne qui di(s)t:
se le ciel est meü, la terre repose ou milieu. Item, les parties du ciel et les
estoilles qui sont devers septentrion sont meües circulairement environ une
partie de l'exel du monde, lequel axel n'est fors une ligne ymaginee, et
nul corps quelcunque ne repose ou milieu du circuite qu'i font les dites
parties ou estoilles. Et donques nul corps n'est requis reposant ou milieu
de leur mouvement circulaire. Item, l'estoille que l'en appelle l'estoille du
nort, laquelle est pres du pole artique, se elle estoit droitement en ce
93b pole, elle seroit meüe circulaire- / ment environ le centre de elle sanz
ce que rien du monde reposast en son centre. Et se aucun responnoit en
disant que aucun corps repose ou milieu de tout le ciel dont ceste estoille
est une partie, ceste response est nulle, car le repos de la terre est du
tout impertinent au mouvement de ceste estoille sanz a ce nuire ou aidier.
Item, contre ceste response et au propos principal est ou ciel instance
manifeste, car pour salver les apparences et les experiences des mouvemens
du ciel, il convient de neccessité confesser que ou ciel sont aucuns
corps celestielz speriques appelléz epicicles, et que chascun tel epicicle
a mouvement circulaire propre a soy environ son centre autre que le
mouvement du ciel en quoy est cest epicicle. Et appert clerement que
c'est impossible selon philosophie que quelcunque corps repose ou milieu
de cest epicicle. Et donques il ne convient pas que aucun corps repose
ou milieu de corps meü circulairement. Et encore ne peut l'en dire que
le corps du ciel qui contient cest epicicle repose, car il est meü, mes c'est
d'autre mouvement. Item, encore pourroit l'en faire instance des mouvemens
des excentriques, car ne la terre ne autre corps ne repose ou milieu
93c ou ou[53a] centre de l'excentrique. Mais pour ce que la // terre repose
dedens l'excentrique et non pas ou centre et rien ne repose dedens
l'epicicle, l'instance devant mise qui estoit de l'epicicle est plus forte que
ceste. Item, se aucun disoit que la diffinicion de mouvement local est
soy avoir autrement selon lieu[54] ou regart d'aucun corps qui repose, et
donques se nul corps ne reposoit, ce seroit impossible que aucun corps
fust meü, je di que ce ne vault, car repos est privacion de mouvement,
si comme di(s)t Aristote en cest chapitre.[55] Et donques n'est pas repos
de l'essence de mouvement et ne doit estre mis en sa diffinicion. Mais par
aventure, aucun diroit que estre meü selon lieu est autrement soy avoir
ou resgart d'autre corps, soit meü ou non-meü; encore di je que ce ne
vault, premierement car hors le monde est une espace ymaginee infinie
et immobile, si comme il fu declaré en la fin du .xxiiii.^{e} chapitre du
premier,[56] et est possible sanz contradiction que tout le monde fust meü
en celle espace de mouvement droit. Et dire le contraire est un article
condampné a Paris.[57] Et ce posé, nul autre corps ne seroit auquel le

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[53] 38*d et seq.*

[53a] *BF* un.

[54] *DE* Dieu.

[55] 90*d*.

[56] 37*b et seq.*

[57] Doubtless Art. 186, among those condemned in Paris in 1277: 'Quod celum numquam quiescit, quia generatio inferiorum, que est finis motus celi, cessare non debet; alia ratio, quia celum suum esse et suam virtutem habet a motore suo; et hec conservat celum per suum motum. Unde si cessaret a motu, cessaret ab esse.' Denifle et Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, I (Paris, 1889), 552-553.

monde se eüst autrement selon lieu. Et donques ne vault la descripcion
desus dite. Item, posé par ymaginacion et si comme il est possible que
93*d* Dieu par sa puissance creast .ii. corps / separés un de l'autre, et soient
.*a*. et .*b*.,[58] et que nul autre corps ne fust fors ces .ii., et que il fussent
meüz samblablement un comme l'autre; et donques se avroient il .i. ou
regart de l'autre touzjours samblablement et .*a*. ne se avroit autrement a
quelcunque autre corps ne .*b*. aussi. Et donques estre meü n'est pas soy
avoir autrement a autre corps. Item, posé que .*a*. fust meü et que .*b*.
reposast, .*a*. et .*b*. se avroient autrement un a l'autre du tout en telle
maniere comme se .*b*. estoit meü et .*a*. reposast. Et donques l'en ne pourroit
assigner cause ne raison pourquoy .*a*. seroit meü plus que .*b*. ou reposast
plus que .*b*., se estre meü estoit avoir soy autrement ou resgart d'autre
corps. Item, je argüe en especial du mouvement du ciel, car se estre meü
ainsi estoit soy avoir autrement ou resgart de la terre qui repose ou
milieu, il s'ensuiroit que les parties du ciel qui sont lasus vers la circunference
et celles qui sont plus bas[59] vers le centre ou vers la terre fussent
meües d'une meïsme velocité ou isnelleté, et samblablement des parties
qui sont ou milieu du ciel et de celles qui sont vers les poles, car les unes
ne regardent pas la terre autrement que les autres plus isnelement, //
94*a* mais d'une meïsme isneleté. Et toutevoies, il est certain que les unes sont
meües plus isnelement que les autres tres notablement, et donques le
mouvement du ciel n'est pas en soy avoir autrement a la terre. Item,
posé par ymaginacion que la terre fust meüe par l'espace d'un jour de
mouvement journal et que le ciel reposast et aprés ce temps la chose
fust si comme elle est, je di que en ce temps le ciel et la terre ne se
avroient. i. ou resgart de l'autre autrement que il avoient devant ce temps
ne que il se ont aprés, mais du tout en tout par samblable maniere sanz
quelcunque difference. Et donques, se estre meü estoit soy avoir autrement
a autre corps, l'en ne pourroit dire pourquoy le ciel reposast en ce
temps plus que autrefois. Item, se il estoit necessaire pour le mouvement
du ciel que la terre reposast si comme di(s)t Aristote, posons donques
que aucune vertu, si comme une intelligence ou un ange, meüst la terre
de mouvement journal par un certain temps, il s'ensuiroit que en ce
temps le ciel fust sanz mouvement journal. Et ainsi la vertu qui mouvroit
la terre avroit en sa puissance de faire que le ciel seroit meü ou que
94*b* il reposeroit. Et ce est inconvenient. Item, en / ce cas, quant telle vertu
mouvroit la terre comme dit est, en ce temps l'intelligence qui mouvoit
le ciel au devant se a ou resgart du ciel et le ciel ou resgart de elle du
tout aussi comme devant. Et donques elle meut le ciel et le ciel est meü
aussi comme devant.[60] Et toutevoies, en ce temps, quant la terre est ainsi
meüe, le ciel se a continuelment[60a] a la terre en une maniere et non
autrement, et a tout corps samblablement. Et donques estre ainsi meü
n'est pas soy avoir autrement a autre corps. Item, estre eschaufé ou autrement
alteré n'est pas soy avoir autrement a autre corps, mais se le corps
qui eschaufe se a autrement a autre, c'est par accident et hors l'essence
de ceste alteracion ou mouvement. Et donques c'est soy avoir autrement
en soy meïsme. Et donques par samblable, estre meü selon lieu est soy
avoir autrement en soy meïsme ou resgart de l'espace ymaginee immobile,
car ou resgart de celle espace ou selon elle est mesuree le isneleté du
mouvement et de ses parties. Et par ce appert que le mouvement du ciel
ne autre [ne][61] requiert, quant est de soy, repos ne mouvement d'autre

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[58] Figure 11, marginal, p. 201.

[59] *A* sont bas plus bas. Redundency partially expunged.

[60] *BDEF* omit 'Et donques . . . comme devant.'

[60a] *B* meue ne le ciel continuelment.

[61] *A* omits 'ne.'

corps. Et donques ne vaut la consequence d'Aristote qui disoit: se le ciel
est meü, la terre repose, etc. Et encore appert par ce que dit est que
94c mouvement local est autre chose que le // corps ainsi meü, car c'est le
corps soy avoir autrement en soy meïsme ou resgart de l'espace ymaginee
immobile. Et tel mouvement est un accident et non pas chose qui puisse
estre separee de toute autre et par soy estant, car c'est impossible,—tel
qui implique contradiction,—mais est aussi comme seroit la curvité ou la
rectitude d'une ligne ou d'une verge, car telle chose ne peut estre
ymaginee sanz aucun subject.

La tierce consequence fu ceste: se la terre est, il convient par neccessité
que le feu soit. Je di que ceste consequence n'est pas neccessaire combien
que le consequent soit vrai de neccessité de nature, et les probacions ne
sont pas bonnes. La premiere estoit telle: la terre et le feu sont contraires
et se un contraire est en estre, il convient que l'autre soit en estre, etc.
Je di que il ne convient pas de neccessité, car se toutes choses estoient
blanches, rien ne seroit noir; et que rien ne soit noir, ce n'est pas impossible
ou que rien ne soit amer et ainsi de pluseurs autres contraires. Item, a ce
que Aristote le veult prouver parce que une meïsme matiere est subjecte a
.ii. contraires, je di que se la matiere est subjecte a un contraire, il ne
94*d* s'ensuit fors[62] que elle peut estre subjecte a l'autre contraire; mes / se ceste
possibilité n'estoit onques reducte a fait, ce ne seroit pas inconvenient,
si comme il fu dit en la fin du premier livre.[63] Item, a l'autre probacion ou
il di(s)t que chaleur est premiere que froidure, etc., l'e[n][64] peut respondre
que chaleur est trouvee en autre chose que en feu, et pour ce, il ne
s'ensuit pas se chaleur est que feu soit. Et par ce que j'ay dit appert que
la quarte consequence n'est pas evidente laquelle est prouvee par
samblables raisons et estoit telle: se terre et feu sont, les .ii. autres elemens
moiens sont. La quinte consequence estoit: se ces elemens sont, il est
neccessité que generacion soit. Je di que non. Et a la premiere raison
quant Aristote di(s)t que c'est impossible que aucun de ces elemens soit
perpetuel, etc., je respons que non, mais est verité que aucunes parties
de feu et de terre sont perpetuelles par nature ou peuent estre, si comme
il fu monstré en la fin du premier livre.[65] Et donques est ce possible[66] de
leur touz qui sont de telle nature comme sont leurs parties, mais ce n'est
pas possible selon le cours de nature qui est de fait. Et a la seconde rayson
d'Aristote qui fu telle en vertu: les mouvemens naturel[z][67] des elemens
95*a* ne sont pas perpetuelz et donques les elemens ne sont pas // perpetuelz,[68]
je di que ce ne vault, car les elemens ou leurs parties, si comme les
parties de terre, ne cessent pas a estre quant leur mouvement cesse, mais
sont meües a leur lieu naturel afin que elle[s][69] y reposent et durent sanz
corrupcion tant comme il est possible. Item, par argüement prins de sens[70]
contraire, l'en pourroit dire ainsi: l'element est perpetuel duquel le repos
naturel est perpetuel; et le repos[70a] de la terre est perpetuel selon Aristote
en la seconde consequence. Et donques est la terre perpetuelle contre ce
que il di(s)t ici.

La sixte consequence estoit: se generacion est, pluseurs mouvemens
sont ou ciel, etc. Je di premierement que, posé que le ciel reposast,
alteracion et generacion seroit, car se un feu estoit maintenant appliquié
a une matiere laquelle il eschaufast et ardist, il ne samble pas chose

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[62] *B* pas.
[63] 61*d*.
[64] *A* le.
[65] 61*d*.
[66] *B* impossible.
[67] *A* naturelles.
[68] *BDEF* omit 'et donques . . . perpetuelz.'
[69] *ADE* elle.
[70] *D* sen; *E* son.
[70a] *F* omits 'est perpetual; et le repos.'

resonnable que il cessast de eschaufer et de arder posé que tout le
mouvement du ciel cessast. Et dire le contraire est selon un article
condempné a Paris.[71] Item, selon verité, quant le soleil fu arresté au temps
de Josué, tout le mouvement du ciel cessa, car autrement tout le ciel[72]
eüst aprés esté desordené, si comme chascun qui se entent en telles choses
95*b* peut veoir clerement. Et l'Escripture meïsme / di(s)t que la lune se
arresta, et toutevoies, generacion ne cessa pas lors ne corrupcion, car ce
pendant, ceulz qui estoient contre Gabaon furent occis.[73] Item, selon une
ancienne fable, quant Jupiter coucha avecques une appellee Almena, il
doubla celle nuit et la fist durer .ii. nuiz. Et ainsi le mouvement du ciel
cessa par l'espace d'une nuit. Et pour ce ne cessa pas generacion, car
lors Jupiter engendra Hercules en celle femme Almena.[74] Or est il ainsi
que pluseurs de telles fables sont fondees sus aucune verité, si comme
met Plato *in Tymeo* de la fable de Pheton[75] qui fu fondee sus la verité
d'un diluge de feu qui fu ou temps et ou païs du roy Pheton. Et semblable-
ment l'en peut dire que ceste fable fu fondee sus la verité de ce que le
mouvement du ciel cessa ou temps que Josué deffendoit la cité de Gabaon.
Et c'est possible et vraisamblable, premierement car quant le mouvement
du ciel cessa a la requeste de Josué, il estoit nuit en aucuns lieus
habitables qui sont plus vers orient que n'estoit Gabaon; et ne convient
pas que entre ces lieus et Gabaon fust tres grant distance, car en Gabaon
le soleil estoit pres de rescouser, si comme il samble par ce que dit
95c l'Escripture: *sol—non festinavit occumbere, etc.*[76] Et don- // ques estoit
ja nuit es parties d'orient. Et convint par neccessité que en ces parties
la nuit [fust][77] plus longue de tant comme le jour fu plus lon[c][78] en
Gabaon. Et est vraisamblable que le memoire ou la renommee de ceste
merveilleuse nuit dura entre les paiens siques a tant que Hercules fu
reputé un dieu ou deifié quant a eulz, et cuidierent ou figu[re]rent[79] que
il avoit esté engendré celle nuit. Et de ce vint la fable devant mise. Item
la sainte Escripture et les histoires des Grecs, quant a ceste matiere, se
concordent en ce que par elles appert que Hercules fu engendré ou
temps ou environ le temps que Josué estoit devant la cité de Gabaon.
Et ce puet asséz apparoir par ce que recite saint Augustin ou .xviii.ᵉ
de *La Cité de Dieu.*[80] Item encore, s'accordent il en ce que la saint Escrip-
ture di(s)t que ce jour dura .ii. jours: *sol-non festinavit occumbere
spacio unius diei*[76] et de ce di(s)t en *Ecclesiastique: una dies facta est quasi
due,*[81]—le jour fu doublé. Et aussi di(s)t la fable que Jupiter doubla la
nuit, et ce jour et celle nuit furent un meïsme temps, si comme dit est.
Or avons donques comment la verité de la sainte Escripture est declaree
95*d* et tesmoingnie en ceste partie par la fable des poëtes / paiens, et telles
confirmacions ou concordances loe et approuve saint Jerome en une

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[71] Article 156, condemned in Paris in 1277: 'Quod si celum staret, ignis in stupam non ageret, quia Deus non esset.' *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, I, 552; cf. above, note 57, fol. 93c.

[72] *B* tout le mouvement du ciel.

[73] *Josue* x, 10-13.

[74] In his *Amphitryon*, Plautus relates that the night was lengthened for the delectation of Jupiter:

> Nunc te, nox, quae me mansisti, mitto ut(i) cedas die[i], Ut mortalis inlucescas luce clara et candida, Atque quanto, nox, fuisti longior hac proxuma, Tanto brevior dies ut fiat faciam, ut aeque disparet.

T. Macci Plauti Comoediae, ed. Goetz and Schoell. Fasc. I (Lipsiae, Teubner, 1902), p. 28. 11. 546-549, Cf. also 11. 271-282.

[75] *Timaeus*, 22C, 4-22D, 3. *D* de me qui; *E* d'Erme qui.

[76] Cf. *Josue* x, 3: 'Stetit itaque sol in medio caeli, et non festinavit occumbere spatio unius diei.'

[77] *A* omits 'fust.'

[78] *A* loing.

[79] *AF* figuirent; *E* figurent.

[80] *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Episcopi de Civitate Dei*, ed. B. Dombart, II (Leipzig, Teubner, 1929), XVIII, 12, p. 270.

[81] *Eccle.* xlvi, 3, 'una dies facta est quasi duo.'

epistre *ad magnum oratorem urbis Romme.*[82] Aprés je di que posé que ou ciel n'estoit mouvement fors seulement le journal, encore seroient alteracion et generacion, car le soleil et les autres planetes et estoilles avroient continuelment autre et autre resgart a la terre et aus choses de cibas, et feroit plus grant chaut le jour que de nuit et a midi que au matin et a une heure que a autre. Et ainsi seroit alteracion et, par consequent, generacion et corrupcion, mes ce seroit d'autre maniere que elles ne sont maintenant. Et pour ce, je conclu et di que ceste consequence ou condicionelle: se generacion est, pluseurs mouvemens celestielz sont, n'est pas simplement neccessaire, mais elle est vraie seulement en tant que se generacion est de telle maniere comme elle est ici-bas selon le cours de nature, il convient selon l'ordenance de nature que pluseurs mouvemens soient ou ciel. Et la cause est car telz mouvemens sont pour faire generacion comme pour cause final, et generacion et toute autre transmutacion naturelle est pour honme, car nature humaine est fin de toute
96*a* creature corporelle // selon verité et selon Aristote ou secont de *Phisique*[83] et en pluseurs lieus. Et est fin de generacion et des autres mutacions, a parler de fin qui est fin de premiere intencion. Et semblablement generacion est fin des mouvemens du ciel, fin de premerainne intencion et non pas de seconde, en la maniere que di(s)t ici Averroïz.[84]

9.—*Ou nouviesme chapitre il monstre que le ciel est* [*de*][1] *figure sperique par raison prinse de la priorité de ceste figure.*

Il[2] convient par neccessité que le ciel soit de figure sperique.

Glose. C'est a dire tres perfetement ronde, et il entent du souverain ciel. Aprés il touche les causes en general.

Tiexte. Car elle lui est tres propre et est premiere selon substance et selon nature.

Glose. Aprés il prouve son propos par .iiii. raisons principales. Et pour la premiere il met .ii. preamb[u]les[3] ou supposicions.

Tiexte. Or disons donques universelement et generalment des figures laquelle est la premiere, soit en superfices ou en corps.

Glose. Il fu dit ou premier chapitre du premier quoy est superfice et quoy est corps.[4] Aprés il met une division.

Tiexte. Et toute figure plaine, ou elle est rectiligne ou elle est circulaire.

96*b* Glose. Il ne fait pas ici mencion des figures qui sont en superfice / sperique ou courve, si comme en la superfice d'une pomme ou d'une pelote, mais seulement de celles qui sont en superfice plainne, si comme est la superfice d'une table ou du pavement d'une sale. Item, il ne fait pas mencion de celles qui sont en telles superfices plainnes et sont contenues ou terminees de ligne ou de lignes tortueuses et courves autrement que ligne circulaire, si comme ainsi[5] ou ainsi.[5] Item, non fait il de celles qui sont contenues de lignes droites ou tortueuses mesleement de .ii. ou de pluseurs, si comme est la figure d'un arc ou une tele,[6] mais il parle ici seulement de celles qui sont en superfice plainne et droite et qui sont contenues de lignes droites ou de ligne circulaire. Et la cause est car cestes sont plus simples que les autres. Et donques, se figure circulaire est premiere et devant cestes, elle est premiere que les autres.

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[82] *A* ortatorem. *Sancti Eusebii Hieronomi Epistulae*, ed. Isidorus Hilberg (Lipsiae, 1910), lxx, 2-6, especially 4, pp. 700-708.

[83] *Physicorum*, II. 8, 198b, 8-199a, 20. Cf. also *Pol.* I, 8, 1256b, 15-22.

[84] *Juntas*, t.c. 21, 109L-M.

[1] *A* omits 'de.'

[2] *Guthrie*, ch. iv.

[3] *A* preambles.

[4] 4*a et seq.*

[5] Figure 12, p. 201. These figures are scattered through the text and in the margin, three in each.

[6] *A* tele glose mais; *DE* telle. Item, mes.

> Tiexte. Et se elle est rectiligne, il convient que elle soit contenue de pluseurs lignes et se elle est circulaire, elle est contenue d'une seule ligne.

Glose. Il appelle rectilignes les figures qui sont contenues et terminees de lignes droites desquelles la premiere est triangle qui est terminee par .iii. lignes ainsi;[5] la seconde est quadrangle, terminee par .iiii. lignes; la
96c tierce // par .v., appelle[e][7] penthagone; la [quarte][8] par .vi. appelle[e][9] exagone et ainsi en procedant sanz fin, selon l'ordre des nombres. Mes figure circulaire est contenue et terminee d'une seule ligne.

> Tiexte. Et pour ce que en chascun gerre ou maniere de choses un est par nature premier et avant que pluralité ou multitude et le simple devant les composts, donques s'ensuit il que de toutes figures plainnes, celle qui est dite cercle est la premiere.

Glose. Aprés il conferme ceci par une autre raison.

> Tiexte. Item, chose perfecte est de laquelle l'en ne peu(s)t rien prendre hors elle des choses qui lui sont possibles, si comme nous avons dit devant.

Glose. Ou premier chapitre du premier et ou tiers de *Phisique*.[10] Et il veult dire que la chose est perfecte a laquelle l'en ne peut adjouster rien qui la parface, etc.

> Tiexte. Et a ligne droite et finie, l'en peut touzjours adjouster, mes non pas a ligne circulaire.

Glose. L'en ne peu(s)t crestre une ligne circulaire, mais l'en peut bien faire en une autre plus grant et il n'est pas ainsi de ligne droite.

> Tiexte. Et donques appert que la ligne est perfecte de soy qui contient cecle et chose perfecte est devant chose imperfecte. Et pour ce, de toutes figures plainnes, cecle[11] est la premiere.

96*d* Glose. Il a diffe- / rence entre cecle et ligne circulaire, car cecle est la superfice ou espace ou aere[11a] qui est contenue en la ligne circulaire appellee circunference, aussi comme l'en diroit en gros exemple que le funs du tonneau est aussi comme le cecle et ce que l'en seult appeller cecle est aussi comme la circunference. Et par semblable, l'en doit savoir que espere est le corps contenu en la superfice qui est appellee circunference sperique.

> Tiexte. Et samblablement, espere est la premiere des figures solides ou corporelles, car elle est contenue d'une seulle superfice, et les autres figures qui sont rectilignes sont contenues de pluseurs superfices.

Glose. Si comme la premiere des figures corporelles rectilignes, qui est appellee pyramide, est contenue de .iiii. triangles qui sont figures rectilignes comme devant[12] est dit, et siet pyramide aussi comme fait ce que l'en appelle cauquetrepe.[13] Et la seconde corporelle aprés ceste est appellee cubus, et est aussi comme un dé et est contenue[14] de .vi. superfices quarrees. Et ainsi chascune autre aprés est contenue de pluseurs superfices.

> Tiexte. Car, si comme cecle est entre les figures plaines, ainsi est espere entre les figures solides ou corporelles.

97*a* Glose. Et donques espere est la premiere // figure corporelle. Et ce conferme il aprés [par][15] une autre raison ou signe.

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[7] *AF* appellé.

[8] *ADEF* la sixte par .vi.

[9] *AB* appellé.

[10] 5c· *Physicorum*, III, 6, 207a, 5-13.

[11] *BDEF* plaines celle est.

[11a] *DE* rondesce.

[12] *DE* sont figurees rectilignes ou devant.

[13] *DE* omit 'cauquetrepe.'

[14] *A* contenuee.

[15] *A* omits 'par.'

Tiexte. Item, il semble que a ce facent tesmoingnage ceulz qui dient que les corps peuent estre divisés en superfices et que il sont engendrés ou composés de superfices.

Glose. Et samblablement, il disoient que les superfices sont composees de lignes et les lignes de poinz indivisibles, mais ceste opinion est reprouvee ou sixte de *Phisique*.[16] Et toutevoies, aucune fois en tenant un faulz opinion l'en sent et est l'en aussi comme contraint a confesser aucune verité; et pour ce, Aristote amaine cez ici en tesmoing de ce que il a dit.

Tiexte. Car de toutes les figures solides ou corporelles, espere toute seulle est celle de quoy eulz disoient que elle ne peut pas estre divisee en superfices, pour ce que elle n'a pas pluseurs superfices mais une seulle.

Glose. Car il disoient que pyramide est divisé en .iiii. superfices qui sont .iiii. triangles, et cubus en .vi. superfices quarrees, etc. Et de ce sera dit plus a plain ou tiers livre.[17]

Tiexte. Car la division d'un corps en superfices ne peut estre fete telement que les parties soient samblables au tout, mais elles sont aussi comme autres en espece.[18]

97b Glose. Ainsi disoient il; et pour / ce, il mettoient que espere ne peut estre divisee en superfices pour ce que elle n'a fors une superfice. Comment que soit que il l'entendissent,—car le texte est obscur,[19]—toutevoies, il confessoient ceste verité que espere est plus simple et premiere que quelcunque figure corporelle.

Tiexte. Or appert donques que espere est la premiere des figures solides ou corporelles.

Glose. Aprés il met a ce la tierce raison ou persuasion.

Tiexte. Item, ceste chose est tres resonnable selon ceulz qui assignent et disposent les figures corporelles selon l'ordre des nombres, car il mettent cecle aussi comme un ou selon unité et triangle selon dualité ou aussi comme .ii. pour ce que ses .iii. angles valent .ii. angles drois, car se l'en attribuoit ou assignoit triangle a un ou a unité, il s'ensuiroit que cecle ne fust pas figure.

Glose. Angle drect est si comme l'angle d'un instrument a mazon appellé esquarretel,[20] et quant .ii. lignes se entre-intersequent en une superfice a angles equalz en maniere d'une crois, il causent .iiii. angles d[r]ez[21] environ le point du milieu de la croiz. Item, il appert par geometrie comment l'ordre des figures superficielles rectilignes est selon le procés des nombres a commencier a .iii., car la premiere est triangle, la seconde quadrangle,
97c la tierce a .v. anglez,[22] la quarte .vi. // angles et la quinte .vii. et a[in]si[23] en procedant sans fin.[24] Et par ce appert que le nombre des anglez[22] de la figure excede en .ii. le nombre par quoy elle est denommee. Item, les .iii. angles de la premiere figure valent .ii. angles drois et les .iiii. de la seconde sont ou valent .iiii. angles drois et les .v. de la quinte valent .vi. angles drois [et les .vi. de la sixte .viii. angles droiz],[25] et ainsi en procedant oultre sanz fin par les figures selon l'ordre des nombres pers

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[16] *Physicorum*, VI, 1, 231a, 21-231b, 18.

[17] 170c.

[18] *BDEF* espace.

[19] The text Oresme was following is as follows: et non est dissolutio corporum in superficies, sicut dissolutio totius corporis in partes. Dissolutio enim corporum in superficies erit in formas diversas. (*Juntas*, 110M). Averrois notes that Aristotle does not agree that the argument is true, but made use of his opponents' arguments to further his own. Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 24, 111A.

[20] *BF* contain a crude figure representing a mason's square.

[21] *A* deez.

[22] *A* angelz.

[23] *A* aussi.

[24] Figure 13, p. 201.

[25] *A* omits 'et les .vi. . . . droiz.'

et non-pers, et par les angles droiz selon les nombres pers seulement. Et donques[26] convient il que la figure qui est du tout sanz angle, c'est a savoir cercle, precede toutes les autres et est aussi comme unité. Et a parler plus proprement, elle est outre et precede unité quant est a angle et est ausi comme le cifre[27] en argorisme qui est devant unité. Et par aventure, pour ce fu ordené que cifre fust de figure circulaire. Et par ce que dit est appert que cecle est la premiere des figures superficielles et, par 97*d* consequent, espere est la premiere des figures corporelles. / Et ainsi Aristote a monstré par .iii. moiens que espere est premiere figure corporelle. Aprés il applique a propos.

> Tiexte. Et pour ce que la premiere figure est deüe au premier corps et le premier corps est celui qui est en la desreniere et souveraine circunference, donques le corps qui est premier meü circulairement est sperique ou de figure sperique.

Glose. Le ciel souverain est le premier en descendant et est le desrenier en montant, et pour ce il est appellé le .viii.^{e} espere, car selon Aristote nulle espere n'est outre. Aprés il conclut des autres cielz qui sont sous le premier.

> Tiexte. Et donques convient il que le ciel qui est contenu[28] a cestui et prochain sans moien soit sperique, car a corps sperique est continué corps sperique. Et samblablement convient il que il soit des autres qui sont en descendant vers le milieu de cestui, car les corps qui sont contenuz[28] et touchiés de corps sperique, il convient par neccessité que touz soient speriques. Et les cielz des planetes qui sont plus bas touchent l'espere qui est desus eulz et touchent[29] un l'autre. Et pour ce, convient il que tout 98*a* corps celestiel meü circulairement soit sperique, car // tous touchent et sont contenus[28] les uns aus autres en leurs esperes.

Glose. Aristote prent yci *continu* ou *continué* largement pour ce que est conti[g]u[30] et prochain sanz[31] moien, car les esperes du ciel ne sont pas proprement continues une a l'autre, car elles ne sont pas meües d'un / 98*b* meïsme(s) mouvement. Et doit l'en savoir que chascun ciel ou chascune espere du ciel qui environne le centre du monde a .ii. superfices: une dehors appelle superfice convexe, et jouste ce dist Ovide: *convexum* 98*c* *quociens claudit nox humida celum*,[32] // et l'autre dedens appellee superfice concave. Et Aristote a monstré par la raison devant mise que la superfice convexe du souverain ciel est sperique. Et pour ce que [cest][33] ciel est meü circulairement et que celui que il touche est aussi meü circulairement et non pas du tout samblablement, et avecques ce, pour ce que c'est impossible par nature que les corps celestielz soient alteréz ne diminuéz, si comme il appert par le sixte chapitre du premier,[34] ou que entre eulz soit aucun lieu vieu, il s'ensuit par neccessité que la superfice concave du souverain ciel et la superfice convexe du secont aprés soient tres perfetement speriques sanz quelcunque asperité ou eminence et que eulz soient meüz un souz l'autre sanz aucune confricacion, mes un passe sus l'autre tres souëf et tres doucement sanz violence. Et est par samblable

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[26] Figure 14, p. 201.

[27] From Med. Latin *cifra* < Arabic *sifr*= zero.

[28] *BDF* continu and continus. This spelling conforms more to the sense of contiguous and not contained throughout this passage of text.

[29] *B* omits 'l'espere . . . et touchent.'

[30] *A* continu.

[31] *DE* et pour ce .iii. sans moien.

[32] Figure 15, p. 215. Oresme, doubtless quoting this line from some Florilegium, is mistaken in citing Ovid as its author. It is found, however, in a quotation in the *Etymologiae* of Isidor of Seville, without indication of its source. Cf. *Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum libri*, ed. W. M. Lindsay, I (Oxford, 1911), III, 39.

[33] *A* omits 'cest.'

[34] 13*a et seq.*

quant a ce du secont ciel et du tiers et ainsi ensuianment en descendant
siques a la superfice concave du ciel de la lune, laquelle est concentrique
au monde et au corps du ciel qui contient ou comprent ou est composé de
touz les cielz parcialz, car autrement tout ce corps ensamble seroit plus
espés en une partie que en autre;—laquelle chose n'est pas vraisamblable
98d ne raisonnable. Et donques convient / il que la superfice concave du ciel
de la lune soit tres perfectement sperique. Et pour ce que en ce monde
n'a lieu qui soit vieu, il s'ensuit que la superfice convexe de l'element ou
espere du feu, laquelle est sanz moien pres du ciel de la lune, est tres
perfectement sperique.[35]

10.—*Ou disieme chappitre il prouve ce meïsme par trois autres raisons.*

Encore appert autrement que le ciel est sperique, car nous voions et est a supposer que tout le ciel est meü circulairement. Et il fu monstré devant[1] que dehors la derreniere et souverainne circulacion, c'est a savoir dehors le souverain ciel, n'est vieu ne quelcunque lieu. Et pour ces causes, il convient de neccessité que le ciel soit sperique, car se il estoit de figure rectiligne ou qui eüst angles,[2] il convendroit que hors le ciel fust aucun corps et lieu vieu.

Glose. Car lieu est le corps ou la superfice du corps qui contient la chose qui est en lieu, si comme met [Aristote][3] ou quart de *Phisique.*[4]

Tiexte. Et se le ciel avoit angle et supereminence qui fust meüe
circulairement, cest angle ne demoureroit pas en un lieu, mes la
ou il avroit esté devant et dont il seroit parti ne succederoit
99a quelcunque corps, // et cel angle ou ceste partie qui est corps
seroit meü a un autre lieu ouquel n'est aucun corps pour la
permutacion et transmutacion des angles.

Glose. Se le ciel estoit de telle figure angulaire et il fust meü circulaire-
ment comme si est, il convendroit que les angles [passassent][5] par une
espace wide et que il entrassent en [une][6] espace wide[7] et lessassent
aprés eulz ou derriere eulz espace wide; si comme, pour grace[8] d'exemple,
se le ciel estoit de figure cubique ou quarree aussi comme est un dé et
un de ses angles fust *.b.* et le centre fust *.a.*, cel angle *.b.* descriroit une
ligne circulaire et entreroit e[n][9] wide espace et lesseroit aprés soy wide
espace,—et c'est ligier a entendre. Et ainsi seroit il de quelcunque autre /
99b figure angulaire.

Tiexte. Samblablement se le ciel estoit d'autre figure que angulaire et que [les][10] lignes qui vont du milieu a la circunference ne fussent pas equales, si comme seroit la figure d'une lentille ou d'un oeuf, il convendroit que dehors le ciel qui est meü circulairement fust lieu et vieu pour ce que tout le ciel ne seroit pas touzjours en une espace.

Glose. Car se le ciel estoit de telle figure, les parties de la circunference qui sont plus loing du centre par ce mouvement entreroient en espace

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[35] At this point *DE* interpolate a passage beginning in the text just below: 'car se il estoit de figure rectiligne,' continuing to the gloss beginning in 99*a*. This passage is recopied in its correct postion.

[1] 34*b*.

[2] *A* angelz.

[3] *A* omits 'Aristote.'

[4] *Physicorum*, IV, 4, 212a, 7-32.

[5] *A* omits 'passassent.'

[6] *AF* omit 'une.'

[7] *B* omits 'et que il entrassent . . . wide.'

[8] Figure 16, p. 215.

[9] *A* et.

[10] *A* omits 'les.'

wide, et ainssi le ciel tout ensamble seroit une fois en un lieu et autre en
autre. Et maintenant, pour ce que il est de figure sperique perfetement,
il est touzjours en un meïsme lieu et est meü en son lieu et non pas meü
de son lieu. Mais contre ce semble estre une instance: car[11] se le ciel
99*c* estoit de figure qui fust besloingne et sanz angle en se trahant // a figure
de oeuf, et il fust meü circulairement environ le plus long[12] dyametre de
lui, et que les poles de cest dyametre ou de cest essel et de cest mouvement
soient *.a.* et *.b.* qui sont aussi comme les bous de ceste figure, il
s'ensuit que le ciel pourroit estre meü ainsi en son lieu sanz ce que il le
lessast ou en issist ne en tout ne en partie, aussi bien comme se il estoit
perfetement sperique, et sanz ce que il convenist hors le ciel metre lieu
ne plain ne vieu plus que se il estoit de figure sperique. Et samblablement
pourroit estre se le ciel estoit de figure comme lentille et il fust meü
environ le dyametre de lui qui est le plus court, car il seroit touzjours en
un lieu, si comme l'en peut legierement entendre et experimenter ou
comprendre par exemple en figure corporelle. Je respon et di premierement
que se le souverain et derrenier[13] ciel estoit de telle figure ou pres
comme est un oeuf et aussi les autres cielz qui sont souz lui et en lui,
et touz ensamble fussent meüs d'un seul mouvement environ le plus long[14]
dyametre qui estoit *.ab.*[15] en la figure precedente, il ne convendroit ja
pour ce hors le ciel mettre lieu vieu plus que se il estoit du tout sperique.
Aprés je di que se ainsi estoit que les cielz des planetes fussent de telle
99*d* figure o- /vale lesquelz sont meüz d'autre mouvement que le derrenier
ciel et sus autres poles, lesquelz soi[en]t[16] *.c.* et *.d.*,[17] il convendroit ou
que ou ciel fust lieu vieu ou penetracion,—c'est a dire que un ciel
trespersast l'autre,—ou condempsacion et compression; et tout ce est
impossible par nature. Tiercement, je di que se le[17] derrenier ciel estoit
100*a* de telle figure ovale ou comme est un oeuf et // la superfice concave de
lui fust de figure sperique, les cielz des planetes qui sont en ceste superfice
seroient speriques et pourroient estre meüz sus les poles du zodiaque,
lesquelz soient *.c.* et *.d.*, et sanz ce que il convenist mettre lieu vieu ne
penetracion ne condempsacion; si comme en gros exemple, nous voions
que l'oeuf n'est pas de figure sperique et le mouël de l'oeuf est sperique
ou presque sperique. Mes se le ciel estoit telement disposé, il convendroit
que le derrenier ciel fust plus espés en une partie que en autre; et ce
seroit un dit sanz raison et sanz apparence. Et avecques ce, il appert par
les autres raisons que il est plus vraisamblable que il soit sperique et
meïsme le derrenier ciel qui est le premier et le souverain corps de ce
monde. Aprés il met la tierce raison principal.

> Tiexte. Item, le mouvement du ciel est la mesure de touz mouvemens.

Glose. Si comme il appert ou quart de *Phisique*.[18]

> Tiexte. Pour ce que ce mouvement seul et non autre est contenu et regulier et pardurable.

Glose. Continu sans intervalle et sanz repos, reguler sanz estre plus isnel ou plus hastif une fois que autre, et pardurable sanz fin.

100*b* Tiexte. Et en chascun gerre ou ma- / niere de chose, ce que
[est][19] le plus tres petit est la mesure de telles choses.

Glose. Ce appert ou .x.e de *Metaphisique*,[20] et selon ce nous disons que

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[11] Figure 17, p. 215.

[12] *A* loing.

[13] *BDEF* omit 'et derrenier.'

[14] *A* loing.

[15] *BDEF* .a. et .b.

[16] *AB* soit; *F* sont.

[17] Figure 18, repeated three lines below as indicated, p. 215.

[18] *Physicorum*, IV, 14, 223b, 18-25.

[19] *ABDEF* omit 'est.'

[20] *Meta.*, X, 1, 1052b, 15-1053a, 10.


le souverain ciel
le ciel de la lune

FIG 15
FOL 98 ab



FIG 16
FOL. 99 a



FIG. 17
FOL. 99 b



FIG. 18
FOL. 99b



FIG. 19
FOL. 100 c


feu
aet
le Pole
le pole

FIG. 20
FOL. 101 d



FIG. 21
FOL. 102 a


feu
feu
aet
aet

FIG. 22
FOL. 103 b

unité ou un est mesure des nombres par la replicacion de elle. Et aussi l'en mesure une longueur en replicant une petite chose, si comme est une aune ou un pié, et un pois en replicant une livre ou une unce ou telle chose qui est petite ou resgart de celle que l'en mesure par elle.

Tiexte. Et des mouvemens le tres plus isnel, c'est le tres plus petit, et le tres plus isnel, c'est le mouvement du ciel.

Glose. C'est a savoir le mouvement journal, qui est tres merveilleusement isnel et qui est tres grant ou resgart du corps meü ou du subject et tres grant ou resgart de l'espace que il descript ou trespasse, mais il est tres petit ou resgart du temps, car en tres pou de temps il passe tres grant espace. Et selon ce, il est mesure[21] des autres mouvemens, c'est a savoir selon temps, et pour ce, il est tres petit en tant comme mesure.

Tiexte. Or est il ainsi que de toutes les figures qui retournent
d'un point a celui meïsme, la ligne du cecle ou de figure circulaire
est la tres plus petite, et le mouvement qui est tres isnel doit
estre selon la ligne qui est tres petite. Et pour ce donques que
100c le ciel est meü tres isnelement, il convient // de neccessité que
il soit de figure sperique.

Glose. Pour ce miex entendre, l'en doit savoir que des figures superficielles
la circulaire est tres plus petite en ceste maniere, c'est a savoir que se
une superfice estoit transmuee de figure en autre sanz la acrestre ou
appeticier, elle ne pourroit estre contenue ne comprinse en plus petite
ligne que est la circulaire,—a prendre touzjours ligne pour ce que est
composé de toutes les lignes dont la superfice est environnee et enclose,
se pluseurs sont. Et aussi, se pluseurs superfices equales estoient[22] de
diverses figures, nulle ne seroit enclose en si petite ligne comme la
superfice circulaire appelle[e][23] cecle. Et ce pourroit estre ligierement
monstré par geometrie. Item, quelcunque superfice, [posé que elle soit
circulaire, une superfice][24] equale peut estre contenue et enclose precise-
ment en ligne plus grande au double ou plus grande au quadruple, et
ainsi en acressant tant comme il plaist selon ymaginacion[25] mathematique;
si comme posé que ces .iii. superfices, *.a.* et *.b.* et *.c.*, soient equales et que
.a. soit circulaire et les autres quadrangles plus longue[s][26] que lees, je di
100*d* que il est possible / que la ligne qui contient *.b.* est double a la ligne qui
contient *.a.* pour ce que *.b.* est de figure plus estroite et plus longue. Et
est possible que la ligne qui contient *.c.* est double a celle qui contient
ou termine *.b.* pour ce que *.c.* est a l'avenant plus longue et plus estroite
et, par consequent, ceste ligne est quadruble a celle qui termine *.a.* Et
ainsi quelcunque superfice, en la variant de figure en autre, peu(s)t
estre a ymaginacion termin[e][27] par si grant ligne[28] comme l'en veult,
mes elle ne peut estre terminee par plus petite que par circulaire ne
contenue en plus petite. Et si comme il fu dit ou chapitre precedent,[29] tel
resgart comme a figure circulaire aus autres figures superficielles, tel
resgart a espere aus autres figures corporelles. Et par ce s'ensuit que
espere est la plus petite figure de toutes en la significacion et entendement
maintenant mis. Et donques est elle propre et convenable au mouvement
du ciel qui est tres petit, si comme dit est. Et jouste ceste ymaginacion,
je faiz une autre raison au propos principal, car de ce que figure circulaire
est la tres plus petite en la maniere desus dite, il s'ensuit de neccessité

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[21] *DE* meu.
[22] *A* repeats 'estoient.'
[23] *ABD* appelé.
[24] *A* omits 'posé que . . . superfice.'
[25] Figure 19, p. 215.
[26] *A* longue.
[27] *ABD* terminé.
[28] *A* grant de ligne.
[29] 96*d*.

101*a* que elle est la plus contenante // ou contentive et de plus grant capacité: *minima ergo capacissima*[30] *et e converso.* Car pour ce que la superfice *.a.* ne peut estre contenue en plus petite ligne que en circulaire, il s'ensuit que la ligne qui la contient ou superfice equale ne pourroit tant contenir en autre figure, car se elle estoit autrement figuree, comment que ce fust, elle contendroit mendre superfice; et tout ce pourroit estre ligierement demonstré par geometrie. Et donques des figures corporelles nulle n'est de si grant capacité comme est la sperique. Et ce appert par experience, car un vaiseau ne peut tant contenir comme il contient en telle figure, et donques est elle convenable au ciel qui tout contient.

11.—*En le .xi.e*[1] *chappitre il met sa quarte raison a monstrer que le ciel est sperique.*

> L'en peut prendre foy que le ciel est sperique des corps qui sont colloquiéz vers le milieu du monde, car l'eaue est environ la terre.

Glose. Fors en la partie qui est descouverte pour l'abitacion des honmes et des bestes.

> Tiexte. Et l'aer est environ l'eaue et le feu environ l'aer, et les
> 101*b* corps qui sont desus[2] selon ceste meïsme raison environ- / nent
> l'un l'autre, car eulz ne sont pas continuz ou continuéz, mes touchent l'un l'autre.

Glose. De ce fu dit vers la fin du .ix.e chapitre.[3]

> Tiexte. Et la superfice de l'element de l'eaue est sperique et ce qui touche a corps sperique ou qui est meü environ corps sperique est sperique par neccessité. Et pour ce appert il que le ciel est sperique.

Glose. Il est certain que se la superfice convexe de l'eaue est sperique, il convient que la superfice concave de l'aer[4] qui contient [l'eaue][5] et la touche soit sperique, mais il ne s'ensuit pas de neccessité par ce, que la superfice convexe de l'aer soit sperique ne des autres corps qui sont desus l'aer. Mais c'est une parsuasion legiere pour ce que il samble que l'element de l'aer ne soit pas plus espés ou parfont en une partie que en autre. Et par aventure, le contraire est vray, car premierement nous voions que l'element de l'eaue n'est pas partout d'une parfondeur ou d'une espesse. Et samblablement, toutes les lignes qui procedent du centre du monde a la superfice de la terre ne sont pas equales, car se ainsi estoit, elle seroit toute couverte de eaue, et pour ce elle est plus parfonde en un lieu que en autre. Et donques est ce possible que les autres .ii. //
101*c* elemens qui sont aer et feu ne sont pas tout environ d'une parfondeur. Item, avecques ce est chose prouvable par raison, car selon ce que il appert ou premier de *Metheores*[6] et par ce que sera dit aprés ou .xv.e chapitre,[7] l'isneleté du mouvement du ciel et la prochainneté du soleil sont causes de chaut et de sec et de engendrer feu. Or est il certain que le mouvement du ciel est tres excellanment plus ysnel vers l'equinocial et vers les parties prochainnes que vers les poles du monde. Et le soleil, selon l'esdrecement de ses rayz, est plus prouchain des parties des elemens qui sont entre les deux tropiques et sous la partie du ciel la ou il a son cours,

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[30] *D* capassissima. Unidentified.
[1] *B* .xii.
[2] *B* desous.
[3] 97*d*.
[4] *B* l'eaue.
[5] *A* lae leaeu.
[6] *Meteorologicorum*, 1, 3, 341a, 17-28.
[7] 111*b*.

et yleucques est plus chaut et plus sec que vers les poles. Et donques pour les dites causes, l'element du feu doit estre plus parfont vers le milieu[8] du ciel et souz le cours du soleil et es parties prochainnes que vers les poles qui sont les bous du monde. Et selon ce, il sambleroit par 101d raison que la superfice concave / de[9] l'element du feu et la superfice convexe de l'element de l'aer fussent de figure presque t[e]le[10] comme est figure de oeuf. Et toutevoies, la superfice convexe du feu est perfetement sperique et la superfice concave de l'aer est presque sperique, et ainsi l'element de l'aer seroit plus parfont vers les poles que vers l'equinocial. Aprés il prouve une chose que il avoit supposee, c'est a savoir que l'eaue est sperique, et c'est a entendre que elle tent a figure[11] sperique en partie, car elle n'est pas entierement[11a] ronde ne sperique.

> 102*a* Tiexte. Mais que la superfice // de l'eaue soit sperique il appert se nous prenons ceste supposicion, c'est a savoir que l'eaue est nee et incline a fluer et courir tousjours au lieu qui est plus bas. Et le lieu est plus bas qui est plus pres du centre du monde. Or posons[12] donques que du centre *.a.* procedent .ii. lignes, *.ab.* et *.ag.*, et soit faite la tierce ligne par desus qui soit *.bg.*; et aprés soit faite une ligne qui procede du centre siques au milieu de ceste tierce ligne et soit *.ad.* laquelle est plus petite que les autres .ii. qui procedent du centre. Et donques le lieu ou est le point *.d.* est plus parfont et plus bas que les autres .ii. poins ou sont *.b.* et *.g.* Et donques fluera et ira l'eaue siques a tant que toutes telles lignes qui procedent du centre a sa superfice soient equales, et vendra l'eaue siques ou point appellé *.e.*, et sera la ligne *.ae.* equale aus autres .ii. qui sont *.ab.* et *.ag.* Et lors l'eaue se reposera 102*b* et touchera ces .iii. poins par / lesquelz pourroit passer ligne circulaire. Et donques la superfice de l'eaue en laquelle est la ligne *.beg.* est sperique.

Glose. Briefment, ce n'est pas fort a entendre que se la superfice de l'eaue n'estoit sperique, il convendroit que une partie de elle fust plus pres du centre que l'autre, et donques seroit celle partie plus bas que l'autre ou que les autres et ne seroit pas l'eaue en repos. Et ceulz qui frequentent la mer apparçoivent bien que la superfice de elle n'est pas droite ne plaine, mais a supereminence et boce et tent a rondesce. Aprés il conclut en declarant sa conclusion.

> Tiexte. Or appert donques par ces raisons que le monde est sperique et que il est tourné selon diligence en telle maniere que il n'est chose faite par main d'onme tournee ou polie samblablement, ne chose quelcunque visible ou qui nous apparoisse, car chascun des corps mixtes que nous voions est composé d'autres dont nul ne peut telement recevoir regularité ne politure si diliganment faite comme peut la nature du corps circulaire, c'est a savoir du ciel.

Glose. Les .iiii. elemens et les corps mixtes ou composés de eulz sont mate[ri]el[z],[13] et pour cause de la matiere et d'aucuns accidens de telz 102*c* corps, ce n'est pas possible par nature ne par art // que quantité notable d'aucun tel corps soit perfetment polie ne du tout onnie sanz aucune inequalité ou asperi[t]é[14] et supereminence, posé que tel corps soit de figure droite et plainne ou de figure sperique ou autre. Et pour ce, ne acier ne verre ne pierre precieuse ne autre corps materiel n'est du tout sanz aucune asperité, combien que elle soit aucune fois imperceptible ou insensible, excepté tant seulement l'element du feu quant a sa superfice convexe qui est perfetement polie et sperique. Et ce ne a pas le feu de soi meïsme, mais de la superfice concave du ciel de la lune qui le contient et qui est perfetement sperique, et a laquelle il touche partout sanz moien quelcunque ne plain ne vieu.

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[8] *A* le mi le lieu.

[9] Figure 20, p. 215.

[10] *A* tole.

[11] *BDEF* elle est toute a figure.

[11a] *B* autrement.

[12] Figure 21, p. 215.

[13] *A* mateuelles.

[14] *A* asperique.

> Tiexte. Et est certain que chascun des elemens, en prenant tousjours la distance vers en haut, a telle proporcion[15] a son prochain, quant a tendre ou a aprochier a figure sperique, comme l'eaue a a la terre.

Glose. La terre qui est le plus bas element n'est pas sperique, car il y a monz et vaulz, mais toutevoies, sa figure trait a sperique et est aussi comme ronde, si comme il appert par l'eclipse de la lune qui appert comme porcion de cecle et qui est causee de l'ombre de la terre. Et qui 102*d* seroit ou ciel et verroit la terre, elle sambleroit toute / ronde. Item, l'eaue approche encore plus que la terre a figure sperique sanz monz et sans vaulz, mais seulement sont en elle aucunes fluctuacions sensibles a cause des venz ou autrement. Item, selon Aristote en ceste partie, de tant comme l'eaue est moins boçue que la terre et plus pres ou plus tendante a figure sperique, de tant est l'aer, c'est a savoir la superfice convexe de l'aer, plus onnie et plus polie que la superfice de l'eaue et plus prochainne de figure perfetement sperique. Et meïsmement car, selon ce que il appert ou premier de *Metheores*,[16] celle superfice de l'aer est bien loing de la ou sont vent et pluie et autres impressions, et par telles est fete commocion ou perturbacion en la superfice de l'eaue. Et donques celle superfice de l'aer est paisible[17] et serie et presque sperique. Item, de tant seroit encore plus polie et plus pres de sperique la superfice convexe du feu quant est de soy, mais elle est du tout sperique pour la raison[18] de ce qui la contient, comme dit est. Item, il peut apparoir par le quart livre que proporcionelment, de tant comme l'eaue est moins pesante et plus legiere que la terre, de tant est l'aer moins pesant et plus legier que l'eaue, et le feu 103*a* moins pesant et plus // legier que l'aer.[19] Et pour ce, aprés ce que Ovide a faite mencion de la terre et de l'eaue, il[20] di(s)t ainsi: *imminet his aer; qui, quanto pondere terre, pondere aque est gravior, tanto est onerosior igne.*[21] Or voions nous sensiblement que une chose pesante de matiere terreste, pour la figure dont elle est composee, se tient sus l'eaue qui est moins pesante, si comme fet une nef ou un vaissel de metal, et autres choses dedens tel vaissel qui sont de tres pesante espece, si comme or et plun. Et la cause est pour la difference de l'aer a l'eaue en pesanteur et en legiereté, lequel aer est dedens le vaissel et resiste a ce que il ne descende plus bas. Item, selon la science qui est appellee *de ponderibus*,[22] l'eaue qui seroit en la place que le vaissel occupe en l'eaue peseroit en l'aer autant precisement comme feroit le vaissel et ce de dedens; si comme se le vaissel poise cent livres, l'eaue qui seroit en la place que il

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[15] *DE* porcion..

[16] *Meteorologicorum,* I, 3, 340b, 3-341a, 7.

[17] *BDE* passible.

[18] *DE* omit 'elle est . . . raison.'

[19] 189*cd.*

[20] *A* eaue et il.

[21] Cf. *Metam.,* I, 52-53: 'Imminet his aer; qui, quanto est pondere terrae, Pondere aquae levior, tanto est onerosior igni.' *Gravior* in the text is a palpable mistake.

[22] This is, of course, an abbreviated statement of the Archimedean principle, first formulated in the fifth proposition of the first book of Archimedes' *De corporibus fluitantibus*; cf. *Archimedes Opera Omnia,* ed. J. L. Heiberg, II (Lipsiae, Teubner, 1913), p. 329. The work or works to which Oresme had reference are doubtless those mentioned by Duhem in his chapter "La Scientia de Ponderibus et Léonard de Vinci" in his *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci,* I (Paris: 1906), ch. vii, pp. 257-316.

occupe ou en la fosse que il fait en l'eaue peseroit cent livres. Et pour
ce, se le vessel pesoit plus que l'eaue qui seroit en l'espace que il occupe
en l'eaue, il descendroit aval. Et c'est la cause pourquoy l'eaue moins
pesante peut moins soustenir que l'eaue plus pesante, si comme l'eaue
103b douce peut moins / soustenir que l'eaue de la mer, et aucun vaissel seroit
seür en la mer qui periroit en l'eaue douce. Je di donques par [la][23]
raison devant mise que se un vaissel de matiere pesante et ouquel fust
matiere pesante, si comme[24] un honme ou pluseurs, estoit sus la superfice
convexe de l'element de l'aer laquelle est presque sperique comme dit est et
sanz perturbacion, tel vaissel pourroit lasus reposer aussi naturelment
comme une nef repose en Seine. Et la cause est pour ce que l'element du
feu est plus legier que l'element de l'aer de tant comme l'aer est plus
legier que l'eaue, comme desus dit est. Et par ce, le feu qui seroit en ce
vaissel resisteroit a ce que le vaissel ne descendist plus aval, aussi comme
dit est de la nef qui est en l'eaue. Et donques, se par nature est possible
que une chose terrestre et pesante peu(s)t reposer si haut, c'est a savoir
par desus tout l'element de l'aer, par plus forte reson Dieu qui est aucteur,
103c conditeur et gouverneur de nature peut faire // que corps humain repose
sus les cielz; et meïsmement car tel corps pesant qui seroit ou est hors ce
monde ne avroit ou a quelcunque inclinacion au centre de ce monde, si
comme il fu monstré et declaré ou .xxiiii.[e] chapitre du premier.[25] Mes
par aventure, aucun pourroit contre ce obicier, premierement car il n'est
pas possible par nature que corps terrestre et pesant soit mis ou fait si
haut comme sus tout l'aer; item, se il y estoit, le feu l'ard[r]oit[26] tantost;
item, se il y estoit et le feu ne l'ardoit, encore seroit il lasus par violence,
car ce n'est pas son lieu naturel. Au premier je di que ce n'est pas simplement
impossible ne qui encloe contradiction que tel corps soit lasus,
combien que ce ne puisse estre fait par vertu naturelle qui soit a present.
Et ceste response appert plus a plain par ce que fu dit ou .xxiiii.[e] chapitre
du premier.[27] D'autre partie, quant a ce propos, il souffist dire sub condicion
que se tel corps estoit lasus ou par nature ou par miracle ou autrement,
il y reposeroit aussi comme Aristote di(s)t ou .xvi.e chapitre du premier[28]
que la terre d'un autre monde, se il estoit, seroit meüe a la terre de cestui.
Au secont, je di que, par aventure, le feu en son espere n'est pas for- /
103d ment ardant sensiblement. Et ce peut l'en cuider parce que nous voions
que, de tant comme feu est en matiere plus grosse et plus compacte et
moins subtille, de tant est il plus violent et plus actif, si comme en un
fer chaut plus que en un tison de busche et en un tison plus que en
flamme. Or est ainsi que la matiere du feu en son espere est tres clere
et tres soutille, et plus que celle de l'aer de tant comme l'aer est plus
soutil et plus transparent ou plus cler que n'est l'eaue. Et pour ce disoient
les Platoniens que le feu de lasus n'est pas malfesant, mes disoient que il
est *innoxius*, et que celui de cibas est corruptible et corrompant:
corruptibilis atque corruptor.[29] D'autre partie, posé que il fust tres ardant,
ce n'est pas impossible simplement que le vaissel qui seroit lasus fust de
matiere inconbustible et qui ne pourroit arder, ou que par[30] vertu divine
l'action de ce feu fust suspensé telement comment il fu en la fornese de
Nabugodonosor.[31] Et comment que soit, la chose est possible quant est de

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[23] *A* omits 'la.'

[24] Figure 22, p. 215.

[25] 38*a*. *A* .xxiiii.

[26] *A* ardoit.

[27] 39*a*. *A* .xxiiii.

[28] 26*c*.

[29] Unidentified. Possibly the source of this doctrine of the Platonists is to be found in *Timaeus* 58C, wherein Plato speaks of a 'fire that does not burn.'

[30] *DE* ardoir oncques par.

[31] *Dan.* iii, 50.

par les qualitéz motivez qui sont legiereté et pesanteur, ou sub condicion en disant: se tel corps estoit la et le feu ne le ardoit, il y reposeroit;—et
104a il souffist, si comme // dit est. Au tiers, je di que tel vessel reposeroit lasus aussi naturelment comme une nef repose en une eaue et samble que ce soit sanz violence. Et appert par ce que se elle estoit perpetuele, elle y reposeroit perptuelment. Et chose violente ne peut estre perpetuelle, si comme il appert ou quart chapitre du premier.[32] D'autre partie, il ne s'ensuit pas que une chose pesante repose violentement pour ce se plus legiere chose est souz elle, si comme il fu declaré ou .xxiiii.^{e} chapitre du premier.[33] Or appert donques comment par philosophie l'en peut estre enduit a soy assentir a aucune chose que nous tenons de la foy.

12.—*Ou .xii.^{e} chappitre il enquiert et met la cause pourquoy le ciel est meü la voie que il torne plus que l'autre voie converse.*

> Un[1] corps peut estre meü circulairement en .ii. manieres, si comme se en un cecle est signé un point et soit .*a*., et d'une part un autre point et soit .*b*., et de l'autre part un[2] autre et soit .*g*.[3] Et donques .*a*. peut estre meü en procedant vers .*b*. ou en procedant et alant vers .*g*.

Glose. Si comme de midi vers occident ou de midi vers orient.

> 104b Tiexte. Et il est dit devant que ces mouvemens ne / sont pas contraires.

Glose. Ce fu dit en le .viii.^{e} chapitre du premier.[4] Et par ce appert la difficulté[5] de rendre cause pourquoy le ciel est meü en une maniere plus que en autre, car se ces mouvemens fussent[6] contraires, l'en peüst dire que il est ainsi meü par l'inclinacion de sa forme. Et le mouvement contraire est naturel au corps contraire au ciel aussi comme les choses pesantes sont meües en bas et les contraires au contraire. Et donques ne souffist il pas dire que le ciel est ainsi meü de sa nature, car se il estoit meü autrement, il ne convendroit pas que il fust d'autre nature ou espece pour ce que ces .ii. mouvemens sont d'une espece. Aprés il reprouve l'opinion de Emped[o]cles[7] qui disoit que c'estoit *a casu* et a l'aventure.[8]

> Tiexte. Mes es choses pardurables rien n'est a cas d'aventure et le ciel est pardurable et son[9] mouvement.

Glose. Il appert ou secont de *Phisique* que choses qui sont *a casu et fortuna* ne sont pas tousjours.[10]

> Tiexte. Et donques convient il par neccessité que [ce que][11] le ciel est meü ainsi a une partie et non pas a l'autre soit principe et premiere cause, ou que de ce soit aucun principe et cause.

Glose. Et ce ne peut estre premiere cause pour ce que ce n'est pas Dieu, et pour ce que tout mouvement a cause efficiente et final autre que ce
104c meïsme mouvement, si comme il appert // ou .vii.^{e} de *Phisique*.[12] Aprés il s'excuse de ce que il parle de si forte question.

> Tiexte. Mais tempter et soy efforcier de parler d'aucunes choses et de toutes sanz rien lessier.

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[32] 11c.

[33] 34*a*.

[1] *Guthrie*, ch. v.

[2] *A* une.

[3] Figure 23, p. 243.

[4] 15*b et seq.*

[5] *BDEF* difference.

[6] *A* fuissent.

[7] *A* Empedecles.

[8] At this point *D* inserts from the following gloss: 'il appert ou secont de *Phisique* que chouses qui sont *a casu et fortuna* ne sont pas tozjours. Glouse.'

[9] *DE* est d'aventuret son.

[10] *E* et a fortuna. *Physicorum*, II, 5, 197a, 29-31.

[11] *A* omits 'ce que.' *F* que se le.

[12] *Physicorum*, VII, 5, 256b, 14-20.

Glose. Si comme di(s)t un aucteur roumain: *nil intemptatum nostri linquere poete.*[13]

Tiexte. Par aventure, ce sambleroit signe ou de grant folie ou de grant presumpcion.

Glose. Celui est fol qui ne scet mettre difference entre ce ou il a difficulté et ce ou [il][14] n'a difficulté, et celui est presumpcieus qui cuide povoir tout bien determiner. Selon Ave[r]roïz,[15] .iiii. causes sont qui peuent mouvoir un honme a enquerir de tres fortes choses: une est deffaute de ve[r]cunde:[16] *inverecundia*, car il ne lui chaut se il di(s)t bien ou mal. Autre est erreur, car il cuide que de tout l'en puisse bien rendre cause. La tierce est ignorance et fatuité, car il ne scet distinguier entre ce que est fort et ce que est legier a savoir. La quarte est amour de verité et desir de savoir les causes des choses. Et ceste quarte maniere est a louer. Ce est selon Ave[r]roïz.[17] Et l'en peu(s)t dire que quant aus .iii. premieres est a entendre ce que di(s)t le Sage: *in pluribus Dei operibus noli esse curiosus*,[18] et Chatonet: *mitte archana Dei celum inquirere quid sit.*[19] Et pour ce di(s)t Aristote aprés.

Tiexte. Et toutevoies, ce n'est pas juste chose de blasmer touz
104d sambla- / blement, mes il convient resgarder la cause qui meut
tel honme a ce dire quelle elle est.

Glose. Se ce est pour amour[20] de verité ou pour autre chose.

Tiexte. Et encore convient il considerer comment il a creance et probacion de ce que il di(s)t et se c'est en maniere humainne et commune[21] ou se il le monstre plus fermement. Car se aucun ataingnoit a ce que il nous peüst faire plus certains de choses neccessairement vraies, il feroit bien. Et doit l'en rendre graces a ceulz qui treuvent de nouvel aucunes bonnes choses.

Glose. L'en doit regarder a .ii. choses: a quelle fin, et comment il parle de si hautes choses; et se il treuve aucunes bonnes raisons, il est a recommender. Aprés il respont a la question devant mise.

Tiexte. Or disons de ceste chose ce que il nous samble. Premierement, nature fait touzjours des choses possibles ce que est le tres miex.

Glose. Et pour ce, selon Averroïz,[22] nature donna aus bestes aucunes choses
qui ne leur sont pas simplement neccessaires, mes le fait pour le miex, si
comme est voiement ou [ouïr].[23] Et par plus forte raison elle doit avoir
donné au ciel ce que est le miex et est possible, car il est plus noble. Mais
il di(s)t que toute chose qui est possible au ciel est neccessaire et aussi //
105a en toutes choses pardurables, car elles sont intransmuables[24] selon leur
essence, etc.

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[13] Horatii Flacci, *De Arte Poetica*, 285: 'Nil intemptatum nostri liquere poetae.' *DE* omit 'nostri.' *B* loquere; *DEF* liquere.

[14] *AF* omits 'il.'

[15] *AF* Avenroiz.

[16] *A* vecunde.

[17] *A* Avenroiz. *Juntas*, t.c. 34, 117E-H.

[18] Cf. *Eccle.* iii, 24: 'In pluribus operibus ejus non eris curiosus.' *E* de pluribus.

[19] *B* celum que inquirere. Cf. *Catonis Disticha*, ed. Joseph Nève, Liège, 1926, Bk. II, Dist. 2: 'An di sint coelumque regant, ne quaerere doceri.' In a foot-note, the editor adds: "Cette leçon ne se rencontre que dans un seul manuscrit. Un très grand nombre d'éditions du XVe siècle donnent la suivante: 'Mitte archana dei coelumque inquirere quid sit.' C'est cette dernière leçon qu'Erasme avait adaptée." Cf. *Catonis Disticha de moribus cum scholiis Des. Erasmi*, London, 1724, p. 16. The edition by G. Nèmethy, Budapest, 1895, reads 'An di sint,' with no reference to the alternate reading in the Notae Criticae; likewise the edition by W. J. Chase in University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History, 7, Madison, 1922. On the other hand, several early editions adopt the reading 'Mitte archana.' Cf. ed. O. Arntzenius, Amsterdam, 1754, p. 152 and especially note 2; ed. C. Hool, London, 1701, p. 9; also *Historia Critica Catoniana*, Amsterdam, 1759, p. 185.

[20] *DE* avoir.

[21] *A* et com commune.

[22] Cf. *Juntas*, t.c. 34, 117I-K.

[23] *A* veue; *F* voiement pour ouyr.

[24] *DE* omit 'car elles sont intransmuables.'

Tiexte. Et verité est que aussi comme des mouvemens drois, celui qui est au lieu plus haut est le plus hounorable et le plus noble.[25]

Glose. Car plus belle chose est monter que d'[a]valer.[26]

Tiexte. Car le lieu de haut est plus divin que celui de bas.

Glose. Et tout mouvement prent denominacion et espece du terme auquel il tent.

Tiexte. Et en ceste maniere est il de devant ou regart de derriere.

Glose. C'est a savoir que devant est plus noble.

Tiexte. Et de dextre ou resgart de senestre, si comme il fu dit devant.

Glose. Ou sixte chapitre.[27]

Tiexte. Et par celle question app[er]t[28] que ou ciel sont ces .ii. differences, c'est a savoir devant et derriere. Et ceste cause donne solucion a ceste question, car se le ciel est meü au tres miex que il peut estre, c'est la cause pourquoy il est ainsi meü pour ce que c'est tres bon que le mouvement qui est simple et perpetuel sanz cesser soit entendant au plus hounorable.

Glose. Et pour ce, est ce miex que il procede d'orient vers midi qui est devant, que vers l'opposite qui est derriere, si comme il peut apparoir par le sixte chapitre et par les autres ou est tractee la matiere comment les .vi. differences de posicion sont ou ciel.[29] Mais il sambleroit que ce 105b fust ici un procés / circulaire, car il avoit esté dit devant que orient est le destre[30] et midi le devant pour ce que le ciel est ainsi meü, et maintenant est dit que le ciel est ainsi meü pour ce que orient est le destre et que midi est le devant. Je respon et di que le premier procés est du signe a la cause et cestui est de la cause au signe, car ce que le ciel est ainsi meü est signe que midi est le devant du ciel et plus noble que l'opposite; et ce que midi est le devant et orient le destre, c'est la cause pourquoy le ciel est ainsi meü. Et telle circulacion n'est pas inconveniente, aussi comme l'en diroit que l'en s[ce]t[31] que le cuer est chaut parce que le poulz est hastif comme par signe, et ce que le cuer est chaut est cause de ce que le peuls est hastif. Toutevoies, il appert par ce que je dis ou sixte chapitre que ces .iiii. differences, destre et senestre et devant et derriere, ne sont pas ou ciel distinctees royaument ne absoluement, mais seulement en relacion[32] sanz difference roiale.[33] Et pour ce, je di que la cause que met ici Aristote est nulle.

13.—*Ou .xiii.^{e} chapitre il monstre que le mouvement du ciel est regulier*[1] *par une reson.*

Aprés ce convient passer[2] outre et dire du mouvement du ciel comment il est regulier et non pas irregulier.

105c [Glose.][3] Regularité // et uniformité sont en mouvement et leur contraires aussi quant a son ysneleté, mais c'est differanment, car regularité et irregularité sont ou resgart du temps ainsi que se le mouvement est equalment isnel en chascune partie de son temps, il est regulier et se non, il est irregulier. Mais uniformité et difformité sont ou resgart du subject [ainsi que se chascune partie du subject][4] meü est meüe aussi isnelement une comme l'autre, le mouvement est uniforme et se non, il est difforme comment que il soit du temps. Et pour ce, le mouvement du ciel n'est pas uniforme, car les parties plus prochaines du centre et les parties plus prochaines des poles sont meües plus tardivement que les autres, mais il est regulier, si comme il sera monstré aprés.

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[25] *DE* des mouvemens celui qui est le plus haut et le plus noble. Glose.

[26] *ABDF* evaller.

[27] 81c.

[28] *AF* apparut; *B* apparu.

[29] 81*d*.

[30] *B* senestre.

[31] *ABF* soit.

[32] *C* resumes at this point after lacuna from 83*a*.

[33] 86*a*.

[1] *A* est le regulier.

[2] *BCF* penser; *D* pouser; *E* poser. *Guthrie*, ch. vi.

[3] *A* T[iexte.]

> Tiexte. Et ce je entent du premier ciel et du premier mouvement, car es cielz qui sont sous ce premier pluseurs mouvemens conviennent et sont concurenz en un.

Glose. Il fu monstré ou tiers chapitre du premier conment aucuns mouvemens sont simples et aucuns composts et mixtes, et peuent estre mixtes de pluseurs droiz mouvemens ou de pluseurs circulaires ou mesleement des uns et des autres.[5] Samblablement, aucun mouvement est regulier et
105*d* aucun irregulier, et aucun peu(s)t / estre mixte de pluseurs reguliers
ou de pluseurs irreguliers ou mesleement des uns et des autres. Et un honme subtil en telles choses peu(s)t legierement ymaginer comment ce est possible que .i. mouvement regulier peut estre mixte de [pluseurs][6] mouvemens irreguliers, et aussi comment un irregulier peu(s)t estre mixte de pluseurs reguliers.[7] Et ce menbre est a nostre propos, car chascun mouvement du ciel singulier ou simple, prins par soy, est simplement regulier, si comme il appert par les raisons qui sont aprés ou texte. Et le derrenier ciel est meü d'un seul simple mouvement regulier, mais chascun des autres qui sont souz lui est meü de mouvement composé et mixte de pluseurs dont chascun simple est regulier. Et ce mouvement composé est irregulier pour ce que les simples dont il est composé sont environ divers centres ou sus divers poles ou pour ces .ii. causes ensamble; si comme, pour grace d'exemple, le propre mouvement du soleil en son excentrique est regulier et le mouvement journal regulier, mais pour ce que le propre mouvement du soleil est environ autre centre et maïs[me]ment[8] pour ce que il est sus autres poles que n'est le mouvement
106*a* journal, il convient que le corps du soleil soit meü irregulie- // rement et
une fois plus tost que autre. Et ce appert clerement, car il descript mendre cecle en .i. jour naturel quant il est es solstices que quant il est en l'equinoctial, c'est a savoir ou plus lonc jour ou ou plus court, que quant la nuit et le jour sont equalz. Et donques est son mouvement plus isnel une fois que autre, et aussi des autres planetes des unes plus, des autres moins, selon ce que elles sont meües de plus ou de moins[9] de mouvemens et environ centres ou sus poles differens et distans plus ou moins. Et selon ce, aucunes sont stacionaires et plus drectes et retrogrades et en telles disposicions qu'i ne peuent estre sanz irregularité de mouvement. Et Averroïz reprent ici[10] ceulz qui mettent ou ciel excentriques et epicicles et promet a declairer par autre voie les apparences qui sont es mouvemens du ciel; mais il ne peut. Aprés Aristote prouve son propos par .iiii. raisons.

> Tiexte. Premierement, se le ciel estoit meü irregulierement, il convendroit que son mouvement eüst intension et enforcement ou accressement de isneleté, et que il eüst vertu et estat de sa plus grant isneleté et remission [ou][11] afflebiement de elle, car
> 106*b* tout mouvement irregulier / a ces .iii. choses.

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[4] *A* omits 'ainsi que . . . subject.'

[5] 7*d*-9*b*.

[6] *A* omits 'pluseurs.'

[7] *B* irreguliers.

[8] *A* maisment; *CDF* meisment.

[9] *BCDEF* meus les unes plus les autres moins de mouvement.

[10] *Juntas*, t.c. 35, 118G-119A.

[11] *A* en.

Glose. Ou les .ii. au moins.

Tiexte. Et la vertu ou la plus tres grant isneleté de tel mouvement irregulier est ou vers le commencement ou vers la fin et terme a quoy il tent, ou en milieu du mouvement; aussi comme, par aventure, es mouvemens qui sont selon nature, la plus grande [isneleté][12] est vers la fin ou il tendent, et es mouvemens qui sont violens elle est vers le terme[13] ou il commencent, et es choses que l'en jecte elle est ou milieu du mouvement.

Glose. Et l'en seult dire que les mouvemens naturelz sont plus isnelz en la fin et les violens ou commencement et les voluntaires ou milieu. Mais pour ce proprement entendre, l'en doit savoir que des mouvemens localz qui ont commencement et fin sont .iiii. manieres: les uns sont purement naturelz, si comme quant la chose pesante descent droit en bas; les autres purement[14] violens, si comme quant chose pesante monte droit en haut; les autres sont violens non pas purement, si comme quant une chose est gectee ou traicte en travers comme seroit une secte; les autres sont faiz par vertu d'ame[15] de beste ou de honme, si comme aler, voler, noer. Les 106c premiers ou le premier, qui est pur naturel, va tousjours // en enforsant et en cresance de ysneleté se les autres choses sont pareilles, si comme quant une pierre descent tout droit par le aer. Le secont, si comme d'une secte traicte droit en haut, va au commencement en enforçant et vers la fin en affleblïant et retardant; et le tiers aussi, fors que il va plus longuement en enforçant et est sa grant vertu ou force plus loing du commencement que en celui qui est pur violent. Et le quart est plus fort vers le milieu. Et pour entendre les causes de ces choses, je di premierement que tout mouvement de chose pesante ou legiere, quelcunque il soit, commence en enforçant telement que quelcunque degré de ysneleté donney ou signey[16] en lui, il convient que il eüst devant mendre ysneleté et mendre et mendre outre toute proporcion;[17] et est ce que l'en seult appeller commencier *a non gradu*. Et la cause est, en general, car le[s][18] excés de la vertu motive sus la resistence ou l'applicacion de elle a la resistence ne peuent estre fetes soudainnement, mais convient que telles choses soient faites partie aprés autre et chascune partie aussi, et rien n'en peut estre fait soudainement. Et se aucun obiçoit de ce que se une pesante mule descendoit et trouvast en sa voie une feive ou une petite 106d pierre rep[o]sante[19] souz soy, ceste meule commenceroit a mouver / ceste pierrete par certain et grant degré de isnelleté et non pas *a non gradu*; je respon et di que, par aventure, seroit elle meüe plus tardivement que la meule vers le commencement et commenceroit *a non gradu* avant que la mole la touchast. Et posé que elle commençast a certain degré, ce ne seroit pas contre ce que dit est, car ceste pierrete conjointe a la mole fait .i. corps mobile avecques elle, et un meïsme mouvement est du tout et de sa partie; et cest mouvement tout commença *a non gradu* pour les causes desus dites. Item, par l'acressement de ceste isneleté est acquise et causee en la chose meüe une qualité motive nouvelle laquelle nous poons nommer force ou redeur, et ceste qualité ou redeur fait aide en mouvement naturel et meut la chose meüe viole[n]tement[20] quant elle est separee du premier moteur ou motif. Item, la generacion de ceste qualité ou redeur crest et enforce tousjours tant comme l'acressement de

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[12] *A* omits 'isneleté.'

[13] *DE* omit 'ou il tendent . . . vers le terme.'

[14] *DE* premierement.

[15] *DE* omit 'de ame.'

[16] *DE* omit 'donney ou signey.'

[17] *B* porcion.

[18] *A* le.

[19] *AB* repesante.

[20] *A* violetement.

l'isneleté crest et enforce. Et quant l'acressement de l'isneleté[21] afflebie, nonobstant que tel acressement dure, aussi appetice l'acressement de ceste qualité nonobstant que elle cresse. Et pour ce, en mouvement violent a
107a .iii. estas ou .iii. parties: une est quant la chose meüe est // conjointe avecques l'instrument qui fait la violence et lors l'isneleté va en cressant, [et la generacion ou acressement de isneleté va aussi en cressant][22] se il n'i a empeeschement par accident. Et par ce que dit est s'ensuit que l'acressement de ceste qualité ou redeur va aussi en cressant. Secondement, quant la chose meüe violentement est separee de tel instrument ou premier motif, encore va l'isneleté en cressant, mais la generacion, enforcement ou cressance de ceste isneleté vient en appetizant et finablement cesse, et lors l'isneleté ne crest plus ne celle qualité ou redeur. Et commence le tiers estat. Et lors la qualité naturelle de la chose meüe, si comme est pesanteur, fait appeticier ceste qualité ou redeur qui enclinoit contre le mouvement naturel de la chose, et va le mouvement en retardant et la violence en appetiçant et finablement cesse. Et par ceste maniere et non par autre quelcunque, l'en peut rendre cause de toutes les apparences et de toutes les experiences que l'en voit en mouvemens violens, soient droit en haut ou droit en bas ou en travers ou circulaires, quant a leur isneleté et tardiveté et reflexion ou retour et quant a toutes teles choses desquelles l'en ne peut assigner autre cause soufissante, si comme je ay autrefois declairé plus a plain.[23] Item, par ce appert pourquoy le coup
107b d'une chose jectee ou traicte est plus grant non pas ou / commencement du mouvement ne en la fin, et pourquoy aucune fois pres du commencement,[24] si comme de ce qui est gecté ou trait droit en haut, et aucune fois plus loing du commencement et plus vers le milieu, si comme de ce que est trait en travers, car le coup est plus fort la ou l'isneleté est plus grande. Item, et pourquoi une chose qui est compacte et plus pesante, si comme pierre ou fer ou plum, donne plus fort coup et est plus fort gecté que une moins compacte, comme seroit drap ou laine, car la cause est pour ce que telle chose compacte reçoit plus l'impression de celle qualité nouvelle qui fait la cressance de l'isneleté, comme dit est, que ne fait autre chose. Item, et pourquoy la chose qui peut estre gectee par une vertu miex que quelcunque autre chose est de certain pois telement que la vertu ne pourroit si bien gecter plus pesante ne moins pesante, et aussi pourquoy plus grant vertu requiert[25] chose plus pesante quant au miex gecter et mendre vertu moins pesante. Et la cause est car se la chose est trop petite ou trop legiere, elle ne peut tant recevoir de celle impression ou qualité nouvelle que j'ay devant nommee radeur; et se la chose gectee est trop pesante, la vertu ne peut faire grant violence a si grant pesanteur.
107c Et pour ce, qui veult tres bien gecter une cho- // se, il convient que la vertu qui gecte et la chose soient deüement proporcionees une avecques l'autre. Item, en[26] mouvement naturel, si comme quant une pierre descent, ceste qualité est touzjours conjointe avecques la pesanteur naturele, et ce est la cause pourquoy la generacion de l'isneleté et de ceste qualité viennent tousjours en cressant, car la pesanteur et la nouvelle qualité tendent a un terme. [Item],[27] et pour ce di(s)t Aristote ou .xviii.^{e} chapitre du premier[28] que se une chose pesante descendoit touzjours sanz fin,

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[21] *B* omits 'crest et enforce. Et quant . . . l'isneleté.'

[22] *A* omits 'et la generacion . . . en cressant.'

[23] This gloss presents a condensed and simplified statement of the impetus theory more fully described in Oresme's *De Configuratione qualitatum*, probably his most important work.

[24] *B* omits 'ne en la . . . du commencement.'

[25] *DE* vertu ne quiert.

[26] *A* Item et pour ce que en.

[27] *A* omits 'Item.'

[28] 29c.

l'isneleté de elle crestroit [tousjours][29] sans fin et aussi la pesanteur de elle; et par ceste pesanteur doit estre entendue ceste qualité nouvelle, car elle est comme pesanteur accidentele pour ce que en ce cas elle encline a descendre, combien que en autre cas elle enclinast en haut ou en travers ou autrement. Or avons donques que nul mouvement de chose pesante ou legiere ne peut estre regulier du tout, car il est moins isnel au commencement que aprés, combien que il soit possible, au moins selon ymaginacion, que la vertu motive et la resistence soient tellement proporcionees et moderees que aucune partie de tel mouvement seroit reguliere, nonobstant celle qualité desus dite. Et appert assés par ce que
107d dit / est et par Aristote que ceste irregularité desus dite est pour ce que telz mouvemens ont commencement et fin, car les uns sont plus isnels vers le commencement et les autres vers la fin et les autres ou moien.

Tiexte. Et la circulacion du ciel n'a lieu ou terme dont elle commence ne lieu ou elle fine ne milieu, et aussi le mouvement du ciel n'a commencement ne fin ne moien simplement, car il est pardurable selon temps. Et avecques ce,[30] la longueur de la ligne que il descript est reduite en se meïsme et ne peut estre divisiee ne froissiee.

Glose. Car ligne circulaire est partout de samblable maniere et n'est pas une partie de elle plus commencement que autre. Et donques tel mouvement n'a commencement ne fin, tant par raison de la figure comme par raison du temps, car selon Aristote, il est perpetuel. Et s'ensuit par ce que dit est que il n'est pas plus isnel une fois que autre.

Tiexte. Et donques se l'isneleté du mouvement du ciel[31] n'est pas en plus grant vertu une fois que autre, il n'est pas irregulier, car irregularité est faite pour ce que l'isneleté est une fois plus fieble et autre foys plus forte.

14.—*Ou .xiii[i].e[1] chapitre il monstre que le mouvement du ciel est regulier par .iii. autres resons. //*

108a Encore appert autrement que tel mouvement est regulier, car toute chose qui est meüe est meüe par aucune vertu.

Glose. Si comme il appert par le .vii.e et par le .viii.e de *Phisique*.[2]

Tiexte. Et donques il convient par neccessité que irregularité soit faite ou par raison de la vertu qui meut ou par raison de la chose meüe ou pour un ou pour l'autre, car peut estre que une chose est meüe irregulairement ou pour ce que la vertu motive n'est pas tousjours equale, ou pour ce que la chose meüe est alteree, ou pour ce que l'un et l'autre sont transmuéz.

Glose. L'isneleté du mouvement ouquel est resistence ensuit la proporcion de la vertu motive a la resistence, et ceste proporcion peut estre muee pour la variacion de la vertu[3] ou de la resistence ou de tous les .ii. se c'est differanment, car se les .ii. cressoient ou appetiçoient sanz varier la proporcion, et[4] l'isneleté seroit touzjours equale. Mais comment qui soit, se l'isneleté est variee, il convient que variacion et mutacion soit fete en la vertu motive ou en ce qui est meü.

Tiexte. Et nulle telle mutacion n'est possible vers le ciel, car nous

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[29] *A* omits 'tousjours.'

[30] *A* avecques ce ce la.

[31] *BCDEF* omit 'du ciel.'

[1] *A* .xiii.e.

[2] *Physicorum*, VII, 1, 241b, 24; 242a, 3-5; 242a, 13-14; VIII, 4, 254b, 7-256a, 3, passim and especially 255b, 31-256a, 3.

[3] *DE* variacion.

[4] *BCDE* omit 'et.'

> avons monstré que le corps du ciel meü est premier et que il est
> 108b simple et que / il n'ot onques commencement et est incorruptible
> et du tout sans transmutacion par neccessité.

Glose. Tout ce fu dit ou quart et ou sixte chapitre du premier.[5] Et ce que il di(s)t "sanz transmutacion" est a entendre de telle qui muast l'isneleté, car le ciel en aucune partie est transmué selon lumiere.

> Tiexte. Or est il molt plus resonnable que la vertu qui meut le ciel soit tele, et que ce qui meut le corps qui est premier et simple et incorruptible soit premier et simple et perpetuel.

Glose. Par le premier corps il entent tout le ciel ensamble qui est meü de mouvement journal, ou le .viii.e espere laquelle il reputoit la premiere.

> Tiexte. Et donques, puisque ainsi est que ce que est meü ne peut estre transmué et si est corps, il s'ensuit que la vertu qui le meut ne peut estre transmuee laquelle est incorporelle,[6] et donques est ce impossible que le mouvement du ciel soit irregulier.

Glose. Il fu dit ou tiers chapitre que ou mouvement du ciel ne a quelcunque
resistence,[7] et pour ce il convient que il soit meü par vertu
voluntaire. Et selon Aristote, ceste vertu ne peut estre transmuee meïsmement
car elle est incorporelle. Mais selon verité, se ceste vertu est
108c un angel, sa volenté peut estre // muee; et se ce est Dieu, il ne convient
pas que Il soit transmué pour ce se Il transmue ses creatures, mais si
comme dist Boëce: *stabilisque manens dat cuncta moveri.*[8] Et la cause est
car Il est en son eternité laquelle est indivisible et sanz succession et de
laquelle fu dit ou .xxiiii.e chapitre du premier et ou premier de ce secont.[9]
Et pour ce, aussi comme le ciel peut estre arresté ou temps de Josué et
estre retourné ou temps du roy Ezechie, samblablement porroit son mouvement
estre avancey ou[9a] retardé, se il plaisoit a Dieu. Et est certain que
se le mouvement du ciel estoit plus isnel ou plus tardif au double ou
plus, combien que ce fust, et touz les autres mouvemens et alteracions de
cibas desquelz il est cause selon Aristote estoient samblablement plus
isnelz ou plus tardis, nul ne pourroit apparcevoir ceste mutacion, mais tout
sambleroit comme maintenant selon apparence humaine. Aprés il met la
tierce raison principal a son propos.

> Tiexte. Item, se ou mouvement du ciel estoit irregularité, ou ce seroit selon tout le ciel ou selon les parties de lui.

Glose. Aussi comme il peut estre que le mouvement d'une nef est regulier
ou pres et les honmes qui sont en la nef peu[en]t[10] estre meüz irregulierement
108d en approchant ou [en][11] esloingnant / les uns des autres, samblablement
l'en pourroit ymaginer que le ciel ou sont les estoilles fichiees fust
meü irregulierement ou regulierement[12] selon soy tout, et que aucune de ses
parties comme sont estoilles se avançassent ou retardassent irregulierement
et approchassent ou esloingnassent les unes des autres.

> Tiexte. Et les parties du ciel ne sont pas irregulieres quant a mouvement, car se les unes eüssent esté meües en avançant et les autres en retardant par le temps infini passé, elles fussent maintenant en autre distance que devant. Et l'en ne apparçoit en rien que les estoilles fichiees soient esloingniees les unes des autres autrement que devant.

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[5] 9*d*, 13*c*.

[6] *DE* corporelle.

[7] 73*b*.

[8] Cf. *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, ed. Stewart and Rand, London, Loeb, 1918, III, M9, 3, p. 262: 'stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri.'

[9] 34*c*, 67*c et seq.*

[9a] *DE* mouvement avant soy ou.

[10] *A* peut.

[11] *A* omits 'en.'

[12] *B* omits 'ou regulierement.'

Glose. Car leurs distances apparoissoient telles ou temps d'Aristote et font encore maintenant comment il estoient observees et escriptes es plus anciens livres d'astrologie. Aprés il reprouve[12a] l'autre membre.

> Tiexte. Mais aussi ne peut l'en dire que tout le ciel ensamble soit meü autrement que devant, car toute retardacion de mouvement est par impotence.

Glose. Se la resistence n'estoit creüe ou enforciee.

> Tiexte. Et impotence est contre nature, car es bestes nous voions que toutes impotences, si comme envieillir et appeticier, sont contre nature.

109*a* Glose. Elles sont contraires // a la nature de la chose particuliere qui est encline a durer et a sa permanence, mes elles sont selon nature universele qui appete continuacion de generacion et corrupcion. Et c'est, par aventure, le ciel et la premiere matiere.

> Tiexte. Et la cause de telles impotences est pour ce que les bestes sont composees, par aventure, de choses teles qui ont lieus propres differens.

Glose. C'est a savoir des .iiii. elemens qui sont contraires et tendent chascun a son lieu naturel. Et est possible que il di(s)t "par aventure" pour ce que aucuns faisoient doubte se les elemens sont es corps mixtes en leur propre forme.

> Tiexte. Car nulle des parties de telz corps mixtes n'est en sa propre region.

Glose. Fors, par aventure, le aer qui est es bestes et l'eaue qui est es poissons.

> Tiexte. Et donques, se es premiers corps, c'est a savoir es corps du ciel, n'est chose contre nature,—et ainsi est il, car il sont simples et non pas mixtes et sont en leur propre region et n'ont chose contraire ne en eulz ne hors eulz,—il s'ensuit que en eulz n'est quelcunque impotence. Et donques leur mouvement ne se retarde onques, et aussi il ne se avance onques, car se il se retardoit, il se pourroit avancier puisque mutacion i[13] pourroit estre.

109*b* Glose. Et se au- / cun disoit que le ciel se peut retarder sanz impotence aussi comme un honme se retarde par volenté,[14] la response seroit selon Aristote, car la volenté de l'intelligence qui meut le ciel peut estre muee. Aprés il met la quarte reson en reprouvant .iii. membres d'une division: le premier est que le mouvement du ciel fust venu en cressant par temps infini passé et que il alast en retardant par temps infini a venir.

> Tiexte. Item, c'est chose desresonnable que la vertu qui meut le ciel doie accrestre l'isneleté de son mouvement par temps infini, et que elle eüst impotence pour quoy le mouvement se retardast par un autre temps infini, car rien qui est hors nature ou contre nature ne dure par temps infini, et chose qui est contre nature et celle qui est selon nature ne durent pas par temps equal; et aussi non font puissance et impotence. Et il convient par neccessité, se le mouvement du ciel[15] procedoit ou temps a venir touzjours en retardant, que ce fust par temps infini.

Glose. Car selon Aristote, tout le temps passé est infini et aussi celui qui est a venir.[16] Et impotence ne peut durer par temps infini, car chose

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[12a] *DE* prouve.
[13] *ABCF* il.
[14] *B* violence.
[15] *DE* temps.
[16] 49*cd*.

109*c* naturelle, si comme est puissance, dure plus que chose desnaturele. // Et tout le temps passé n'est pas plus grant que tout le temps a venir. Mais a parler proprement, il ne sont pas equalz, car un infini n'est pas plus grant ne plus petit que l'autre ne equal a l'autre, si comme je monstrai evidanment pieça sus le tiers de *Phisique*.[17] Aprés ce, Aristote reprouve le secont membre de la division qui est tel: que l'isneleté du mouvement du ciel fust venue et procedast encore touzjours en acressant perpetuelement sanz commencement et sans fin, ou perpetuelment en appetisant. Et ce reprouve[18] il par. .ii. resons.

> Tiexte. Mais encore n'est ce pas possible que l'isnelité du ciel creüst et enforçast tousjours perpetuelment, car ainsi le mouvement du ciel s[er]oit[19] infini et non determiné. Et nous avons autrefois dit que tout mouvement est determiné et est de aucun terme et en aucun terme.

Glose. De ce fu dit ou sixte de *Phisique*[20] et est a entendre quant a isneleté, car il avient[21] que elle soit terminee[22] a aucun certain degré ou autrement, elle procederoit en cressant sanz fin ou en appetiçant sanz fin. Aprés il met a ce la seconde raison.

> Tiexte. Item, ce ne pourroit estre se ainsi est que il conviengne
> 109*d* prendre aucun temps ouquel le / ciel fait un circuite ou une circulacion lequel est si petit que il ne la pourroit faire en mendre temps. Et il est ainsi, car aussi comme il n'est pas possible de dire une chançon ou de aler a un lieu en quelcunque temps tant soit petit, mais est de chascun tel fait le temps determiné que l'en ne[23] peut exceder en isneleté ne faire tele chose en mendre temps, donques n'est il pas possible que le ciel soit meü ainsi que il face un circuite en quelcunque temps. Et se c'est verité, comme si est, donques ne peut venir son isneleté touzjours en cressant ne, par consequent, touzjours en appetiçant, car c'est samblable de l'un et de l'autre pour ce que se[24] l'isneleté du ciel enforçoit touzjours sanz fin, aussi pourroit elle afflebier et que une revolucion fust fete en plus grant temps et en plus grant et ainsi sans fin.

Glose. Et c'est impossible, car aussi comme il est un temps si petit que elle ne peut estre fete en mendre, aussi est un temps si grant que elle ne peu(s)t estre faite en plus grant ne plus tardivement, car les choses naturelles sont terminees en grandeur et en petitesce, si comme il appert ou premier de *Phisique*.[25] Mais il me samble que ceste raison par soy
110*a* ne // conclut pas, car se l'isneleté du mouvement du ciel a esté et soit touzjours en cressant sanz commencement et sanz fin, il ne s'ensuit pas que elle passe onques ou attaigne siques a certain degré, si comme, pour exemple, siques au double. Car se le ciel estoit meü demain plus tost que hui de la moitié de l'isn[el]eté[26] du jour de huy et que l'isneleté fust au jour de hui comme .ii. et demain comme .iii. et elle creüst le tiers jour de la moitié de la premiere moitié[27] et fust comme .iii. et demi, et ainsi sans fin en adjoustant tousjours de jour en jour mendre degré d'isneleté selon proporcionalité soudouble, il est certain que l'isneleté du ciel ne attaindroit onques en temps du monde siques a isneleté double; et samblablement en retournant vers le temps passé et en rabatant de

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[17] Oresme refers to his commentary on the *Physics*. The discussion would likely concern ch. 5.

[18] *DE* prouve.

[19] *A* soit.

[20] *Physicorum*, VI, 4, 234b, 10-18; 5, 235b, 6-17.

[21] *BCDEF* convient.

[22] *BCDEF* determinee.

[23] *BDE* omit 'ne.'

[24] *DE* omit 'se.'

[25] *Physicorum*, I, 4, 187b, 7-188a, 5.

[26] *A* isneté.

[27] *B* omits 'de la premiere moitié.'

l'isneleté selon proporcionalité soudouble, si comme que le ciel fust hier
meü plus tart que hui de la moitié de l'isneleté du jour de hui et avant-hier
plus tart de la moitié de ceste moitié et ainsi en oultre sans fin. Et encore
pourroit estre la maniere telement ymagine[e][28] que onques n'avroit esté
par tout le temps infini passé que le ciel n'eüst esté meü oultre certain
110*b* degré d'isneleté. / Et samblablement, se le mouvement avoit procedé et
procedast sans commencement et sans fin touzjours en retardant, il ne
s'ensuit pas que il soit onques meü plus tart au double que maintenant et
aussi de quelcunque autre proporcion, car je ay parlé de ceste proporcion
pour cause d'exemple. Je di donques de la consequence que fait ici
Aristote que elle n'est pas bonne, combien que le consequent so[it][29] vrai,
c'est a savoir que le mouvement du ciel n'est pas telement irregulier et
est souffissanment prouvé par les autres raisons. Aprés il met la quarte
raison.

> Tiexte. Item, or demeure donques que se le mouvement du ciel est irregulier, il convient que ce soit telement que il soit une fois plus isnel et autre foiz tardif, et aprés plus isnel et que il se change ainsi puis d'un, puis d'autre. Et ce samble un dit du tout desraisonnable et samblable a une fiction. Item, il ne pourroit ainsi estre que ce ne fust apparceü meïsmement en ces choses qui sont opposites, et de tant sont elles plus sensibles et plus apparcevables comment elles sont plus prochaines les unes des autres.

Glose. Car il samble se le mouvement du ciel estoit hui plus isnel et
110c demain // plus tardif, que l'en le apparcevroit bien. Mais non feroit en
.ii. cas: un est se il se retardoit ou avançoit insensiblement, si comme il
est possible a ymaginacion; autre est se les autres mouvemens de cibas
se retardoient ou avançoient proporcionelement, car lors tout sambleroit
comme il est maintenant, si comme il est dit devant. Or avons donques
[que le mouvement du ciel est regulier et par le chapitre precedent][30]
que le mouvement des choses pesantes et des legieres est irregulier. Mais
a parler de uniformité et de difformité de mouvement dont fu touchié ou
chapitre precedent, .ii. choses sont a considerer ou ciel, c'est a savoir
mouvement et circuite, et .ii. es choses pesantes, c'est a savoir mouvement
et descente,[31] et pareillement es legieres. Je di donques que le ciel est
difforme en mouvement et uniforme en circuite; et la cause est car les
parties devers les poles et celles qui sont vers le centre sont meües plus
tardivement que les autres, mais toutes font leur circuite et les parties
de leur circuite[32] ou de leur circulacion ou revolucion equalment une
aussi comme l'autre. Et pour ce, les astrologiens divisent chascun cecle
du ciel par equal nombre de degrés, soit petit, soit grant. Et au contraire,
110*d* le mouvement d'une chose pesante / peut estre uniforme et que chascune
partie soit meüe equalment et aussi isnelement[33] une comme l'autre, mais
la descendue est difforme, car la partie qui est ou milieu de la chose
descent et approche plus isnelement du centre que ne font celles qui sont
es bous ou es extremités, et si n'est pas meüe plus isnelement; si comme,
pour exemple, soit *.a.* le centre du monde et *.b.c.d.* soit la chose pesante,
et que ces .iii. parties soient meües equalment en descendant selon .iii.
lignes droites. Il appert asséz clerement que *.c.*, qui est ou milieu et qui va
tout droit vers le centre, approche plus isnelement du centre qui ne font

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[28] *A* ymaginé.

[29] *A* soy.

[30] *A* omits 'que le mouvement . . . precedent.' 106*b* *et seq.*

[31] *B* distance.

[32] *B* omits 'et les parties de leur circuite.'

[33] *DE* equalement.

.b. et *.d.*, qui descendent par lignes qui ne tendent pas tout droit vers le centre, mais aus costés.[34] Aprés il recapitule.

Tiexte. Et donques en tant soit dit du ciel comment il est un seulement.

111*a* Glose. Tout ensamble et non pas pluseurs en pluseurs // mondes.

Tiexte. Et [que][35] il n'ot onques commencement et est pardurable et encore que il est meü regulierement.

15.—*Ou .xv.*^{e} *chapitre il commence a determiner des estoilles et premierement de leur substance et comment elles sont cause de chaleur.*

Aprés[1] convient dire des estoilles de quoy elles sont et de quelles figures et comment elles sont meües.

Glose. Il entent par estoilles generalment le soleil et la lune et les autres estoilles. Et ce segnefie en latin *astrum.*

Tiexte. Et dire que chascune des estoilles est de la substance et de l'espece tele comme est le corps meü en quoy elle est, c'est tres resonnable et consequent ou ensuiant aus choses dites par nous, car nous avions dit devant que aucun corps est qui est meü et qui est nay et enclin naturelment a estre meü circulairement.

Glose. Ce fu dit ou quart chapitre du premier et la fu dit que c'est le ciel.[2] Et donques, puisque les estoilles sont meües circulairement aussi comme le ciel, il s'ensuit que elles sont de la nature du ciel, combien que elles soient plus luisantes et plus sensibles, car nous voions presque

111b samblables differences en pluseurs choses quant a leurs parties. / Aprés il monstre comment ce s'acorde aucunement aus dis des anciens.

Tiexte. Car aussi comme les anciens dient que les estoilles sont de nature de feu pour ce que il dient que le corps qui est lasus en haut est feu, aussi comme ce soit raisonnable que chascune chose soit de la nature de celles ou elle est, et samblablement disons nous.

Glose. C'est a savoir que les estoilles sont de la nature du ciel ou elles sont, et pour ce que les anciens cuidoient que le ciel et les estoilles fussent de nature de feu pour ce que il eschaufent et enluminent aussi comme fait feu. Et il sont d'autre nature, si comme il fu monstré ou quart chapitre du premier.[3] Aristote met aprés une cause pourquoy le ciel et les estoilles sont cause de chaleur.

Tiexte. Mais chaleur est causee de eulz et lumiere aussi parce que de leur mouvement le aer est escommeü et triblé, car mouvement est naturelment nay et apte a eschaufer et affouer et boies ou fustes et pierres et fer.[4] Et donques est ce plus raisonnable que mouvement eschaufe ce que est prochain de feu. Et c'est aer.

Glose. Car il est pres du feu et quant a lieu ou region et quant a qualité, car il est de sa nature chaut et moiste. Aprés il monstre par signe que

111c mouvement // est cause de chaleur.

Tiexte. Aussi il appert es sëetes qui sont traictes, et par ce elles sont fetes chaudes comme feu en tant que le plun qui est en aucunes remet et decourt. Et pour ce que ces sectes eschaufent, il est neccessité que le aer qui est environ elles eschaufe.

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[34] Figure 24, p. 243. *DE* add: 'Aprés s'ensuit la figure de ceste ymaginacion presentement declairee.' The figure is not executed in either Ms.

[35] *A* omits 'que.'

[1] *Guthrie*, ch. vii.

[2] 9*d*.

[3] 11*bcd*.

[4] *DE* omit 'et boies . . . et fer.'

Glose. Aucuns sont ici a descort, car les uns dient que le mouvement de la secte est cause d'eschaufer le aer et les autres dient au contraire, et, par aventure, que le mouvement de la sëete eschaufe l'aer et l'aer chaut eschaufe la sëete et aprés la sëete et l'aer s'entre-eschaufent; et de ce apparoistra plus par ce que sera dit aprés.[5] Et aprés il met comment le mouvement des choses materiales et le mouvement du ciel sont differentement cause de chaleur.

> Tiexte. Et ces sëetes eschaufent pour ce que elles sont meües en l'aer, et pour la percussion ou confricacion du mouvement l'aer[5a] est affoué et eschaufe comme feu. Mais des corps du ciel qui sont lasus chascun est meü en son espere telement que il ne sont en rien faiz chauz ne affouéz. Mais l'aer qui est desous ceste espere circulaire du ciel, il convient par neccessité que il soit eschaufé par le mouvement de elle.

111*d* Glose. Le ciel ne peut estre alteré ne transmué selon quel- / cunque qualité active ou passive, si comme sont chaleur, fredure, etc., et ce fu dit ou sixte chapitre du premier.[6] Et pour ce, il n'est chaut ne froit ne sec ne moiste, etc. formeement, mes seulement en vertu et puissance que il a de causer et faire chaleur ou telle qualité es choses materiales de cibas par son mouvement ou autrement, si comme il sera declairé aprés.[7] Et combien que son mouvement soit regulier, il ne s'ensuit pas pour ce que il eschaufe l'aer tousjours et partout equalment. Et de ce Aristote met la cause aprés.

> Tiexte. Et meïsmement le ciel eschaufe l'aer par le mouvement de la partie ou le soleil est fichié. Et pour ce, quant il approche de nous et il est eslevé et sus nous, adonques est chaleur engendree. Et en tant soit dit par nous que les estoilles ne sont pas de nature de feu et que elles ne sont pas meües en la region ou espere de l'element du feu.

[Glose.][8] En ce chapitre est doubte contre ce que dit est que les estoilles sont de telle nature comme le ciel. Et aprés sont .ii. difficultés: une est comment mouvement local de corps materiel[9] est cause de chaleur; l'autre est comment le mouvement du ciel est cause de chaleur es choses de cibas. 112*a* Quant au premier, il sam- // bleroit que les estoilles et le ciel ou les cielz ou elles sont ne soient pas d'une nature et d'une espece tres especial aussi comme sont les parties de aer pur et simple et d'eaue pure et simple; premierement, car les estoilles sont luisantes et sensibles et le ciel es autres parties n'est pas luisant ne sensible, et ce di(s)t ici Averroïz.[10] Et nous ne voions pas telles differences es parties des autres corps simples, c'est a savoir des .iiii. elemens, et toutevoies le ciel est encore plus simple corps. Et donques les estoilles ne sont pas parties du ciel, mais sont corps d'autre espece qui sont dedens le ciel. Item, les impressions appellees estoilles courantes ou qui cheent: *stelle cadentes*, ne les estoilles co[m]ees[11] ou les commetes qui sont en l'aer ne sont pas de la nature de l'aer, si comme il appert ou premier de *Metheores*.[12] Et donques par samblable, les estoilles qui sont ou ciel ne sont pas de la nature du ciel. Item, Aristote veult conclurre que elles sont de la nature du ciel pour ce que elles sont meües circulairement aussi comme est le ciel; et il ne s'ensuit pas, car les estoilles comees sont meües aussi comme l'aer ou elles sont, si comme il

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[5] 115*b*.

[5a] *B* mouvement de l'aer.

[6] 13*d*.

[7] 114*b*.

[8] *ABCD* omit 'Glose.'

[9] *A* materielz.

[10] *Juntas*, t.c. 42, 125B *et seq.*

[11] *A* conrees; *E* semees.

[12] *Meteorologicorum*, I, 4, 341b, 6-28; 7, 344a, 11-33.

112*b* appert ou premier de *Metheo- / res*,[13] et si ne sont pas de la nature de l'aer,
si comme dit est. Je respon en soustenant l'opinion d'Aristote qui est
plus vraisamblable et plus raisonnable en ce que n'est l'opposite, et di,
quant au premier, que les estoilles sont la plus dempse ou la plus espesse
partie de leur ciel et non pas de dempsité ou espesseur qui soit de telle
nature ou de telle maniere[14] comme est l'espesseur des corps de cibas,
laquelle est quant ou la ou plus de matiere est en moins de quantité, mais
est d'autre guise qui ne peut pas bonnement estre exprimee. Toutevoies,
nous povons dire que en l'estoille est plus comprins de la nature du corps
du ciel que en autre partie de lui et, pour ce, elle est plus noble et plus
vertueuse que autre partie et est plainne de lumiere. Et ne s'ensuit pas
pour ce que elle soit d'autre espece, car nous voions que aucunes parties
de buches pourries sont luisantes et autres non et sont toutes d'une espece.
Item, Remigius en son comment sus Marci[a]n[15] recite comment les Grecs
disoient que les bons angelz forment les corps en quoi il apparoissoient du
haut aer et les mauvés du bas aer. Et ainsi, l'aer quant est de soy peut
bien estre condempsé ou fait espés en tant que il est visible combien que,
112*c* par // aventure, ce ne puisse estre fait par vertu naturelle. Et tel aer n'est
pas d'autre espece que les autres parties qui sont invisibles. Et donques
ne convient il pas que les parties du ciel qui sont visibles et les autres
different en espece. Et encore ne s'ensuit il pas pour ce, que le ciel ne
soit corps simple sans ce que il soit composé ou mixte de pluseurs simples,
mais est encore plus simple que nul des .iiii. elemens qui sont composts
de .ii. su[bst]ances[16] appellees forme et matiere. Et le corps du ciel est
d'une seulle substance laquelle, se elle est appellee forme ou matiere,
toutevoies est elle d'autre raison et d'autre maniere que la forme ou la
matiere de[s][17] choses de cibas. Au secont, des estoilles commees et[c].,[18]
je di que ce n'est pas samblable, car Aristote monstre ou premier de
Metheores[19] comment les cometes sont d'autre matiere et d'autre nature
que n'est aer. Au tiers samblablement, et car elles sont faites de nouvel
en l'aer et d'autre matiere et sont meües au mouvement de l'aer aussi
comme une chose qui est portee en une nef, fors en tant comme elles sont
aucune fois traictes par l'influence des estoilles du ciel. Mais les estoilles
du ciel sont perpetuelment et naturelment meües aveques le ciel comme
112*d* aveques leur tout et / d'un meïsme mouvement. Or avons donques que
chascune estoille est de telle espece comme est le ciel ou elle est. Mais se
touz les cielz et estoilles sont d'une espece, c'est une autre question dont
je dirai aprés.[20]

Quant au secont point: pourquoy et comment mouvement local de choses materielles est cause de chaleur; premierement, en aucun mouvement se fredeur est fete, ce n'est pas proprement pour tel mouvement, mais est par accident parce que la vraie cause de fredeur est renouvelee par ce mouvement, si comme par souffler ou par venter. Et aussi est ce par accident que une eaue courante est plus froide que la dormante aucune fois. Mais nous voions en pluseurs experiences que mouvement eschaufe, si comme de pierres hurtees une a l'autre ou a fer ou a acier et des tisons qui sont meüz. Et Victruvius[21] ou secont livre *De Architectura*[22] recite comment en un bois espés, parce que le vent faisoit les branches freer une a l'autre, feu fu engendré et flamme: *arbores agitate inter se*

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[13] *Ibid.*, I, 4, 342a, 12-27.

[14] *E* matiere.

[15] *A* marcion. Cf. fol. 71c, note 69.

[16] *A* superances.

[17] *A* de.

[18] *AB* et.

[19] *Meteorologicorum*, I, 7, 344a, 11-33.

[20] 120*b et seq.*

[21] *B* Victurinus.

[22] *DE* Architecture.

terentes ramos ignem excitaverunt et flammam.[23] Et le mouvement des
113*a* gens et des bestes les eschaufe. Et pour ce que longue chose // seroit
reciter les opinions, reprobacions, alteracions des causes que pluseurs
assignent en ce, je suppose premierement une experience que je cuide
estre vraie, et est ceste: que se un corps ferme est meü tres isnelement
de quelcunque mouvement local, chaleur n'est pas pour ce causee es
parties de ce corps qui sont en parfont dedens lui se n'est, par aventure,
bien pou par l'eschaufement des parties de lui qui sont vers dehors. Et
ce pourroit estre esprouvé en la mole du feivre et en pluseurs autres
choses. Item, se une mole est dedens une autre, si comme *.a.* en *.b.*, se
celle de dedens est meüe[24] isnelement et l'autre se repose ou est meüe
113*b* circulaire- / ment au contraire, chaleur sera engendree et faite en une
mole et en l'autre es parties de elles qui sont pres aprés et qui freent
ensamble. Mais se celle de dehors estoit meüe samblablement comme celle
de dedens sanz freer une a l'autre, ja par ce ne seroit engendree chaleur
entre elles .ii. Et tout ce appert par experience. Et par ce peut l'en legierement
reprouver les opinions des autres qui mettent que mouvement local est
cause de chaleur selon soy,—les uns pour ce que il est premier, les autres
pour ce que il fait rarefaction,[25] les autres pour sa perfection ou telles
choses. Et par les causes que eulz assignent, l'en peut conclure contre
l'experience desus dite. Et par ce appert que celles causes sont fauses.
Je di donques que ce n'est pas voir generaument que tout mouvement soit
cause de chaleur, mes seulement tout mouvement ouquel est faite vehemente
confricacion ou freement d'un corps a autre et violence et es
parties ou est la confricacion. Et ce appert assés par les experiences desus
mises et par autres, si comme de la confricacion des instrumens ou ferremens
des charpentiers et des roes et des moles ou de telles choses par la
confricacion ou freement desquelles est engendree chaleur et aucune fois
113*c* feu. Item, quant les corps qui fre- // ent ensamble sont moulz et tendres,
il ne font pas grant chaleur, mes tant plus sont fermes et durs et plus
eschaufent, car plus y a de confricacion et de violence. Item, tant plus
sont poliz et onniz, tant moins freent et moins y a de violence, et aussi
tant mains eschaufent se les autres choses sont pareilles. Et au contraire,
tant plus sont aspres[26] et plus freent et de tant eschaufent plus aussi,
ceteris paribus. Item, es roes des moulins et en celles[27] des charretes es
parties ou elles freent, l'en met ea[u]e[28] ou oingnement pour empeeschier
la cause de l'eschaufement, et c'est la violence de la confricacion qui par
ce est empeeschie ou appeticie. Item, se les autres choses sont pareilles,
de tant comme le mouvement est plus isnel, de tant eschaufe il plus et ce
n'est pas pour autre chose fors pour ce que de tant est la confricacion
et la violence plus grande. Et donques, puisque telle chose non-mise,[29]
chaleur n'est pas faite en mouvement, et elle mise, chaleur est faite, et se
elle crest, chaleur crest et quant elle appetice, calefaction ou generacion
de chaleur appetice, l'en peut conclure que telle confricacion violente est
cause de chaleur. Et samble que ce fu l'intencion d'Aris[to]te[30] par ce que /
113*d* il di(s)t ou tiexte: *tricto aere*, c'est a dire que l'aer est triblé ou triboulé

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[23] D flammen. Cf. *Marcus Vitruvii Pollio de Architectura*, ed. Valentinus Rose et Herman Müller-Strübing, II (Lipsiae, 1867), p. 33, ll. 17-18: 'Homines veteri more ut ferae in silvis et speluncis et nemoribus nascebantur ciboque agresti vescendo vitam exigebant. Interea quodam in loco ab tempestatibus et ventis densae crebritatibus arbores agitatae et inter se terentes ramos ignem excitaverunt, et eo flamma vehementi perterriti qui circa eum locum fuerunt sunt fugati.'

[24] Figure 25, p. 243. *A* repeats 'de dedens est meüe.'

[25] *B* omits 'les autres . . . rarefaction.'

[26] *DE* plus pres apres et plus.

[27] *A* moulins et es roes et en celles.

[28] *A* eaeu.

[29] *D* chouse non mie; *E* chose nommee.

[30] *A* Ariste.

par le mouvement. Item, il di(s)t: *propter plagam*, c'est a dire pour la
percussion, selon les expositeurs,[31] que il est eschaufé combien que la
percussion ou confricacion, que les parties de l'aer qui est un corps mol
font les unes contre les autres, ne feïssent pas grant eschaufement ou
calefaction, se ne fust la tres grant isneleté du mouvement, si comme il
sera dit aprés, et ce que l'aer est disposé a ce, si comme di(s)t Aristote:
quia propinquius[32] *igni, etc.* Et aussi saint Gregoire suppose que confricacion
est cause de eschaufement en une omelie ou il di(s)t ainsi: *animus*[33] *per
ea que usu didiscit quasi confricatus incalescit.*[34] Et ou mouvement des
gens ou des bestes chaleur est causee par les esperis corporelz[35] qui sont
chauz de leur nature et sont meüz lors par les membres, et aussi par la
confricacion des parties du corps comme sont char et nerfz et olz et de
celle qui est en l'isneleté du mouvement des esperis. Et se aucun demandoit
en outre la cause pourquoy et la maniere comment confricacion fait
chaleur, par aventure pourroit l'en dire que, par la violence qui est en
114*a* elle,[36] nature est escommeüe et aussi comme aïree // et pour ce elle se
eschaufe et engendre et cause chaleur qui est une premiere qualité perfecte
et active. Et selon verité, pluseurs effeiz naturelz sont dont l'en ne[37]
pourroit assigner les causes particulierement et determineement, et
meïsmement de pluseurs experiences que l'en voit en generacion de
chaleur et de feu, si comme il appert par saint Augustin ou .xxi.^e^ livre[38]
de *La Cité de Dieu*[39] ou il met pluseurs telles experiences merveilleuses et
di(s)t que l'en n'en peut rendre cause. Or est ici une doubte: verité est
que confricacion de corps dont un ou les .ii. sont mixtes et ont en soy
chaleur ou feu est cause de chaleur pour ce que, par aventure, par ce
est escommeüe et exitee la chaleur qui est en eulz; mais a savoir mon se
par la confricacion de .ii. corps qui seroient simplement sanz chaleur seroit
fete chaleur, si comme sont .ii. porcions de terre qui est pur element
simple, et par aventure pourroit l'en dire que si seroit. Car se confricacion
peut causer .vi. ou .vii. degrés de chaleur la ou il n'avoit que un seul, si
comme en mabre ou en fer ou telles choses qui sont moult froides, il
samble que elle peut donques bien causer un degré de chaleur la ou il
114*b* n'avoit point,[40] car la matiere a / en soy puissance de recevoir chaleur.
Et la terre pure a puissance de engendrer chaleur moiennant tel mouvement et telle violence.[40a] Et par aventure, l'en pourroit dire que ceste
raison ne conclude pas.

Quant au tiers point: se le mouvement du ciel est cause de chaleur et en quelles choses et comment; je di premierement que il ne fait ou ciel quelcunque chaleur pour .ii. causes: une est car le ciel n'est pas recevable de telles qualités actives et passives, si comme il fu dit ou sixte chapitre du premier,[41] et n'est pas le ciel chaut formeement mais se[ulem]ent[42] en vertu aussi comme le vin ne samble pas chaut a touchier et si a vertu de eschaufer. Mais ce n'est pas du tout samblable, car il a ou vin chaleur[43]

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[31] The comments of the principal *expositeurs* on this moot passage will be found in the following: *Themistii in Libros Aristotelis de Caelo Paraphrasis*, ed. Samuel Landauer (Berlin, 1902), p. 110; *Juntas*, t.c. 42D, mentions the interpretations of Themistius and Alexander, refuting Themistius; *B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, ed. Auguste Borgnet, IV (Paris, 1890), pp. 169-171;*Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria in libros Aristotelis de Caelo et Mundo*, Leonine ed., III (Rome, 1886), p. 157, mentions Simplicius and Alexander.

[32] *B* propinqus; *CF* propinquus.

[33] *DE* anime.

[34] *Sancti Gregorii Magni XL Homiliarum in Evangelia*, I, Homilia xi, I, in PL 76, 1115A.

[35] *A* corporelles.

[36] *A* qui en est elle.

[37] *BCDEF* omit 'ne.'

[38] *B* chapitre.

[39] *Sancti Aurelii Augustini de Civitate Dei*, ed. B. Dombart, II (Lipsiae, Teubner, 1877), 495-497, especially 496.

[40] *A* repeats 'point.'

[40a] *B* volente.

[41] 13c.

[42] *A* sel eurent.

[43] *B* omits 'samblable . . . chaleur.'

formeement. Une autre cause est car mouvement n'est pas cause de chaleur fors la ou est violence et confricacion, si comme il est dit devant, et ou ciel n'est quelcunque violence, si comme il appert assés par le quart chapitre du premier et par le sixte.[44] D'autre partie, les cielz sont tres perfectement speriques et polis, si comme il appert par le .xi.^{e} chapitre,[45] et donques il ne freent en rien un a l'autre ne a autre chose par leurs
114c mouvemens, et par consequent, il ne se entre-es- // chaufent en rien par
ce. Aprés le ciel en descendant[46] est l'espere de l'element du feu, si comme il fu dit en la fin du tiers chapitre du premier.[47] Et samble que le mouvement du ciel ne face en ce feu quelcunque chaleur premierement, car, si comme il fu dit en le .xi.^{e} chapitre,[48] la superfice concave du ciel en laquelle est contenu l'element du feu est souverainnement polie et si est aussi la superfice convexe de l'element du feu, et donques par ce mouvement n'est faite confricacion ne distraction ne violence ne eschaufement par consequent, comme dit est. Item, le feu en son espere est tres perfectement chaut en souverain[49] degré et de sa propre nature,—posé que il ne fust en rien meü,—et donques il ne peut par nature estre fet plus chaut. Et posé que il peüst estre fait plus chaut par aucune cause forainne et dehors, ceste chaleur adjoustee seroit desnaturelle et pour nient ou sans cause final; et Dieu et nature ne font rien pour nient, si comme il fu dit en le .viii.^{e} chapitre du premier.[50] Aprés, en descendant, est la region de l'element de l'aer qui est haute,[51] car, si comme il appert par le premier de *Metheores*,[52] l'aer est divisé en .iii. parties en regions,—une haute, l'autre basse et l'autre moienne,—et ne sont pas equales. Et
114d celle[53] haute region est meüe comme le ciel, mais plus tar- / divement
pour ce que les causes de ce mouvement sont plus fiebles et plus remisses touzjours en descendant. Et peu(s)t l'en dire raisonnablement que une de elles est l'influence du ciel ou la vertu de l'intelligence qui le meu(s)t qui encline cel aer a ensuir le mouvement du ciel. L'autre cause est car la superfice concave de l'element du feu, qui est meüe mout plus isnelement[54] que l'aer, n'est pas perfectement sperique ne souverainnement polie, mais est aspre et aussi comme endentee en[55] la superfice convexe de l'aer. Et ainsi elle fait confricacion et distraction et violence en l'aer qui est meü moins isnelement selon l'inclinacion desus dite. Et par ce est causee en cel aer chaleur qui est tres grant pour .iii. circunstances: une est la velocité du mouvement par quoy la distraction et la violence sont fetes plus grandes. Et ce entendoit Aristote par ce que il disoit: *tricto aere.* Et les autres .ii. il note en ce que il di(s)t: *propinquius*[56] *autem aer igni,* car cel aer est prochain du feu selon lieu et prochain en qualité, car de sa nature il est chaut et moiste. Mais celle moisteur ou humidité est gastee
115a et consumee par l'excés de la chaleur. Et ainsi cel aer est affoué // et
ardant et chaut outre la nature de aer qui seroit pur element ausi comme l'aer de la region moienne est froit hors la nature de aer qui seroit pur et simple element, si comme il appert ou premier de *Metheores.*[57] Et Dieu et nature ont telement disposee celle haute region pour la generacion ou inflammacion d'unes impressions qui sont fetes lasus comme sont cometes, et sont causes ou signes d'aucuns effes notables ici-bas, aussi comme la region moienne de l'aer est froide pour la generacion d'autres

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[44] 11*d*, 13*cd*.

[45] 102*b*.

[46] *DE* apres en descendant le ciel est; *F* omits 'le ciel.'

[47] 9*c*.

[48] 102*b*.

[49] *DE* son.

[50] 16*b*.

[51] *BDE* est plus haute.

[52] *Meteorologicorum*, I, 3, 340b, 24-36.

[53] *D* et si la haute; *E* et se la haute.

[54] *DE* tost.

[55] *DE* et est aussi comme en tendence en.

[56] *BCF* propinquus.

[57] *Meteorologicorum*, I, 3, 341a, 17-28.

impressions profectables aus fruis de terre et a autres choses comme sont les pluies et telles choses. Aprés en descendant sont la region moienne de l'aer et la basse ou nous sommes, et l'eaue et la terre qui ne sont pas meües circulairement. Mais samble que la chaleur de l'aer de la haute region ne fait ici-bas quelcunque chaleur, car corps chaut qui est sanz lumiere ne peut causer chaleur loing de soy sanz eschaufer les corps moiens materielz. Et la region de l'aer moienne est touzjours froide et plus que l'aer de cibas. Et donques l'aer de lasus ne nous eschaufe pas. Je di donques que le mouvement du ciel est cause de chaleur non
115b pas sanz moien, mais en .ii. / manieres qui ensuient: une est car il eschaufe le haut aer parce que le ciel meü meut le feu et le feu fait en le aer confricacion, distraction et violence par quoy il est fet plus chaut, comme dit est. Item, les corps du ciel lumineus par leur lumiere et par leur influence eschaufent les corps contenus ou ciel qui sont[58] a ce disposés et selon ce que il sont disposés. Et pour ce que les raiz et les influences de telz corps du ciel sont appliquiéz et esdreciés sus les corps de cibas par le mouvement du ciel et par ce l[es] eschaufent,[59] comme dit est,—pour ce di(s)t l'en que le mouvement du ciel est cause de chaleur. Et ceste voie est plus concordable a raison et aus experiences que celles que les autres mettent, lesquelles je ne recite pas a present pour cause de briefté. Et ne appert par raison ne par quelcunque experience que le mouvement du ciel soit ou puisse estre autrement cause de chaleur.

16.—Ou .xvi.^{e} chapitre il monstre que les estoilles sont meües au mouvement des cielz ou elles sont et non autrement.

Pour[1] ce que il samble que les estoilles sont meües et tout le ciel ausi, il convient par neccessité que le ciel et les estoilles ne se
115c meuvent et que ceste mutacion apparoisse // pour autre cause.

Glose. Si comme pour ce que la terre est meüe circulairement selon l'opinion d'aucuns.

Tiexte. Ou que le ciel et les estoilles ensamble soient meüs ou que un soit meü et l'autre non. Et c'est impossible se la terre repose que le ciel et les estoilles reposent, car les apparences que l'en voit ne seroient pas faites. Et nous supposons que la terre repose.

Glose. Et de ce sera dit aprés.[2]

Tiexte. Or demeure donques que le ciel et les estoilles soient meüz ou que un soit meü et l'autre non. Et dire que le ciel est meü et que les estoilles sont meües par elles de leur propre mouvement, et que le ciel et une estoille fussent aussi comme .ii. hommes qui vont un chemin d'une equalité, c'est chose desresonnable, premierement, car des estoilles fichies chascune a aussi tost perfete sa revolucion en son circuite comme a l'autre. Et donques, celles qui sont[3] vers l'equinocial sont meües tres plus isnelement et font en un meïsme temps tres plus grant circuite que ne font celles qui sont vers les poles. Et ainsi une petite estoille qui est vers l'equinocial est meüe plus isnelement que une grande qui est vers le pole, et toutevoies nous voions es autres corps que le plus
115d grant est meü plus / isnelement de mouvement naturel. Item, se une estoille qui est vers le pole estoit transportee et mise plus vers l'equinocial, elle seroit meüe plus isnelement et se elle estoit

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[58] *DE* corps qui sont ou ciel et qui sont.
[59] *A* par ce l'eschaufent.
[1] *Guthrie*, ch. viii.
[2] 148*d*.
[3] *E* vont.

mise encore plus pres du pole, elle seroit meüe plus tardivement. Et donques [elle][4] n'est pas ainsi meüe par soy, mais seroit et est portee et meüe ou mouvement du ciel. Item, se aucun disoit que les estoilles fichiees, grandes et petites, font leurs circuites grans et petis toutes en un meïsme temps *a casu* et a l'aventure, ce n'est pas dit selon raison, car posé que ce peüst estre de .ii. ou de .iii., toutevoies dire que il soit ainsi de toutes, c'est chose desraisonnable et samble une fiction. Item, chose qui est a cas d'aventure ou de fortune n'est pas selon nature et n'est pas partout ou en touz les supposts[4a] d'une espece. Et toutes les estoilles fichiees sont meües d'une ordenance, et c'est signe que elles sont meües non pas par soy, mais au mouvement du ciel ou elles sont fichiees.

Glose. Aussi comme les clous qui sont fichiés en une nef. Ce sont en sentence les raisons d'Aristote a impr[o]ver[5] le premier membre de la division devant mise. Aprés il improuve l'autre membre par .ii. raisons.

116*a* Tiexte. Item, // se aucun disoit que le ciel repose et ne se meut et que les estoilles sont meües, les choses devant dites s'ensuiroient lesquelles ne sont pas raisonnables, c'est a savoir que aucunes petites estoilles seroient meües plus isnelement que celles [qui][6] sont assés plus grandes. Et donques, puisque le ciel et les estoilles ne sont meüz chascun de soy et que les estoilles ne[7] sont meües de soy sans ce que le ciel soit meü, mes que telz dis sont desraisonnables, il demeure et reste que le ciel est meü et que les estoilles reposent ou ciel fors tant comme elles sont meües et portees aus mouvemens des cielz ou elles sont enfichiees. Car seulement a dire en ceste maniere et non en autre, il ne s'ensuit chose desraisonnable, car ainsi l'estoille qui est ou plus grant cecle est meü[e][8] plus isnelement, soit grande ou petite, pour ce que cel cecle ou partie du ciel est meü plus isnelement[8a] environ son centre. Car aussi comme nous voions en autres corps que le plus grant est meü plus isnelement que le petit de leur propre mouvement, samblablement est il es corps circulaires, car celui qui descript plus grant cecle ou porcion de plus grant cecle[9] en equal temps
116*b* est meü plus isne- / lement.

Glose. Aussi comme la grande pierre descent plus tost que la petite, se les autres choses sont pareilles. Aprés il met la seconde raison contre le secont membre de la division devant mise.

Tiexte. Item, le ciel ne peut estre divisé ne une partie de lui separee de l'autre,[10] car il est tout continué ensamble, si comme il fu monstré devant.

Glose. Ou sixte chapitre du premier,[11] ou il fu dit comment il est inalterable et impassible. Et se ainsi estoit que il ne[12] fust meü circulairement et que les estoilles courussent et passassent parmi, aussi comme un oisel est meü par l'aer et un poisson par l'eaue, il convendroit que elles divisassent et persassent le ciel. Or avons donques que les estoilles sont meües avecques le ciel sanz le diviser, mais ce nonobstant, encore pourroit l'en ymaginer que en leur lieu que elles ont ou ciel elles fussent meües en une de .ii. manieres. Et ce improuve Aristote aprés.

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[4] *A* omits 'elle.'

[4a] *F* et ne sont pas par tous les sup.

[5] *A* Aristotez a imprever.

[6] *ABCF* omit 'qui.'

[7] *BCDE* omit 'ne'; *F* omits 'et que les estoilles ne sont meües de soy.'

[8] *A* meü.

[8a] *F* omits 'soit grande . . . plus isnelement.'

[9] *B* omits 'ou porcion de plus grant cecle.'

[10] *BE* divise en une partie; *DE* separe de luy car.

[11] 13*a*.

[12] *E* omits 'ne.'

Tiexte. Item, les estoilles sont de figure sperique et ronde, si comme les autres le dient et confessent, et nous le devons dire, car elles sont de la nature du ciel et le ciel est sperique.

Glose. Tout ce appert par le .ix.ᵉ et par le .xv.ᵉ chapitre.[13]

116*c* Tiexte. Et de // corps sperique par soy .ii. mouvemens peuent estre: un est circumgiracion et l'autre volutacion ou titubacion.[14]

Glose. Le premier est quant tel corps est meü environ son centre, si comme un bacim qui tourne sus un bastonnet, et est dit en françois tournier ou virer, de *girari*;[15] et ainsi sont meüs les cielz epicicles dedens le ciel. L'autre mouvement est comme d'une roe de charete que l'en maine par le chemin et est dit en françois roeler ou comme une pelote roele.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, se les estoilles sont meües par elles en leur lieu, il convient que ce soit par une de ces .ii. manieres; et il n'est pas ainsi, car se elles fussent meües seulement par circumgiracion ou tourniement, elles demourassent[16] en un lieu et ne fussent pas translatees d'orient en occident, et touz dient le contraire.

Glose. Et se aucun disoit que elles sont meües ainsi en tourniant et, non pas seulement mes aveques ce, elles sont meües au mouvement du ciel environ le centre du monde aussi comme le bacim qui tournie, et avecques ce est porté de lieu en autre;—a ce improuver Aristote met la seconde raison.

Tiexte. Item, c'est raisonnable que toutes soient meües d'un mouvement.

116*d* Glose. Pour ce, selon Averroïz,[17] que / Aristote entent que elles sont toutes d'une nature et d'une espece, et de ce sera dit aprés plus a plain.[18]

Tiexte. Et de toutes les estoilles ou corps du ciel visibles, le soleil tout seul appert estre ainsi meü et seulement quant il lieve et quant il rescouse ou pres de cel temps. Et ce n'est pas pour ce que il soit ainsi meü, mais est pour ce que il est loing de nous, car pour la fleblesce de notre veüe qui est loing du soleil a grant distance elle tremble. Et par aventure, c'est la cause pourquoy il samble que les estoilles fichiees sintillent et oilletent et les planetes ne sintillent pas, car elles sont pres; et pour ce, le voiement ataint a elles puissanment. Mes en regardant les estoilles fichiees, pour ce que elles sont tres loing, la veüe tremble. Et ainsi le tremblement de la veüe fait sambler que l'estoille soit meüe, car se la chose que l'en voit est meüe ou se le voiement est meü, ce ne fait difference.

Glose. L'en voit souvent que une chose qui ne se meut samble estre meüe
pour aucun mouvement qui est en nostre veüe. Mais quant est du soleil
117*a* qui samble aucune foiz tournier en son lieu, la cause // n'est pas seule-
ment pour ce que il est loing, car il nous appert moult plus grant que
Venus ou Jupiter qui ne samblent pas estre ainsi meüs. Et me samble
que de ce sont .ii. causes principales: une est l'excellence et la force de
la lumiere du soleil qui grieve les ouilx et par ce les esperiz corporelz de
l'instrument de nostre veüe sont meüz et tournent, et pour ce il samble
que le soleil tourne. Une autre cause est concurrente[19] et sont les vapeurs

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[13] 96*a*, 111*a*.

[14] *C* tibubacion; *DE* turbacion; *F* bacion, marginal.

[15] *DE* giray.

[16] *E* elles ne demourassent.

[17] *Juntas*, t.c. 48, 130K.

[18] 118*a*.

[19] *B* contrariete.

ou exalacions qui sont entre nous et le soleil, lesquelles sont meües et font adonques apparoir ou soleil aucun mouvement, lequel samble tourniement pour la premiere cause. Et pour ce appert plus telle chose au matin ou au vespre quant nous regardons le soleil par plus de vapeurs moi[en]nes.[20] Et de ce que les estoilles semblent sintiller ou ouilleter, je cuide que avecques ce que elles sont loing, que le mouvement d'aucunes exalacions ou vapeurs parmi lesquelles nous les voions, soient cause de telle apparence. Et pour ce et selon ce, elles samblent aucune fois oilleter et aucune foys non et une fois plus, autre moins. Et se aucun disoit que 117b c'est bien possible que les estoilles tournient / en leur lieu, mais nous ne l'appercevons pas pour ce que nous sommes trop loing, aussi comme qui seroit un pou loing d'un bacin qui torne l'en ne appercevroit pas que il tournast,—contre ceste response et contre le second membre de la division desus mise est la raison qui s'ensuit.

> Tiexte. Mais encore appert que les estoilles ne sont pas meües en rouelant ou en tumbant, car toute chose qui tournie ou qui rouele,[21] il convient par neccessité que elle tourne ce desus desouz ou ce devant derriere. Or est il ainsi que ce que l'en appelle la face de la lune appert touzjours en une maniere.

Glose. Et donques la lune n'est pas meüe par soy ne en tourniant ne en rouellant et, par consequent, ainsi est il de toutes les estoilles et planetes; car, selon Averroïz,[22] c'est l'intencion d'Aristote que elles sont toutes d'une espece.

> Tiexte. Or est ce raisonnable que toutes choses qui sont meües par soy meïsme aient aucuns propres mouvemens. Et[23] l'en ne voit pas que les estoilles soient meües de propres mouvemens, par quoy il s'ensuit que elles ne sont pas meües par soy meïsme.

Glose. Si comme selon les fables des poiens et des poëtes qui mettent que 117c le soleil rouele et est tiré et meü comme la roe d'un char par // .iiii. chevaus, lesquelz l'aube du jour attele et arregne au matin, si comme Ovide descript.[24] Aprés il prouve encore son propos principal par une autre raison.

> Tiexte. Item, dire que nature n'eüst donné aus estoilles aucuns membres ou instrumens naturelz pour leur mouvement, se mouvement avoient par elles, ce seroit chose desresonnable, car nature ne fait rien pour nient ne a l'aventure ou tellement quelement. Et ne pourroit estre que, quant a ce, elle [eüst][25] eü cure et sollicitude des bestes et que elle eüst eü en despit si precieus corps comme sont les estoilles.

Glose. Car, selon Aristote, elles sont corps vivans de vie intellective. Mes de ce fu dit la verité ou quint chapitre.[26] Et donques se elles se meüssent par soy, nature leur eüst donné membres motifs comme elle a aus bestes, et encore par plus forte reson.

> Tiexte. Mais il samble que nature ait ainsi fait a encient et ainsi comme de bonne science en leur ostant ou non-donnant toutes choses par quoy elles peüssent soy mouvoir et proceder par soy, car, quant a leur figure, elles sont moult loing des corps qui ont instrumens habiles a tel mouvement.

Glose. Car elles n'ont pié ne queue[27] ne elle.

117*d* Tiexte. Et pour ce, il samble raisonna- / blement fait que tout le ciel est de figure sperique et chascune des estoilles aussi, car de toutes figures la sperique est la plus utile, apte et abile a mouvement de corps qui est meü en son lieu, car, par ce et ainsi, tel corps sera meü tres isnelement et si retendra meïsmement son lieu. Et ceste figure est tres inhabile et tres inepte ou mal taillie pour mouvement qui est devant soy, car elle n'est en rien samblable aus figures des corps qui sont meües par soy pour ce que une partie de elle n'a quelcunque eslevement sus l'autre, si comme ont les figures longues ou autres que speriques ou rondes, mais est tres differente de figures des corps qui procedent[28] et vont de lieu en autre.

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[20] *AC* moines; *F* moinnes.
[21] *DE* tumbe.
[22] *Juntas*, t.c. 49, 131F-132A.
[23] *E* que.
[24] *Metam.*, II, 108-121.
[25] *A* omits 'eüst.'
[26] 77*d*.
[27] *BCDEF* omit 'ne queue.'

Glose. Si comme sont les bestes, car se il estoient de figure sperique, il ne pourroient ne aler ne voler, car de tant comme elles approchent plus[29] de figure ronde, de tant sont elles moins habiles a tel mouvement. Et pour ce di(s)t l'en de telz que eulz sont miex tailliéz a roueler que a courir. Et devant est monstré que les estoilles ne rouelent pas. Aprés il conclut.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, afin que le ciel soit meü en son lieu et que les
118a estoilles ne procedent ou voisent // par elles, c'est chose raisonnable que l'un et l'autre soit de figure sperique, car meïsmement en ceste maniere un sera meü en son lieu,—c'est le ciel,—et l'autre reposera,—ce sont les estoilles.

Glose. Fors tant comme elles [sont][30] meües au mouvement du ciel ou elles sont comme parties de lui et aucunement aussi comme est un clou qui est fichié en une nef. Et est a savoir que ce nom *stella* ou *stelle* en latin signifie seulement les estoilles, mes *astrum* ou *astra* signifie generaument estoilles et lune[31] et soleil. Et pour ce, comme je dis au commencement en ce chapitre et aprés, l'en doit entendre par estoilles generaument les choses desus dites.

Ici sont .ii. choses a declarier: une est de la face de la lune par quoy Aristote prouve que elle ne tourne pas en son lieu; l'autre est se la lune et toutes les estoilles sont d'une meïsme espece. Quant au premier point, celle figure ou obscurté ou tache qui appert en la lune et est appellee *macula lune*, selon ce que aucuns ont regardé et consideré ou temps seri et cler vers les matins environ plainne lune, si comme recite Albert sus *Metheores*,[32] elle est telle: yleuques est aussi comme l'ymage d'un lyon /
118b qui a la teste vers orient, et sus le dos de ce lion aussi comme la figure d'un arbre transversal qui s'encline vers occident, et au costé de cest arbre aussi comme l'ymage d'un honme qui seroit appoué a cel arbre et qui avroit ses piés vers le derriere du lyon. Ce di(s)t Albert en sentence; et me samble que l'en ne peu(s)t pas bien proprement comprendre ne aviser distincteement ceste figure mes confusement, si comme aucuns ymaginent es nues similitude de bestes et de chasteaus.[33] Aprés convient considerer de la cause et de ce furent pluseurs opinions. Aucuns ont dit que pour ce que elle est pres de l'espere du feu, elle est ainsi gastee, bruslee et enfumee; mais ce ne peut estre, car celle tache fust creüe en .iii.^{m} ou en .iiii.^{m} ans et non est. Item, selon philosophie le ciel et ses parties
118c sont inalterables et impassibles, si comme il fu dit ou sixte chapitre // du premier.[34] Les autres dient que pour ce que la lune est de froide nature en vertu, elle attrait continuelment vapeurs grosses qui sont entre nous

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[28] *DE* qui sont meuz et vont.

[29] *BCDEF* omit 'plus.'

[30] *A* omits 'sont.'

[31] *A* et et lune.

[32] *E* Albertus. Oresme has given the wrong reference. The passage quoted is found in Albert's commentary on *De Caelo et mundo*, II, iii, 8; cf. *B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, IV (Paris, 1890), p. 188.

[33] Figure 26, p. 243.

[34] 14*a*.



FIG. 23
FOL. 104 a



FIG. 24
FOL. 110 d



FIG. 25
FOL. 113 a


la lune
orient
occident

FIG. 26
FOL. 118 b


le soleil
le ouil
le ouil
le mireur

FIG. 27
FOL. 119 a


l'epicicle
la lune
la lune

FIG. 28
FOL. 120 a



.i.	.ii.	.iiii.	.vii.	.xvi.	.xxxi.					
.3.	.vi.	.xii.	.xxiii.	.xlviii.						
2	xviii.	.xxxlii:								
xxvii	iiii	.xvii.								
xx iiii .j.										
cxliiii.										
c IIII.xxix										

FIG. 29
FOL. 125 c

et elle et sont causes de celle apparence. Mais ce ne vault, car telles impressions ou vapeurs ne demeurent pas longuement en un estat et celle tache appert touzjours sanz crestre et sanz appeticier et sans mutacion ou variacion de figure ne autrement. Les autres dient que c'est la similitude de la terre et de la mer et des montaingnes qui appert en la lune aussi comme en un mirëeur. Mais ce ne peut estre, car les montaingnes ne font pas boce en la terre en telle proporcion[35] ne en figure si loing de sperique comme est la figure desus dite. Item, les boces que font les montaingnes ne apparoissent pas de si loing, mais tout samble ront, si comme l'en voit par experience quant la lune est en eclipse. Item, posé que les boces ou montaingnes fussent si grandes, elles apparoistroient autrement ou mireur de la lune quant elle est en orient et quant elle est a midi, etc., et nous voions le contraire. Item, la lune ne represente rien par maniere de reflexion et comme mireur, si comme je dirai tantost aprés.

118*d* Or lessons donques ces opinions et autres qui n'ont / apparence, et pour entendre celle qui est la plus raisonnable nous devons savoir premierement que la lumiere de la lune vient du soleil et appert legierement parce que la partie de elle qui regarde le soleil luist et l'autre non, et parce que quant elle est eclipse[e][36] l'ombre de la terre lui [o]st[e][37] sa lumiere. Item, nous ne voions pas la lumiere du soleil en la lune aussi comme en un mireur, car l'en ne verroit pas la lune ainsi comme l'en la voit, mais le soleil apparoistroit tant seulement en une petite partie de la porcion de la lune qui nous appert enluminee et aucune fois en nulle, et seroit veü de certain lieu une fois et autre fois d'autre, et non pas de partout de la ou l'en voit la porcion de la lune enluminee.[38] Et seroit tout aussi comme quant l'en resgarde le soleil en un mireur ou en une eaue, l'en ne le voit pas de chascun lieu dont l'en voit le mireur ne en chascun endroit, mais en certaine partie et de certaine distance, et de une autre distance[39] l'en le voit en un autre lieu. Et la cause est assés legiere a entendre, car, selon la science de perspective et selon experience, la ligne qui va de le ouil au
119*a* mireur et celle qui retourne du mireur au soleil par reflexion, // ces .ii. lignes font .ii. angles equalz sus un point de la superfice du mireur la ou appert le soleil. Et pour ce convient il que d'un lieu ou d'une distance le soleil apparoisse en .i. endroit ou en une partie du mireur, et d'un autre lieu ou distance qui ne seroit en la ligne qui va de le ouyl a ce point, il apparaistroit en une autre partie du mireur, si comme l'en peu(s)t considerer en exemple et en figure. Et selon ce[40] que recite Averroïz, un appellé Avennartha[41] fist un especial tractié a monstrer que la lumiere que la lune a du soleil n'est pas par fraction ou par reflexion. Item, aucuns corps sont non-diafa[n]es[42] et non-transparenz ou sont obscurs, si comme fer ou poiz noire ou telles choses, et les raiz ou lumiere du soleil ne autre
119*b* ne passe[nt][43] tout oultre parmi telz corps / se il ne sont tenves, car en telz corps la lumiere se parfonde pou ou nient, mais elle retourne par reflexion ou par refraction. Et se telz corps sont bien poliz, les raiz de lumiere retournent ou sont froissiéz par un meïsme ordre, et ainsi telz corps sont mireurs. Et se il ne sont poliz, la reflexion ou refraction est faite sans ordre, diversement, et vont ou tournent les uns raiz de ça et

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[35] *DE* porcions.

[36] *ABCF* eclipse.

[37] *A* ests.

[38] *A* partout de la lune la ou l'en voit la porcion enluminee.

[39] *B* omits 'et de une autre distance.'

[40] Figure 27, p. 243. *DE* considerer et ymaginer en exemple et en ceste presente figure pourtraicte selon ymaginacion qui est devant mise et declairee. The figure is not executed in either Ms.

[41] *DE* aventnarcha. *Juntas,* t.c. 49, 131H.

[42] *A* non-diafaires; *B* non-dyalphanes; *DE* omit 'non.'

[43] *A* passe.

les autres de la. Et pour ce, tel corps n'est pas mireur representant figure combien que il represente couleur ou lumiere. Item, autres corps sont dyaphanes ou transparenz ou clers, si comme sont verre et cristal et eaue, et en telz corps se profonde la lumiere et perce et passe tout oultre, se il ne sont parfonz et espés. Et donques, selon ce que eulz sont transparenz ou clers plus ou moins, selon ce se profonde en eulz la lumiere plus ou moins et fait telz corps estre visibles. Item, la lune est corps sperique perfetement poli, si comme il sera dit aprés ou .xx.[e][44] chapitre, et donques, par ce que dit est, se elle fust corps non-transparent et obscur aussi comme est fer ou acier, elle representast la lumiere du soleil en maniere de mireur; et devant est monstré que non fait par quoy il s'ensuit que elle est corps
119c transparent // et cler comme seroit cristal ou verre au moins es parties qui sont vers la superfice de elle. Et avecques ce, telz corps sont aucunement obscurs. Et en outre il s'ensuit que la lumiere du soleil se profonde en la lune aucunement, mes elle ne perce ou passe pas tout outre pour la grande quantité et parfondeur du corps de la lune. Mes ceste lumiere entre dedens bien pou ou resgart de la quantité du corps de la lune, car aussi nous voions que parmi eaue qui est bien clere, se elle est moult parfonde, la lumiere du soleil ne descent pas siques au fonz. Item, se la lune estoit equalment transparente ou clere es parties de elle qui reçoivent ceste lumiere, elle seroit equalment enluminee en une partie comme en autre; et le contraire appert par la tache ou figure de quoy nous parlons.[45] Et donques convient il que les parties de la lune de leur propre nature ne soient pas toutes samblables et uniformes ne equalment transparentes ou cleres, mais differanment, aussi comme nous voions aucunes differences ou ciel en aucunes autres parties. Et c'est la cause de la tache et apparence desus dite. Mais l'en doit savoir que aussi comme d'une pierre d'albastre
119d les vaines ou parties qui sont plus cleres et parmi / lesquelles l'en verroit ausi comme parmi cristal, icelles samblent plus obscures et moins blanches que les autres, samblablement est des parties de la lune. Et donques, de tant comme elles sont plus cleres aucunes et que la lumiere du soleil se profonde plus en elles, de tant apparoissent elles plus obscures et les autres moins, proporcionelment. Et selon ce est celle tache de la figure ou manieres desus mises. Mais contre ceste opinion, laquelle est en ce propos la plus vraiesamblable et la plus raisonnable, est une forte instance: car selon les experiences certaines qui ont esté pieça par les anciens observees et gardees quant au mouvement de la lune, l'en ne pourroit salver les apparences que l'en voit et a veües touz temps sans metre cecle epicicle ou ciel de la lune, si comme mettent les astrologiens. Et donques, se ceste tache est ou corps de la lune, il convendroit que elle apparust une foiz en une maniere et autre fois en autre, selon ce que la lune seroit une fois en la basse partie de son epicicle et autres fois es costés ou desus. Et ce appert legierement par exemple en figure, supposé que celle tache
120a fust aussi comme un arbre lequel fust tout droit quant // la lune seroit en la basse partie de son epicicle. Et donques,[46] quant la lune seroit es costés de l'epicicle, cel arbre sambleroit tourné de travers. Et par experience, nous voions touzjours ceste tache en une maniere, aussi comme se la lune ne fust pas meüe au mouvement de l'epicicle. Et par ce sambleroit que ceste tache n'est pas ou corps de la lune. Je respon que si est, mes il convient dire que le corps de la lune, en recompensant contre le mouvement que elle a en son epicicle, tourne telement[47] en son lieu que

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[44] *A* xx. Cf. 130*a*.

[45] *D* figure que voions; *E* figure que nous voions.

[46] Figure 28, p. 243.

[47] *DE* omit 'en son epicicle tourne telement.'

touzjours sa face regarde vers nous en une maniere. Et ainsi, quant elle
120b fait / un tour ou circuite environ le centre de son epicicle, elle en fait
un autre au contraire en son lieu environ le centre de son corps. Or appert
donques que par le signe par lequel Aristote veult prouver que la lune
ne tourne pas en son lieu, c'est a savoir parce que la face de elle nous
appert touzjours en une maniere, par ce signe meïsme appert que il
convient mettre le contraire de ce que Aristote di(s)t, supposé que la
tache soit en la lune comme dit est et que elle soit meüe en l'epicicle
comme si est, car autrement ne pourroit l'en sa[l]v[er][48] les apparences,
si comme il fu touchié ou .xiii.^{e} chapitre.[49]

Quant au secont point: a savoir mon se tous les corps du ciel sont d'une
espece, si comme il samble que Aristote suppose en cest chapitre et en
autres aprés; et Averroïz et Macrobes et autres tiennent que eulz sont touz
d'une espece tres especiale, mais Avicenne et Albert et autres dient le
contraire.[50] Et pour declairer ce que m'en samble, je di que aucunes choses
sont d'une espece tres especiale, si comme touz honmes ou touz buefz et
telles choses; mais, quant a propos, autres choses sont d'une espece pres-
120c que // tres especial et toutevoiez, elles sont de diverses especes tres
especialz, si comme pour grace de exemple sont les pommes dont les
unes sont de Pepin et les autres de Blancdurel[51] ou d'autre complant; et
ainsi de pluseurs autres plantes, herbes, arbres ou fruiz et ausi de pluseurs
bestes qui sont de .ii. ou pluseurs especes prochainnes et pou differentes
et sont d'un gerre, si comme sont, par aventure, aucuns chiens. Je di
donques que, posé que les corps du ciel soient d'une espece general ou de
pluseurs especes prochaines, toutevoies ne sont eulz pas d'une meïsme
espece tres especial aussi comme di(s)t Averroïz, ne aussi comme seroient
les parties ou porcions d'une eaue ou d'un aer. Premierement, car aussi
comme toutes porcions de terre descendent et sont meües d'une meïsme
maniere quant elles sont meües de mouvement naturel, samblablement
se touz les corps du ciel fussent d'une espece tres especial, touz fussent
meüz d'une guise. Et l'opposite est vray, car les planetes de leur propre
mouvement sont meües autrement que le premier ciel ou souverain ciel
et presque en maniere contraire, si comme il fu dit ou .vii.^{e} chapitre.[52]
Et les planetes meïsmes entre elles sont meües en diverses manieres. Item,
120d selon Averroïz en cest chapitre ou / .xlix.^{e} comment,[53] se les corps du ciel

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[48] *AF* savoir; *C* sauvoir.

[49] 107*a*.

[50] *Juntas*, t.c. 49, 132A and t.c. 59, 138F; also Metaphysica, *Juntas*, VIII, XII, t.c. 41. Also *Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobii Commentariorum in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. F. Eyssenhardt, Lipsiae, Teubner, 1893, I, xiiii, 22, p. 544, 11. 1-3. Avicenna is quoted by Averrhoës in the latter's *Sermo de substantia orbis*, *Juntas, IX*, Venice, 1623, ch. 7, 14F; cf. also *Avicennae Metaphysicae*, Venice, 1508, fol. 104^{v} and the German translation by M. Horten, *Die Metaphysik Avicennas*, Halle, 1907, p. 595. Albert's discussion is found in Lib. II, tr. iii, 4, of his commentary on *De Coelo*, *Alberti Magni Omnia Opera*, ed. A. Borgnet, IV (Paris, 1890), 174-177. The various discussions on this point are summarized by Pierre Duhem, *Le Système du monde*, IV (Paris, 1916), 545-559, especially 551.

[51] Pippin apples are still a popular variety and are grown in many localities in Europe and America. The origin of the name is obscure, but the word *pépin*, meaning fruit or vegetable seed, is found in the Twelfth Century (cf. *Dict. Général*); that the meaning of the term should have been extended to include the fruit and ultimately the tree bearing the fruit is in accordance with one of the most common phenomena of semantics. *Blancdurel* is a compound of *blanc* + *Hurel*, the latter used as a proper name in parts of lower Normandy (Sartilly, Avranches), in the same manner as *blanc d'oeuf*. The species of apple cited by Oresme is mentioned for the first time in 1371 according to Charles de Beaurepaire, *Notes et documents concernant l'Etat des campagnes de la haute Normandie dans les derniers temps du Moyen-Age* (no place nor date), pp. 48, 396, 398. Cf. also H. Moisy, *Glossaire comparatif anglo-normand*, Caen, 1889, p. 124, art. Blandureau; also F. Godefroy, *Dictionnaire*, IV, 530c, art. 3, Hurel. *B* blandurel.

[52] 88*d et seq.*

[53] *Juntas*, t.c. 49, 131L-M. *C* .xlix^{e} comme le comment se; *D* .xlix.^{e} dit que se; *E* .xlix.^{e} chapitre dit que se; *F* .xlix.^{e} comme se les.

estoient meüz sus divers centres, il seroient differenz en espece. Et vielle Averroïz ou non, il convient confesser que eulz sont meüz environ divers centres, si comme il fu dit tantost devant et est la verité. Item, Averroïz confesse[54] que les corps du ciel sont meüz sus divers poles; et donques par ceste diversité, l'en doit conclure que il different en espece, car ceste difference qui est en leurs mouvemens naturelz ne peut estre fors pour la difference de la nature[55] de telz corps et non pas par accident ne a cas de fortune. Item, les corps du ciel sont differens en vertu, si comme il appert par les livres d'astrologie, et nous voions par experience que le soleil seche et que la lune[56] amoistist et pluseurs telles operacions differentes; et donques parce que les effiz des corps du ciel sont ainsi differenz, nous devons croire que telz corps ne sont pas touz d'une meïsme nature. Item, Aristote di(s)t ou *Livre des bestes*[57] que la nature de la lune est samblable a la nature de la terre, selon ce que Averroïz allegue en cest chapitre,[58] et di(s)t en autre lieu en ce secont livre que les corps du ciel ont vertus samblables aus vertus des elemens;[59] et donques puisque
121*a* les elemens different en espece, les corps du // ciel different en espece
combien que en autre maniere. Item, les vertus[59a] des corps du ciel ne sont pas seulement differentes mes sont contraires, car, selon les livres d'astrologie, les uns corps du ciel sont benivoles ou de bonne influence et les autres malivoles, et aussi les uns sont cause de chaut et les autres de froit; et se les effecz naturelz sont contraires, les causes qui les font ne sont pas d'une espece ou d'une nature. Mais a ce responnent aucuns et dient que nul corps du ciel n'est malivole, mais ceulz qui sont moins benivoles sont dis malivoles; et ce disoit Macrobes.[60] Et peut estre que ce est verité. Mais il dient que samblablement les corps du ciel touz sont cause de chaleur et nul de fredeur, mais celui qui moins eschaufe est dit froit en vertu. Et il me samble que il n'est pas ainsi, car fredeur est une qualité positive opposite a chaleur comme son contraire, si comme il fu dit en le .viii.ᵉ chapitre,[61] et est une qualité active et corruptive de chaleur, si comme il appert ou quart de *Metheores*.[62] Or est il ainsi selon Aristote ou premier de *Metheores*[63] que toute la vertu de ce monde yci-bas est gouvernee par
121b les mouvemens et par les corps du ciel; et don- / ques l'operacion que
fait ici-bas .i. corps froit, c'est a savoir refroider ou infrigidacion, est fete principalment et causee de l'influence du ciel comme de cause qui est premiere que n'est la nature du corps froit. Et selon l'aucteur *Des Causes*,[64] la cause qui est premiere influe et fait plus a l'effect que celle qui est secondaire. Et par ce appert que aucuns corps du ciel ont vertu refrigerative ou de causer froidure et autres sont cause de chaleur, et par consequent comme dit est, il sont differenz en espece. Item, il n'est pas vraysamblable que corps lumineus de soy perpetuelment, si comme est le soleil de soy, et non pas [par][65] pourreture ou par accident, et corps non-lumineus et obscur de soy, si comme est la lune, soient d'une espece et d'une nature. Mais aucun pourroit dire encontre: car le ciel ou est le soleil et le corps du soleil sont d'une espece, si comme il fu dit ou .xv.ᵉ chapitre,[66] et toutevoies le soleil[67] est lumineus et le ciel non; je respon que

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[54] *Ibid.*

[55] *BCDEF* omit 'de la nature.'

[56] *DE* solail.

[57] Not found in *De Animalibus.*

[58] *Juntas*, t.c. 49, 131G.

[59] *Ibid.*, t.c. 32, 115K.

[59a] *B* uns.

[60] *Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobii Commentariorum in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. F. Eyssenhardt, Lipsiae, Teubner, 1893, I, xix, 19-27, especially 26, pp. 562-563.

[61] 90*c*.

[62] *Meteorologicorum*, IV, 1, 378b, 10-28; 1, 379a, 19-22.

[63] *Ibid.*, I, 2, 339a, 21-23.

[64] *Ueber das reine Gute bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de causis*, ed. Otto Bardenhewer, I (Freiburg, 1882), 163: 'Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda.:'

[65] *A* omits 'par.'

[66] 111*a*.

[67] *E* ciel.

se il estoit possible que une autre partie du ciel du soleil[68] fust fete aussi
condempsee ou aussi espesse comme est le soleil, elle seroit lumineuse ou
luisant; et donques sont il d'une espece, car condempsacion et rarefaction
121*c* ou *rarum et dempsum* ne diversifient pas l'espèce, si // comme il fu dit ou
.xv.ᵉ chapitre.[69] Mais se une autre partie du ciel de la lune estoit aussi
condempsee comme est la lune ou comme est le soleil, celle partie seroit
obscure de soy et par ce appert que elle differe du soleil en espece. Item,
selon Averroïz ou .xii.ᵉ de *Methaphisique*,[70] l'ordenance du ciel est en telle
maniere comme est le gouvernement d'une cité la ou est un prince qui a
une operacion souveraine, et les autres officiers chascun la sieue en obeïssant
au prince. Et met encore Averroïz une autre similitude de pluseurs
artifices qui sont souz un principal auquel il servent. Et ausi semblablement
les intelligences font les mouvemens du ciel souz la souveraine laquelle
fait le mouvement journal. Et par ce s'ensuit que aussi comme les
offices et *princeps* de la cité different en espece, et aussi comme les ars
qui sont souz un art principal et les instrumens de telz ars[71] different en
espece, samblablement les mouvemens du ciel et les corps du ciel qui sont
instrumens des intelligences different en espece, et aussi comme font les
membres d'un corps, car, selon Averroïz, le ciel est un corps vif. Item,
selon Averroïz, en choses inmaterieles ne peuent estre pluseurs supposts
121*d* en une espece et donques chascune intelligence / differe de l'autre en
espece. Et les corps du ciel[72] sont vifs par les intelligences selon Averroïz,[73]
et donques sont eulz differenz en espece, car avecques ce, telle comparoison
ont les corps du ciel un a l'autre comme les intelligences qui les meuvent
ont une a l'autre. Mais Averroïz ou ceulz qui sont de son oppinion pourroient
argüer au contraire: premierement, car touz les mouvemens du ciel
sont d'une espece pour ce que mouvement circulaire ne a aucun contraire,
si comme il fu dit en le .viii.ᵉ chapitre du premier.[74] Et les corps naturelz
simples qui ont un mouvement simple sont d'une espece, si comme il
samble par ce que[75] fu dit ou tiers chapitre du premier.[76] Item, touz corps
simples qui ont un lieu sont d'une espece, si comme il samble par ce que
fu dit ou .xiii.ᵉ chapitre du premier.[77] Et le lieu de toutes les esperes celestielz,
c'est le centre[77a] du monde meïsmement de toutes celles qui sont
concentriques au monde. Item, .iiii. elemens corruptibles et materielz sont
et le quint element incorruptible, c'est le ciel et est appellé la quinte
essence. Et donques aussi comme de chascun des autres elemens toutes
les parties sont d'une espece tres especial, si comme les parties de pure //
122*a* terre et de pure eaue et ainsi des autres, samblablement toutes les parties
de tout le ciel[78] sont d'une meïsme espece, et encore par plus forte raison,
car le ciel est plus simple que nul des autres elemens du monde. Au premier,
je di que il ne convient pas que touz mouvemens circulaires soient
d'une espece pour ce se tel mouvement ne a contraire, et peut l'en dire
que les mouvemens du ciel sont differens en espece selon ce que il sont
environ divers centres ou sus divers poles. D'autre partie, il ne convient
pas se .ii. corps du ciel sont meüz de mouvemens samblables en espece que
telz[79] corps soient pour ce d'une espece, car une meïsme espere[80] du ciel
est meüe de pluseurs mouvemens et n'est pas pour ce de pluseurs especes.[81]

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[68] *B* omits 'du solail.'

[69] 112*b* *et seq.*

[70] *VIII*, ed. *Juntas*, 1574, t.c. 44, 328B-C.

[71] *DE* omit 'principal et . . . telz ars.'

[72] *DE* omit 'du ciel.'

[73] For this question cf. 31*b*, and also *Juntas*, t.c. 61, 140A-B; *Metaphysica*, ed. *Juntas*, vol. *VIII*, XII, t.c. 35, 318H, and t.c. 42 and 43, 326C-327B.

[74] 14*d*.

[75] *A* par ce que qui fu.

[76] 7*d*.

[77] 22*d*.

[77a] *DE* esperes celestieles sont les centre du m.

[78] *DE* omit 'toutes les parties de tout le ciel.'

[79] *BCDE* touz.

[80] *BDE* espece.

[81] *C* esperes; *F* omits 'especes.'

Au secont, je di que lieu est dit en .ii. manieres; si comme il fu dit ou .xvii.^{e}
chapitre du premier:[82] une est de ce selon quoy un corps est dit deüement
assis en son lieu, a prendre *lieu* en autre maniere, c'est a savoir pour ce
que contient[83] .i. corps ou une chose. Et en la premiere maniere, le centre
du monde est lieu de la terre et du ciel et selon ce, pluseurs corps simples
ont un lieu. Mais a prendre *lieu* pour ce qui contient un corps sanz moien,
122*b* chascune espere[84] du ciel / a son lieu fors la derreniere et ainsi, se les
esperes different en espece, leurs lieus different en espece. Au tiers, je di
que ce n'est pas samblable quant a ce du ciel et des autres elemens, car
par le ciel sont gouvernés touz les autres elemens et les corps mixtes selon
Aristote ou premier de *Metheores*,[85] et telz corps gouvernéz sont moult
differens. Et pour ce, convient il que ou ciel selon ses parties soit difference
non pas tele ne si grande comme entre les corps desus dis, mais plus grant
que entre les parties d'un des autres elemens. Et nientmoins, le ciel est plus
simple corps que quelcunque autre element, car eulz sont composts de
matiere et de forme qui different plus que les parties du ciel lequel n'est
pas de matiere selon Averroïz.[86] Une autre response seroit que toutes les
parties d'un element ne sont pas d'une espece, si comme les parties de la
terre qui sont de pluseurs manieres ou especes selon ce que met Plinius
ou .xviii.^{e} livre de *l'Istoire naturel*.[87] Mais aucun pourroit dire que celles
parties ne sont pas pure terre qui soit pur element, mais comment qui
soit, la premiere response souffist, car c'est raisonnable que entre les parties
du ciel soit plus grande diversité que entre les parties d'un des autres //
122*c* elemens qui sont touz gouvernés par le ciel. Et selon ce, en la sainte
Escripture souvent la terre est nommee en singulier et les cielz en plurie[r],[88]
si comme la ou est dit: *audite celi, et auribus percipe terra*;[89] item:
audite, celi, que loquor: audiat terra.[90] Or avons donques que touz les cielz
ne sont pas d'une espece tres especial.

17.—*Ou .xvii.^{e} chapitre il reprouve l'opinion d'aucuns qui disoient que les corps du ciel par leurs mouvemens font sons melodieus.*

> Dire[1] que les corps du ciel meüs[2] font armonie, c'est a dire sonz melodieus et consonans, il appert par ce que nous dirons que c'est un dit legier et superflu, car la verité n'est pas telle, si comme aucuns cuident au[s]quelz[3] il samble que il convient par necessité que son[4] soit fait par le mouvement de si grans corps. Car nous voions des corps qui sont ici-bas pres de nous que par leurs mouvemens il font son,[4] et toutevoies il ne sont pas si grans ne meüz de samblable isneleté, si comme sont le soleil et la lune. Item, c'est impossible que si grande multitude d'estoilles et la grandeur des corps meüs et de telle insneleté ne facent son qui soit tres fort et tres grant.

Glose. Ceste opinion tenoient Pytagoras[5] et ses ensuians et peut estre
122*d* entendue / en .ii. manieres: une est pour ce que aucuns cuidoient que
les estoilles fussent meües parmi le ciel en le divisant sanz ce que le ciel

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[82] 28c.

[83] *B* que il contient.

[84] *B* espece.

[85] *Meteorologicorum*, I, 2, 339a, 21-23.

[86] *De Substantia Orbis*, ed. Juntas, IX (1574), ch. 2, 5M-6B.

[87] *C. Plinii Secundi Naturalis Historia*, ed. D. Detlefsen, III (Berlin, 1868), XVIII, 46, p. 135.

[88] *A* plurient.

[89] *Isai.* i, 2, *DE* omit 'audite . . . item.'

[90] *Deut.* i, 1.

[1] *Guthrie*, ch. ix.

[2] *BCDEF* omit 'meüs.'

[3] *A* auquelz.

[4] *DE* ce.

[5] *CF* Pytagores; *D* Pithagoires; *E* Pitagoires. Cf. the myth of Er in Plato, *Republic*, 617B.

fust meü circulairement, aussi comme une sëete est meüe parmi l'aer ou un oyseau. Et se ainsi estoit, le soleil et les estoilles feroient son[4] tres grant et tres fort de tant comme telz corps sont plus grans et plus isnelement meüz sans comparaison que une sëete ou telle chose qui fait son par l'aer. Mais le soleil ne les estoilles ne sont pas meüz en ceste maniere, si comme il est determiné ou .xvi.[e] chapitre[6]. Une autre maniere de entendre cest opinion est que tout le ciel du soleil soit meü et ainsi des cielz des autres estoilles, et que ces cielz par leurs mouvemens facent son;[4] et ce entent Aristote a reprouver. Mais il monstre ici aprés comment il metroient[7] que telz sonz font melodie.

> Tiexte. Et supposoient que selon ce que[8] les isneletés sont plus loing ou plus grandes une ou resgart de l'autre, que selon ce elles ont proporcions de consonancieus. Et pour ce disoit il que la voiz des estoilles qui sont meües en circuite est armonique.

Glose. C'est a dire consonante et melodieuse. Mais si comme dit est, les
123*a* estoilles sont // meües avecques le ciel ou espere ou elles sont aussi comme
le clou de la nef est meü au mouvement de la nef. Et donques ce que il
di(s)t des estoilles est a entendre des cielz ou elles sont, lesquelz sont
tres grans corps et meüz tres isnelement. Et pour ce disoient les
Pithagoriens que il font tres grant son lequel il appelloient voiez pour
ce que les cielz sont choses vivez et qui ont ame selon leur opinion et
de Aristote meïsme, laquelle fu reprouvee ou quint chapitre.[9] Aprés il
met comment il faisoient sattisfacion a une doubte.

> Tiexte. Et pour ce que ce samble chose desraisonnable que nous ne oiions ceste voiz, il dient que la cause est car des ce que nous sommes engendrés et que nous avons vie, tantost nous oiions continuelment ce son et pour ce nous ne le povons appercevoir ou resgart de la silence contraire, car voiz et silence un aprés l'autre font avoir congnoissance un de l'autre. Et donques aussi comme les martelleurs ou bateurs de arain et de cuivre ne mettent en ce difference ou ne apparçoivent le son que il font pour l'acoustumance, telement est il a touz honmes ou resgart du son du ciel.

123*b* Glose. Ceste cause ne souffist pas, car telz bateurs ne peuent / ouïr un
petit son mout mendre que n'est leur martelleiz et sont aussi comme
assourdéz, mais nous oiions[10] bien petis sons trop mendre que ne devroit
estre le son du ciel. Aprés Aristote reprouve leur dit encore autrement.

> Tiexte. Mais si comme nous avons dit devant, teles choses attraient par plaisance et par maniere de musique ceulz a qui elles sont dites; mais c'est impossible que il soit ainsi, car ce n'est pas vray dont il cuidoient prendre cause de respondre, si comme dit est. Mes aveques ce, c'est inconvenient que les corps qui n'ont quelcunque sens et ne oiient rien ne eüssent a souffrir de ce, car nous voions que les sons excellenz destruissent les corpulences des corps meïsmes qui sont sans vie,[11] si comme le son du tonnerre dissipe les pierres et les plus durs corps qui soient.

Glose. Ce n'est pas pour ce que telles choses sentent ou apparçoivent le son, mais c'est pour la force du mouvement de l'aer qui est feru et meü des corps qui sonent.

> Tiexte. Et comme ainsi soit que les corps du ciel sont si tres grans et sont meüz si tres isnelement, il convendroit que leur son passast

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[6] 115c. *A* .xvi.

[7] *DE* omit 'comment il metroient.'

[8] *A* repeats 'selon ce que.'

[9] 77*d*.

[10] *DE* avons.

[11] *DE* en vie.

et fust plus fort que le son du tonnerre, de tant comme leur
123c quantité est plus grant // et l'isneleté de leur mouvement. Et
donques par plus forte raison il seroit neccessaire que le son des
cielz attainsist et venist ici-bas et que il feïst tres grant force de
violence.

Glose. Et que il rompist tout. Mais Simplicius en son comment[12] veult dire que l'en pourroit bien soustenir que le ciel fait son, et dire que tel son n'est pas corrompant ne violent mais est confortatif et vivifiant aussi comme sont les mouvemens du ciel. Et la cause pourquoi nous ne le oiions pas, ce n'est pas pour l'acoustumance, si comme aucuns disoient, mais est pour ce que nos sens ne sont pas bien disposéz a ce, aussi comme les chiens veneurs sentent et oudourent telles choses que nous ne povons sentir. Et pour ce disoient les Pythagoriens que Pythagoras avoit aucune fois ouÿ le son du ciel, car il avoit pour lors les sens et l'entendement purifiéz et tres bien ordenéz a ce. Et tout ce recite et reprouve saint Thomas d'Aquin longuement et prolixement;[13] mais briefment, il appert clerement par ce que sera dit ou chapitre ensuiant[14] que c'est impossible naturelment que le ciel sonne et face son sensible.

123d 18.—*Ou .xviii.ᵉ chapitre il monstre que les cielz par leurs mouve- / mens
ne font aucun son.*

Mes c'est chose raisonnable que nous ne oiions pas le son du ciel et que les corps de cibas n'ont a souffrir de tel son, car le ciel ne sonne pas; et avecques ce, les choses que nous avons dites devant sont cause manifeste et font tesmoing que nous disons verité, et sont argüement a respondre a la doubte que font les Pitagoriens en disant que les corps du ciel meüz font symphonie.

Glose. Car il fu dit ou .xvi.ᵉ chapitre[1] que les estoilles ne sont meü[e]z[2] fors au mouvement des cielz ou elles sont et, en ce supposant, Aristote prouve aprés son propos par .ii. raisons dont la premiere est prise de la cause efficiente de son.

Tiexte. Car touz corps qui sont meüz par soy font son et plaie.

Glose. C'est a dire division et violence, et est a entendre des corps qui sont meüz parmi autres corps.

Tiexte. Mais quelconques corps qui sont fichiés en corps meü et
qui sont parties de tel corps aussi comme sont les clous ou les
parties d'une nef, telz corps ne peuent faire son ne aussi la nef
se elle est portee en l'eaue, combien que par les raisons de
124a Pytagoras c'est inconvenient se corps meü ne sonne. Et // bien
est verité que le maast ou autre partie de la nef ou la nef[3] toute
fait aucune fois grant son par son mouvement, mais c'est ce qui
est meü en corps non-meü ou autrement meü; car ce que est
meü en corps meü continuelment et samblablement et sanz faire
plaie, c'est a dire percussion et division, c'est impossible que il
face son. Et pour ce, nous devons dire en ceste maniere en cest
propos.

Glose. C'est a savoir que les estoilles ne sonnent pas, car elles sont portees aveques le ciel comme souvent est dit. Et de ce que dit est de la nef, il est verité que quant la nef et le fleuve sont meüz samblablement d'une isneleté, la nef ne fait pas son contre l'eaue; mais quant elle est meüe autrement et elle divise l'aer ou l'eaue aucune fois fait son et noise, ou elle toute ou aucune partie de elle. Et briefment, il appert ou secont de *L'Ame* que son ne peu(s)t estre sans ce que division soit faite et percussion et violence.[4]

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[12] *Simplicii in Aristotelis de Coelo Commentaria* (Commentaria in Aristotilem Graeca, VII), ed. I. L. Heiberg, Berlin, 1894, II, 9, pp. 463-465, especially 464, 6.

[13] *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria in libros Aristotelis de Coelo et Mundo*, Leonine ed., III (Rome, 1886), II, 9, lect. xiv, pp. 173-177.

[14] 124*b*.

[1] 115*b*.

[2] *A* meüz.

[3] *B* omits 'ou la nef.'

> Tiexte. Et se les estoilles estoient meües par elles en la multitude ou parmi la multitude de l'aer qui est espandu partout lasus ou du feu, si comme touz dient qui ne[5] mettent le ciel d'autre nature que les elemens, il convendroit par neccessité que elles feïssent 124b son / qui passast la force et la grandeur naturelle de tout autre son. Et se ainsi estoit, il convendroit que ce son attainist siques ici et que il destruisist tout et nous feïst tou[s][6] sourz. Et comme tel accident ne appere pas, donques s'ensuit il que nulle des estoilles ne soit[7] meüe par soy de mouvement qui soit fait d'ame ou d'entendement ne qui soit fait par violence.

Glose. Aprés il met une autre raison prinse de cause final.

> Tiexte. Et est aussi comme se nature avoit pourveü pour le temps qui estoit a venir, car se le mouvement des estoilles n'estoit en la maniere que nous avons dit, nulle chose de cest monde ici-bas ne dureroit en samblable maniere.

Glose. Car se les estoilles estoient meües parmi le ciel en le divisant, elles feroient si grant son et si fort que les corps de cibas ne pourroient durer, et pour ce ordena nature que elles ne fussent meües fors au mouvement des esperes ou elles sont fichiees afin que les corps de cibas fussent saufz. Mais il me samble que combien que la conclusion soit vraie et que les estoilles et le soleil soient ainsi fichiés comme souvent dit est,[8] toutevoies la raison ou consequence que font Aristote et Averroïz[9] n'est pas bonne. 124c Car posé que le ciel fust de na- // ture de aer ou de feu et que les estoilles courussent[10] ou volassent parmi et le divisassent et que par ce elles feïssent violence et tres grande sonnerie, noientmoins tel son seroit imperceptible a nous et ne pourroit estre ouÿ de cibas pour ce que il seroit trop loing de nous, et par consequent, il ne estonneroit pas et ne corromproit pas les corps de cibas. Et ce appert par raison, car le mouvement du soleil et des estoilles est tres merveilleusement isnel et toutevoies, pour ce que il est si loing de nous, il n'est pas appercevable par sens dehors,[11] c'est a savoir par nostre voiement precisement sanz l'aide de la vertu memorative que se recorde que le soleil ou l'estoille[11a] fu veüe en un lieu et puis est veüe en autre ou en autre resgart, car qui les resgarde de prime face, il samble que elles ne se mouvent. Et donques l'en pourroit dire par samblable que le son des estoilles qui est tant loing et qui est causé par ce mouvement ne peu(s)t estre apparceü par nostre ouïe precisement et la vertu memorative ne autre ne peu(s)t faire que il soit ouÿ puisque il ne vient siques a nos oreilles. Item, encore par plus forte raison, car l'isneleté du mouvement des estoilles est plus grande ou regart de quel- 124d cunque isneleté de cibas,[12] si comme de / la foudre, que ne seroit la violence du mouvement des estoilles ou resgart de la violence du mouvement de la foudre, de tant comme le ciel qui est selon leur opinion de nature de feu est plus rare ou plus cler et plus aesé ou plus legier a diviser que n'est l'aer ou le feu de cibas. Et donques le son qui est fait par la violence du mouvement des estoilles ne excede pas tant le son du tonnerre comme l'isneleté des estoilles qui est imperceptible excede le isneleté de la foudre. Et donques par plus forte raison le son des estoilles seroit imperceptible, et par consequent, il ne corromproit pas les corps de cibas.

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[4] *De Anima*, II, 8, 419b, 9-25.

[5] *B* omits' ne.'

[6] *A* tout.

[7] *E* estoilles une soit.

[8] 115c *et seq.*

[9] *Juntas*, t.c. 52-56, 133K-136B.

[10] *DE* concurrent.

[11] For another reason why we do not hear the celestial harmony cf. *Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobii Commentariorum in Somnium Scipionis*, II, iiii, 14-15; ed. F. Eyssenhardt, Lipsiae, Teubner, 1893, pp. 598-599.

[11a] *DE* la lune.

[12] Plato emphasized the rapidity of movement of the celestial spheres in the myth of Er, *Republic*, 617B.

> Tiexte. Et ainsi est dit que les estoilles sont de figure sperique et que elles ne sont pas meües par soy mais au mouvement[13] du ciel.

Glose.[14] Pour ce que pluseurs anciens de grant auctorité tenoient que ou
ciel est armonie et musique, je veul declairer et adrecier l'opinion que
aucuns telz povoient avoir. Et premierement, l'opinion de ceulz qui
cuidoient que les estoilles feïssent son en courant parmi le ciel, aussi
comme un oyseau vole par l'aer, est souffisanment reprouvé, car les
125a estoilles ne sont pas ainsi meües, si comme souvent // dit est. Et se aucuns
disoient que non pas les estoilles mais touz les cielz meüz font son sensible,[15]
c'est naturelment impossible: premierement car tout son sensible est fait
avecques violence, si comme il appert ou secont livre de *L'Ame*,[16] et les
mouvemens du ciel qui sont perpetuelz sont du tout sanz violence, si
comme il fu dit ou tiers chapitre.[17] Item, en tout son sont percussion et
division, si comme il appert ou secont de *L'Ame*,[18] et les corps du ciel ne
fierent en rien un l'autre et sont meüz sanz diviser aucun moien quelcunque,
si comme il appert en pluseurs lieus de philosophie et de astrologie.
Item, touz corps qui resonent tremblent et fremissent,[19] si comme il appert
des campanes et des instrumens de musique, et ou ciel ne peut estre tel
tremblement qui n'est pas mouvement simple, car le ciel est meü tant
seulement de mouvement purement circulaire. Item, quant aucuns corps
meüz circulairement passent un sus l'autre et il font son, c'est pour l'aer
ou autre chose qui est enclose entre telz corps, si comme il peu(s)t
apparoir par le secont de *L'Ame*,[20] et entre les esperes du ciel ne a chose
moienne quelcunque mais sont conjointes sanz moien. Item, toute fois
125b que telz corps qui passent un contre l'autre ou un sus / l'autre resonent,[21]
c'est pour ce que il sont aspres et que il freent un a l'autre. Et pour ce,
quant l'en met entre telz .ii. corps oincture, le son appetice ou cesse, si
comme il appert par experience. Or est il ainsi que les corps du ciel sont
si tres perfectement onniz et poliz que rien ne peüst plus sanz quelcunque
aspresce, si comme il fu dit en le .xi.e chapitre,[22] et donques passent il un
sus l'autre tres souef et tres seriement sanz confricacion quelcunque et,
par consequent, tres paisiblement sanz noise et sanz son. Or avons donques
que les corps du ciel par leurs mouvemens ne font pas son sensible. Et
peut estre que aucuns anciens qui mettoient ou ciel armonie ne entendoient
pas que le ciel feïst tel son, mais entendoient que ou ciel est une maniere
de musique laquelle est es proporcions des quantités et des qualités et
des mouvemens et des vertus et des influences des corps du ciel. Item,
selon ce l'en pourroit dire que aussi comme les sens naturelz des honmes
et des bestes sont d'autre raison et d'autre maniere que l'entendement des
intelligences ou des honmes, samblablement les sons sensibles sont d'autre

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[13] *DE* soy meismes au m.

[14] *BCDEF* omit 'Glose.'

[15] *B* font son semblable; *DE* cielz ensemble font son.

[16] *De Anima*, II, 8, 419b, 9-13.

[17] 73*b et seq.*

[18] *De Anima, ibid.*, 11-13.

[19] *DE* qui recevent tremblement et fr.

[20] *De Anima*, II, 8, 419b, 33-420a, 26.

[21] *B* omits 'resonent.'

[22] 102*bc*.

guise et d'autre maniere que ne sont les sons celestielz lesquielz sont
insensibles. Et pour ce, Cassiodorus en une epistre qui se commence *cum*
125*c* *rex // francorum* disoit ainsi: *armonia celi humano sermone ydonee non*
potest explicari, quam[23] *racio tantum animo dedit, sed auribus mortalium*
natura non prodidit.[24] Il di(s)t que nature n'a pas fait sentir la musique
du ciel aus oreilles des mortelz et pour ce l'en ne peut pas dire proprement
quelle elle est. Item, les proporcions des sons celestielz sont
armoniques. Et doit l'en savoir que toute proporcion est armonique
laquelle est entre nombres qui sont de proporcionalité double ou qui sont
de proporcionalité treble ou qui sont procreéz et faiz par multiplicacion
de nombres de l'une et de l'autre[25] des proporcionalités desus dites. Et
pour ce miex entendre soit faite une figure en maniere de eschequier, et
ou premier angle ou premier quarré soit .i., et ou secont en la ligne ou
125*d* renc desus soit .ii.,[26] / et aprés soit .iiii. et puis .viii. et ainsi touzjours en
doublant et en procedant selon proporcionalité double tant comme il
plaist sanz fin. Item, en descendant desouz .i. soit .iii., et desouz aprés soit
.ix. et puis .xxvii.[27] et ainsi en outre tant comme il plest sanz terme en
procedant selon proporcionalité treble.[28] Item, en l'angle commun de .ii.
et de .iii. soit .vi., [et en l'angle commun de .iiii. et de .iii. soit .xii.,][29] et
en l'angle commun de .ii. et .ix. soit .xviii. et ainsi en procedant selon cest
ordre et selon ceste maniere[30] l'en peut multeplier telz nombres et croistre
la figure tant comme l'en veult. Et verité est que ceste figure est plainne
de tres grans misteres et peu(s)t l'en prendre en elle consideracions tres
excellentement belles et merveilleuses, et contient en vertu toute
musique speculative. Et chascun des nombres de ceste figure est dit
armonique et nul autre; et chascune proporcion qui est entre .ii. de ces
nombres est dite armonique et non autre. Et ces proporcions ne sont pas
toutes consonantes, mais tant seulement .iiii. desquelles les premiers
nombres different par seule unité et n'est ainsi de quelcunque autre proporcion
armonique. Et de ces .iiii. proporcions une est dyapason ou double
qui est de .ii. a .i.; l'autre est dyapente qui est de .iii. a .ii.; la tierce est
126*a* dyathesaron qui [est][31] // de .iiii. a .iii.; et la quarte est ton qui est de .ix.
a .viii.[32] Et ainsi sont tant seulement .iiii. proporcions qui sont consonantes
ou consonancies simples, mais pluseurs sont ou peuent estre composees
de cestes. Item, aucuns des anciens qui mettoient son es cielz disoient que
le ciel qui est le plus bas, c'est a savoir l'espere de la lune, resone le plus
accu ou gresle et que la plus haute espere resone le plus gros son ou le
plus bas et les autres moiennement par ordre touzjours la plus basse
plus acuement.[33] Et les autres mettoient le contraire et avoient plus grant
couleur, car la grosseur du son ensuit la quantité ou grandeur des corps
qui sonent avecques leur figure, mais la force du son ensuit l'isneleté du
mouvement, *ceteris paribus*. Et donques la plus haute espere soneroit le
plus gros ou le plus bas, mes elle sonneroit plus fort que celle qui est
plus basse. Item, selon verité, il est vraisamblable que aucuns des mouvemens
du ciel soient incommensurables, si comme je ay monstré autrefois
en un tracté pour ce fait.[34] Et ce posé, il convient par neccessité que les

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[23] *DE* quem.

[24] *Epistulae Theodericianae Variae*, ed. Th. Mommsen (MGH, Auct XII, Berlin, 1894), XL, Boethio Patricio Theodericus Rex, p. 72, ll. 20-22: 'Harmonia vero caeli humano sermone idonee non potest explicari, quam ratio tantum animo dedit, sed auribus natura non prodidit.'

[25] *BCDEF* multiplicacion de l'un et de l'autre.

[26] Figure 29, p. 243.

[27] *B* 24.

[28] *DE* double.

[29] *A* omits 'et en l'angle . . . soit .xii.'

[30] *BCDEF* omit 'et selon ceste maniere.'

[31] *ABC* omit 'est.'

[32] *B* omits 'a .viii.'

[33] Cf. *Somnium Scipionis*, II, iiii, 1-5, p. 596.

[34] Reference to *De Commensurabilitate et incommensurabilitate motuum coelestium.*

corps du ciel soient continuelment et tousjours en nouvelle disposicion tele
126*b* que c'est impossible naturelment que onques fussent en / semblable,[35] ne
que il y soient autrefois, supposé que il eüssent esté et fussent meüz
perpetuelment sanz commencement et sanz fin. Item, selon ce peut estre
que les corps du ciel parce que il sont touzjours en nouvelle disposicion
que onques ne fu samblable, ainsi il font continuelment nouvelle musique
insensible: *et canticum novum*,[36] si que onques[37] ne fu tel. Item, pour ce
que les corps de cibas sont gouvernéz par les corps celestielz et par leurs
mouvemens selon nature, si comme di(s)t Aristote ou premier de
Metheores,[38] il s'ensuit que, selon ce, les choses de cibas sont touzjours
en nouvelle ordenance si que[39] onques ne fu telle, et que les faiz humains,
excepté ce que est de volenté hors inclinacion naturelle, sont continuelment
nouviaux et telz que onques ne furent aucuns du tout samblables.
Item, aussi comme mutacion ne peut estre que elle ne soit en miex ou en
non-miex combien que aucune fois tout ensamble soit tres bien, si comme
un chant de pluseurs voiez tres bon ne seroit pas si bon se les voies[40]
estoient tousjours ou tres meilleur acort, samblablement selon la variacion
de la musique insensible du ciel les choses de cibas sont une fois en
126c meilleur disposicion que en autre, et selon ce une // fois est pais, autre
guerre, si comme dit l'Escripture: *tempus belli, et tempus pacis*;[41] une fois
sterilité, autre fois fertilité et ainsi des autres mutacions. Item, par
aventure pourroit l'en dire que le ciel est aussi comme celui qui chante
ou fait melodie et, aveques ce, dance et fait double musique: *cantu et
gestu*, en chant et en deport. Et le monde de cibas fait seulement musique
de deport, aussi comme celui qui dance et ensuit la mesure du chant que
il escoute. Et peut estre que ce entendirent saint Augustin et Boëce et
autres qui parlent de musique mondaine laquelle il appellassent celestiele,
ne fust ce que elle se estent aus corps de cibas en la maniere desus dite.

Et donques par ce que dit est et par ce que s'ensuit, nous povons raisonnablement
dire que de musique sont .iii. manieres: une est humaine, autre
mondaine et la tierce est divine. La premiere est sensible as oreilles et
les autres non, mes de la seconde l'en vient en cognoissance par raison
humaine, et de la tierce ont experience les angelz et les ames beneürees.
Item, de la seconde font mencion, comme dit est, saint Augustin et Boëce
et Macrobes[42] et autres et meïsme la sainte Escripture, si comme il
126*d* pourroit / sambler par ce que Job .xxviii.^{e} est ecript: *concentum celi quis
dormire faciet?*[43] aussi comme qui diroit que le chant acordable du ciel
dure continuelment sanz cesser. Item, pour ce que, selon les philosophes,
les intelligences meuvent les cielz, il s'ensuit que par elles est fait ceste
musique. Et de ce recite Macrobes que Plato disoit que en chascune espere
du ciel est une syrene qui chante a Dieu: *Plato—singulas aït Syrenas
singulis*[44] *orbibus insidere . . . nam Syren deo canens Greco intellectu*

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[35] *DE* feussent ensemble ne.

[36] Cf.*Psalm* xxxix, 4; cxliii, 9; cxlix, 1; *Apoc.* v, 9; xiv, 3.

[37] *DE* sicques que oncques.

[38] *Meteorologicorum*, I, 2, 339a, 21-23.

[39] *BCDEF* disposicion; *DE* sicques oncques.

[40] *DE* omit 'tres bon . . . se les voies.'

[41] *Eccle.* iii, 8. *BCDEF* omit 'et.'

[42] The doctrine of the harmony of the spheres is doubtless of Pythagorean origin, but the source upon which these writers drew was quite certainly Plato's myth of Er (*Republic*, 617B), to which was added the speculation of Timaeus regarding the ratios of the spheres to one another (*Timaeus*, 35B *et seq.*), these ratios being arranged in harmonic sequences and appearing to have musical significance. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, ed. R. G. Bury (Loeb Classical Library, *Plato with an English Translation*, VII), foot-notes, pp. 66-72. Oresme has reference here to the musical treatises of Saint Augustine, *De Musica*, PL 32, 1081, *et seq.*; of Boethius, *De Musica* especially I, 2, PL 63, 1171 *et seq.*; and that contained in the *Somnium Scipionis*, II, i-iv, especially I, pp. 583-589.

[43] *Job* xxxviii, 37; Oresme's reference is incorrect in all Mss.

[44] *E* Plato ait singulas; *B* singulas orbibus.

valet.[45] Item, de la tierce musique meïsme firent mencion pluseurs anciens
paiens qui establirent que l'en menast les corps a sepulture en chantant en
signe que les ames retournent a la douceur de la musique divine selon
ce que recite Macrobes.[46] Et la sainte Escripture parle souvent de la
musique divine des angelz et des ames beneürees laquelle est
musique divine causee de Dieu: *cantabant canticum novum ante sedem,*[47]
etc. Item, si comme je ay touchié devant et selon les anciens philosophes,
la musique insensible des corps du ciel est selon les proporcions armoniques
dont je ay faite mencion et desquelles est composee musique humaine et
127*a* sensible laquelle se conforme[48] et a une colligance et // affinité a la musique
celestiel. Et ceste conformité ou aliance peu(s)t apparoir par un merveilleus
signe lequel je n'ay pas apris par doctrine d'autre et est tel: car,
selon les astrologiens, es corps du ciel sont .iiii. principaulz resgars, c'est
a savoir le sixtil ou sixte, et le quart, et le trine ou tiers et l'opposite; et
les lignes ou cordes de ces .iiii. resgars, une ou resgart de l'autre, sont es
proporcions qui ensuient et sont ici aprés descriptes en figure. Et premierement
soit fait un demicecle sus le dyametre[49] *.ab.* et c'est le resgart opposite;
item, soit fete la ligne *.ac.* qui soit le resgart trine ou treble; item, la
ligne *.ad.* qui soit le resgart quart; item, la ligne *.ae.*[50] qui soit le resgart
sextile ou sixte. Je di donques que entre ces .iiii. lignes, en comparant[51]
une a l'autre, sont .vi. proporcions, c'est a savoir de *.ab.* a *.ac.*, ou pour
miex entendre, entre *.ab.* et *.ac.* la moitié de la proporcion qui est de .iiii.
a .iii. qui est appellee la moitié de sequitercie; item, entre *.ab.* et *.ad.* la
moitié de proporcion double qui est de .ii. a .i.; item, entre *.ab.* et *.ae.*
proporcion double; item, entre *.ac.* et *.ad.* la moitié de proporcion
sequialtere, laquelle sequialtere est de .iii. a .ii.; item, entre *.ac.* et *.ae.* est
127*b* la moi- / tié de proporcion triple ou treble; item, entre *.ad.* et *.ae.* la
moitié de proporcion double. Et tout ce ay je autrefois declairé evidanment
en un livret que je nommay *Algorisme de proporcions*[52] et par demonstraison
pure mathematique a laquelle nul ne pourroit par raison contredire.
Or appert donques que les proporcions qui sont entre les resgars du
ciel sont toutes armoniques ou parties de armoniques et non pas seulement
armoniques, mais consonantes ou parties de consonantes. Et donques est
ce bien signe que ou ciel est musique et que entre elle et musique humaine
de laquelle elle est cause sous Dieu est colligacion. Et elle est causee et
depent sanz moien de la tierce musique divine et de Dieu, duquel di(s)t
l'Escripture que il fait concorde en ses choses hauteines—Job .xxii.^{e}: *qui
facit concordiam in sublimibus suis.*[53]

Aspectus celi distant moderamine tali: sextilis, quartus, trinus et
oppositus.[54] //

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[45] *BF* grece intellectu. *Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobii Commentariorum in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. F. Eyssenhardt, Lipsiae, Teubner, 1893, II, iii, 1, p. 592: 'Hinc Plato in Re publica sua cum de sphaerarum caelestium volubilitate tractaret, singulas ait Sirenas singulis orbibus insidere, significans sphaerarum motu cantum numinibus exhiberi, nam Siren deo canens Graeco intellectu valet.'

[46] *Ibid.*, II, iii, 6, p. 593.

[47] *BCDEF* sedem Dei. Cf. *Apoc.* xiv, 3: 'Et cantabant quasi canticum novum ante sedem, et ante quatuor animalia.'

[48] *BDE* conferme.

[49] *DE* un cercle sanz le dy.

[50] *B* .ac.

[51] *D* .iiii. figures signes en c.; *EF* .iiii. signes en c.

[52] *Algorismus proportionum*, ed. M. Curtze, Berlin, 1868.

[53] *BCDEF* in sublimis suis. *Job* xxv, 2; the chapter reference is incorrect in all Mss.

[54] *B* omits 'aspectus celi . . . et oppositus.' Figure 30, p. 274.

127c 19.—[*Ou .xix.e chapitre il traicte de l'ordre des cielz des planetes.*][1]

> Es livres d'astrologie est soufissanment dit de l'ordre des estoilles, comment les unes sont plus hautes et plus loing de nous et les autres sont plus basses et plus pres.

Glose. Ce suppose Aristote des astrologiens qui ont trouvé[2] par observances et par experiences comment le ciel .viii.e ou sont les estoilles fichies est par desus les esperes des planetes. Et aprés est l'espere de Saturne en descendant; aprés est Jupiter et puis Mars et aprés est le soleil et puis Venus et puis Mercure et aprés est la lune. Et ne convient ja de ce faire figure, car tout ce appert ou commencement du *Tractey de l'espere.*[3] Aprés il met ce de quoi doit considerer le philosophe.

> Tiexte. Et la cause de ceste ordenance par quoy les unes sont /
> 127d plus haut et plus loing de nous que les autres est pour ce que les unes sont meües plus isnelement et les autres plus tardivement, car l'en suppose que la derreniere et souverainne circulacion ou mouvement circulaire est simple et tres isnel.

Glose. Ou temps d'Aristote l'en ne avoit encore apparceü que le .viii.e espere ou sont les estoilles fichies fust meü[e][4] d'autre mouvement que de journal, et pour ce tenoit Aristote que c'est le souverain ciel meü tres isnelement d'un seul mouvement tres simple. Mes depuis a esté trouvé que elle est meüe de mouvement composé de pluseurs, et pour ce les astrologiens mettent que par dessus elle est une noviesme espere. Et de ce sera dit aprés plus a plain.[5] Et il fu declairé ou tiers chapitre du premier comment un mouvement peu(s)t estre composé de pluseurs et comment un corps peu(s)t estre meü de pluseurs mouvemens.[6]

> Tiexte. Mes des autres, c'est a savoir des planetes, les mouvemens sont plus tardis et de chascune sont pluseurs, car chascune s[el]on[7] propre cercle et par son propre mouvement est meü[e][8]
> 128a au contraire du // souverain ciel.

Glose. Et aveques ce, chascune est meüe de mouvement journal aveques le souverain ciel.[9] Et doit l'en savoir que le propre mouvement des planetes n'est pas droitement ne proprement contraire au mouvement journal, car mouvement circulaire n'a point de contraire, si comme il appert par le .viii.e chapitre du premier,[10] mais il est aussi comme contraire improprement pour ce que le mouvement journal est de orient en [o]ccident[11] et le propre mouvement des planetes est *e converso*, de occident en orient, et encore sus autres poles par quoy il est encore moins contraire.

> Tiexte. Et pour ce, est ce chose raisonnable que la planete qui est tres prochaine au ciel meü de mouvement circulaire simple et premier, parface son cercle ou circuite par son mouvement propre en plus long[12] temps et plus tardivement; et que celle qui est toute la plus loing du ciel qui est ainsi meü de mouvement simple et premier parface son cercle en moins de temps et plus isnelement; et des autres qui sont moiennes, que celle qui est plus prochaine
> 128b ou souve- / rain ciel parface son circuite en plus grant temps;

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[1] *A* omits chapter heading; *B* ou .xx. c. *Guthrie*, ch. x.

[2] *DE* tenu.

[3] *De l'espere*, ed. L. McCarthy, Thesis, Toronto, 1942, ch. iii., ll. 175-180.

[4] *A* meü.

[5] 128*cd*.

[6] 8*a*.

[7] *A* son.

[8] *A* meü.

[9] *BCDEF* omit 'Et aveques ce . . . ciel.'

[10] 14*d*.

[11] *A* accident.

[12] *A* loing.

> et que celle qui est plus loing de ce ciel en mendre temps. Car le souverain ciel a tres grande puissance sus le ciel qui est tres pres de lui, et a petite puissance sus celui qui est loing de lui pour cause de la distance.

Glose. De ce propos ont esté .iii. opinions: une est que le ciel souverain
est meü d'un simple mouvement lequel est journal et tres isnel. Et pour
ce, par sa force il ravist et trait aveques soy les cielx[13] des planetes qui sont
souz soy, et retarde leur[14] mouvement propre qui est aussi comme au
contraire, comme dit est. Mais ceste opinion n'est pas du tout vraie ou
peut estre mal entendue, car combien que le mouvement journal des
planetes puisse estre dit ravissement par similitude en maniere que
parlent les poëtes, toutesvoies, selon verité, ou ciel n'est quelcunque
ravissement ne violence, mes chascun mouvement du ciel est tres naturel
et voluntaire franchement et purement. Une autre opinion fu que le .viii.^e^
ciel la ou sont les estoilles fichies, est le souverain meü de simple mouve-
128*c* ment // journal et les autres cielx des planetes l'ensuient sans violence,
ainsi que le plus prochain de lui l'ensuit plus et est plus tardif en son
mouvement propre et le plus loing l'ensuit moins, comme devant dit est.
La tierce opinion est samblable a ceste fors tant que, pour ce que le .viii.^e^
espere n'est pas meüe seulement de mouvement simple journal, ceste
opinion met une autre espere novisme par desus le .viii.^e^, laquelle .ix.^e^ est
meüe seulement de simple mouvement journal et les autres l'ensuient[15]
comme dit est. Mais autrefois je avisay une opinion telle: que ja soit ce
que le .viii.^e^ espere soit meüe de .ii. mouvemens; par aventure, ne convient
il pas pour ce mettre une espere par desus elle en laquelle ne appert
quelcunque estoille, mais peut estre que le .viii.^e^ est la souveraine et que
elle et les autres sont meües de mouvement journal, mais les autres en
descendant plus tardivement de leurs mouvemens propres comme dit est.
Et ne sont pas toutes meües selon l'autre mouvement de celle .viii.^e^ espere
128*d* qui est, selon aucuns, / en cent ans d'un degré contre le mouvement
journal. Et de ce sera dit aprés plus a plain.[16] Item, encore pourroit l'en
assigner autre cause pourquoy les planetes plus hautes font leurs cours
ou leur propre mouvement en plus lonc temps, et est pour ce que tant
plus sont hautes, tant plus grant cecle descrivent elles et font plus grant
circuite.

> Tiexte. Et les planetes moiennes entre la plus haute et la plus basse parfont leurs cours ou leur circuite selon la proporcion de la distance que elles ont au souverain ciel, si comme monstrent les astrologiens.

Glose. Par aventure que les astrologiens de ce temps mettoient que le
soleil et Venus et Mercure estoient touz .iii. en un meïsme ciel pour ce
que il font leurs cours[17] aussi comme en un meïsme temps. Et semble
que ce dit soit raisonnable et que une meïsme intelligence soit
appropriee a ce ciel total et le meuve d'un mouvement commun a ces
.iii. planetes. Mais aveques ce, ce ciel total est divisé en autres pluseurs
129*a* cielz parcials qui sont comme membres de lui, aussi // comme le .viii.^e^
est membre de tout le ciel, et selon ce sont pluseurs autres mouvemens
de ces cielx parcialz,—les uns de Mercure, les autres de Venus, etc.,—et
autres intelligences qui font ces mouvemens. Item, il ne convient pas que
selon ce que les planetes sont plus basses et plus loing du souverain ciel
que elles soient pour ce meües plus isnelement de leur propre mouve-

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[13] *B* cecles.
[14] *A* retarde de leur.
[15] *A* autres le l'ensuient.
[16] 133*d* ff.
[17] *D* leur corps.

ment proporcionelment ou selonc proporcionalité precise, car aveques ce est a considerer et a compenser la puissance et la volenté ou desir de la vertu motive.

20.—*Ou .xx.ᵉ chapitre il monstre que les estoilles sont de figure sperique.*

> L'en[1] doit cuider raisonnablement que de chascune estoille ou de chascun corps du ciel visible la figure est sperique.

Glose. Si comme la figure du soleil et celle de la lune et des autres estoilles; et ou .ix.ᵉ chapitre fu dit quelle est figure sperique ou espere 129b et est un corps ou milieu[2] du- / quel est un point dont toutes les lignes droites qui vont a la circonference sont equales. Mais de telz corps sont .ii. manieres: un est creous ou concave et contient en soy autre[s][3] corps, si comme est le ciel qui contient les .iiii. elemens en sa superfice concave; autre corps sperique est qui est tout masseiz, si comme seroit une pelote d'or perfaitement ronde. Et en ceste maniere doit l'en entendre que les estoilles sont speriques, car dire que elles sont creuses ou concaves et que elles contiennent autres corps aussi comme un vaiseau contient vin ou eaue, ce samble chose fainte et divinee. Et pour ce, l'en ne doit pas ainsi entendre ce que di(s)t l'Escripture qui appelle le soleil: *vas admirabile opus Excelsi.*[4] Aprés il prouve son propos par .iii. raisons.

> Tiexte. Car nous avons monstré devant que les estoilles ne sont pas nees ou habiles a estre meües par elle[s] meïsme[s],[5] car nature ne fait rien desraisonnablement ne pour nient. Et pour ce, aus corps qui sont de soy immobiles, elle a donné telle figure qui est immobile et ce est figure sperique pour ce que elle ne a 129c quelcunque instrument // ordené a mouvement. Et donques appert que les corps des estoilles sont speriques.

Glose. Ceste raison fu mise ou .xvi.ᵉ chapitre a monstrer que les estoilles ne sont pas meües par soy et de soy aussi comme sont les bestes, car figure sperique est a ce inhabile,[6] mes elle est tres habile a mouvement qui est fait par violence ou par vertu dehors, et pour ce sont de telle figure les pierres d'engin et les pelotes ou esteufs[7] dont les enfans se esbatent. Item, encore le ay je autrefois monstré par une belle ymaginacion, car se une espere d'or ou d'autre metal tres perfaitement polie[8] estoit sus une table tres onnie et tres equalment haute selon toutes ses parties et rien ne resistast au mouvement de ceste espere sus celle table fors seulement la pesanteur de l'espere, je di que il ne pourroit estre vertu pulsive quelcunque si petite ou vertu motive dehors tant fust petite qui ne peüst mouver ou faire roueler ceste espere sus celle table, et que une tres petite vertu la pourroit mouver et si pourroit mendre vertu mile foiz et mendre 129d cent mile fois et / ainsi sans fin. Et la cause est pour ce que la pesanteur de ceste espere qui trait et encline d'une part et celle qui resiste et encline d'autre sont equales en ce cas. Aprés il met une autre raison.

> Tiexte. Item, selon raison, toutes les estoilles sont figurees samblablement aussi comme est une de elles.

Glose. Car selon Averroïz, elles sont toutes d'une espece tres especial aussi comme sont tous honmes, mes ce fu reprouvé ou .xvi.^{e} chapitre.[9] Mais verité est que elles sont toutes d'une espece general selon laquelle il est raisonnable que elles soient toutes d'une figure, aussi comme elles sont toutes meües de mouvement circulaire. Et meïsme es choses corruptibles de cibas voit l'en que pluseurs qui different en espece sont presque d'une figure. Et donques se nous voions que une estoille est[10] de figure sperique, nous devons cuider que si sont les autres.

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[1] *Guthrie*, ch. xi.

[2] 96*a*. Figure 31, p. 274.

[3] *A* autre.

[4] *Eccle.* xliii. 2.

[5] *A* elle meïsme.

[6] 115c.

[7] Apparently *pierres d'engin* means rounded stones used in a sling-shot; *esteuf*, modern *éteuf*, is an obsolescent term for *balle de paume* and appears in Godefroy, *Complément*, as *estius*; the etymology is uncertain.

[8] *B* omits 'tres perfaitement polie.'

> Tiexte. Et il appert parce que l'en voit a le ouil que la lune est
> corps sperique, car ce que elle samble creistre et descreistre en
> 130*a* lumiere ne pourroit apparoir ainsi com- // me nous voions se
> elle estoit d'autre figure.

Glose. Si comme se elle estoit ronde et plate comme une tabour ou d'autre figure quelcunque, car tousjours une moitié de la lune ou pres est devers nostre voiement, et aussi touzjours une moitié de elle ou environ est devers le soleil et enluminee se elle ne est eclipse[e].[11] Et selon ce que ces .ii. moitiés de la superfice de la lune participent ensamble, la lune nous appert plus ou moins enluminee et croistre et appeticier, et ne pourroit ainsi apparoir se elle estoit de quelcunque figure autre que sperique. Et l'en pourroit esprouver legierement chose samblable en une espere d'or ou de cuivre a la lumiere d'une chandelle, car telle espere sambleroit plaine et enluminee toute quant nous serions entre elle et la chandelle, et quant elle seroit aussi comme entre nous et la chandelle[12] elle sambleroit obscure. Et je disoie notablement que pres de[13] la moitié de la superfice de
la lune est devers nous et non pas la moitié, et seroit veüe se elle estoit
130*b* enluminee, car toutes fois que un corps sperique / plus grant que l'espace
de entre .ii. ouylz est devant nous, l'en ne pourroit voier fors moins de la moitié de la superfice. Et donques nous ne pourrions veoir la moitié de la superfice de la lune posé que elle fust toute enluminee. Item, toute foiz que .i. corps sperique est enluminé d'un autre corps sperique plus grant de lui, il convient que plus de la moitié de cel corps soit enlumine[e].[14] Et donques plus de la moitié de la superfice de la lune est enluminee du soleil. Item, tant plus est tel corps sperique pres de celui qui l'enlumine aussi comme la lune pres du soleil, tant plus grande partie de sa superfice est enluminee. Et donques plus grande partie de la lune est enluminee[15] quant elle est en conjunction que en opposicion, et plus en approcant de la conjunction et moins que elle en est plus loing. Et par ce s'ensuit que tant plus de la lune nous appert enlu[m]ine[e],[16] tant moins en est enlumine[e][17] et, *e converso*, tant moins nous appert de elle enlumine[e],[18] tant plus en est enlumine[e],[19] et ce n'est pas fort a entendre.[20] Aprés il met la tierce raison qui est aussi comme confirmacion de la seconde.

> Tiexte. Item, il appert par les demonstracions d'astrologie que les
> 130*c* eclipses du soleil ne seroient pas // lu[n]aire[s],[21] ce est a dire
> teles comme la lune appert, se ainsi ne estoit que la lune et le
> soleil[22] ne fussent corps speriques.

Glose. Car eclipse de soleil est pour ce que la lune est pour lors entre nous et le soleil. Et ceste raison prove que telz corps sont de figure ronde, plate ou sperique. Mes, par aventure, elle ne conclut pas evidanment que eulz soient de figure sperique.

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[9] 117*b*, note 15; cf. also *Juntas*, t.c. 59, 138F; also t.c. 49, 131K-M.

[10] *BCDEF* omit 'Et donques . . . est.'

[11] *ABCF* eclipse.

[12] *DE* omit 'et quant elle . . . la chandelle.'

[13] *A* pres et de.

[14] *A* enluminé.

[15] *B* omits 'Et donques . . . enluminee.'

[16] *A* enluniné.

[17] *ADEF* enluminé.

[18] *ABCF* enluminé.

[19] *ABCF* enluminé. *DE* omit 'tant plus . . . enlumine[e].'

[20] *DE* entendre en regardant ceste presente figure ici mise. The figure is not executed, but doubtless the reference is to figure 32, 130c.

[21] *A* luminaire; *CDEF* lunaire.

[22] *A* soleleil.

Tiexte. Et donques se un de telz corps est sperique, il s'ensuit que les autres sont speriques.

Glose. Car eulz sont tous d'une espece general, si comme dit est devant.
Et nons-obstans cestes[23] raisons, aucun pourroit dire que la lune n'est
pas perfaitement sperique ne les autres estoilles, car la terre n'est pas
130*d* sperique, et toutevoies / il sambleroit que elle le fust qui la veroit d'ausi
lo[i]n[g][24] comme nous voions la lune. Et ce appert par l'ombre de la
131*a* terre en l'eclipse de la lune. Mais // dire que en la superfice de la lune
sont mons et valees lesquelles nous ne appercevons pas pour ce que elle
est si loing, ce est une divinaille. Et si doit l'en cuider que les corps
lumineux du ciel sont de figure noble et parfaite et telle est figure sperique,
si comme il fu dit ou .ix.^e chapitre.[25]

21.—*Ou .xxi.^e chapitre il propose deux fortes questions.*

Nous[1] tempterons a dire de .ii. questions ce que il nous en semble desquelles chascun doit bien faire doubte. Et ce que nous voulons si prestement parler de si haute matiere, l'en doit reputer que nous le faisons aveques verconde, par desir de enquerir verité plus que par trop grant hardiesce ou par presompcion. Et ainsi doit faire tout honme qui pour amour de philosophie est diligent et desirant d'avoir aucunes petites souffissances des choses dont nous avons tres grans doubtes.

Glose.[2] Aprés il propose la premiere question.

Tiexte. Et comme pluseurs teles doubtes soient, toutevoies entre
les autres ce n'est pas petite merveille pour quelle cause les
131b planetes qui sont / plus loing du ciel qui est meü de premier
mouvement, ce est a savoir seulement de mouvement journal, ne
sont meües de tant de pluseurs mouvemens comme elles sont plus
loing de ce premier ciel. Mes est ainsi que aucunes planetes
moiennes entre ce souverain ciel et les plus basses sont meües
de pluseurs mouvemens que ne sont les plus basses. Et toutevoies,
il sambleroit raisonnable se le premier et souverain corps est meü
d'un seul mouvement, que le secont tres prochain de lui fust meü
de pou de mouvemens, si comme de .ii., et le tiers aprés de .iii.
ou selon un autre ordre de nombres. Or est le contraire vrai,
car le soleil et la lune sont meüz de moins de mouvemens que ne
sont aucunes des autres planetes, combien que elles soient plus
loing du milieu du monde et plus pres du premier corps que ne
sont le soleil et la lune.

Glose. Selon Averroïz,[3] au devant de Ptholomee[4] les anciens tenoient que
la lune avoit .iii. mouvemens seulement, et Ptholomee[4] met que elle en a
.v. et Mercure .ix. et chascune des autres planetes .viii. excepté le soleil;
131c et dit // Averroïz que les anciens disoient que le soleil est le premier
audesus de la lune. Mais a declarer de chascune planete quans mouvemens
elle a, ce seroit longue chose et, par aventure, incertaine et appartient

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[23] Figure 32, p. 274.
[24] *A* lonc; *DE* de ainsy loing.
[25] 97*d*.
[1] *Guthrie*, ch. xii.
[2] *BCDEF* omit 'Glose.'
[3] *Juntas*, t.c. 60, 139F. *C* Avenrois.
[4] *CDEF* Tholomee.

plus aus astrologiens. Et quant a propos, il souffist supposer comme chose certaine par astrologie que aucunes planetes plus basses sont meües de moins de mouvemens que ne sont aucunes autres qui sont plus hautes. Et est grant merveille pourquoy ce peu(s)t estre. Aprés il monstre que la lune est plus basse que autres qui sont meües de pluseurs mouvemens que elle n'est.

> Tiexte. Et l'ordre d'aucunes planetes appert a regarder, car nous avons veü que la lune estoit demie ou en quartier, et que la planete appellee Mars entra et fu mucie desriere la partie de la lune qui estoit noire et sans lumiere et issist devers la partie qui estoit clere et enluminee.

Glose. Il convenoit que ce fust quant la lune estoit ou premier quartier
devant la plaine lune pour ce que la lune est meüe moult plus isnelement
131*d* de son propre mouvement que n'est Mars. / Or appert donques que la
lune estoit lors entre nous et Mars et donques est Mars[5] plus haut que
n'est la lune.

> Tiexte. Et samblablement dient des autres planetes les anciens Egipciens et Babiloniens qui ont jadis et par pluseurs ans pris garde a telz choses et en ont faites observacions.

[Glose.][6] Aprés il propose la seconde question.

> Tiexte.[7] Item, encore n'est ce pas merveille se aucun fait doubte pour quelle cause ou premier ciel est si grant multitude de estoilles que elles sont, quant a nous, innombrables.

Glose. Et pour ce di(s)t de Dieu l'Escripture: *qui numerat*[8] *multitudinem stellarum, etc.*[9]

> Tiexte. Et en chascun des autres cielz a tant seulement une singuliere estoille et ne voions que en un de ces cielx ou esperes soient .ii. estoilles ou pluseurs fichies.

Glose. Il entent par le premier et souverain ciel le .viii.^{e} espere ou sont les estoilles que nous appellons fichies, si comme souvent dit est. Aprés il monstre que il est bon de faire teles questions.

> Tiexte. Et faire questions de ces choses est bien et est profitable a
> 132*a* intelligence ou a entendement qui se // estent a plus.

Glose. Selon autre translacion,[10] il di(s)t que par ce est acreüe la vertu de nostre entendement, ce est a dire que entendement[11] humain, qui se excercite et estudie en telles nobles questions, est par ce aussi comme eslevé et miex ordené et disposé a la cognoissance de plus hautes choses, si comme sont les choses divines; car si comme di(s)t le Sage: *a magnitudine speciei et creature, cognoscibiliter poterit creator*[12] *horum videri.*[13] Aprés il touche la difficulté de telles choses.

> Tiexte. Et combien que de ces choses nous ne puissons avoir ou assigner fors tres petites causes, tant pour ce que elles sont si loing de nous comme pour ce que nous povons bien pou cognoistre de leurs accidens, toutevoies par ce que nous dirons pourra apparoir que faire ces doubtes n'est pas desraisonnable.

Glose. Encore, selon Averroïz,[14] peu(s)t l'en assigner autre cause de leur difficulté, car les corps du ciel sont tres merveilleusement differenz des corps que nous sentons ici-bas en excellence de noblesce.

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[5] *B* omits 'et donques est Mars.'

[6] *ABCDEF* omit 'Glose.'

[7] *DE* omit 'Tiexte.'

[8] *E* nuerat.

[9] *Psalm* cxlvi, 4.

[10] The Arabic-Latin version by Michael Scot; given in italicized text in *Juntas*, 139I-K.

[11] *B* omits 'ce est a dire que entendement.'

[12] *CDEF* orator.

[13] Cf. *Sap.* xiii, 5: 'A magnitudine enim speciei et creaturae, cognoscibiliter poterit creator horum videri.'

[14] *Juntas*, t.c. 61, 139M.

22.—*Ou .xxii.ᵉ chapitre il met la solucion de la premiere question.* /

132b Mes nous faisons ces doubtes pour ce que nous enquerons des corps du ciel aussi comme se eulz fussent corps qui fussent seulement corps et qui eüssent tel ordre comme ont les corps qui sont du tout sans ame.

Glose. Car se ce [f]ussent[15] corps qui fussent meüz par embruissement ou inclinacion de nature, si comme sont les .iiii. elemens, et non pas par vertu intellective ou voluntaire, l'en ne peüst pas bien assigner cause pourquoy leurs mouvemens ne fussent autrement ordenéz.

Tiexte. Mais nous devons avoir opinion des corps du ciel comme de corps qui participent en action voluntaire et en vie,[15a] et ainsi il ne samblera pas que il s'ensuive rien qui soit hors raison.

Glose. Selon l'autre translacion,[16] il di(s)t que les corps du ciel sont corps vivans de vie intellective. Et ce est la premiere de .iiii.[17] supposicions que il met a son propos. Et la prouve Averroïz par .ii. raisons:[18] une est car il convient par necessité que tout corps ait ame et vie qui est plus noble 132c que tel a ame et vie; et le ciel est plus noble que // les corps de cibas qui ont vie intellective. Item, les corps du ciel ont determineement figure sperique, et corps non-vifz ne[19] requierent determineement une figure plus que autre; et donques le ciel est corps vif. Mais ceste opinion fu reprouvee ou quint chapitre[20] et les raisons devant mises ne concludent pas, car il ne convient pas que tout corps soit vif qui est plus noble que cel est vif, car un saphir ou une esmeraude est plus noble que une mousche ou que un ort verm et que pluseurs corps vifz d'ame materiele. D'autre partie, corps vif d'ame intellective, si comme est corps humain consideré sans ame, n'est pas si noble comme est le ciel qui est corps perpetuel, mais l'ame qui est perpetuele, esperituele[21] est plus noble que le corps du ciel. Et si est par[22] la raison de l'ame, car aveques ce que dit est, les corps et les mouvemens du ciel sont ordenés de Dieu et de nature pour creature humaine, si comme il fu dit en la fin d[u][23] .viii.ᵉ chapitre.[24] Et la seconde raison a petite apparence, car l'en pourroit dire que pluseurs 132d corps non-vifz requierent determi- / neement certaine figure, si comme sont marguerites et aucunes autres pierres precieuses et autres choses. Et donques le ciel n'est pas pour ce corps vif. Mais comment que soit, posé que il fust corps vif aussi comme est un honme ou que il soit sanz vie aussi comme est un horloge, toutevoiez selon philosophie l'en doit supposer que il est meü par choses qui ont entendement et volenté et vie, si comme sont intelligences ou angelz. Aprés il met la seconde supposicion.

Tiexte. Item, il samble que la chose qui a le plus grant bien qui puisse estre a et possiet ce bien sanz quelcunque action.

Glose. Ce est Dieu, et[25] selon Averroïz,[26] les autres choses purement incorporeles, car leur action est leur substance. Et donques doit l'en ici entendre ce que il di(s)t *sanz action*, ce est a savoir par laquele tele chose soit transmuee.

Tiexte. Et la chose qui est tres prochain[e][27] de ceste a et poussiet son bien et sa fin par pou de action[28] ou par une seule action, et

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[15] *A* eüssent.

[15a] *E* omits 'vie.'

[16] Cf. *Juntas*, 139L for the Arabic-Latin version.

[17] *B* .ii.

[18] *Ibid.*, t.c. 61, 140A-D.

[19] *B* omits 'ne.'

[20] 77*d et seq.*

[21] *DE* ame qui est corps esperitual et esp.

[22] *DEF* Et si est honme par; *C* honme, marginal gloss.

[23] *A* de; *BCF* de le.

[24] 95*d*.

[25] *DE* c'est a dire et.

[26] *Juntas*, t.c. 61, 140B.

[27] *A* prochain.

[28] *DE* par double action; *BCF* par par de action.

celles qui en sont plus loing ont leur bien et leur fin par pluseurs
133*a* actions, si comme nous // voions es corps humains que un corps a santé sans soy excerciter et un autre corps a santé par aler .i. pou, et un autre pour santé a mestier de courir et de luitter et d'autre labour.

Glose. Aprés il met la tierce supposicion.

Tiexte. Item, un autre corps est lequel ne peu(s)t avoir parfaite santé pour quelcunque labour ou excercitacion que il face, mes il attaint a une[29] autre disposicion qui n'est pas si bonne; car ce est fort de faire pluseurs operacions ou une operacion souvent, si comme gecter pluseurs grosses pierres, mais ce est plus ligier gecter une de elles ou .ii. Et samblablement venir a aucune fin par pou[30] de moiens est plus ligier ou plus aisié a faire, mais ce est plus grant difficulté de venir a ce par pluseurs moiens.

Glose. Si comme se un vouloit empetrer une grace du prince, se il convenoit que il suppliast a un et cestui a l'autre, et l'autre au tiers ou au quart,[31] et le quart ou le quint au prince, ce seroit plus fort que se il la povoit
133*b* obtenir sans moiens par supplier[32] au prince. Et pour ce, aucun est / qui ne pourroit obtenir telle grace ne par une supplicacion ne par moiens. Or avons donques .iiii. degrés: le premier est la chose qui a tres grant perfection sanz transmutacion; le secont est ce que approche du premier par une seule transmutacion ou operacion; le tiers est ce qui en approche par pluseurs; le quart qui n'en pot approchier mais attaint ou approche a une autre perfection plus petite par une ou par .ii. ou par pluseurs operacions. Et encore sera dit aprés du quint degré[33] qui n'a operacion ne perfection fors tres petite. Aprés il met la quarte supposicion.

Tiexte. Et nous devons cuider que l'action des estoilles ou des cielz est tele quant a propos comme est celle des honmes et des bestes et des plantes,[34] car honme a pluseurs operacions et, par la multitude de elles, il aquiert moult de biens qui sont ordenéz a une fin et a un bien. Mais la chose qui a le plus grant bien qui puisse estre ne a mestier de action.

Glose. Ce est a entendre de action qui est accident par quoy telle chose
133*c* est transmuee. Et Dieu est intransmuable et son action est sa // substance.

Tiexte. Et action est en .ii. choses: une est la fin pour quoy elle est; l'autre est ce qui oevre pour la fin.

Glose. Et est accident et, comme dit est, honme a pluseurs telles actions tendantes a une fin principal qui est felicité.

Tiexte. Mais les autres bestes ont moins d'operacions et les plantes[34] encore moins et, par aventure, une seule et petite.

Glose. Les bestes ont operacions de vie sensitive et de vie vegetative, et les plantes[35] seulement de vie vegetative.

Tiexte. Et ainsi est une fin principal a quoy l'en tent aussi comme honme tent a une fin ou pluseurs fins et operacions qui toutes sont ordenees a une.

Glose. Aprés il repete en declarant ce que dit est.

Tiexte. Et donques une chose est qui participe en souverain bien et autre qui attaint pres de tel bien par pou de mouvemens, et autre par pluseurs et autre qui est moult loing de perfection, mais il lui souffist estre pres de imperfection; ausi comme se santé estoit fin et un honme fust tousjours perfaitement sain, et un 133d autre en approchast par estre atte- / nué, et l'autre par estre attenué et par courir ou par une autre operacion qui fust ordenee pour miex courir. Et ainsi sont pluseurs mouvemens et operacions ordenees pour santé. Et un autre fust qui ne peüst venir ne approchier a parfaite santé, mais par courir ou par attenuacion ou evacuacion, il attainsist a une petite santé qui fust fin de celle operacion; et maïsmement a toutes choses fust tres bon de attaindre[36] la fin principal et se elles ne peuent, tousjours tendent elles a la meilleur que elles peuent avoir. Et elle est meilleur de tant comme elle est plus prochaine de la fin qui est tres perfaitement bonne.

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[29] *E* il actement une.
[30] *DE* moins.
[31] *DE* omit 'ou au quart.'
[32] *D* sous sup.; *E* sans sup.
[33] 134*a*.
[34] *DE* planetes.
[35] *EF* planetes.

Glose. Aprés il applique a propos.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, la terre est du tout sanz mouvement et les choses prouchaines de elle ont pou de mouvemens, car elles ne attaignent pas ou approchent au souverain, mais seulement tant comme elles peuent, il approchent et pou a celui qui est tres divin principe.[37] Et le premier ciel attaint a grant perfection par 134a .i. seul // mouvement et les choses moiennes qui sont entre le premier ciel et les autres tres basses attaignent a perfection, mes ce est par pluseurs mouvemens.[38]

Glose. Si comme il fu dit tantost devant, .v. degrés de choses sont: le premier et le quint sont Dieu et la terre, et sont du tout sans mouvement, un pour sa tres grande et infinie perfection et l'autre par sa tres petite perfection. Et est a entendre que la terre toute ensemble ne se meu(s)t: *terra autem in eternum stat.*[39] Le secont degré est le premier[40] ciel qui a sa perfection par un seul simple mouvement. Le tiers a sa perfection par pluseurs mouvemens et le quart ne peut ataindre a si grant perfection,[40a] mes le a mendre[41] par pou de mouvemens ou par pluseurs. Et chascun de ces .iii. degrés moiens a grant latitude et peu(s)t estre devisé et subdivisé en pluseurs. Et par ce Aristote veult donner a entendre la solucion de la question, car aucun ciel moien est meü de moins de mouvemens que tel ciel est plus haut[42] et que tel ciel est plus bas, pour ce que par ce petit 134b nombre de mouvemens il aquiert / aussi grant perfection ou plus grande que tel ciel est plus haut de lui ou il ne peut pas ataindre a si grant perfection, mes a une petite laquelle il aquiert par pou de mouvemens. Mais, en verité, il me samble que ceste response a pou d'apparence, car les esperes du ciel ne sont pas en ordre de perfection selon ce que elles sont ordenees en siege et que une est plus haut que l'autre, car tout le ciel est aussi comme un corps et les esperes celestielx sont aussi comme les membres ou les pieces de ce corps. Et pour ce, le soleil qui est ou milieu des planetes est le plus noble corps du ciel et est plus parfait que Saturne ne que Jupiter ne que Mars qui sont plus haut que lui, et aussi est vraysemblable que Jupiter est plus parfait que Saturne et la lune que n'est Mercure. Item, Aristote suppose que le .viii.e ciel soit celui a qui est approprié[43] le premier mouvement, c'est a savoir le journal. Mes supposé que ce soit le souverain et premier ciel et que il ne fust meü d'autre mouvement, toutevoies ce mouvement ne lui est pas approprié ne l'in- // 134c telligence qui le fait, car ce est le propre mouvement de tout le ciel et la masse de toutes les esperes est le corps meü de ce mouvement, combien

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[36] *DE* entendre.

[37] *DE* prince.

[38] *DE* omit 'et les choses moiennes . . . mouvemens.'

[39] *Eccle.* i, 4. *B* omits 'autem.'

[40] *DE* omit 'premier.'

[40a] *DE* a sa tres grande perfection.

[41] *E* mes a la mendre.

[42] *BCDEF* omit 'haut.'

[43] *B* attribué.

que ses parties soient meües d'autres mouvemens. Et se il estoit autrement,
le mouvement journal des planetes seroit violent ou desnaturel et
ravissement; et ce ne[44] peut estre, si comme il fu dit ou tiers chapitre.[45]
Item, il suppose[45a] que les cielz soient corps vifz et que il se meuvent de
soy meïsme par les intelligences qui sont comme les ames par quoy telz
corps vivent, mais ce fu reprové ou quint chapitre.[46] Item, Averroïz suppose
en le .viii.^e chapitre et ici[47] que les cielz sont meüz de premiere intencion
et principalment pour soi meïsme afin de leur perfection aquerir ou
maintenir et garder, et sont meüs de seconde intencion pour les choses
de cibas. Et met de ce exemple ou .xii.^e de *Methaphisique*[48] de un honme
qui se exercite en aucun artifice principalment pour garder sa santé, et
moins principalment et comme pour fin seconde pour le guaing qui vient
134*d* de l'artifice. Mais ceste opinion fu reprouvee / en le .viii.^e chapitre,[49] car
toutes choses corporelles sont pour honme principalment meïsme selon
Aristote en secont livre de *Phisique*[50] et ou premier de *Politiques*.[51] Et
pour ce, selon verité, les corps du ciel ne attaignent ou aquierent par leur
mouvement quelcunque perfection fors tant seulement que par telz
mouvemens il sont appliquiéz deüement pour oevrer a la fin pour quoy
il sont ou furent creés; ausi comme une pierre precieuse ou une herbe
qui par mouvement est mise sus le ouil ou sus autre membre ne aquiert
en soy par ce mouvement[52] autre perfection fors que par ce est appliquié
a oevrer a la fin que entent celui qui ainsi l'applique. Et samblablement,
je di que les corps du ciel sont tres precieux et ont en soy tres merveilleuses
et tres nobles vertus tant sensibles comme insensibles, mes il sont
meüz par choses incorporeles lesquelles ne sont pas formes ne ames de
cez corps, si comme il fu dit ou quint chapitre.[53] Et est aussi comme un
135*a* char qui est meü par les // chevaulz qui le mainent selon ce que les
poëtes[54] fignoient que .iiii. chevaux mainent le curre du soleil, fors tant
que les cielz sont meüz par vertus incorporelles, comme dit est, selon
verité et sanz labour, sans travail, sanz difficulté et sanz resistence. Et par
ces mouvemens les intelligences ou angelz les appliquent deüement pour
la tra[n]smutacion,[55] generacion et conservacion des corps de cibas. Et
le souverain et principal moteur est Dieu qui ainsi les demaine comme
ses instrumens; et de ce disoit un poëte: *organa sunt primi, sunt instrumenta*
supremi.[56] Et selon ce, par les mouvemens du soleil sont faiz jour
et nuit, esté et yver; de quoy di(s)t l'Escripture: *frigus et estus, estas et*
hyemps, nox et dies non requiescunt.[57] Et par les mouvemens de la lune
sont faiz autres effeiz; et de ce est escript: *luna—, ostensio temporis, et*
signum evi.[58] Et samblablement, par les mouvemens des autres estoilles
et planetes sont causéz certains effiz en ce monde cibas. Je di donques que
135*b* l'assiete et ordenance des / corps du ciel, le nombre, l'isneleté, la qualité,
la diversité ou difference de leurs mouvemens,—toutes ces choses sont
telement fetez selon ce que il est expedient et que il compete a la
generacion et conservacion des corps de cibas, et comme pour fin. Et ne

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[44] *B* omits 'ne.'

[45] 73*b*.

[45a] *A* supposent.

[46] 77*d et seq.*

[47] *Juntas*, t.c. 64, 142H-K. Cf. also 91*d et seq.*, *Juntas*, t.c. 21, 108L-M.

[48] *Metaphysicorum*, ed. Juntas, VIII, 1574, t.c. 44, 328B.

[49] 91*d et seq.*

[50] *Physicorum*, II, 2, 194a, 34-35.

[51] *Politicorum*, I, 1, 1253a, 1-4.

[52] *DE* soy autre mouvement.

[53] 77*d et seq.*

[54] Ovid, *Meta.*, II, 1-328, the fable of Phaeton. *F* omits 'selon ce que les poëtes . . . mainent.'

[55] *A* trasmutacion.

[56] Unidentified; a quotation from Bernard Sylvester, cf. 69*a*, n. 44. *B* primi et sunt.

[57] Cf. *Gen.* viii, 22: 'frigus et aestus, aestas et hiems, nox et dies non requiescent.'

[58] Cf. *Eccle.* xliii, 6: 'Et luna in omnibus in tempore suo, ostensio temporis, et signum aevi.'

convient diviner ne assigner autre cause ne autre response a la question proposee, salve la grace d'Aristote.

23.—*Ou .xxiii.ᵉ chapitre il respont a la seconde question.*

> Et de la seconde doubte, ce est a savoir pourquoy ou premier ciel qui est meü d'un seul mouvement est si grant multitude d'estoilles, et es autres cielz des planetes qui sont meüz de leurs propres mouvemens en chascun ne a que une singuliere estoille: premierement, aucun pourroit cuider raysonnablement que le ciel meü du premier mouvement ha par sus les autres moult grant excellence quant a vie et quant a estre, principe ou cause.

Glose. L'estoille est plus noble partie de son ciel que ne sont les autres parties, et pour ce ou ciel qui est plus noble est telle multitude d'e- // 135c stoilles. Et le ciel qui est meü du premier mouvement est le plus noble, tant pour ce que il est par desus touz [comme][1] pour ce que il est le plus estendu et est meü [l]e[2] plus isnelement; et, selon Aristote, ce est le .viii.ᵉ espere. Mes ce que il di(s)t que ce ciel ha vie a esté souvent reprouvé devant.[2a] Item, aucun pourroit dire que l'espere du soleil lequel est moien entre les planetes et est le ouyl du monde: *sol oculus mundi*,[3] est plus noble que ne est le .viii.ᵉ espere. Et pour ce les anciens le tenoient et reputoient le souverain Dieu.[4] Et Macrobes, ou livre appellé *De saturnalibus*,[5] allegue a ce propos les theologiens paiens et recite comment par Joves il ne entendoient autre chose que le soleil, et par Saturne le soleil et par Mars et par Venus et Mercure et Dyane et Hercules et Juno, et ainsi de touz les autres principalz appelléz diex [o]u[6] deësses. Et toutevoies, en l'espere du soleil ne a que un corps lumineus. Et, par aventure, l'en 135d pourroit dire que la perfec- / tion du soleil excede la perfection de toutes les estoilles fichies, mais la perfection de le .viii.ᵉ espere excede les perfections des autres planetes pour les causes desus mises. Aprés il met une autre response a la question principal.

> Tiexte. Item, ce est selon raison, pour ce, que le mouvement premier meut pluseurs corps divins, c'est a savoir les estoilles fichies, et des autres, ce est a savoir des planetes, pluseurs mouvemens meuvent un tel corps, car chascune des planetes est meüe de pluseurs mouvemens. Et ainsi nature recompense et fait telle ordenance que au ciel qui est meü d'un seul mouvement elle donne pluseurs corps lumineux, et a chascun ciel qui a un seul tel corps elle donne pluseurs mouvemens.

Glose. Il fu monstré ou tiers chapitre du premier[7] comment un corps peut estre meü de pluseurs mouvemens ou d'un mouvement mixte et composé de pluseurs. Aprés il met une tierce response. //

> 136a Tiexte.[8] Item, les autres esperes des planetes ont chascune une estoille pour ce car moult de esperes celestielx meuvent une tele

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[1] *A* omits 'comme.'

[2] *A* se.

[2a] Cf. 91*d et seq.* and 134*c*.

[3] Cf. Ovid, *Metam.* iv, 227.

[4] Cf. *Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobii Commentariorum in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. F. Eyssenhardt (Lipsiae, Teubner, 1893), I, xvii, 12-16, p. 554.

[5] *Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobii Conviviorum Primi Diei Saturnaliorum*, ed. F. Eyssenhardt (Lipsiae, Teubner, 1893), I, xvii-xxiii, pp. 86-127.

[6] *A* au.

[7] 8*a*.

[8] *DE* tierce raison; *C* omits 'Tiexte.'

estoille et de ces esperes celles qui sont premieres moevent la desreniere en laquelle est une seule estoille, et ceste desreniere espere est fichie et meüe en moult d'autres esperes et chascune espere est un corps.

Glose. Tout ce di(s)t Aristote selon les astrologiens de son temps qui mettoient que tant de mouvemens comme a Saturne, tant a il d'esperes et il est en la desreniere qui est fichie es[9] autres. Mais ceste opinion est reprouvee par les astrologiens qui ont depuis esté.

Tiexte. Et l'oevre ou mouvement de la souverainne espere est commune a toutes et chascune des autres a son propre mouvement par nature qui est adjousté.

Glose. Tout le ciel ensamble, aussi comme un corps, est meü naturelment de mouvement journal, et le premier est meü de ce seul mouvement et les autres aveques ce sont meüz aussi comme au contraire en procedant 136b de orient vers oc- / cident.

Tiexte. Et de tout corps fini e[s]t[10] la vertu finie.

Glose. Selon les expositeurs,[11] il veult dire que la vertu qui meut le ciel est finie et ce est a entendre finie en qualité ou intension, car elle est infinie en duracion. Et convient, selon ce que il dient, que elle ait certaine proporcion au corps meü. Et donques qui adjousteroit ou ciel de Saturne ou d'une autre planete une estoille ou .ii., lequel ciel est meü contre le mouvement journal, la vertu qui meut tout le ciel ensamble de mouvement journal ne le pourroit mouvoir ou non pas si isnelement. Mais ceste raison ne est pas bonne, car combien que en autres mouvemens soit certaine proporcion entre ce qui meut et la chose meüe, il ne est pas ainsi du mouvement du ciel, car il est meü par vertu simplement voluntaire et sanz quelcunque resistence. Et pour ce, se il estoit meü par autre vertu, si comme par pesanter ou par force dehors, puisque il n'a resistence, il 136c seroit meü sans temps soudainnement; et ce est impos- // sible. Et bien est verité que, selon Aristote, l'en ne pourroit adjouster en ciel d'une planete une seule autre estoille, mes sa raison ne prouve pas que se perpetuelment ou ciel d'une planete eüssent esté pluseurs estoilles que il ne pëu[s]t[12] estre meü. Et donques la vraie solucion ou response a ceste question est aussi comme de la precedente; car, selon verité, en le .viii.^{e} ciel sont estoilles en si grant nombre et de tele quantité et qualité et telement ordenees et assises, et aussi en chascun ciel des planetes un seul tel corps et telement disposé en toutes choses comme il est convenable et a fin de la generacion et conservacion des corps de cibas. Aprés il recapitule.

Tiexte. Et ainsi est dit de mouvement circulaire et des estoilles ainsi meües et quellez elles sont selon leur substance et selon leur figure et de leur mouvement et de leur ordre.

24.—*Ou .xxiiii.^{e} chapitre il commence a determiner de la terre en tant comme elle est centre du monde. Et premierement de son lieu, en reprouvant aucunes opinions.*

136d Aprés ce,[1] convient dire de la terre en quel lieu / elle est mise ou assise, et a savoir mon, se elle se repose ou[2] se elle est meüe, et de la figure de elle. Et du lieu ou siege de elle, touz ne ont pas une opinion, car pluseurs, ce est a savoir ceulz qui tiennent que le ciel ou le monde est fini,[3] dient que elle est ou milieu du monde. Mais les philosophes de Ytalie appellés Pytagoriens tiennent le contraire et dient que le feu est ou milieu et que la terre est une estoille obscure qui est meüe de mouvement circulaire environ ou entour le milieu, et par ce sont faiz nuit et jour. Et encore afferment ces philosophes que une autre terre est opposite a ceste et que le feu est ou milieu entre ces .ii. terres, et celle autre terre il l'appellent *Antistona*, ce est a dire contremise.

---

[9] *BCDEF* et.

[10] *A* Et de ce tout corps fini et la vertu finie.

[11] Cf. Alexander and Avicenna as quoted by Averrhoës, *Juntas*, t.c. 71, 145K *et seq.*

[12] *A* peut.

[1] *Guthrie*, ch. xiii.

[2] *DE* omit 'se elle se repose ou.'

Glose. Aprés il met leur maniere de proceder.

Tiexte. Et cez ci ne queroient pas raisons ne causes pour appliquier aus choses qui nous apperent par experience.

Glose. Si comme l'en doit faire en science naturele.

Tiexte. Mes il se adheroient a leurs raysons et opinions et se
137*a* efforçoient de les attraire a salver // les experiences par aournemens de paroles. Et a pluseurs autres samble il que l'en ne doie pas assigner a la terre son lieu ou milieu de la region ou du monde, et creent ceci pour ce que il [ne][4] considerent pas les apparences que nous voions, mes considerent plus a leurs raisons.

Glose. Aprés il met .ii. de leurs raisons.

Tiexte.[5] Car il cuident que a l'element qui est le plus honorable soit deüe convenablement la region qui est plus hounorable. Or est il ainsi que le feu est plus honorable que la terre.

Glose. Car il est plus actif et plus cler et plus soutil.

Tiexte. Et il disoient que les termes sont plus nobles que les choses qui sont moiennes entre les termes, et disoient que le centre et le milieu du monde[6] est terme. Et en pensant ceste raison, il ne cuidoient pas que la terre fust ou milieu, mais le feu.

Glose. Aussi comme le cuer qui est le plus noble membre est aussi comme ou milieu de la beste ou de le honme. Aprés il met leur seconde raison.

137*b* Tiexte. Item, encore disoient les Pythagoriens que il est / bien
convenable que l'element qui est le plus principal et le plus precieus de touz soit ou lieu ou il [puisse][7] estre miex gardé; et tel est le milieu. Et pour ce, il le nomment la Chartre ou la Garde de Joves qui est dieu. Et ceste region a le feu.

Glose. Il ne entendoient pas que ceste prison [fust][8] a l'element du feu pour paine, mes pour garde. Et par aventure, il entendoient,—et est certain d'aucuns philosophes,—que elle est pour poine aus ames des pecheurs. Aprés il respont a ces .ii. raisons ensamble.

Tiexte. Et cez ci prenoient ce mot *moien* aussi comme se il ne fust dit que en une maniere, et que le moien de magnitude ou de corps et le moien de substance ou de nature fust un meïsme; et non est, car es bestes le milieu de la beste et le milieu de son corps ne est pas un.

Glose. Car le cuer est le milieu de la beste et ou plus noble lieu,[9] mais le milieu de son corps est vers le nombril. Et pour ce, est un milieu de la quantité ou magnitude, si comme le centre d'une espere ou d'un autre corps, mais autre milieu est qui eslit nature pour le meilleur[10] lieu.

137*c* Tiexte. Et se ces milieus sont // differens es bestes, nous devons
cuider que il different moult plus en tout le ciel ou en tout le monde.

---

[3] *BCDEF* infini. The Latin text bears out the reading of *A*: cum plurimi, qui totum celum finitum esse aiunt. Cf. *Juntas*, 146I.

[4] *A* omits 'ne.' Cf. *Juntas* 147C.

[5] *BCDEF* omit 'Glose . . . Tiexte.'

[6] *A* repeats 'du monde.'

[7] *A* peut.

[8] *A* soit.

[9] *DE* omit 'et ou plus noble lieu.'

[10] *D* milieu.

Et pour ceste cause, les Pithagoriens ne deüssent pas craindre a mettre la terre ou milieu de tout le monde ne dire que illeques ou centre est la Chartre de Joves, mais il deüssent querir pour melieu ce qui est apte et convenable a ce que illeques soit la chose. Et le lieu qui est hounorable, ce est le melieu. Et tel est ce qui contient et qui est fin moult plus que ne est ce qui est contenu et de quoy[11] il est fin, car ce qui est contenu est aussi comme matiere et ce qui contient est comme substance de forme.

Glose. Or est ainsi que le feu contient les autres elemens, si comme il appert ou premier de *Metheores*,[12] et donques est il en plus hounorable lieu que ne est la terre et donques est il en milieu, a prendre milieu pour meilleur lieu.

Tiexte. Et tel opinion, comme dit est, ont aucuns[13] du lieu de la terre.

Glose. Ce estoient les Pithagoriens qui disoient que elle ne estoit pas ou centre, etc.

137d 25.—*Ou .xxv.^{e} chapitre il recite les opinions d'aucuns du / mouvement de la terre.*

Semblablement touz ne ont pas un opinion du repos et du mouvement de la terre, car touz ceulz qui dient que elle ne est pas ou milieu du monde dient que elle est meüe en circuite environ le milieu ou centre du monde, et non pas seulement ceste terre, mes aussi une autre que il appellent *Antixtone*,[1] si comme nous avons dit devant.

Glose. Ou chapitre precedent.[2] Aprés il met une autre opinion.

Tiexte. Et il samble a aucuns que pluseurs [corps][3] telz comme est la terre sont meüs en circuite environ le centre, lesquelz corps ne nous apparent pas pour ce que la terre le nous empeesche. Et la raison qui les meut est pour ce que la lune est plus souvent souvent eclipsee que ne est le soleil, car, si comme il dient, chascun de telz corps la fait eclipser et non pas seulement la terre.

Glose. Il disoient que la lune eclipse le soleil et la terre la lune, et pour ce que il ne est que une seule lune et pluseurs terres sont, pour ce est 138a la lune plus // souvent eclipsee que le soleil. Mais ceste raison ne est pas[4] bonne, car la lune ne est [on]ques eclipse[e][5] fors par l'ombre de ceste terre. Et la cause pourquoy elle est plus souvent eclipse[e][6] que le soleil est autre que il ne dient, si comme il appert par les livres d'astrologie. Aprés il met comment il responnoient a ce que nous voions tousjours la moitié du ciel, et se la terre ne[7] estoit ou centre, nous en verrions plus ou mains.

Tiexte. Et combien que la terre ne soit pas ou centre mes est hors et en distance, nientmoins il dient que les choses apparoissent telement comme se elle estoit ou centre pour ce que la distance que elle a au centre ne est pas grande ne sensible au resgart de tout le ciel.[8]

Glose. Ce est leur reponse en sentence. Aprés il met une autre opinion.

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[11] *A* contenu est ausi comme et de quoy.

[12] *Meteorologicorum*, I, 2, 339a, 16-17.

[13] *BCDEF* est ou aucuns.

[1] *BCF* anxtitone; *D* anstitone.

[2] 136*d*.

[3] *A* omits 'corps.'

[4] *A* repeats 'pas.'

[5] *A* aveques l'eclipse; *CF* eclipse.

[6] *ACF* eclipse; *DE* omit 'eclipse[e].'

[7] *DE* omit 'ne.'

[8] *DE* regart quelle ou ciel.

Tiexte. Et aucuns dient que la terre est ou centre du monde et
que elle est revolute et meüe en circuite environ le pole a ce
establi, si comme il est ecript ou livre de Platon appellé *Tymeus.*[9]
138b Glose. Ce fu l'opinion d'un appellé Heraclitus / Ponticus[10] qui mettoit
que la terre est meüe circulairement et que le ciel repose. Et Aristote ne
reprouve pas ici ces opinions pour ce, par aventure, que il li sembloit[11]
que elles ont petite apparence et que elles sont ailleurs assés reprouvees
en philosophie et en astrologie.

Mes, souz toute correction, il me samble que l'en pourroit bien soustenir
et coulourer la desreniere opinion, ce est a savoir que la terre est meüe
de mouvement journal et le ciel non. Et premierement, je veul declairer
que l'en ne pourroit monstrer le contraire par quelcunque experience;
secondement, que ne par raisons; et tiercement, metray raisons a ce.
Quant au premier point, une experience est: car nous voions sensiblement
le soleil et la lune et pluseurs de[s][12] estoilles de jour en jour lever et
rescouser et aucunes tournier entour le pole artique. Et ce ne peu(s)t
estre fors par le mouvement du ciel, si comme il fu monstré ou .xvi.e
chapitre.[13] Et donques est le ciel meü de mouvement journal. Une autre
138c experience est: car se la terre est ainsi meüe, elle fait un // tour parfect
en un jour naturel. Et donques nous et les arbres et les maisons sommes
meüs vers orient tres isnelement, et ainsi il nous sembleroit que l'aer et
le vent venist touzjours tres fort devers orient et bruir[oit][14] aussi comme
il fait contre un quarreau d'arbeleste et moult plus fort;[15] et le contraire
appert par experience. La tierce est que met Ptholomee: car qui seroit en
une naif meüe isnelement vers orient et trairoit une seëtte tout droit en
haut, elle ne charroit pas en la naif mes bien loing de la naif vers occident.
Et semblablement, se la terre est meüe si tres isnelement en tournant
de occident en orient, posé que l'en gectast une pierre tout droit en haut,
elle ne cherroit pas ou lieu dont elle parti mes bien loing vers occident;
et le contraire appert de fait. Il me samble que par ce que je dirai a ces
experiences, l'en pourroit respondre a toutes autres qui seroient amenees
a ce propos. Et donques je met premierement que toute la machine corporelle
ou toute la masse de tous les corps du monde est devisee en .ii.
138d parties: une / est le ciel aveques l'espere du feu[16] et la haute region de
l'aer, et toute ceste partie, selon Aristote ou premier de *Metheores*,[17] est
meüe de mouvement journal. L'autre partie est tout le demourant, c'est

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[9] *Timaeus*, 40B.

[10] Heraclides of Pontus, contemporary of Aristotle, was but one of several early Greeks who supported the theory of the diurnal rotation of the earth around the center of the universe. It has been shown that the theory was both well known and important; in attacking it, Aristotle was attacking one of the major astronomical hypotheses of his time. It is not improbable that Oresme knew of the friendly remarks concerning it in Simplicius' commentary on *De Coelo*, II, vii, xiii and xiv; in any case, he knew of the flat rejection in Saint Thomas, *Libri de Coelo et mundo*, II, xxvi. Thorndike, *Hist. of Magic and Experimental Science*, III, 581, and *Science and Thought in the Fifteenth Century*, p. 141, as well as Duhem, *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci*, III, 249 *et seq.* have pointed out the prestige of the theory at the University of Paris in the Fourteenth Century. Buridan, Occam and Albert of Saxony yere favorable to the concept in their commentaries on *De Coelo*. Duhem based the exaggerated claims implied in the title of his article 'Un Précurseur français de Copernic: Nicole Oresme,' *Revue générale des sciences pures et appliquées*, XX (1909), 866-73, entirely upon this gloss. It will be clear to the reader that this gloss contains really nothing to support Duhem's thesis. Of much more significant value, however, is Duhem's historical account of the transmission of Heraclides' theory in *Le Système du monde*, III, 44-162, ch. iii: Le Système d'Héraclide au moyen-âge. An excellent summary with much new material is contained in Grant McColley, 'The Theory of the Diurnal Rotation of the Earth,' *Isis*, XXVI (1936-37), 392-402.

[11] *A* sembleroit.

[12] *A* de.

[13] 115c *et seq.*

[14] *A* bruirent.

[15] *DE* omit 'd'arbaleste . . . fort.'

[16] *DE* ciel.

[17] *Meteorologicorum*, I, 3, 340b, 10-12.

a savoir la moienne et la basse region de l’aer, l’eaue et la terre et les corps mixtes, et, selon Aristote,[18] toute ceste partie est inmobile de mouvement journal. Item, je suppose que mouvement l[ocal ne][19] peut estre sensiblement apparceü fors en tant comme l’en apparçoit un corps soy avoir autrement ou resgart d’autre corps. Et pour ce, se un honme est en une nef appelle[e][20] .a. qui soit meüe tres souef, isnelement ou tardivement, et que cest honme ne voie autre chose fors une autre naif appellee .b. qui soit meüe du tout semblablement comme .a. en quoy il est, je di que il samblera a cest honme que l’une et l’autre naif ne se meüe. Et se .a. repose et .b. est meüe, il lui appert et semble que .b. est meüe; et se .a. est meüe et .b. repose, il lui semble comme devant que .a. repose et que 139a .b. est meüe. // Et ainsi se .a. reposoit par une heure et .b. fust meüe, et tantost en l’autre heure ensuiant fust, *e converso*, que .a. fust meüe et .b. reposast, cest honme ne pourroit apparcevoir ceste mutacion ou variacion, mes continuelment li sembleroit[20a] que .b. fust meüe; et ce appert par experience. Et la cause est car ces .ii. corps .a. et .b. ont continuelment autre resgart un a l’autre en tele maniere du tout quant .a. est meü et .b. repose comme il ont quant, *e converso*, quant .b. est meü et .a. repose. Et il appert ou quart livre de *La Perspective* de Witelo[21] que l’en ne[22] apparçoit mouvement fors telement comme l’en apparçoit .i. corps soy avoir autrement[23] ou resgart d’un autre. Je di donques que, se des .ii. parties du monde desus dites, celles desus estoit au jour de huy meüe de mouvement journal, comme si est, et celle de bas non, et demain fust le contraire que celle de cibas fust meüe de mouvement journal et l’autre non, ce est a savoir le ciel, etc., nous ne pourrions apparcevoir en rien 139b ceste mutacion, mes tout sembleroit estre en une ma- / niere huy et demain quant a ce. Et nous sambleroit continuelment que la partie ou nous sommes reposast et que l’autre fust tousjours meüe, aussi comme il semble a un honme qui est en une naif meüe que les arbres dehors sont meüz. Et samblablement, se un honme estoit ou ciel, posé que il soit meü de mouvement journal, et cest honme qui est porté aveques le ciel voioit clerement la terre et distin[c]teement[24] les mons, les vaulz, fleuves, villes et chastiaulz, il lui sambleroit que la terre [fust][25] meüe de mouvement journal, aussi comme il samble du ciel a nous qui sommes en terre. Et semblablement, se la terre estoit meüe de mouvement journal et le ciel non, il nous sembleroit que elle reposast et que le ciel fust meü; et ce peut ymaginer legierement chascun qui a bon entendement. Et par ce appert clerement la response de la premiere experience, car l’en diroit que le soleil et les estoilles apparent ainsi couchier et lever et le ciel tourner pour le mouvement de la terre et des elemens ou nous habitons. A la 139c seconde appert // la response parce que, selon cest opinion, la terre seulement ne est pas ainsi meüe, mes aveques ce l’eaue et l’aer comme dit est, combien que l’eaue et l’aer de cibas soient meüz autrement par les vens ou par autres causes. Et est samblable comme se en une naif meüe estoit aer enclos, il sambleroit a celui qui seroit en cel aer qui[26] il ne se meüst.

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[18] *BCDEF* omit ‘et selon Aristote.’

[19] *A* le calue.

[20] *A* appellé.

[20a] *DE* omit ‘li sembleroit.’

[21] *Witellonis Opticae libri decem* a Federico Risnero, Basileae, 1572, IV, 110, p. 167: ‘Quoniam enim moveri est aliter se habere nunc, quam prius: palam quod facilitas huius comprehensionis motus fit ex comparatione rei motae visae ad aliud visibile quiescens non motum. Quando enim comprehenditur situs unius rei mobilis, respectu alterius rei visibilis, tunc etiam comprehenditur diversitas situs eius respectu illius visibilis, et tunc comprehenditur motus.’ This edition of Witelo’s *Optics* or *Perspective* is appended to Alhazen’s *Opticae*, Basel, 1572

[22] *DE* omit ‘ne.’

[23] *DE* soy a mouvoir autrement.

[24] *A* distinteement.

[25] *A* seroit.

[26] *BCDEF* que.

A la tierce experience, qui semble plus forte, de la seëtte ou pierre
gecte[e][27] en haut, *et cetera*: l'en diroit que la seëtte traite en haut,
aveques ce trait est meüe vers orient tres isnelement aveques l'aer parmi
lequel elle passe, et aveques toute la masse de la basse partie du monde
devant designee qui est meüe de mouvement journal; et pour ce, la seëtte
rechiet ou lieu de terre dont elle parti. Et cele chose appert possible par
samblable, car se un honme estoit en une nef meüe vers orient tres isnelement sans ce que il apparceüst ce mouvement et il tiroit sa main en
139*d* descendant et en descrisant une droite ligne contre le maast / de la nef,
il lui sambleroit que sa main ne fust meüe fors de mouvement droit; et
ainsi, selon cest opinion, nous semble il de la seëtte qui descent ou monte
droit en bas ou en haut. Item, dedens la nef ainsi meüe, comme dit[28] est,
peuent estre mouvemens du lonc, du travers, en haut, en bas et en toutes
manieres, et semblent estre du tout comme se la nef reposast. Et pour
ce, se un honme en celle nef aloit vers occident moins isnelement que elle
ne va vers orient, il lui sembleroit que il approcheroit d'occident et il
approche d'orient;[29] et samblablement ou cas devant mis, touz les mouvemens de cibas sembleroient estre comme se la terre reposast. Item, pour
declairer la response a la tierce experience aprés cest exemple artificiel,
je en veul mettre un autre naturel lequel est vray selon Aristote; et
pose que en la haute region de l'aer soit une porcion de pur feu appellé *.a.*
qui soit tres ligier en tant [que][30] par ce il monte tout au plus haut //
140*a* au lieu appelé *.b.* pres de la superfice concave du ciel. Je di que aussi
comme il seroit de la seëtte ou cas desus mis, il convient en cestui que
le mouvement de *.a.* soit composé de mouvement droit et, de partie, de
circulaire, car la region de l'aer et l'espere du feu par lesquelles *.a.* passa[31]
sont meües, selon Aristote, de mouvement circulaire. Et donques se il ne
estoient ainsi meüs, *.a.* monteroit tout droit en haut par la ligne *.ab.*;
mes pour ce que par mouvement circulaire et journal *.b.* est entretant
translaté sique[s][32] endroit *.c.*, il appert que *.a.* en montant descript la
ligne *.ac.* et est le mouvement de *.a.* composé de mouvement droit et de
circulaire. Et ainsi seroit le mouvement de la secte comme dit est, et de
tele composicion ou mixcion de mouvemens fu dit ou tiers chapitre du
premier.[33] Je conclu donques que l'en ne pourroit par quelcunque
experience monstrer que le ciel fust meü de mouvement journal et que
la terre ne fust ainsi meüe. /

140*b* Quant au secont point,[34] se ce povoit estre monstré par raisons: il
me semble que ce seroit par celles qui ensuient ausquelles je respondray
telement que par ce l'en pourroit respondre a toutes autres a ce pertinentes.
Premierement, tout corps simple a un seul simple mouvement; et la terre
est un element simple qui a, selon ses parties, droit mouvement naturel
en descendant. Et donques elle ne peut avoir autre mouvement, et tout
ce appert par le quart chapitre du premier.[35] Item, mouvement circulaire
ne est naturel a la terre, car elle en a un autre, comme dit est; et se il
lui est violent il ne pourroit estre perpetuel, selon ce que il appert ou
premier livre en pluseurs lieus.[36] Item, tout mouvement local est ou resgart
d'aucun corps qui repose, selon ce qui di(s)t Averroïz en le .viii.e
chapitre;[37] et par ce, il conclut que il convient par necessité que la terre

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[27] *A* gecté.

[28] *B* nef ausi come dit.

[29] *DE* d'occident.

[30] *A* omits 'que;' *DE* que par ce qu.

[31] *B* omits 'par lesquelles .a. passa.' Cf. 116*b* *et seq.*

[32] *A* si que.

[33] 8*a et seq.*

[34] Figure 33, marginal, p. 274.

[35] 9*d*.

[36] 39*c et seq.*

[37] *Juntas*, t.c. 18, 107I.


e
d
c
sextilis
quartus
trinus
oppositus
a
b
ab medietas seſsquitercie ac
ab medietas duplé ad
ab dupla ac
ac medietas seſsquialtere ad
ac medietas triplé ae
ad medietas duplé ae

FIG. 30
FOL. 127 c


spere
tabula

FIG. 31
FOL. 129 a


le soleil
la lune
le euyl

FIG. 32
FOL. 130 cd



FIG. 33
FOL. 140 b



FIG. 34
FOL. 144 c

FIG. 35
FOL. 145 a



FIG. 36
FOL. 149 c


le pole
le axel
t
le centre
t
t
le axel
le pole

FIG. 37
FOL. 150 cd

repose ou milieu du ciel. Item, tout mouvement[38] est fait par aucune vertu
motive, si comme il appert ou .vii.^e et .viii.^e de *Phisique*,[39] et la terre ne
140c peu(s)t // estre meüe circulairement par sa pesanteur; et [se] elle [est][40]
ainsi meüe par vertu dehors, cel mouvement seroit violent et non
perpetuel. Item, se le ciel n'estoit meü de mouvement journal, toute
astrologie seroit fause et une grant partie de philosophie naturelle ou l'en
suppose partout ce mouvement ou ciel. Item, ce semble estre contre la
sainte Escripture qui di(s)t: *oritur sol, et occidit, et ad locum suum
revertitur: ibique renascens, girat per meridiem, et flectitur ad aquilonem:
lustrans universa*[41] *in circuitu pergit spiritus, et in circulos suos revertitur.*[42]
Et ainsi est il escript de la terre que Dieu la fist inmobile: *etenim firmavit*[43]
orbem terre, qui non commovebitur.[44] Item, l'Escripture di(s)t que le
soleil se arresta ou temps de Josué et que il retorna ou temps du roy
Ezechias;[45] et se la terre fust meüe comme dit est et le ciel non, tel
arrestement eüst esté retournement, et le retournement[46] que dit est eüst
plus esté arrestement. Et ce est contre ce que di(s)t l'Escripture. Au
premier argüement ou il est dit que tout corps simple a un seul sim- /
140d ple mouvement, je di que la terre, qui est corps simple selon soy toute,
ne a quelcunque mouvement selon Aristote, si comme il appert ou .xxii.^e
chapitre.[47] Et qui diroit que il entent que[48] cel corps a un seul mouvement
simple, non pas selon soy tout mes selon ses parties et seulement quant
elles sont hors de leur lieu, contre ce est faite[49] instance de l'aer qui
descent quant il est en la region du feu et monte [quant][50] il est en la
region de l'eaue; et ce sont .ii. simples mouvemens. Et pour ce, l'en
peu(s)t dire moult plus raisonnablement que chascun corps simple ou
element du monde, excepté, par aventure, le souverain ciel, est meü en
son lieu[51] naturelment de mouvement circulaire. Et se aucune partie de
cel corps est hors de son lieu et de son tout, elle y retourne le plus droit
que elle peu(s)t, osté empeeschement; et ainsi seroit il d'une partie du ciel
se elle estoit hors du ciel. Et n'est pas inconvenient que un corps simple
141a selon soy tout ait un simple mouvement en son lieu // et autre mouvement
selon ses parties en retournant[52] en leur lieu, et convient tele chose octrier
selon Aristote, si comme je dirai tantost aprés. Au secont, je di que ce
mouvement est naturel a la terre etc., toute et en son lieu, et nientmoins
elle a autre mouvement naturel selon ses parties quant elles sont hors
de leur lieu naturel et est mouvement droit et en bas. Et selon Aristote,
il convient octrier chose samblable de l'element du feu qui est meü
naturelment en haut selon ses parties quant elles sont hors de leur lieu.[53]
Et avecques ce, selon Aristote, tout cest element en son espere et en son
lieu est meü de mouvement journal perpetuelment, et ce ne pourroit estre
se ce mouvement estoit violent. Et selon cest opinion, le feu n'est pas ainsi
meü, mais ce est la terre. Au tiers, ou est dit que tout mouvement requiert
aucun corps reposant: je di que non fors quant a ce que tel mouvement
puisse estre apparceü et encore souffiroit il que cel autre corps fust meü
141b autrement, mais il ne requiert pas autre corps quant a ce / que cel
mouvement soit, si comme il fu declairé en le .viii.^e chapitre.[54] Car posé
que le ciel[55] soit meü de mouvement journal et posé que la terre fust

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[38] *A* tout le mouvement.
[39] *Physicorum*, VII ,1, 241b, 24-242a, 19; VIII, 4 *passim* and especially 255b, 31-256a, 3.
[40] *A* et elle ainsi.
[41] *DE* omit 'lustrans universa.'
[42] *Eccle.* i, 5-6.
[43] *DF* firmabit.
[44] *Psalm* xcii, 1.
[45] *Josue* x, 12-14.
[46] *B* omits 'et le retournement.'
[47] 133*d et seq.*
[48] *DE* omit 'il entent que.'
[49] *BCDEF* forte.
[50] *A* omits 'quant.'
[51] *DE* ciel.
[52] *B* omits 'en retournant.'
[53] Cf. Bk. I, 16-18, 26*a et seq.*
[54] 90*b*.
[55] *B* aer.

meüe samblablement ou au contraire, ou que, par ymaginacion, elle fust
adnichilee, pour ce ne cesseroit pas le mouvement du ciel et ne seroit
pour ce plus isnel ne plus tardif, car l'intelligence qui le meut ne le corps
qui est meü ne seroient pas pour ce autrement disposés. D'autre partie,
posé que mouvement circulaire requerist autre corps reposant, il ne
convient pas que ce corps soit ou milieu du corps ainsi meü, car ou melieu
de la mole d'u[n][56] molin ou d'une tele chose meüe, rien ne repose fors
un seul point mathematique qui n'est pas corps, ne aussi ou milieu du
mouvement de l'estoille que est pres du pole artique. Et donques l'en
pourroit dire que le souverain ciel repose ou est meü autrement que les
autres corps pour ce que il est requis a ce que les autres mouvemens
soient, ou a ce que eulz soient perceptibles. Au quart, l'en peu(s)t dire
141*c* que la vertu qui ainsi meu(s)t en circuite ceste basse partie // du monde,
ce est sa nature, sa forme et est ce meïsme qui meut la terre a son lieu
quant elle en est hors, ou par tele nature comme le fer est meü a l'aimant.
D'autre partie, je demande a Aristote quelle vertu meut le feu en son
espere de mouvement journal, car l'en ne peut pas dire que le ciel le
traie ainsi ou ravisse par violence, tant pour ce que cel mouvement est
perpetuel, tant pour ce que la superfice concave du ciel est tres polie, si
comme il fu dit en le .xi.[e][57] chapitre, et pour ce elle passe sus le feu tres
souef sans freer, sanz tirer ou bouter, si comme il fu dit ou .xviii.e
chapitre.[58] Et donques convient il dire que le feu est ainsi meü circulairement de sa nature et par sa forme ou par aucune intelligence ou par
influence du ciel. Et semblablement peut dire de la terre celui qui met
que elle est meüe de mouvement journal et le feu non. Au quint, ou est
dit que se le ciel ne faisoit un circuite de jour en jour toute astrologie
seroit fause, etc.: je di que non, car tous resgars, toutes conjunctions,
141*d* opposicions, constellaci- / ons, figures et influences du ciel seroient aussi
comme il sont du tout en tout, si comme il appert clerement par ce que
fu dit en la response de la premiere experience,[59] et les tables des
mouvemens et tous autres livres aussi vrays comme il sont fors tant
seulement que du mouvement journal[60] l'en diroit que il est ou[61] ciel selon
apparence et en terre selon verité, et ne s'ensuit autre effit de l'un plus
que de l'autre. Et a ce propos fait ce que met Aristote ou .xvi.e chapitre[62]
de ce que le soleil nous appert tournier et les estoilles sintiller ou ouilleter,
car il di(s)t que se la chose que l'en voit est meüe ou se le voiement est
meü, ce ne fait difference; et aussi diroit l'en en ce propos que nostre
voiement[63] est meü de mouvement journal. Au sixte, de la sainte Escripture
qui di(s)t que le soleil tourne *et cetera*: l'en diroit que elle se conforme[64]
en ceste partie a la maniere de commun parler humain aussi comme elle
fait en pluseurs lieus, si comme la ou il est escript que Dieu se repenti et
142*a* que il se courrousa et // rapaisa et teles choses qui ne sont pas ainsi du
tout comme la lettre sonne.[65] Et meïsme pres de nostre propos, lisons nous
que Dieu queuvre le ciel de nues: *qui operit celum nubibus*,[66] et toutevoies, selon verité le ciel queuvre les nues. Et ainsi diroit l'en que le ciel
est meü selon apparence de mouvement journal et la terre non, et selon
verité il est au contraire. Et de la terre l'en diroit que elle ne se meut
de son lieu selon verité[67] ne en son lieu selon apparence, mais bien selon

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[56] *A* du.
[57] *A* .xi. 102*b*.
[58] 125*b*.
[59] 138*b*.
[60] *BCF* omit 'journal.'
[61] *DE* omit 'mouvement . . . est ou.'
[62] 116*d*.
[63] *DE* omit 'est meü ce ne . . . nostre voiement.'
[64] *B* elle est conforme; *DE* elle se conferme:
[65] Cf. *Gen.* vi, 6; *Isai.* xlvii, 6; *Psalm* lix, 3; 1 *Par.* xiii, 10; *Psalm* cv, 40.
[66] *Psalm* cxlvi, 8. *E* coperit.
[67] *BCDEF* omit 'selon verité.'

verité. Au .vii.^{e}, presque semblablement l'en diroit que ou temps de Josué
le soleil se arresta et ou temps de Ezechias il retourna, et tout selon
apparence; mais selon verité, la terre se arresta ou temps de Josué et
avança ou hasta son mouvement ou temps de Ezechias et en ce n'eü(s)t
difference quant a l'effect qui s'en ensuit. Et ceste voie semble plus
raisonnable que l'autre, si comme il sera declairié aprés.[68]

142b Et quant au tiers point, je veul metre persuasions ou ray- / sons par
quoy il sambleroit que la terre soit meüe comme dit est. Premierement,
car toute chose qui a mestier d'une autre chose doit estre appliquiee a
recevoir le bien que elle a de l'autre par le mouvement de elle qui reçoit;
et pour ce, voions nous que chascun element est meü au lieu naturel ou
il est conservé et va a son lieu, mes son lieu ne vient pas a lui. Et donques
la terre et les elemens de cibas qui ont mestier de la chaleur et de
l'influence du ciel tout environ doivent estre disposés par leur mouvement
a recevoir ce profit deüement, aussi, a parler familiairement, comme la
chose qui est rostie au feu reçoit environ elle la chaleur du feu parce que
elle est tournee et non pas parce que le feu soit tourné environ elle. Item,
ou cas que ne experience ne raison ne monstrent le contraire, si comme
dit est, ce est moult plus raisonnable que touz les principalz mouvemens
des simples corps du monde soient et voisent ou procedent touz une voie
142c ou en une maniere. Et ce ne pourroit estre se- // lon les philosophes et
astrologiens que tous fussent d'orient en occident; mes se la terre est
meüe comme dit est, touz procedent une voie d'occident en orient,[69] ce
est a savoir la terre en faisant son circuite en un jour naturel sus les
poles de ce mouvement, et les corps du ciel sus les poles du zodiaque;—
la lune en un moys, le soleil en un an, Mars en .ii. ans ou environ, et
ainsi des autres. Et ne convient mettre ou ciel autres poles principalz ne
.ii. manieres de mouvement, un d'orient en occident et les autres aussi
comme au contraire et sus autres poles, laquelle chose il convendroit
mettre par necessité se le ciel estoit meü de mouvement journal. Item, par
ceste maniere et non autrement seroit le pole artique le desus du monde
en quelcunque lieu que ce pole soit, et occident seroit la destre partie en
supposant l'ymaginacion que met Aristote ou quint chapitre.[70] Et ainsi la
partie de terre qui est habitable et meïsmement celle ou nous sommes
seroit le desus et[71] le destre du monde et ou resgart du ciel et ou resgart
142d de la terre, car / tout mouvement de telz corps procederoit de occident,
comme dit est. Et c'est bien raisonnable que habitacion humaine soit ou
plus noble lieu qui soit sus terre; et se le ciel est meü de mouvement
journal, tout le contraire est verité selon ce que il appert par Aristote ou
.vii.^{e} chapitre.[72] Item, combien que Averroïz die ou .xxii.^{e} chapitre que
mouvement est plus noble que repos,[73] le contraire appert, car meïsme selon
Aristote en cel chapitre .xxii.^{e},[74] la plus noble chose qui soit et qui puisse
estre a sa perfection sanz mouvement; ce est Dieu.[75] Item, repos est fin de
mouvement et pour ce, selon Aristote, les corps de cibas sont meüz a
leurs lieus naturelz pour y reposer.[76] Item, en signe que repos vaut miex,
nous prions pour les mors que Dieu leur doint repos: *requiem eternam,
et cetera.*[77] Et donques reposer ou estre moins meü est miex et plus noble
condicion que estre meü ou plus meü et plus loing de repos. Et par ce
143a appert la posicion desus dite tres raisonnable, car l'en // diroit que la terre,

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[68] 143*d*.

[69] *B* d'orient en occident.

[70] 79*b*.

[71] *DE* dessus de nous et.

[72] 87*a*.

[73] *Juntas*, t.c. 61, 140A.

[74] *D* Aristote ou en ce chapitre .xxii^{e}; *E* Aristote ou en ce .xxii.^{e} chapitre.

[75] 132*d*.

[76] *Physicorum*, 230b, 25-27.

[77] From the antiphon for the dead in the Mass and Breviary.

qui est le plus vil element, et les elemens de cibas font leur circuite tres isnelement et l'aer souverain et le feu moins isnelement, si comme il appert aucune foiz par les cometes, et la lune et son ciel encore plus tardivement, car elle fait en un moys ce que la terre fait en un jour naturel. Et ainsi en procedant tousjours, les plus hauz cielz font leur revolucion plus tardivement combien que en ce soit aucune instance, et est ce procés siques au ciel des estoilles fichiees lequel repose du tout ou il fait sa revolucion tres tardivement et selon aucuns en .xxxvi.^{m} ans,[78] ce est en cent ans meü par un degré. Item, par ceste voie et non par autre peut estre legierement solute la question que propose Aristote ou .xxi.^{e} chapitre[79] aveques pou de addicion. Et ne convient pas mettre tant de degrés de choses ne teles difficultés obscures comme Aristote met en sa response ou .xxii.^{e} chapitre.[80]
143*b* Item, ce est chose tres raisonnable que les corps[81] qui sont / plus grans ou plus loing du centre facent leur circuite ou revolucion en moins de temps que ceulz qui sont plus loing du centre, car se il les faisoient en temps equal ou mendre, leurs mouvemens seroient isnelz excessivement. Et donques l'en diroit que nature recompense et a ordené que les revolucions des corps qui sont plus loing du centre soient faites en plus grant temps. Et pour ce, le souverain des cielz qui sont meüz fait[82] son circuite ou sa revolucion en tres long temps, et encore est il tres isnelement meü pour la grandeur de son circuite. Mais la terre qui fait tres petit circuite si l'a tantost fait par mouvement journal, et les autres corps moiens entre le plus haut et le plus bas font leurs revolucions moiennement, combien que ce ne soit pas proporcionelment. Et par ceste maniere, une constellacion qui est vers aquilon, i.e. *maior ursa* que nous appellons *le char*, ne va pas a recul[o]ns[83] le char devant les buefz, si comme il yroit posé que il fust meü de mouvement journal, mes va par droit ordre.
143*c* Item, // touz philosophes dient que pour nient est fait par pluseurs ou par grandes operacions ce[84] qui peu(s)t estre fait par moins d'operacions ou par plus petites. Et Aristote di(s)t en le .viii.^{e} chapitre du premier[85] que Dieu et nature ne font rien pour nient. Or est il ainsi que se le ciel est meü de mouvement journal, il convient mettre es principalz corps du monde et ou ciel .ii. manieres de mouvemens aussi comme contraires: un d'orient en occident et les autres *e converso*, comme souvent dit est. Et avecques ce, il convient mettre une isneleté excessivement grande, car qui bien pense et considere la hautesce ou distance du ciel et la grandeur de lui et de son circuite, se tel circuite est fait en un jour, honme ne pourroit ymaginer ne penser comment l'isneleté du ciel est merveill[eus]ement[86] et excessivement grande et aussi comme inopinable et inestimable. Et donques puisque touz les effetz que nous voions peuent estre faiz et toutes
143*d* apparences salveez pour mettre en lieu / de ce une petite operacion, ce est a savoir le mouvement journal de la terre qui est tres petite ou resgart du ciel, sans multeplier tant de operacions si diverses et si outrageusement grandes, il s'ensuit que Dieu et nature les avroient pour nient faites et ordenees; et ce est inconvenient, comme dit est. Item, posé que tout le ciel soit meü de mouvement journal et que, aveques ce, le .viii.^{e} espere soit meüe d'autre mouvement, si comme mettent les astrologiens, il convient selon eulz mettre une .ix.^{e} espere qui est meüe seulement de mouvement journal. Mais posé que la terre soit meüe comme dit est, le

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[78] *C* .xxxv^{m} ans.

[79] 131*a* *et seq.*

[80] 132*d* *et seq.*

[81] *B* ellez; *C* omits 'corps;' *DE* cielz; *F* celles.

[82] *DE* qui est meu fait.

[83] *A* reculans.

[84] *DE* operacions ou par plus petites ce.

[85] 16*b*.

[86] *A* merveillement.

.viii.e ciel est meü d'un seul mouvement tardif, et ainsi par ceste voie il ne
convient pas songier ne adiviner une noviesme espere naturele, invisible
et sans estoilles, car Dieu et nature avroient pour nient faite tele espere
quant par autre voie toutes choses peuent estre aussi comme elles sont.
144*a* Item, quant // Dieu fait aucun miracle, l'en doit supposer et tenir que
ce fait Il sanz muer le commun cors[87] de nature fors au moins que ce peüst
estre. Et donques se l'en peu(s)t salver que Dieu aloingna le jour ou
temps de Josué par arrester le mouvement de la terre ou de la region de
cibas seulement laquelle est si tres petite et aussi comme un point ou
resgart du ciel, sans mettre que tout le monde ensemble fors ce petit point
eüst esté mis hors de son commun cours[88] et de son ordenance et meïsmement
tielz corps comme sont les corps du ciel, ce est moult plus raisonnable.
Et ce peu(s)t estre ainsi salvé, si comme il appert par la response
a la .vii.e raison[89] qui fu faite contre ceste opinion.[90] Et samblablement
porroit l'en dire du retour du soleil ou temps de Ezechias. Or appert
donques comment l'en ne peut monstrer par quelcunque experience que
le ciel soit meü de mouvement journal, car comment que soit, posé que il
144b soit ainsi meü et la terre non ou la terre meüe et le / ciel non, se un ouyl[91]
estoit ou ciel et il voï[s]t[92] clerement la terre, elle sembleroit meüe, et se
le ouyl[93] estoit en terre, le ciel sembleroit meü. Et le voiement n'est pas
pour ce deceü, car il ne sent ou voit fors que mouvement est. Mais se il
est de tel corps ou de tel, ce jugement est fait par les sens de dedens, si
comme il met en *Perspective*, et sont telz sens souvent deceüs en telz cas,
si comme il fu dit devant de celui qui est en la nef meüe.[94] Aprés est
monstré comment par raisons ne peu(s)t estre conclus que le ciel soit
ainsi meü. Tiercement, ont esté mises raisons au contraire et que il n'est
pas ainsi meü, et nientmoins touz tiennent et je cuide que il est ainsi
meü[95] et la terre non: *Deus enim firmavit orbem terre, qui non commovebitur,*[96]
nonobstans les raisons au contraire, car ce sont persuasions
qui ne concludent pas evidanment. Mais consideré tout ce que dit est, l'en
pourroit par ce croire que la terre est ainsi meüe et le ciel non, et n'est
144c pas evidant du contraire; et toutevoies, ce semble // de prime face autant
ou plus contre raison naturelle comme sont les articles de nostre foy ou
touz ou pluseurs. Et ainsi ce que je ay dit par esbatement en ceste maniere
peut aler valoir a confuter[97] et reprendre ceulz qui voudroient nostre foy
par raysons impugner.

26.—*Ou .xxvi.e chapitre il reprouve une opinion de la figure de la terre et met la doubte que pluseurs* [*f*]*ont*[1] *du lieu et du repos de la terre.*

> Semblablement fait doubte de la figure de la terre, car il samble a aucuns que elle est sperique ou ronde, mais [as][2] autres semble que elle est lee et de telle figure comme est une large campane ou d'un tymbre.

Glose. Il cuidoient que elle [fust][3] de tele figure comme seroit le maoule d'un large tymbre[4] qui avroit la face desus. Aprés il met leurs raisons.

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[87] *CDEF* corps.

[88] *DE* corps.

[89] *B* la .viii. raison.

[90] 142*d*.

[91] *DE* oisel.

[92] *A* voit.

[93] *DE* oiseau.

[94] *BCDEF* il appert. Witelo, *op. cit.*, p. 183; cf. 138*d*-139*a* and note 21.

[95] *BCDEF* omit 'et nientmoins . . . ainsi meü.'

[96] Cf. *Psalm* xcii, 1: 'Etenim firmavit orbem terrae, qui non commovebitur.'

[97] *BCDEF* omit 'aler;' *DE* valoir et confuter; *F* confuteur.

[1] *AB* sont.

[2] *A* omits 'as.'

[3] *A* omits 'fust.'

[4] Figure 34, p. 274.

Tiexte. Et faisoient cest argüement car le soleil quant il recouse et quant il lieve, la terre le nous muce partie aprés autre selon ligne droite et non pas selon porcion de ligne circulaire, si comme il deüst estre se la terre fust de figure sperique.

144*d* Glose. / Il leur sembloit que quant le soleil est demi-couchié et appert demi que la ligne qui divise ces .ii. parties, quant a nostre resgart, fust courve aussi comme un arc se la terre fust ronde. Et ceste ligne est droite. Aprés il met la response.[4a]

Tiexte. Mais il ne consideroient pas comment le soleil est tres loing de la terre et comment la rondesce ou circuite de la terre est tres grant ou resgart de nous. Et pour ce, combien que il soit petit ou resgart du soleil, nientmoins il est si grant ou resgart de nous que la porcion de lui nous semble droite; mais pour ceste fantasie il ne convient pas croire que la terre ne soit ronde.

Glose. Aprés il met une autre raison.

Tiexte. Item, encore opposent il et dient que il convient que la terre ait ceste figure plate et droite pour ce que elle repose. Et ce sont les manieres que l'en di(s)t du mouvement et du repos de la terre.

Glose. Aristote ne respont pas a la desreniere raison pour ce, par aventure,
145*a* que elle a trop pou d'apparence et sera reprouvee aprés.[5] // Aprés[6] il met la doubte des anciens quant au repos de la terre.

Tiexte. Or vient une doubte qui fait tous merveillier, meïsmes ceulz qui sont raisonnables, ce est a savoir car nous voions que se une petite partie de terre est haut eslevee et l'en la lesse aler, elle est meüe et ne repose pas. Et[7] tant est plus grande ou plus pesante, et elle est meüe en bas plus isnelement; et toute la terre qui est en l'air aussi comme eslevee n'est pas meüe et donques comment peut reposer si grant pesanteur? Item, quant teles petites parties de terre sont lessiees aler de haut et descendues en bas, se l'en oste de la terre qui est desouz elles, [et autre chose ne leur resiste, elles][8] descendront encore plus en bas. Et pour ce, est ce un philosophisme[9] ou question dont touz les anciens sont esbahis et merveilliéz.

Glose. Car il leur semble que se toute la terre qui est si tres pesante se repose en l'air ou en l'eaue, que chascune de ses parties deüst reposer en l'air en quelcunque lieu, et que, se elles descendent, aussi deüst elle descendre.

145*b* 27.—*Ou .xxvii.ᵉ chapitre il commence a reprover .v. / causes que les anciens mettoient du repos de la terre.*

Encore est ce grant merveille des solucions que les anciens faisoient a ceste doubte, car elles sont plus inconvenientes que n'est la doubte; car les uns dient que ce est pour ce que [ce][1] qui est desouz en bas est infini, et de ceste opinion[2] fu Xenofanes de Kolo[f]e.[3]

[4a] *F* omits 'Apres . . . response.'

[5] 146*a*.

[6] *A* Glose aprés.

[7] Figure 35, marginal, p. 274.

[8] *A* omits 'et autre chose . . . elles.'

[9] *BEF* sophisme; *C* phophisme; *D* souphisme.

[1] *A* omits 'ce.'

[2] *D* ce qui est infini en bas et de ceste op.; *E* ce que est infini en bas et de ceste op.

[3] *A* Kolose; *B* Zenofanes de Kalofe; *C* Kalofe; *D* Cenofanes de Kalofe; *E* Cenofanes de Kalophe; *F* Xenofanes de Kalofe. Text in Diels, *Die Fragmente de Vorsokratiker*, I, Berlin, 1912. 11 A47 (53, 38ff), B28 (63, 8).

Glose. Il entendoient que desouz est terre touzjours en aval sans fin et sans terme.

Tiexte. Et ce dient il afin que il ne labourent plus en enquerant la cause du repos de la terre. Et de ce se esbahi(s)t et merveilla Empedocles[4] en disant que ceulz qui par leur langue ont ceste vanité moutepliee ont petit entendement en ce que il dient que les parfondeurs ou parfondeces de terre sont infinies, et que aussi l'air en haut est infini.

Glose. Tout ce fu reprouvé ou premier livre[5] en le .xi.^{e} et .xii.^{e} chapitre.[6] Aprés il met la seconde cause ou response.

Tiexte. Mais les autres dient que la terre est mise en eaue; et est une opinion tres ancienne et di(s)t l'en que Tales Milesius le
145c disoit, et que la terre se repose // pour ce que elle noe en eaue
aussi comme noeroit un fust ou une tele chose qui ne repose pas en l'air mais en l'eaue.

Glose. Tales Milesius fu un des .vii. sages. Et sembleroit que le Prophete conformast son parler a cest opinion quant il dist de Dieu: *qui firmavit terram super aquas.*[7] Mais ce est a entendre de aucuns fleuves qui passent parmi la terre ou par souz terre, ou pour ce que pluseurs cités sont fondees sus eaues selon[8] ce que dist le Prophete: *de orbe terrarum que Deus ipse super maria fundavit eum: et super flumina preparavit eum.*[9] Aprés il reprouve cest opinion par .iii. raisons.

Tiexte. Et celui qui ainsi ne pensoit pas que par semblable raison, l'e[n][10] peut demander de celle eaue qui soustient la terre par quoy elle est soustenue, car eaue qui est eslevee en l'air n'i repos[e][11] pas se elle ne est en chose qui la soustienne. Item, aussi comme l'air est plus legier et moins pesant que l'eaue, aussi est la terre plus pesante que l'eaue, et donques ne peut estre par
145d nature le plus ligier desouz le plus pesant. / Item, se toute la
terre ensamble repose naturelment en eaue, donques chascune de ses petites parties devroit noer en l'eaue. Et nous voions le contraire, car chascune tele petite terre mise en eaue va au fons et tant est plus grande, et elle descent en l'eaue plus isnelement.

Glose. Aprés il met la cause de l'erreur de ces anciens.

Tiexte. Et ceulz qui assignent teles causes deffaillent pour ce que il ne enquierent pas de la doubte ou question tant comme il est possible, mais leur soufist tant que celui qui demande ne die rien au contraire. Mais qui veult bien enquerir la verité d'une chose, il doit considerer toutes les doubtes, non pas seulement que l'en lui fait, mais que l'en pourroit faire.

Glose. La premiere opinion met que la terre est soustenue de terre; la seconde que de l'eaue. Aprés il met la tierce qui met que ce est de l'aer.

Tiexte. Mais Anaximenes et Anaxagoras et Dem[o]critus[12] dient que la terre se repose pour cause de sa figure qui est lee, et pour
146a ce, elle ne peut divi- // ser l'aer mais chevauche l'aer qui est
souz elle; et pluseurs corps faiz par artifice de certaines figures se tiennent en haut et resistent aus vens, et sont fors a mouvoir pour leur resistence et a estre traiz en bas. Et semblablement

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[4] Cf. Diels, *op. cit.*, 21 B39 (241, 16).

[5] *B* omits 'ou premier livre.'

[6] 19*c*-22*a*.

[7] *Psalm* cxxxv, 6.

[8] *A* eaues et selon.

[9] Cf. *Psalm* xxiii, 1-2: 'Domini est terra, et plenitudo eius: orbis terrarum, et universi qui habitant in eo. Quia ipse super maria fundavit eum: et super flumina praeparavit eum.'

[10] *ACF* le.

[11] *A* reposa.

[12] *A* Demecritus.

pour ce que la terre a grant latitude et est bien lee, l'aer qui est desouz elle est comprimé et n'a lieu ou il se puisse transferer pour faire voie a la tierce[13] terre, et pour ce elle ne peut descendre outre. Et a monstrer que aer comprimé peut soustenir choses pesantes, les devant dis amainent pluseurs exemples ou argüemens, si comme de uns vaisseaux appelléz *clepsedres* par quoy l'en fait que l'aer est dedens l'eaue et desouz eaue.[14]

Glose. Aprés il reprouve ceste opinion par .iii. raisons.

Tiexte. Mais ce ne peut estre; premierement, car la figure de la terre ne est pas lee ne plate, mais est ronde.

Glose.[15] Si comme il sera declairié aprés.[16]

Tiexte. Item, selon leurs dis, la latitude de la terre ne seroit pas
146b cause de son / repos, mais la grandeur de elle qui comprent grandement de aer souz elle qui n'a lieu ou il se puisse trestourner. Et donques se la terre est ronde, aussi bien pour ce que elle [est][17] grande comprent elle grant aer desouz soy; et donques selon leur raison, aussi bien reposeroit elle, se elle estoit sperique ou ronde. Item, ceste doubte ne resgarde pas seulement la terre, mais tous les corps du monde aussi comme se nous eüssons encore commencement a determiner se les corps ont mouvement naturel ou non, et se il ont mouvement violent. Et pour ce que nous avons a nostre povoir tout ce determiné devant, nous en userons maintenant.

Glose. Tout ce fu determiné ou premier livre en pluseurs chapitres.[18]

Tiexte. Car se les corps ne ont mouvement naturel, il n'ont pas mouvement violent, et se il n'ont ne naturel ne violent, rien ne seroit meü. Et tout ce est determiné devant.[18a] Et encore se ainsi estoit, rien ne reposeroit, car aussi comme mouvement est naturel ou violent, aussi est repos. Et se mouvement [est][19] selon na- //
146c ture, le repos auquel tent tel mouvement ne est pas violent. Et donques se la terre repose maintenant par violence ou milieu, le mouvement par quoy elle y descent est violent. Et ce dient touz les desus diz et que elle descent en bas par la force et violence de la circungiracion ou revolucion du ciel, car en choses qui telement sont tournees et girees les plus pesantes se traient tousjours au melieu.

Glose. Par cele giracion ceulz qui vennent le blé font venir les pierretes ou milieu du van.

Tiexte. Et touz ceulz qui mettent que la terre fu engendree et faite dient que par ceste maniere elle vint au milieu.

28.—*Ou .xxviii.ᵉ chapitre il reprouve .ii. autres causes ou opinions du repos de la terre.*[1]

Aucuns quierent la cause[2] du repos de la terre et dient les uns que ce est pour sa grandeur et pour sa latitude.

Glose. Ceste est ja reprouvee.[3]

Tiexte. Et les autres, si comme Empedocles, dient que la cause

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[13] *BCDEF* omit 'tierce.'
[14] *BDE* omit 'et desouz eaue.'
[15] *DE* omit 'Glose.'
[13] 150*d* *et seq.*
[17] *A* omits 'est.'
[18] Chapters 2-4.
[18a] 26*b*.
[19] *A* qr.
[1] *B* omits the entire chapter heading.
[2] *A* causes.
[3] 145*d*.

146d est pour ce que le ciel est environ elle et est [si][4] tres / isnelement meü que par ce il ne seuffre que la terre se moeve; aussi comme l'eaue qui est en vaisel lequel l'en tournie de[5] bas en haut en circuite, quant le vaisel est [isnelment][6] tournié et il est en haut, l'[ea]ue[7] ne chiet pas, et ne est qui l'empeesche fors l'isneleté du mouvement.

Glose. Ainsi mettent les enfans par esbatement une escuele o de l'eaue en un cercle de tonneau et puis revirent[8] et tournent ce cercle isnelement sans ce que l'eaue cheie. Aprés il reprouve ces opinions.

Tiexte. Mais, posé que la velocité ou isneleté de la giracion ou revolucion du ciel, ne aussi la latitude de la terre ne empeeschassent en rien le mouvement de elle, et que l'aer desouz elle peüst estre meü et transporté sans estre en rien comprimé, il convendroit que la terre fust meüe quelcunque part, car se elle fu meü[e][9] au milieu par violence, elle y repose par violence; et donques il convient que par nature et par neccessité elle ait aucun mouvement par[10] // lequel elle se partiroit du milieu. 147a Et se elle estoit indifferanment encline a estre meüe en haut ou en bas et non plus d'une part que d'autre, donques l'aer qui est desus elle ne l'empeescheroit pas que elle ne peüst estre meüe amont, ne celui qui est souz elle que elle ne peüst estre meüe en bas, car une meïsme cause est d'une part comme d'autre.

Glose. Aprés il met la seconde raison par especial contre Empedocles [qui disoit][11] que devant que le monde fust fait et que le ciel fust meü, les elemens estoient en une confusion par discorde,[12] et amistié les mist en ordenance et par ce le monde fu fait.

Tiexte. Item, l'en pourroit dire contre Empedocles et lui demander quant les elemens estoient separéz un de l'autre et en confusion, quelle cause estoit pourquoy la terre se reposoit.

Glose. *Terra autem erat inanis et vacua,*[13] *vel incomposita.*

Tiexte. Et l'en ne peut dire que ce fust la giracion ou revolucion du ciel, car encore ne estoit il pas meü selon Empedocles.

147b Glose. / Aprés il reprouve par .iii. raisons la cause que mettoit Empedocles du mouvement de la terre.

Tiexte. Et ce est inconvenient dire que, au premier quant le monde fu fait, le mouvement ou giracion du ciel fist la terre descendre ou[14] milieu, car pour quelle cause [y][15] descendroient les parties de terre maintenant et toutes choses pesantes puisque la giracion du ciel ne attaint ou approche de nous?

Glose. Car combien que le ciel moeve[16] le feu et le haut aer, comme souvent dit est, toutesvoies il ne meut pas circulairement les elemens de cibas.

Tiexte. Item, le feu monte en haut pour aucune cause et non pas pour la giracion du ciel, car elle le feïst descendre; et donques se de sa nature il est meü a aucun lieu, l'en doit cuider que aussi la terre par nature est meüe en bas et non pas pour la giracion du ciel. Item, les choses ne sont pas pesantes et legieres pour la giracion du ciel, car, selon Empedocles, avant que [le][17] ciel tournast estoient les elemens pesans et legiers. Et donques estoient

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[4] *AB* omit 'si.'
[5] *A* repeats 'de.'
[6] *A* omits 'isnelment.'
[7] *A* lieue.
[8] *A* revinrent.
[9] *A* meü.
[10] *A* repeats 'par.'
[11] *A* omits 'qui disoit.'
[12] *B* concorde; *DE* discort.
[13] *Gen.* i, 2.
[14] *DE* du.
[15] *A* omits 'y.'
[16] *E* moienne.
[17] *A* omits 'le.'

147*c* eulz enclins par nature a estre meüz a certains lieus, // car se le monde estoit infini, ce seroit impossible que il eüst ne haut ne bas; et par ce sont determinés pesant et legier, que l'un va bas et l'autre haut. Et pluseurs ont esté deceüz en assignant les causes du repos[18] de la terre.

Glose. Aprés il met le quint opinion.

Tiexte. Et aucuns sont qui dient que elle repose pour la similitude du regart que elle a au ciel par equale distance, et un des anciens qui ce tenoient fu Anaximandres. Et sa raison[19] estoit car puisque la terre est colloquiee ou milieu et que elle resgarde toutes les parties du ciel semblablement, il ne convient pas que elle se moeve[16] plus en haut que en bas, ne vers une partie du ciel que vers l'autre. Et aveques ce, ce est impossible que elle soit meüe ensamble a parties contraires et pour ce convient il par neccessité que elle se repose.

Glose. Aprés il reprouve ceste cause par .v. raisons.

Tiexte. Mais ce di(s)t est legierement prouvé et ne est pas vray; premierement, car par ceste raison toute chose qui seroit mise ou milieu[20] du monde se reposeroit, et donques le feu y reposeroit
147*d* se il y estoit; car la raison / que il mettent ne est pas propre pour la terre plus que pour autre chose. Item, ce que il dient n'est pas neccessaire, car la terre ne repose pas seulement ou milieu mais est meüe au milieu, car au lieu ou est meüe une partie de la terre, a ce lieu meïsme seroit elle meüe toute se elle en estoit hors, et la ou une chose est meüe par nature, illeques repose elle par nature. Et donques ne est ce pas pour ce que elle resgarde semblablement et equalment les parties du ciel, car ce est commun a toute chose qui seroit mise ou milieu; mais estre meü au milieu est propre a la terre. Item, ce est inconvenient de querir ou assigner cause pourquoy la terre repose[21] ou milieu et non querir cause pourquoy le feu repose en haut sanz monter et sans descendre, car se il a ce lieu par nature, ausi convient il par neccessité que la terre ait son lieu par nature.

Glose. Et donques elle y repose par sa nature. Aprés il met [l]a[22] quarte
148*a* raison en repetant // leurs argüemens.

Tiexte. Item, se cest lieu ne est pas naturel a la terre mais elle y repose par neccessité pour la similitude ou equale distance, il convient que il quierent et assignent cause du repos du feu. Car de la terre il disoient que ausi comme une pel qui est fort tiree equalment de toutes pars ne pourroit estre rompue, et comme celui qui avroit tres grant fain et tres grant soif equalment et avroit pres de soy equalment a amengier et a boire, semblablement il disoient que par tele indifference repose la terre ou milieu.

Glose. Il leur sembloit que se une pel est de equal force en toutes ses parties et equalment tiree de toutes pars ou une corde, que celle chose ne romproit pas, car par tele raison comme elle romproit en[22a] un lieu, par tele raison romproit elle partout et elle seroit divisee en parties indivisibles. Mais il est certain du contraire se les vertus qui tirent estoient plus fortes que la resistence de la pel ou de la corde. Et est impossible par
148*b* na- / ture tant pour le mouvement du ciel et l'alteracion des choses

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[18] *BCDEF* mouvement.

[19] *DE* et sanz raison.

[20] *E* lieu.

[21] *DE* terre ne repose.

[22] *A* sa.

[22a] *F* omits 'car par tele raison comme elle romproit en.'

tirantes et tirees, tant pour autres mutacions que celle equalité[23] peüst, se elle estoit, longuement durer. Et aussi de celui qui a fain et soif.

Tiexte. Item, ce est merveille comment il enqueroient du repos de la terre et ne faisoient mencion pour quelle cause une chose monte en haut et l'autre descent au milieu se il n'i a qui l'empeesche. Mais encore ne est pas voir ce que il dient, que la chose qui est ou milieu du monde se repose pour ce que il ne est raison pourquoy que elle fust meüe a une part plus que [a][24] autre, car pour ce ne convient il pas que elle repose, mais que elle soit meüe non pas toute a une part mais une partie a une part et les autres [a][24] autres. Car par leur raison meïsme, se une partie de feu ronde estoit ou milieu et ou centre, il se reposeroit si comme fait la terre, car il resgarderoit semblablement les parties du ciel, et toutevoies il monteroit en haut aussi comme nous voions que feu est meü se il ne est empeschié. 148c Mais // il ne iroit pas tout[25] d'une part pour la similitude et equalité que il a au ciel, mais chascune partie ou porcion iroit devers la partie du ciel que elle regarde et dont elle est plus pres, si comme la quarte partie de ce feu a la quarte partie de son lieu naturel et ainsi des autres, car tel feu ne quelcunque corps ne est pas point indivisible. Et est semblable comme quant .i. corps par condempsacion est fait en mendre lieu ou par rarefaction en plus grant lieu.

Glose. Car en condempsacion chascune partie s'approche du milieu de tel corps et par rarefaction chascune se en esloingne.

Tiexte. Et pour ce, par samblable rayson comme dit est du feu, la terre selon ses parties se departist du milieu et montast vers le ciel, ne fust ce que le milieu est son lieu par nature. Et donques avons recitéz presque touz les opinions de la figure du mouvement et du repos de la terre.

29.—*Ou .xxix.*^e^ *chapitre il prouve par .iiii. resons que la terre repose ou milieu du monde.*

148d Nous[1] dirons donques premierement, a savoir / mon, se la terre a mouvement ou repos, car, si comme nous avons dit, les uns dient que elle tourne environ le centre aussi comme[2] une autre estoille; les autres mettent que elle est ou milieu et que elle est tournee et revolute environ son centre et environ son pole ou ses poles. Mais que ce soit impossible il appert; premierement, car posé que elle soit hors le milieu ou en milieu, il convient par neccessité que mouvement circulaire lui fust violent, car tel mouvement n'est pas naturel a la terre. Car chascune partie de elle avroit tel mouvement, et nous voions que toutes tendent au milieu par mouvement droit. Et donques seroit ce mouvement circulaire violent a la terre; et ce ne est pas possible que chose violente et qui est hors nature soit perpetuele, et l'ordre du monde est perpetuel.

Glose. Ceste rayson est fondee sus ce que un corps simple ne a que un

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[23] *DE* celle qualite.

[24] *A* omits 'a.'

[25] *BCDEF* omit 'tout.'

[1] *Guthrie*, ch. xiv.

[2] *D* tourne vers le centre; *E* tourne vers le centre autre come.

mouvement simple, si comme il fu dit ou quart chapitre du premier.[3]
149*a* Mes a ce fu respons ou .xxv.ᵉ cha- // pitre au secont argüement du
secont point,[4] car l'en diroit que la terre a un mouvement naturel circulaire en son lieu et un autre hors son lieu. Et aussi quant une pierre descent, aveques ce elle est meüe de mouvement journal, si comme il fu dit devant.

Tiexte.[5] Item, tous corps meüz de mouvement circulaire, excepté le souverain ciel, sont meüz de pluseurs mouvemens.

Glose. Si comme il appert des cielx des planetes.

Tiexte. Et donques se la terre est meüe circulairement, posé que ce soit environ le milieu ou en milieu,[5a] il convient que ce soit au moins de .ii. mouvemens circulaires. Et se ainsi estoit, il convendroit que les estoilles fichiees apparussent lever et couchier une fois en .i. lieu et autre fois en autre; et il ne est pas ainsi.

Glose. Ceste consequence est legiere a entendre, mais ceste raison a
trop pe[u][6] d'apparence contre ceulz qui diroient que la terre est meüe
seulement de mouvement journal et le ciel non, jouste ce que fu dit ou
149*b* .xxv.ᵉ chapi- / tre.[7]

Tiexte. Item, le mouvement des parties de la terre est au milieu et ainsi seroit de toute la terre, se elle estoit hors du milieu.

Glose.[8] Aprés il meut une doubte avant que il parface ceste raison.

Tiexte. Et se ainsi est que la terre soit maintenant ou centre du monde, donques un meïsme point est milieu du monde et de la terre auquel sont meües et tendent[9] les choses pesantes par nature et les parties de terre. Et ainsi aucun pourroit faire doubte, a savoir mon, se elles sont meües vers ce point en tant comme milieu de tout le monde ou en tant comme milieu de la terre.

Glose. Aprés il respont.

Tiexte. Mais il convient par necessité que elles soient meües
a ce lieu en tant et selon ce que il est milieu du monde, car les
choses legieres, si comme sont les parties du feu qui sont meües
au contraire des pesantes, elles sont meües ad l'extremité et a
la circunference de la region des elemens, ce est a la superfice
concave du ciel qui contient les elemens. Et que un point soit le
149*c* milieu de la terre et le // milieu de tout le monde, ce est par
accident, car la chose pesante tent et est meüe au milieu ou vers
le milieu de la terre, mais ce est selon accident et selon ce que
la terre a son milieu ou milieu[10] de tout le monde.

Glose. Car se la terre estoit mise et tenue par force hors du milieu du monde et une pierre fust lessiee cheoir, ceste pierre ne seroit pas meüe vers le milieu de la terre mais vers le centre du monde. Et maintenant elle va vers le centre de la terre pour ce que il est ou centre du monde. Et ce prouve[11] Aristote aprés par signe.

Tiexte. Et que la chose pesante soit meüe au milieu de la terre il appert par signe,[12] car les choses pesantes ne sont pas meües a terre ou vers terre par equale distance, mes en approchant[13] et a semblables ang[l]es.[14] Et donques sont elles meües vers un milieu[14a] ou vers un point qui est le milieu et le centre de la terre.

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[3] 9*d*.
[4] 140*b*-141*c*.
[5] *BCDEF* omit 'Tiexte.'
[5a] *DE* omit 'ou en milieu.'
[6] *A* petit; *C* pe.
[7] 139*c et seq.*
[8] *DE* omit 'Glose.'
[9] *BCDEF* pendent.
[10] *B* omits 'ou milieu.'
[11] *E* reprouve.
[12] Figure 36, p. 274.
[13] *DE* omit 'mes en approchant.'
[14] *A* anges; *B* angelz.

149*d* Glose. Se .ii. pierres, / .*a.* et .*b.*, descendent a terre sus .ii. lieus de terre, .*c.* et .*d.*, elles ne descendroient pas par lignes equidistantes, mais vendroient tousjours en approchant. Et la ligne .*ac.* par quoy descent .*a.* feroit sus la superfice de la terre .ii. angles, .*e.* et .*f.*, equalz un a l'autre et aussi feroit la ligne .*bd.* Et se .*a.* et .*b.* povoient aler siques au centre, elle[s] hurteroi[en]t[15] une a l'autre. Aprés il conclut .ii. choses en parfaisant sa raison.

Tiexte. Or appert donques par neccessité que la terre est ou milieu du monde et que elle est immobile pour les causes desus dites.

Glose. Pour ce, selon les expositeurs, [que][16] elle est meüe a son lieu afin que elle y repose. Mais ceste rayson ne est pas evidente, car les autres elemens ne reposent pas en leurs lieus et meïsmement le feu qui est le plus haut et le plus legier aussi comme la terre est le plus bas element et le plus pesant, car, selon Aristote, le feu est meü circulairement en sa region comme souvent // est dit.[16a] Et convient que ce soit naturelment, car ce est perpetuelment. Aprés il met la quarte raison. 150*a*

Tiexte. Item, les choses pesantes qui sont par violence gectees tout droit en haut retournent arriere ou lieu dont elles partirent, tant soient gectees haut. Et par ce appert que la terre ne est pas meüe ne hors du milieu.

Glose. Ceste raison ne conclut pas evidanment que la terre ne soit meüe de mouvement journal, si comme je dis ou .xxv.^e^ chapitre.[17] Aprés il met la cause du repos de la terre.

Tiexte. Et encore appert la cause de ce que elle repose, car se par nature elle est encline a estre meüe de toutes pars vers le milieu, si comme nous voions, et le feu en haut, ce est impossible que quelcunque petite partie de elle soit derechief meüe en haut se ce ne est par violence ou par force, car d'un corps ne est que un mouvement naturel et simple de corps simple. Et d'un corps ne peuent estre .ii. mouvemens naturelz contraires; et mouvemen[t][18] qui est [en][19] bas et au milieu est / contraire a celui qui est en haut. Et donques se ce est impossible que quelcunque partie de terre soit naturelment meüe en haut, encore est ce plus impossible de toute la terre, car au lieu ou la partie est encline[20] a estre meüe par nature, a ce lieu est enclin le tout. Et donques se ce est impossible que la terre soit meüe, ce est neccessaire que elle repose ou milieu. 150*b*

Glose. Par privacion de mouvement droit, car ceste rayson ne conclut plus. Aprés il prouve encore que elle est ou milieu.

Tiexte. Et que la terre soit ou milieu il appert par ce que dient les mathema[ti]ciens[21] en astrologie, car les figures et les translacions par quoy est determiné l'ordre des estoilles monstrent que la terre est assise ou milieu.[22]

[14a] *F* lieu.

[15] *AF* elle hurteroit; *C* hurteuroit.

[16] *A* omits 'que.'

[16a] 9*d et seq.*

[17] 138*d et seq.*

[18] *A* mouvemens.

[19] *A* omits 'en.'

[20] *A* enclinee.

[21] *A* mathemaciens.

[22] Oresme's version of this passage gives an incorrect interpretation of the Latin text: 'Attestantur autem his et ea, que a Mathematici dicta sunt circa Astrologiam, ea enim quae apparent, accedunt *translatis figuris*, quibus determinatus est astrorum ordo, tanquam in medio posita terra.' (*Juntas*, 165E). *Guthrie*, 297a, 3-6, reads: 'This belief finds further support in the assertions of mathe-

Glose. Car se elle estoit hors du milieu, ce seroit en une de .iii. manieres,
ce est a savior ou en l'axel du monde entre les .ii. poles, ou hors l'axel
du monde en equale distance des .ii. poles, ou hors l'axel plus pres d'un
150c pole que de l'autre. Et conment que ce fust, l'en ne verroit // pas[23] la
moitié du ciel de quelcunque lieu de terre et si fait; item, l'en ne verroit
pas les estoilles telement comme l'en les voit; item, les jours et les nuiz
ne seroient pas ainsi comme il sont; item, se la terre estoit hors de l'axel
du monde, les eclipses de lune ne seroient pas en vraie opposicion et si
sont. Et toutes ces choses peuent clerement apparoir par ymaginacion[24]
150d et en figure / et sanz figure.

Tiexte. Et en tant soit dit du lieu et du repos et du mouvement de la terre.

30.—Ou .xxx.e chapitre il monstre que la terre est de figure sperique par .ii. raisons natureles.

Il convient par neccessité que la terre soit de figure sperique,
car chascune de ses parties a en soy pesanteur par quoy elle
151a tent au milieu. Et la plus grande ou la plus pesante // boute la
plus petite et la comprime, et se conforment telement les unes
aveques les autres siques a tant que elles viennent a ce que tout
soit ou milieu. Et ce que nous disons, il le convient entendre et
ymaginer ausi comme se la terre eüst esté faite en la maniere
que aucuns disoient que au commencement elle estoit partout
espartie en menues parcelles. Mais toutevoies, il disoient que
elles estoient descendues et assamblees ou milieu par cause de
violence.

Glose. Si comme il appert ou .xxviii.e chapitre.[1]

Tiexte. Et il vault miex mettre la verité et dire que ce est pour ce que, selon nature, chose pesante est meüe au milieu et ainsi les petites parties de terre qui estoient esparties et disperses de toutes pars furent meües au milieu semblablement et equalment.

Glose. Et ainsi fu la terre faite ronde et est a savoir que Aristote ne
entent pas que la terre fust faite, mais il entent ainsi: la terre est de
telle fason ou figure comme se elle eüst esté faite en la maniere que les
151b anciens / disoient, et elle eüst esté ronde. *Ergo et cetera.*[2] Aprés il oste
.iii.[3] cavillacions et sont teles en sentence.

Tiexte. Et se aucun disoit que au commencement il avoit plus de partie[s][4] de terre d'une part du centre que de l'autre, et donques quant elle[s][5] se assembler[en]t[6] il en eüt plus d'une part que d'autre et ainsi la terre ne est pas ronde, je di que, posé que ainsi eüst esté, toutevoies celle plus grande partie eüst boutee l'autre tant que le milieu du monde fust le milieu de toute la masse de la terre ensamble.

Glose. Aprés est la seconde cavillacion.

Tiexte. Et semblablement l'en peut respondre a une autre doubte: se aucun disoit que la terre est sperique et ou milieu, mais posé

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maticians about astronomy: that is, the observed phenomena—the shifting of the figures by which the arrangement of the stars is defined—are consistent with the hypothesis that the earth lies at the centre.'

[23] Figure 37 occupies the upper two-thirds of folio 150c. P. 274.

[24] *B* peuent legierement apparoir et en fig.

[1] 147*a*.

[2] *B* omits 'Ergo' and 'cetera.'

[3] *B* .ii.

[4] *A* partie; *BCDEF* des parties.

[5] *A* elle.

[6] *A* assembleroit.

que addicion soit faite et que elle cresse d'une part et non pas
de l'autre, si comme il est possible, donques ne sera elle plus ou
milieu ne sperique. Mais ce ne est pas fort a respondre qui
considere comment une chose pesante, aussi comme une pierre,
seroit meüe au milieu se elle ne avoit arrestement, car elle ne
descendroit pas seulement tant que une partie de elle touchast
151c le contre ou le milieu, mais tant que le milieu de // elle fust ou
milieu du monde et que il eüst autant de pesanteur d'une part
comme d'autre. Et semblablement seroit il de toute la terre se
adjoustement estoit fait d'une part et non d'autre.

Glose. Se l'aer ne estoit qui resiste au mouvement de la terre, si tres petit de terre ou d'autre chose pesante ne pourroit estre adjoustee ou engendree d'une part de la terre plus que d'autre que elle ne fust aucun petit meüe tant que le centre de toute la pesanteur[7] fust ou centre du monde. Mais pour ce que l'aer resiste au mouvement de la terre, une petite addicion ne la peut faire mouvoir. Mais elle pourroit bien estre si grande que elle seroit plus forte que la resistence de l'aer qui contient la terre et lors, pour certain, la terre seroit meüe toute ensemble tant que le milieu de [sa][8] pesanteur fust ou centre du monde. Item, Aristote ne veult pas prouver que la terre soit perfaitement sperique, car elle a monz et valz; mais elle est ronde et approche de figure sperique, si comme il fu dit en le .xi.e chapitre.[9] Aprés il oste la tierce cavillacion.

151*d* Tiexte. / Et se aucun disoit que la raison devant mise suppose que la terre toute fu faite et ce est faulz, ce ne fait difference, car elle est de telle figure et en tel lieu comme se elle eüst esté faite et par celle meïsme raison.

Glose. Aprés il met la seconde raison.

Tiexte. Item, toutes choses pesantes qui cheent de haut a terre descendent par lignes qui font sus terre plains[10] angles equalz, et ne descendent pas par lignes equidistantes mais viennent en approchant. Et telement est fait[11] mouvement a[12] corps qui est naturelment sperique. Et donques est la terre sperique ou elle tent de sa nature a figure sperique, et non pas par force ou violence ne contre nature.

152*a* Glose Mais elle n'est pas perfaitement[13] // sperique comme dit est. Et se elle estoit d'autre figure, si comme quarre[e][14] en plate, les choses qui tendent au centre par droite ligne descendissent sus terre, l'une tout droit et l'autre de biés a angles non equalz, si comme il appert legierement en figure.

31.—*Ou .xxxi.e chapitre il prove encore que la terre est sperique par .iiii. raisons de astrologie.*

Encore appert que la terre est ronde par les apparences que nous voions, car les eclipses de lune ne fussent pas ainsi disposees se la terre ne fust ronde.

Glose. Eclipse de lune est causee pour l'ombre de la terre qui attaint a la lune quant la terre est droit entre le soleil et la lune, si comme je declaray ou .xlviii.^{e} chapitre du traité de *l'Espere.*[15] Et quant la lune eclipse et non pas toute, la ligne qui divise la partie enluminee de celle qui est obscure est porcion de ligne circulaire, et il ne seroit pas ainsi se la terre n'estoit ronde. Et par ce appert que les montaingnes ne tollent pas 152*b* sensiblement la rondesce de la terre, car / ce fust apparceü en l'eclipse et non est. Et pour ce que aucun diroit que l'eclipse appert tele pour la rondesce de la lune et non pour celle de la terre il di(s)t aprés.

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[7] *BCDEF* centre ou la pesanteur.

[8] *A* omits 'sa.'

[9] *DE* ou .ix.e ch. 101*a*.

[10] *A* plaines; *BC* plaine; *D* plainne; *E* plaine; *F* pleine.

[11] Figure 38, p. 294.

[12] *BCDEF* de.

[13] *BCDF* elle est parf.; *E* mes est elle est parf.

[14] *A* quarré.

> Tiexte. Et nous voions que les figuracions qui apparent en la lune en un moys sont en .iii. differences, car aucune fois la partie enluminee est divisee de l'autre par ligne droite, si comme ou premier et ou desrenier quartier; aucune fois par ligne circulaire concave, si comme vers la conjunction devant et aprés; et aucune fois par ligne circulaire convexe ou boçue, si comme vers l'opposicion devant et aprés.[16] Mes la ligne qui divise la partie enluminee de l'obscure en eclipse est touzjours boçue devers la partie obscure et convexe ou arcue devers la partie enluminee. Et il ne pourroit ainsi estre se la terre n'estoit ronde.[17]

Glose. Ce est aisie chose a entendre. Et les figures que l'en voit en la lune chascun moys, ce est pour la rondesce de elle et pour les resgars que[18] elle a au soleil dont lumiere lui vient, si comme il est declairié ou .xliiii.^{e} 152*c* chapitre du trai- // tié de *l'Espere.*[19]

> Tiexte. Item, par ce que appert des estoilles, il est certain non pas seulement que la terre est ronde[20] mais aveques ce que elle n'est pas grande, car par aler assés pou de chemin droit vers midi ou droit vers le pole[21] artique, l'en apperçoit clerement que l'en a autre ozizon, ce est a dire autre cercle qui divise la partie du ciel que nous voions de celle qui nous est occulte et semble estre souz nous. Et par tele translacion, les estoilles qui estoient droit sus la teste semblent estre grandement transmuees. Et quant l'en se transmue en alant droit vers le pole artique ou droit vers midi, l'en peut veoir autres estoilles que l'en ne povoit devant, car en Egypte et en Cypre aucunes estoilles sont veües lesquelles l'en ne voit pas es regions qui sont vers le pole artique ou vers septentrion. Et en ces regions aucunes estoilles apparent tousjours sanz couchier ou sanz rescouser[22] lesquelles ne apparent onques 152*d* en aucunes regions qui sont vers midi. Et par / ce appert non pas seulement que la terre est de ronde figure mais meïsme appert que elle n'est pas grande, car tele mutacion de veoir autres estoilles ne seroit pas si tost faite ne pour aler si pou de voie.

Glose. Car il appert par le traitié de *l'Espere* ou .xxvi.^{e} chapitre[23] que se un honme se transportoit vers le pole tout droite voie par .xliii. lieues[24] ou environ, le pole seroit eslevé sus son h[e]mispere[25] plus un degré que de la ou il se parti; et de tant seroit il plus bas se cest honme aloit autant vers midi. Et par ce est conclus ou dit traitié que le circuite de la terre contient environ xv^{m} vii^{c} l lieues,[26] et ce est bien pou de chose quant a toute la terre du monde. Aprés il met la tierce raison prinse de signe.

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[15] *De l'espere*, ed. L. McCarthy, Thesis, Toronto, 1942, ll. 2053-2092.

[16] *A* aprés. Tiexte. Mes la ligne; *DE* omit 'et aucune fois par ligne circulaire convexe . . . et aprés.'

[17] *DE* n'estoit enluminee. Oresme's translation of this passage of text enlarges considerably upon the original. Cf. *Juntas*, 170D.

[18] *A* resgars et que.

[19] *BCDEF* ou .xviii.^{e} chap. Cf. *op cit.* ll. 1869-1904.

[20] *A* rondee.

[21] *A* vers midi ou droit vers midi ou droit vers le pole.

[22] *BCDEF* sans coucher et sans lever lesquelles.

[23] *Op. cit.* ll. 1021-1042.

[24] The measure of a degree on the meridian is stated by Oresme, on the authority of Sacrobosco, from whose *Tractatus de sphera* (*ca.* 1250) he borrowed freely, to be 700 stadia: 'Or est il ainsi trouvé par experience que se un homme aloit vers septentrion tout droit tant que le pole lui fust plus eslevé d'un degré, ou droit a midi tant qu'il luy fust moins eslevé d'un degré, il avroit passé de la terre .vii.^{c} estades, selon l'aucteur de *l'Espere.*' Cf. *op. cit.*, ll. 1034-1039. The value of the *estade* is fixed in the passage immediately following: 'Et ainsi avron que en circuite de la terre a tourner tout entour a .ii.^{c}. lii.^{m}. estades, qui valent .xv.^{m}. .vii.^{c}. 1. lieues, car une lieue vault .ii.^{m} et un mil

Tiexte. Item, pour ce cuident aucuns que le lieu qui est en la fin de terre habitable vers occident environ les colompnes de Hercules et le lieu qui est en la fin d'orient habitable vers Inde soient prochains, et que la mer qui joint a l'un et a l'autre soit une meïsme mer.

153*a* Glose. Haly[27] dist que // ces colompnes estoient .iii. ymages ou ydoles lesquelles Hercules mist en .iii. isles pres du passage Hercules que nous appellons les Destroz[28] de Marroch. Et dist Haly[29] que chascune ydole tenoit unes clefs en segnefiant que en outre vers occident et vers celle grant mer l'en ne treuve habitacion. Et aucuns les appellent *Gades Herculis.* Item, Averroÿs di(s)t yci[30] que il vit une de ces ydoles encore toute droite eslevee et en estant, et puis fu depecie et destruite par les Barbares qui orent guerre contre les gens de cel[le][31] isle en l'an de la predicacion de Mahomet cccc[32] et xxx; ce fu environ l'an de grace mil et cinquante et vii.

Tiexte.[33] Et que les lieus desus diz soient prochains ce n'est pas chose incredible, car ceulz qui ce dient ont a ce argüement pour ce que ou desrenier habitable vers occident et ou desrenier vers orient sont engendrés elephans, et par ce semble que ces .ii. lieus aient convenience et prochaineté.

Glose. Car, par aventure, teles bestes ne sont pas trouvees en autres
153*b* lieus. Aprés il met la quarte / rayson.

Tiexte. Item, les mathematiciens qui ont tempté a trouver la mesure de la rondece ou circuite de la terre dient que elle est de iiii^{c} mile,[34] par quoy il n'appert pas seulement que elle est ronde mes aveques ce que elle n'est pas grande ou resgart des autres estoilles.

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vault .viii. estades, et une estade cent et .xxv. pas, et un pas .v. piés, et un pié vault .iiii. paumes, et une paume .iiii. doyc.' An *estade* thus equals 125 paces or 625 feet and a mile is figured as 5,000 feet. With two such miles to the league, a degree equals 87½ miles (82.8 English miles) or approximately 44 leagues. *BCDEF* are palpably wrong in the reading 'par xviii lieues.'

[25] *A* homispere.

[26] Equivalent to 31,500 miles of 5,000 feet (29,900 English miles). These figures relative to the size of the earth, along with many other sections of Oresme's *Traictié de l'espere*, were translated almost verbatim into Latin by Pierre D'Ailly in the latter's *Ymago mundi* (1410). The influence which this work exercised upon the cosmological ideas of Christopher Columbus is well known; cf. Edmond Buron, ed., *Ymago mundi de Pierre D'Ailly*, I (Paris, 1930), 5-37; copious foot-notes indicate the extent of Oresme's contribution to this work and Columbus' marginal notes to his personal copy are included.

[27] *B* Hercules; *F* Hals. Bibl. Nat., *Mss. franç. 1348* and *1349* contain Oresme's French translation of Ptolomey's *Quadripartitum* with the commentary of Haly Abenragel (Ibn Ridwan, Rijan, Roden, etc.), probably the first of Oresme's translations for Charles V, made about 1360 and still unpublished. Oresme's original was the Latin version by Egidius de Thebaldis for Alfonso el Sabio (ca. 1260), made from an Arabic text, with the assistance of Judah ben Levy. The Latin text was several times published in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. Cf. *Liber Ptholomei quattuor tractatum cum Centiloquio ejusdem Ptholomei: et commento Haly: impressum in Venetiis per Erhardum ratdolt de Augusta Die 15 mensis januarii 1484*, fol. 35^{v}, col. 1.

[28] *BCDEF* Destres.

[29] *E* Et de Ytalie que; *F* Aly.

[30] *Juntas*, t.c. 111, 171L.

[31] *A* cel.

[32] *DE* ccc.

[33] *DE* omit 'Tiexte.'

[34] Oresme has omitted *estades* after *mile;* possibly, as his gloss indicates, because his copy did not contain the word *stadiorum* which appears in the vetus version: 'quadringenta stadiorum milia.' Cf. *Juntas*, 172C-D. This, the first recorded calculation of the circumference of the earth, amounts to approximately 46,000 English miles. Cf. the interesting note to this passage in W. D. Ross, *The Works of Aristotle translated into English*, II, Oxford, 1930, 298a, 17 and also his *Aristotle*, Oxford, 1923, p. 96, n. 3.

Glose. Cest tiexte quant a ce nombre n'est pas samblable en tous livres; toutevoies, selon l'aucteur de *l'Espere*, ce circuite est .ii. cens et .lii. mille estades et font xv^{m} vii^{c} et cinquante lieues.[35]

En ces .ii. chapitres, oultre ce que dit est, sont aucunes choses plaisantes
a considerer: et premierement, je diray de la pesanteur de la terre ou
resgart du centre; aprés, de ce meïsme une especial consideracion; tierce-
ment, des choses pesantes ou resgart du centre et quartement, de la figure
de la terre. Quant au premier point, je di que en ce propos .iii.[36] centres
sont a considerer, ce est a savoir le centre du monde, le centre de la
quantité de la terre et le centre de sa pesanteur. Car se une espere
153c masseite de pur or estoit samblable en toutes ses parties, un // meïsme
point seroit centre de sa quantité et centre de sa pesanteur;[37] mais se elle
estoit vers une partie de pur or et vers l'autre fust mixtioné de plus legier
metal,[38] le centre et le milieu de sa pesanteur ne seroit pas le centre de
sa quantité. Et par ce appert que se la terre estoit de pesanteur semblable
en toutes ses parties, un seul point seroit centre de sa quantité[39] et centre
de sa pesanteur et ce seroit le centre du monde. Et donques[40] une partie
quelcunque de sa superfice ne seroit pas plus basse que l'autre et, par
consequent, il s'ensuiroit que elle fust toute couverte de eaue se n'estoit,
par aventure, le coupeau d'aucune haute montaingne. Et pour ce que il
n'est pas ainsi, il s'ensuit que la terre est dessamblable selon ses parties
telement que en la partie qui est descouverte d'eaue n'est pas si grant
153*d* pesanteur comme en l'autre pour ce, par / aventure, que ce n'est pas
terre pure, mais a en elle mixtion d'autres elemens. Et Dieu et nature ont
ordené que elle soit descouverte afin que honmes et bestes y puissent
habiter. Et pour ce, ceste partie est la plus noble et est ausi comme le
devant et la face[41] ou visage de la terre, et le demourant ou l'autre partie
est envelopé en eaue et vestu et couvert de mer ausi comme d'un chaperon
ou d'une coiffe:[42] *abissus, sicut vestimentum, amictus eius.*[43] Et le centre
de la grandeur ou quantité de[44] la terre est ausi comme endroit *.a.*,[45] et le
centre de sa pesanteur est plus bas ou centre du monde endroit *.b.*, si
comme l'en peut ymaginer en figure. Et la superfice de la mer est con-
centrique au monde et ont un meïsme centre le monde et la mer. Et par
ce que dit est s'ensuit que se Dieu et nature fesoient que la terre vers
154*a* la // partie habitable devenist et fust faite ausi pesante comme elle est
vers l'autre partie, ou que la pesanteur de celle autre partie appetiçast
tant que toute la terre fust uniforme et de semblable pesanteur en toutes
ses parties, il convendroit que la partie qui est habitable descendist et
que toute la terre fust plungie en la mer et toute couverte de eaue, ausi
comme un honme qui cuevre son visage de son chaperon. Et ainsi pourroit
estre un diluge universel et sans pluie.

Quant au secont point, je suppose que les elemens naturelment peuent,
selon leurs [parties],[46] crestre et appeticier par generacion et corrupcion,
et ce suppose Aristote ou chapitre precedent[47] et appert ou livre de
154b *Generacion et corrupcion*[48] et en pluseurs autres lieus. Et donques[49] / posé

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[35] Cf. n. 26 above, and *de l'Espere*, ch. 26, ll. 1039-1042.

[36] *E* .ii.

[37] *DE* omit 'Car se une espere . . . de sa pesanteur.'

[38] *B* aer.

[39] *DE* omit 'Et par ce appert . . . centre de sa quantité.'

[40] Figure 39, p. 294.

[41] Figure 40, p. 294.

[42] *BCDEF* coeffe et de ce dit l'escripture: *abissus.*

[43] *Psalm* ciii, 6. *B* omits 'amictus.'

[44] *DE* centre ou la grandeur de la quantité de.

[45] *DE* omit 'est ausi comme endroit *.a.*'

[46] *A* omits 'parties.'

[47] 151*b*.

[48] *De Generatione et corruptione*, I, 5, 321a, 3-322a, 35.

[49] Figure 41, p. 294.

que par tele generacion fust faite addicion notable en aucune partie de
terre si comme, pour exemple, en la partie ou nous sommes souz le
meridien ou ligne de midi et soit ceste partie de terre signee par *.b.*; ou
que par corrupcion fust faite diminucion en la partie opposite: je di que,
ce fait, il appert par Aristote ou chapitre precedent[50] que le lieu ou nous
sommes, appellé[51] *.b.*, descendroit vers le centre du monde appellé *.a.*, si
comme l'en peu(s)t ymaginer en figure. Item,[52] je pose que par aprés une
autre fois fust faite addicion semblable vers midi au lieu de terre appellé
.d. qui est en distance de *.b.* par la quarte partie du circuite de la terre;
je di que par ce, *.d.* se approcheroit du centre du monde et, par consequent,
de tant se trairoit *.b.* plus vers senestre. Par quoy il appert clerement que
.b., le lieu ou nous sommes, approcheroit du pole artique et seroit ce pole
plus eslevé sus nostre hemispere que il n'est maintenant. Et soit posé, si
comme il est possible, que ce fust par un degré et que aprés par grant
154*c* laps de temps et par semblable maniere fust plus // eslevé par un autre
degré, et puis par un autre et ainsi en outre, je di que par moult de milliers
de ans pourroit estre fait et naturelement selon ce procés que *.b.*, le lieu
de terre ou nous sommes, avroit fait demi-circuite et que il avroit tel
resgart au pole antartique comme nous avons au pole artique, et seroit
le pole antartique[53] eslevé sus *.b.* par tant de degrés comme est maintenant
le pole artique. Aprés je di que, ce fait et supposé que le ciel fust tousjours
meü comme il est ou sera continuelment, le soleil et les estoilles en
ce lieu *.b.* leveroient de la partie que nous appellons occident et
coucheroient au contraire. Et ce appert; car se les poles du monde estoient
meüz par mouvement tardif tant que le pole artique fust la ou est le
antartique, ce que dit est avendroit et est avenu selon ce que disoient
aucuns et fu recité en le .viii.^e^ chapitre du premier.[54] Et il est certain que,
quant a ce propos, les choses desus dites apparroient ne plus ne moins
semblablement se la terre estoit meüe comme dit est et les poles du ciel
154*d* fussent immobiles, comme se la terre estoit / immobile et les poles fussent
meüz, selon l'ymaginacion mise ou premier livre en le .viii.^e^ chapitre.[55]
Et encore appert autrement ceste chose, car se un honme resgarde vers
le pole artique, le soleil et les estoilles lievent a sa destre. Et se cest honme
aloit tout droit vers le pole artique et passast outre tout droit vers les antipodes,
le soleil et les estoilles leveroient[56] a sa senestre et coucheroient a
sa destre des ce que il seroit notablement oultre le pole.[57]

Quant au tiers point, je pose que la terre fust perciee et que l'en veïst
par un grant treu tout d'outre en oultre siques de l'autre part la[58] ou
seroient les antipodes se la terre estoit partout habitee; je di premierement,
se l'en lessoit cheoir une pierre par ce treu, elle descendroit et
passeroit oultre le centre[59] en montant tout droit vers l'autre partie siques
a un terme, et puis retourneroit siques oultre le centre par deça, et
aprés redescendroit arriere et passeroit le centre moins que devant et
iroit et vendroit pluseurs fois en appetizant teles reflexions siques a
155*a* tant // que finablement elle reposeroit ou centre. Et la cause est pour
l'impetuosité ou embruissement que elle aquiert par la cressance[60] de
l'isneleté de son mouvement jouste ce que fu dit plus a plain ou .xiii.^e^
chapitre.[61] Et ce peut l'en entendre legierement par une chose que nous

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[50] 151*b*.

[51] *A* appelléz.

[52] Lacuna in *DE* from this point to beginning of paragraph, 154*d*.

[53] *B* omits 'et seroit le pole antartique.'

[54] 16*d*.

[55] 16*c*.

[56] *A* estoilles les leveroient.

[57] Lacuna in *DE* ends here.

[58] *A* lan; *DE* omit 'la.'

[59] *B* treu.

[60] Figure 42, marginal, p. 294.

[61] 105*c* *et seq.*


centre
centre

FIG. 38
FOL. 151 d


mixte
pour or b a

FIG. 39
FOL. 153 c


terre
a
b
aer

FIG. 40
FOL. 153 d


Pole artique
b b
a
d d
audi
b
pole antartique

FIG. 41
FOL. 154 a



FIG. 42
FOL. 155 a



FIG. 43
FOL. 155 b



FIG. 44
FOL. 155 c


Paris
Romme

FIG. 45
FOL. 155 d


a b c
a
b
occident a
la terre
orient b
a
b
b a

FIG. 46
FOL. 157 a b

voions sensiblement, car se une chose pesante, et soit *.b.*, est pendue a
une longue corde, se l'en la boute avant, elle branlle et va et vient et
fait pluseurs reflexions tant que finablement elle repose au plus droit
et au plus pres du centre que elle peu(s)t. Item, posé que la terre fust
perforee ou perciee comme dit est, et que un honme fust ou centre tout
droit la teste d'une part du centre et les piés d'autre; je di que cest
honme avroit la teste en haut ou enmont et les piés aussi enmont et ne
seroit pas plus en gesant que en estant ne adens que envers. Et[62] pluseurs
teles choses peuent estre considerees en ceste matiere. Item, de toute
eaue ou de semblable liquer reposante, la superfice de desus est porcion
155*b* de figure sperique dont / le centre[63] est le centre du monde, si comme
il appert ou traitié de *l'Espere*[64] et en pluseurs lieus. Et par ce, il appert
que se un vaiseau plat comme seroit un hanap estoit ou centre, il sous-
tendroit plus d'eaue que se il estoit plus haut et seroit comblé. Et appert
ausi que tant est plus bas et il y peut plus d'eaue, et tant est plus haut
et il y en peut moins. Item, encore appert que une chose perfaitement
droite a livel[65] et droit assise sans pendre plus d'une part que d'autre,
comme seroit une table *.ab.*, est plus basse ou milieu que es bouz, car
celle partie est plus pres du centre. Et donques elle pourroit soustenir
eaue et tant plus seroit bas et plus en soustendroit. Item, quant une chose
pesante, comme seroit la table *.ab.*, descent et est meüe equalment aval
ou en bas, les parties du milieu approch[e]nt[66] du centre plus isnelement
que ne font les autres, si comme il fu plus a plain declairié ou .xiiii.e
chapitre.[67] Item, il appert par Aristote ou chapitre precedent que se .ii.
155*c* pierres en autres choses pesantes descendent // en[68] bas vers le centre,
elles viennent touzjours en approchant une de l'autre. Et par ce s'ensuit
et est verité que qui feroit une tour bien haute et meneroit le mur tout
droit en haut a plon, celle tour seroit plus large par haut que par bas.[69] Item,
semblablement qui feroit une parfonde fosse tout droit selon l'instrument
appellé plun, elle seroit plus estroite en bas que en haut continuelment
en descendant. Et pluseurs autres choses peuent estre considerees en
ceste matiere par ce que dit est.

Et[70] quartement: de ce que la terre est ronde comme dit est, il s'ensuit
que se un homme povoit alér d'une cité a autre sans monter et sans
155*d* avaler, l'en peut ymaginer une autre voie plus brieve qui / est[71] partie
en devalant et partie en montant. Car la voie qui est sans monter et sans
avaler est aussi comme un arc, et la voie droite qui seroit comme la
corde est plus basse et plus pres du centre ou milieu que es bouz. Item,
se le pole estoit grandement et pres de equalment eslevé sus .ii. cités
aussi comme, pour exemple, sus Paris et sus Prague[72] qui sont bien
distantes, et un honme alast de l'une a l'autre sans approchier ne
esloingnier du pole,[73] il ne yroit pas par si brieve voie comme se il se
approchoit du pole par la moitié de la voie et par l'autre moitié s'en
esloignast; et ce peu(s)t l'en veoir clerement en une espere solide. Item,
se un honme aloit par sus terre droit vers le pole ou de costé tant que il
eüst le pole desriere soy, je di que adonques le soleil et les estoilles
156*a* qui lie- // vent a destre quant il est deça le pole leveroient a sa senestre
quant il seroit oultre le pole, si comme l'en peut veoir en l'espere

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[62] Lacuna in *DE* to paragraph, 155c.

[63] Figure 43, marginal, p. 294.

[64] Chaps. 1 *op. cit.*, ll. 103-113, and 4, ll. 224-238.

[65] *B* a l'ouel.

[66] *A* approchant.

[67] 110*d*.

[68] Figure 44, p. 294. Cf. 151*b*.

[69] *B* large en haut que en bas.

[70] *DE* resume here.

[71] Figure 45, p. 294.

[72] *DE* sur Espaigne.

[73] *DE* du centre.

artificiel et fu touchié devant ou secont point en la fin.[74] Item, il appert
par Aristote en ce desrenier chapitre que le circuite de la terre n'est
pas grant, et se un homme povoit aler tousjours devant soy et il errast
chascun jour .x. lieues, il avroit fait ce circuite en quatre ans et seze
sepmaines et .ii. jours, si comme je declairay autrefois ou .xxvi.^{e}
chapitre[75] du traitié de *l'Espere.*[76] Item,[77] encore seroit fait tel circuite
en mout moins de temps se il estoit fait par un cercle qui ne divisast
pas la terre en .ii. parties equales, si comme se un honme partoit de
ici de Rouen et aloit vers orient ou vers occident touzjours en equale
distance du pole qui est ici eslevé environ .l. degrés. Se cest honme
povoit touzjours ainsi aler, il revendroit ici au lieu dont il est parti, et
n'aroit pas erré tant de voie de grandement comme se il fust alé en
156*b* faisant son circuite souz l'equinocial ou par autre voie envi- / ron le
centre de la terre. Item,[78] selon Aristote il ne fault pas grandement que
tel circuite ne se peut bien faire, car la fin d'abitacion vers occident et
l'autre fin vers orient sont bien prochaines, si comme il appert en ce
desrenier chapitre.[79] Item, posé que ce peüst estre fait en pluseurs jours
par honme ou par oyseau, celui qui feroit tel circuite ou voiage en alant
devant soy vers orient avroit un jour et une nuit artificielz plus que
celui qui ne partiroit de son païs. Item, celui qui le feroit en alant devant
soy vers occident avroit moins un jour et une nuit artificielz que celui
qui ne se mouvroit. Item, par ce s'ensuit que se .ii. honmes partoient d'un
lieu et fais[oi]ent[80] ce circuite en un meïsme temps et partissent d'un
lieu l'un quant l'autre et revenissent a ce lieu l'un quant l'autre, et l'un
le feïst [en alant vers orient et l'autre][81] en alant vers occident, il convendroit
par neccessité que celuy qui va vers orient eüst en ce meïsme
temps deux jours et deux nuis artificielz plus que n'a en ce meïsme
temps celui qui va vers occident. Et ce ay je autrefois declairié ou
156*c* .xxxix.^{e} chapitre du // traitié en françois que je fis *De l'espere.*[82] Item,
encore de ce s'ensuient autres choses bien merveilleuses lesquelles,
aveques ce que dit est, je mis pieça en mettre quant je en [ai][83] trouvee
ceste ymaginacion. Et ces .xxiiii. vers par .iiii. sisennes, je les veul ici
reciter afin que ceulz qui ont noble engin se puissent excerciter a les
exposer et entendre, car il ne contiennent rien qui ne soit pure verité.

Cingat humum vicus[84] terramque regiret[85] in orbem.[86]
Incipiant per eum simul et cessent simul *A B*
Terras ambire.[87] Maneat *C* donec utrumque
Ad punctum redeat prius unde recesserat.[88] Et quod
A petat occasum, *B* tendat solis ad ortum.
Per naturalesque dies *C* novem requiescat.

Dico[89] quod *A* solum vulgaribus octo diebus
Noctibus et totidem peragat positum sibi cursum;

---

[74] *DE* omit 'et fu touchié . . . en la fin.' Cf. 154*c*.

[75] *E* ou xvi^{e} ch.

[76] 'Et ainsi, qui pourroit environner toute la terre, et yroit chascun jour .x. lieues, il avroit fait son tour en mil .v.^{c} lxxv. jours, qui valent .iiii. ans .xvi. sepmaines et .ii. jours.' *Op. cit.*, ll. 1046-1049.

[77] Lacuna in *DE* to 'Item, selon Aristote,' 156*b*.

[78] *DE* resume here.

[79] 152*d*. *B* omits 'desrenier chapitre.'

[80] *A* faisent.

[81] *A* omits 'en alant . . . et l'autre.'

[82] The caption of the chapter is 'D'une merveilleuse consideracion ou circuite de la terre.' *Op cit.* ll. 1655-1720.

[83] *AF* omits 'ai.'

[84] In the margin preceding this verse, another hand has inserted 'casus' in *A*. *B* humum intus terram.

[85] *DE* terram quoque giret.

[86] *B* in cebe.

[87] *B* abire.

[88] *B* recessat et que.

[89] *A* in left margin, Prima conclusio. In the

Atque, pari passu, *B* motum tempore tanto.
Tunc bis quinque dies tot et umbras noctis habebit,
156*d* Nam sibi[90] sol tociens orietur / et occidet. Et sic
Non ad idem sed idem sunt[91] octo novemque decemque.

Contingua[t][92] *B* domos reperit. Celebratur[93] in una
Fest[a][94] dies Domini;[95] sed ozizontem per eundem
Altera que sequitur feriam vult esse secundam.
Unde neccessario fieret distinctio talis
Si populus circum[96] terras habitaret ubique
Legibus et totus mundus regeretur eisdem.

Atamen econtra procedens luce sub una,
Lune primo diem Domini[95] post indeque lune[97]
Lapsa nocte subit. Igitur poterit[98] fore[99] tempus
Quo[100] videt *A* pascha; sed mox pertransit ad illos
Qui tergunt miseras pia per jejunia culpas
Postque colunt pure sollemnia mistica pasche. Alleluia.[101] //

157*a* Et[102] ainsi a l'ouneur de Dieu et par sa grace je ay acomplis le premier
et le secont livres de *Celo et Mundo* pour lesquiex miex entendre est
expedient le traitié de *l'Espere* en françois dont je ay faite mencion. Et
seroit bien que il fust mis en un volume aveques ces .ii. livres et me semble
que ce sera .i. livre de naturele philosophie noble et tres excellent. Et
157*b* encore ay je, a l'aide de Dieu, / telement ordenéz le tiers et le quart
que il sont dignes de mettre aveques les autres. Cy fenist le secont livre
du *Ciel et du monde.*[103]

---

same manner, before the following two strophes respectively, .ii.ª conclusio, tertia conclusio.

[90] *E* si.

[91] *C* sut.

[92] *A* continguas.

[93] *B* celebrat.

[94] *A* festo.

[95] Ernst Borchert in his *Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei Nicolaus Oresme* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, XXXI, 3) Münster, 1934, publishes the poem on p. 21, n. 83, from Ms. *D*. He has transcribed 'Domini' as 'donum' in both cases, with what meaning he does not say.

[96] *DE* arcum.

[97] *DE* postremaque luna.

[98] *BCDEF* petitur.

[99] *DEF* fere.

[100] *B* quen; *CDEF* que.

[101] *DE* repeat 'Alleluia' three times. This somewhat enigmatical poem appears to be Oresme's unique effort in verse. For the reader's convenience, the following free rendering in English is appended:

Let a road encircle the land and world; let it encircle the globe. Let *A* and *B* begin at the same time to go about the world by this road and let them cease at the same time. Let *C* remain stationary until both of these two return to the point whence they first set forth. And let *A* go towards the west while *B* goes towards the east. Let *C* abide for nine natural days.

I say that *A* completes the course he set himself in eight ordinary days only and as many nights (i.e. according to common computation). And at the same rate of speed *B* completes his course in the same amount of time. Then he will have twice five days and as many shades of night, because as far as he is concerned the sun will rise and set just that number of times. And so eight, nine and ten are not just about the same but exactly the same.

Let it happen that *B* returns home. Sunday is being celebrated on a certain feast day (i.e. Easter from the context). But throughout the same hemisphere the next following day will be Monday. Whence such a distinction would necessarily be made if everywhere throughout the world there were people living and if the whole world were governed by the same laws.

But on the contrary, anyone proceeding in the opposite direction under one light of the moon (i.e. on one night), first comes nigh upon Sunday when still another night of the moon has elapsed. It will be therefore almost the time upon which *A* sees Easter. But soon he passes over to those who wipe away their wretched faults through pious fastings (i.e. while it is still Lent) and who afterwards celebrate the mystical solemnities of Easter in a pure manner.

[102] Figure 46, p. 294.

[103] *BCDEF* omit 'Et encore . . . *du monde*.'

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